Category: Nuclear Weapons

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Task Force conducting a safety review of Japan’s discharge of treated water into the sea at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (FDNPS) today issued its first full report since the water discharge began last year. In its observations, the Task Force found the discharge to be consistent with international safety standards and reaffirmed the conclusions from the Agency’s comprehensive safety report issued on 4 July last year.

During its mission from 24 to 27 October 2023, the Task Force reviewed the facilities and equipment installed at FDNPS to discharge the ALPS (Advanced Liquid Processing System) treated water. It also met with Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), the operator of the plant, Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA).

The IAEA’s comprehensive report – issued before the discharge began – found Japan’s plan for handling the treated water to be consistent with international safety standards and that the discharge as planned would have a negligible radiological impact to people and the environment. Japan started to discharge the water on 24 August 2023 and has so far completed the release of three batches, a total of 23 400 cubic metres of water.

The Task Force – made up of IAEA and independent experts from 11 different countries – was appointed by IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi in 2021 to review the safety of Japan’s plan for the water stored at the Fukushima Daiichi NPS against international safety standards. The standards constitute the worldwide reference for protecting the public and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation.

Based on their assessments made during the October mission, the Task Force also concluded the following:

• A robust regulatory infrastructure is in place in Japan to provide operational safety oversight of the discharge of ALPS treated water, and the Task Force was able to witness first-hand the onsite presence of the NRA and its activities in this regard.
• Based on its observations at the FDNPS, the Task Force confirmed that the equipment and facilities are installed and operated in a manner that is consistent with Japan’s plan for the release of the water and the relevant international safety standards.
• The Task Force reiterated the finding from the IAEA’s comprehensive report that optimization of protection – that is the process to determine the level of protection and safety for individuals – needs to be considered as part of the overall decommissioning of the FDNPS site. However, the Task Force fully recognized that the discharges are in the early stages and that further time and operational experience are required before progress can be made on this issue.

As part of its ongoing multiyear safety review, the IAEA will continue to conduct Task Force review missions. The Agency also maintains its continuous presence at the IAEA Fukushima Daiichi NPS Office to monitor and assess the ongoing water discharge.

Reports on ongoing corroboration of data

Separately, the IAEA also issued two reports done as part of its safety review of the water discharge detailing the latest findings of its ongoing corroboration of the measurement data underpinning Japan’s plan for the discharge of the ALPS treated water.

The IAEA is conducting a series of interlaboratory comparisons (ILCs) to corroborate the source and environmental monitoring conducted by TEPCO and other relevant Japanese authorities for the ALPS treated water discharge. Consistent with relevant IAEA international safety standards, TEPCO is required to monitor the characteristics and activity of the treated water and to establish and implement monitoring programmes in order to accurately evaluate public exposure due to the discharge and to comply with its national regulatory authorization.

The first report describes an ILC that assessed TEPCO’s capabilities for accurate and precise measurements of the radionuclides present in the treated water stored on site. Water samples were taken in October 2022 from two tanks at FDNPS. In the second report, the IAEA details an intercomparison of radionuclides analyses in samples of seawater, sediment, fish and seaweed taken in November 2022 from offshore locations and a fish market close to FDNPS. Carried out prior to the start of the water discharge, this exercise corroborates monitoring intended to establish a baseline for activity concentrations in the marine environment against which any future impact can be measured.

The ILCs involved laboratories from the IAEA Nuclear Sciences and Applications Department, an external laboratory in the Republic of Korea and laboratories in Japan separately analysing samples, followed by a quantitative comparison of the results by the IAEA. The results of both ILCs provide confidence in Japan’s capability for undertaking accurate and precise measurements related to the discharge of ALPS treated water.

Additional ILCs will be conducted in the future for ALPS treated water, as well as environmental samples, and occupational radiation protection.

Additional information such as frequently asked questions and a timeline of activities can be found on the IAEA’s dedicated Fukushima Daiichi ALPS Treated Water Discharge webpage.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) mission said the United Kingdom has a strong commitment to nuclear and radiation safety and has made progress to reinforce its regulatory functions. The team also identified areas for further enhancements, including the need to effectively recruit and retain regulatory specialists and inspectors.

The Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) follow-up mission was conducted at the request of the UK Government and took place at the headquarters of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), in Bootle, near the city of Liverpool. Its purpose was to evaluate the implementation of 24 recommendations and 19 suggestions provided during the initial IRRS mission in 2019.

IRRS missions are designed to strengthen the effectiveness of the national nuclear and radiation safety regulatory infrastructure, based on IAEA safety standards and international good practices, while recognizing the responsibility of each country to ensure nuclear and radiation safety.

The IRRS team – comprised of seven senior regulatory experts from seven IAEA Member States, three IAEA staff members, and one observer from Canada – held interviews with 13 regulatory authorities included within the scope of the review.

In the UK, nuclear and radiation technologies are used in various sectors for energy production, healthcare, industry and research. The country’s nine nuclear power reactors provide just over 14 per cent of the country’s electricity. The UK Government recently announced its plans to quadruple UK nuclear power by 2050.

In healthcare, nuclear and radiation technologies are employed for medical imaging, cancer treatment and diagnostic procedures, enhancing patient care and disease detection. Furthermore, nuclear technologies play a crucial role in industrial applications, such as non-destructive testing and sterilization processes. Universities and research institutions in the UK use accelerators, reactors and other facilities for nuclear physics, materials science and various scientific experiments.

The IRRS team said that since 2019, the UK regulatory bodies involved in the review have shown a strong professionalism and commitment in carrying out their mandate to nuclear and radiation safety in the UK. Of the 24 recommendations and 19 suggestions made in 2019, 19 recommendations and ten suggestions have been successfully addressed and closed. Notable achievements included:

• The establishment of the Radiological Safety Group, an overarching coordination group, which consists of senior officials from all government departments and regulatory bodies having responsibilities for radiological safety, and the associated Radiological Safety Working Group.
• A new requirement under which an applicant must submit a safety assessment to the regulator before obtaining an authorization to operate a facility or conduct an activity with radiation sources.
• The Environment Agency introduced a new nuclear Radioactive Substances Regulation business planning process to ensure a graded approach to safety inspections.
• The UK developed a new framework for facilitating national-level contribution and communication of IAEA safety standards updates.

“This IRRS follow-up mission demonstrated that the UK has made continuous improvements since the IRRS 2019 mission to the highest standards of nuclear and radiation safety,” said Ramzi Jammal, acting Chief Executive Officer of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, and the Team Leader for the IRRS follow-up mission. “The findings of the mission will contribute to the ongoing efforts to ensure a robust regulatory framework for the benefit of the public and the environment.”

Four good performances were recognized by the team in its reports. These included:

• The Openness and Transparency Policy of ONR.
• The decision to commission an independent and transparent assessment of ONR’s culture and to publish the assessment report.
• The establishment of a nuclear site resource prioritization tool by the Environment Agency (EA).
• The UK regulatory framework Draft Standards and Guidance Status Spreadsheet, which facilitates the national coordination in relation to the IAEA safety standards updates.

“We thank the IRRS mission team members for productive discussions on the UK’s radiological safety framework,” said a spokesperson for the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero. “We are committed to maintaining the highest nuclear safety standards and are grateful for the hard work of our government departments and regulatory bodies across the four nations of the UK in helping to make the mission a success. It comes at an important moment for British nuclear as the Government recently set out plans for a revival to deliver up to 24 GW by 2050. This will require a robust regulatory framework and significant work has already been done by UK regulators to develop their approach and work more closely with international partners.”

In its report, the team made six new findings consisting of four recommendations and two suggestions in relation to the topics covered during the IRRS initial mission. In particular, the team noted that the inability to recruit and retain specialists and inspectors has had an impact on the regulatory processes of some bodies and recommended a pay reform where required in order to ensure the statutory remit is delivered.

At the closing session, Anna Hajduk Bradford, Director of the IAEA Division of Nuclear Installation Safety, emphasized the collaborative spirit of the mission. “This comprehensive review underscores the commitment of the UK to enhancing its nuclear and radiation safety measures,” she said. “I commend the UK for requesting the mission.”

The final mission report will be provided to the Government in about three months.

IAEA Safety Standards

The IAEA Safety Standards provide a robust framework of fundamental principles, requirements and guidance to ensure safety. They reflect an international consensus and serve as a global reference for protecting people and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

The nuclear safety and security situation at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) remains extremely fragile with “very real” potential dangers of a major accident, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) told the United Nations Security Council ahead of his fourth mission to the site early next month.

Addressing the Security Council on Thursday for the sixth time since the war began almost two years ago, he warned against complacency and made clear the IAEA would stay focused on helping to prevent a potentially catastrophic nuclear accident, at the ZNPP or any of the country’s other nuclear facilities.

“A nuclear accident has not yet happened. This is true. But complacency could still lead us to tragedy. That should not happen. We must do everything in our power to minimize the risk that it does,” he said.

Briefing the 15-member Security Council on developments since the establishment last May of the five concrete principles for the protection of Europe’s largest nuclear power plant, he emphasised the importance of his experts stationed at the site obtaining the access they need to monitor adherence to these principles.

Director General Grossi announced he would cross the frontline to travel to the ZNPP “within the next two weeks”, enabling him to assess the situation there first-hand some eight months after his previous mission to the plant.

The last time he went to the site in southern Ukraine was in June 2023, soon after the destruction of the downstream Kakhovka dam, which supplied water for reactor cooling and other essential nuclear safety and security functions at the ZNPP.

In his address to the Security Council at U.N. Headquarters in New York, the Director General underlined potential threats to nuclear safety and security at the site, as well as other challenges.

“Although the plant has not been shelled for a considerable time, significant military activities continue in the region and sometimes in the vicinity of the facility, with our staff reporting rockets flying overhead close to the plant, thereby putting at risk the physical integrity of the plant,” he said.

In addition, the plant’s off-site power supplies remain “highly precarious”, as it is currently relying on just two external power lines, compared with 10 before the conflict.

“There have now been eight occasions when the site lost all off-site power and had to rely on emergency diesel generators, the last line of defence against a nuclear accident, to provide essential cooling of the reactor and spent fuel,” Director General Grossi said.

He also highlighted challenges related to the significantly reduced number of staff – who are “under unprecedented psychological pressure” – as well as the equipment maintenance situation.

“The reduced number of qualified and trained operating personnel and the challenging supply chain has had a negative impact on the maintenance of equipment which is essential for maintaining the safety of the plant,” he said. 

The Director General stressed that the IAEA experts should have sufficient access to monitor the situation regarding the seven pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict, as well as the more recent five protection principles for the ZNPP.

“There are occasions when the team has not had timely access to some areas of the plant – sometimes for many months,” he said.

There “have been no indications that the five concrete principles are not being observed,” he said, but added: “Nevertheless, in line with the evolving situation, the Agency needs to have timely access to all areas of the ZNPP of significance for nuclear safety and security, to monitor that all five concrete principles are being observed at all times.”

On the ground at the ZNPP this week, the IAEA experts at the plant were informed that one of the plant’s back-up power electrical transformers that failed last week was under maintenance and that there were no indications of structural damage.

The failure showed the continuing vulnerability in the availability of external power, which the plant needs to cool its six reactors and for other essential nuclear safety and security functions.

The ZNPP said it had investigated and identified the preliminary cause of the failure, and the IAEA experts are expecting to be informed of the outcome in the near future.

Also this week, the IAEA experts performed a walkdown of the cooling pond area and met with plant staff handling the site’s water management to discuss how the cold winter weather may affect the cooling pond, which supplies water for some of the site’s needs not related to safety, and how the ZNPP deals with any impact of ice.

Prior to the conflict, the water in the cooling pond was kept warm due to the operation of the reactor units. With all six units now in extended shutdown, the IAEA team observed small amounts of ice in a few locations of the cooling pond.

But earlier this winter, when it was colder, most of the cooling pond surface was covered by a two-centimetre layer of ice, the site informed the IAEA team.

Despite the winter cold, the team was also informed that there are a lot of fish in the cooling pond. Several non-tropical fish species have survived the cold temperatures and continue to clean the cooling pond water.

The height of the cooling pond currently is at 15.61 metres, around one metre below the level before the Kakhovka dam was destroyed with little change in the height over recent months.

The cooling water for the six shutdown reactors continues to be supplied by the 11 groundwater wells near the sprinkler ponds.

The IAEA experts were not permitted to visit the ZNPP cooling pond isolation gate during the walkdown.

During other walkdowns in the past week, the IAEA experts visited the reactor hall of unit 3, as well as the safety systems rooms of units 3 and 5. A single small boric acid deposit was observed in one of the safety systems rooms of unit 3.

Regarding the boric acid deposits in unit 6, the Russian Federation regulatory body issued a “special order” on 20 January for the repair of the leak in the unit’s storage tank. The ZNPP informed the IAEA experts of its intention to fix the microcracks in the tank, which will require its draining. Borated water is used in the primary coolant to help maintain nuclear safety functions.

The IAEA team also conducted a walkdown of the 750 kilovolt (kV) open switchyard where it confirmed that only one such power line was connected to the electricity grid – down from four before the conflict. The switchyard components that were damaged in 2022 had been dismantled, but spare parts were available.

Elsewhere in Ukraine, the IAEA experts present at the Khmelnitsky, Rivne and South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) as well as at the Chornobyl site have reported that nuclear safety and security is being maintained despite the challenging war-time circumstances, including the frequent sound of air raid alarms at some of the facilities. On 23 January, a new team of experts arrived at the Chornobyl site, replacing their colleagues there.

In his address to the Security Council, Director General Grossi noted that these NPPs were operating, with most of their reactor units at full capacity.

“Although our teams continue to report that nuclear safety and security is maintained, they are also confirming the looming threat of military conflict and at some plants having to take shelter on several occasions. I wish to remind the Council that the availability of off-site power is essential to ensure their safe operation,” he said.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) lost its immediate back-up power supply to the reactor units for several hours this week, in the latest incident underlining persistent nuclear safety and security risks at the site, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said today.

Thursday’s failure of two of the ZNPP’s back-up power electrical transformers showed the continuing vulnerability in the availability of external power, which the plant needs to cool its six reactors and for other essential nuclear safety and security functions.

Even though the back-up 330 kilovolt (kV) line remained available and could have provided power to the ZNPP if the 750 kV line was lost, the failure reduced the redundancy of the already fragile power supply. These two power lines are the only ones that remain available for Europe’s largest nuclear power plant (NPP), compared to four 750 kV lines and six 330 kV lines before the conflict.

The back-up power supply was restored eight hours later when two other back-up power electrical transformers were put into operation. The ZNPP is investigating the cause of the failure, informing the IAEA experts at the site that there was no sign of external transformer damage.

The incident came just a few weeks after the ZNPP – following discussions with the IAEA – carried out work on the back-up power electrical transformers so that the 330 kV line could immediately deliver electricity if the 750 kV line were to fail, as has happened repeatedly during the armed conflict.

“The plant’s vulnerable power status remains one of the main dangers for nuclear safety and security at the site. The situation remains extremely worrying in this respect. The site has already lost all off-site power eight times since August 2022, forcing it to rely on emergency diesel generators,” Director General Grossi said.

During the past week, the IAEA experts discussed the plant’s maintenance activities with the ZNPP and were shown its high-level 2024 maintenance plan for such work, which is vital for nuclear safety and security. The ZNPP informed the IAEA team that the priority is to perform maintenance on the site’s safety systems as well as important activities not conducted last year. The annual maintenance plan includes the safety systems, diesel generators, unit transformers and the 750 kV electrical switchyard.

The IAEA team did not receive a copy of the maintenance plan for a detailed review. However, based on discussions and information provided to the team, the IAEA concludes that the ZNPP will not be implementing a comprehensive maintenance plan during 2024.

“A well-established maintenance plan and its timely implementation are essential to ensure plant safety and security,” Director General Grossi said. “This maintenance needs to be performed to ensure nuclear safety, especially in the current situation where the six reactors have been shut down for an extended period. It is important that the IAEA has a thorough understanding of the maintenance plans to be able to fully assess nuclear safety at the ZNPP. We will continue to monitor the maintenance situation closely.”

The IAEA team has continued to conduct walkdowns at the site, including to all six main control rooms yesterday, where the experts were able to observe staffing levels but could not ask questions about their qualifications and experience.

After being granted access to the reactor hall of unit 6 earlier this week, the IAEA experts are still seeking access to the other reactor halls, as well as to parts of all six turbine halls that they have not yet been able to visit, as well as to some of the reactor rooftops. Such access is needed to monitor nuclear safety and security as well as adherence to the five concrete principles for the protection of the ZNPP, Director General Grossi said.

The IAEA team has continued to monitor the situation and gather information regarding boric acid deposits in some of the safety system rooms of unit 6, which were first observed on 22 December. During yesterday’s visit to its main control room, the team confirmed that the level of boric acid in the storage tank was above the minimum level in the technical specifications, despite the previously observed leak of boric acid.

Mines along the perimeter of the ZNPP, in a buffer zone between the facility’s internal and external fences, which were previously identified by the IAEA team and were removed in November 2023, are now back in place. This is a restricted area inaccessible to operational plant personnel. Director General Grossi reiterated that the presence of mines is inconsistent with the IAEA safety standards.

Elsewhere in Ukraine, the IAEA teams at the Rivne, Khmelnitsky, and South Ukraine NPPs as well as the Chornobyl site continue to report that nuclear safety and security is maintained despite multiple air raid alarms heard over the past week. The IAEA experts at the Khmelnitsky, Rivne and South Ukraine NPPs have reported air-raids on a near-daily basis with the teams at the Khmelnitsky and Rivne NPPs required to take shelter on several occasions.