Source: United States INDO PACIFIC COMMAND
Track Record and Trajectory: U.S-Philippine Defense Ties Since 2021
Thank you, Greg, for that introduction. And thanks as always to CSIS for bringing together the South China Sea Conference, and to all of you for being here today. This continues to be one of the most important gatherings of experts on security issues in the Indo-Pacific – not just here in Washington, but across the country, and indeed the whole region. And I’ve always gained a lot of valuable insights from discussions with the people here, whether as a think tanker or in my current role at the Department of Defense.
When I last spoke at this conference in 2022, I devoted a significant portion of my remarks to a major concern of ours at the time, which was the sharp increase in coercive and risky PLA operational behavior against U.S. assets in the South China Sea. A lot has happened since then, and I’d welcome the chance to discuss that further during our question-and-answer session in a few minutes.
But if the biggest headlines from those remarks two years ago were about one of the issues that most concerned us at the time . . . today I want to talk about an aspect of the Department’s track record in the region that we’re particularly proud of. . . and that’s the historic progress we’re seeing in the alliance between the United States and the Philippines.
Now, observers have used a variety of adjectives to describe what Washington and Manila have delivered together in the past three-and-a-half years.
But I believe that historians will record this period in the alliance as truly transformative and decisive, as emblematic of broader strategic changes across the Indo-Pacific, as the direct result of leadership by both President Biden and President Marcos, and as a central feature of Secretary Austin’s legacy in the region.
That’s because over the course of this Administration, we have elevated the U.S.-Philippines alliance to stand among our most vital defense partnerships in the world. We have raised the profile of alliance engagements. We have stood shoulder-to-shoulder with Manila in the midst of a changing security environment. We have delivered major agreements for U.S. rotational presence in the Philippines – and sought unprecedented funding to support these agreements. We have taken major steps to increase interoperability with the Philippines and our support for the modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. And we have pursued new opportunities together with the Philippines to cooperate multilaterally with likeminded partners across the Indo-Pacific in support of a shared vision for a free and open region.
Of course, sometimes when you’re following these issues day-to-day, it can be difficult to step back and take stock of the totality of what we’ve achieved in the U.S.-Philippines alliance over the past several years. So today, I wanted to walk through each of these key areas of progress to give you all a fuller picture of how we at DoD are thinking about the alliance right now – as well as where we see opportunities in the months and years ahead.
First, we’ve seen unprecedented senior-leader engagement between Washington and Manila since the start of the Biden Administration, including and especially by Secretary Austin. He has invested countless hours in this relationship, and that has directly resulted in greater personal trust as our two countries push forward major defense priorities.
As some of you know, I was actually sworn in by Secretary Austin as he was flying out to the region in the summer of 2021. And one of the most important elements of that trip involved a stop in Manila, where he met with then-President Duterte. I’ll never forget that engagement, which marked a key turning point at a critical time in the alliance. In the wake of that meeting, we saw a renewed commitment to the alliance on both sides. And that trajectory picked up considerable momentum under the leadership of President Marcos, who Secretary Austin has hosted at the Pentagon on multiple occasions. In fact, when President Marcos was back at the Pentagon this April, Secretary Austin repeated something that he says frequently both in public and private, which is – and I’m quoting here – “that our two countries are more than allies. We’re family.”
And I think you’ve seen that sense of conviction at the core of Secretary Austin’s engagements with his counterparts from the Department of National Defense, including most recently with Secretary Teodoro. The two of them have met together here in Washington, in Hawaii, in Jakarta, and in Singapore. They speak regularly on the phone. Together, they participated in April’s historic 3+3 meeting with their diplomatic counterparts and the national security advisors from our two countries. And they’re poised to meet again soon with Secretary Blinken and Secretary Manalo for another 2+2 ministerial.
And that kind of personal investment has yielded enormous dividends for our defense and security cooperation with the Philippines. This brings me to my second point about how we’ve continued to stand with our ally as Manila defends its lawful rights in the South China Sea. . . including at Second Thomas Shoal, which is a low tide elevation beyond any lawful territorial sea, on the Philippines’ continental shelf, and well within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. I know that’s a lot of legalese. But I also know there are a lot of experts here today and around the world who understand exactly what I’m describing.
Let me be clear that the PRC’s claim to the Shoal has no more credibility today than it did when the Arbitral Tribunal issued its unanimous ruling in 2016. And the kind of revisionism and coercion we’ve seen there from the PRC is both destabilizing and dangerous.
This aggressive PRC behavior stands in sharp contrast to the remarkable leadership by President Marcos and his team in protecting the well-being of the Philippine troops on the BRP Sierra Madre and in defending the rights of the Philippines under international law.
All the while, the United States has acted in support of the Philippines and made clear that our alliance commitments are ironclad. . . and that all nations should be able to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows.
Importantly, our cooperation with the Philippines extends beyond our support for their lawful operations at Second Thomas Shoal and other parts of their Exclusive Economic Zone. That’s my third point today, which is about the significance of what we’ve delivered together in terms of force posture.
Looking back, 2023 was a transformative year for making U.S. force posture in the Indo-Pacific more mobile, distributed, resilient, and lethal. Secretary Austin said in December that it was a decisive year in a decisive decade for our defense priorities with allies and partners in the region. And our decision with the Philippines in February 2023 to expand U.S. rotational access to four new strategic sites under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement was a highlight in a year that saw a series of major announcements.
And we’re committed to continuing to invest in infrastructure improvements at all nine EDCA sites to strengthen combined training, exercises, and interoperability between our forces, as well as to support humanitarian assistance and disaster response efforts. In fact, the Biden Administration’s budget request this year includes more than $120 million for these efforts – which in just one year is more than double what we’ve invested in EDCA infrastructure to date. We’ve seen strong bipartisan support on Capitol Hill for the U.S.-Philippines alliance, and this year’s budget is a historic opportunity to keep delivering.
And as we’ve reached new agreements with the Philippines on force posture, we have also undertaken a range of other efforts to modernize our defense cooperation, deepen our interoperability, and accelerate the Philippines’ capability development. And that’s my fourth point. On these issues, the Department’s track record with the Philippines since the start of this Administration has been defined by historic mosts, firsts, and first-evers.
The first combined maritime exercises in the South China Sea in years. The largest-ever Balikatan exercise, and the first-ever to involve HIMARS and cyber defense elements. The first-ever visit of fifth-generation U.S. fighter jets to the Philippines. Our first-ever combined air patrol, and our first-ever combined UAV engagement. And new Bilateral Defense Guidelines to provide strategic direction and focus for all of these initiatives.
And we’re poised to deliver so much more together in the future. As you’ve seen publicly, the United States and the Philippines are discussing the conclusion of a General Security of Military Information Agreement – or GSOMIA – that will strengthen and expand our information sharing. We are also working together on a Security Sector Assistance Roadmap to help prioritize shared investments in the modernization of Philippine forces. And while I don’t have anything to announce today regarding the Foreign Military Financing included in the Indo-Pacific National Security Supplemental that Congress passed this spring… let me just say that we recognize Capitol Hill’s sense of urgency and prioritization when it comes to our support for Manila. . . and we’ll have more to say on that soon.
And I would also be remiss if I didn’t mention the continued work of the Quad partners in support of the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness initiative – or IPMDA – and the benefits that effort will yield for partners across the South China Sea region, including the Philippines.
Fifth and finally, the historic growth in the alliance between the United States and the Philippines has helped enable a growing community of minilateral cooperation across the region. At this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Secretary Austin described this growing trend as a “new convergence around nearly all aspects of security in the Indo-Pacific.” This is not a single coalition or institution, and it’s certainly not like any other arrangement in any other region. Instead, it’s unique to the opportunities and challenges of the Indo-Pacific – comprised of
likeminded countries who share a vision for what the region can and should look like. Two months ago in Hawaii, the defense ministers from Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the United States held their first-ever joint press conference after a long day of meetings together – and for me, that event really captured the spirit of this new convergence, our shared sense of momentum, and, yes, the vital role of the Philippines.
The future we’re striving toward is one with greater interoperability and cooperation among likeminded Indo-Pacific partners, and this means enhanced reciprocal access, more participation in larger and more complex regional exercises, greater investment together in advanced capabilities. . . and Manila stands at an intersection of all of that. Now, the new convergence in the Indo-Pacific won’t always start with or include the United States. Nor should it. That’s why, for example, we are really encouraged by the important opportunities that will emerge from the reciprocal access agreement announced this week between Japan and the Philippines.
In closing, I’ll just say again that the recent growth of the U.S.-Philippines alliance has been nothing short of remarkable. In fact, some of what we have achieved together would have been simply unimaginable during that flight out to the region three years ago. And yet here we are today with a future trajectory that is as clear as it is promising. We have delivered historic results together, and we have more achievements still to come.
So thank you again to Greg Poling and to CSIS for the opportunity to talk about this Administration’s track record with the Philippines since taking office – and I’m looking forward to our discussion