Advisory provides guidance for detecting exploitation activity, recommended actions and mitigations, and novel post-exploitation findings
WASHINGTON – The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Multi-State Information Sharing & Analysis Center (MS-ISAC), Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Center (ASD’s ACSC), United Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre), a part of the Communications Security Establishment, and New Zealand’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ) and Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-NZ) released a Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) today in response to the active exploitation of multiple vulnerabilities within Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure gateways.
The authoring organizations and industry partners have observed persistent targeting of these vulnerabilities by a variety of cyber threat actors. These vulnerabilities (CVE-2023-46805, CVE-2024-21887, CVE- 2024-22024, and CVE-2024-21893) can be used in a chain of exploits to bypass authentication, craft malicious requests, and execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges. In turn, exploitation of these vulnerabilities may allow lateral movement, data exfiltration, web shell deployment, credential theft including domain administrators, and persistent access on a target network.
This joint advisory provides technical details on observed tactics used by these threat actors and indicators of compromise to help organizations detect malicious activity. All organizations using these devices should assume a sophisticated threat actor could achieve persistence and may lay dormant for a period of time before conducting malicious activity. Organizations are urged to exercise due caution in making appropriate risk decisions when considering a virtual private network (VPN), to include whether to continue operating these Ivanti devices.
“Since initial disclosure of these vulnerabilities, CISA and our partners have urgently worked to provide actionable guidance and assist impacted victims. This includes an emergency directive to remove and rebuild vulnerable Ivanti devices to reduce risk to federal systems upon which Americans depend,” said CISA Executive Assistant Director Eric Goldstein. “Today’s joint advisory provides further details based upon industry partnerships, incident response findings and evaluations of the relevant products. Every organization using these products are strongly encouraged to adopt the actions outlined in this advisory.”
“The FBI and our partners are releasing this Cybersecurity Advisory so that organizations are able to protect themselves from malicious actors exploiting their networks,” said Assistant Director Bryan Vorndran of the FBI’s Cyber Division. “Private and public sector entities should follow the guidance included in this advisory to ensure these critical vulnerabilities are mitigated.”
“The continued targeting of widely used security applications and appliances speaks to the determination of cyber threat actors, with government entities and private organizations alike caught in the crosshairs. Implementing effective controls in areas like asset and vulnerability management, multi-factor authentication, and incident response planning are essential to operational resilience amid today’s fast-moving threat landscape,” said Randy Rose, VP, Security Operations & Intelligence, Center for Internet Security, Inc.
“We strongly urge all organisations to patch and take other recommended actions to address this vulnerability. We know it is subject to exploitation by malicious actors who use it to bypass authentication mechanisms and access restricted data on affected devices,” said the acting Head of the Australian Cyber Security Centre, Phil Winzenberg. “If your organisation is using these products, it’s crucial that the guidance in this advisory is implemented immediately, in particular I urge critical infrastructure operators to be alert to new risks.”
“We encourage organisations who have not already to take immediate action to mitigate vulnerabilities impacting affected Ivanti devices by following the recommended steps. This is particularly important for those organisations working across critical infrastructure, as we are aware of the active exploitation of some of these vulnerabilities,” said UK NCSC Chief Technology Officer Ollie Whitehouse. “The NCSC and our international partners also urge software manufacturers to embed secure by design principles into their practices to promote a positive security culture and help improve our collective resilience.”
“Today we join our partners across the Five Eyes to urge organizations in Canada and internationally to follow the advice included in today’s joint advisory as quickly as possible. These vulnerabilities can significantly impact organizations’ networks, emphasizing the need for organizations to implement resilient defence-in-depth mitigations and for manufacturers to prioritize secure by design engineering practices,” said Rajiv Gupta, Associate Head, Canadian Centre for Cyber Security.
“This advisory clearly shows that malicious actors are continuing to seek out, and actively exploit, vulnerabilities in commonly used technology and software”, said Rob Pope, Director CERT NZ, a part of New Zealand’s National Cyber Security Centre. “Businesses need to stay alert to these vulnerabilities and immediately follow all steps to mitigate or prevent attacks from happening. We strongly recommend that anyone working in the IT sector sign up for updates from their country’s cyber security agencies to stay ahead of the bad guys.”
To assist organizations with understanding the impacts of this threat, the joint advisory provides key findings from a variety of tests conducted by CISA from an attacker’s perspective.
With our partners, CISA recommends that software manufacturers incorporate secure-by-design and -default principles and tactics into their software development practices. By aligning to these principles, we will reduce the prevalence and impact of avoidable vulnerabilities and insecure configurations that jeopardize the safety of organizations around the world.
All organizations are urged to review the advisory and implement recommended actions and mitigations.
About CISA
As the nation’s cyber defense agency and national coordinator for critical infrastructure security, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency leads the national effort to understand, manage, and reduce risk to the digital and physical infrastructure Americans rely on every hour of every day.
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the following partners (hereafter referred to as the authoring organizations) are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory to warn that cyber threat actors are exploiting previously identified vulnerabilities in Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure gateways. CISA and authoring organizations appreciate the cooperation of Volexity, Ivanti, Mandiant and other industry partners in the development of this advisory and ongoing incident response activities. Authoring organizations:
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Multi-State Information Sharing & Analysis Center (MS-ISAC)
Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC)
United Kingdom National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-UK)
Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre), a part of the Communications Security Establishment
New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ)
CERT-New Zealand (CERT NZ)
Of particular concern, the authoring organizations and industry partners have determined that cyber threat actors are able to deceive Ivanti’s internal and external Integrity Checker Tool (ICT), resulting in a failure to detect compromise.
Cyber threat actors are actively exploiting multiple previously identified vulnerabilities—CVE-2023-46805, CVE-2024-21887, CVE-2024-22024, and CVE-2024-21893—affecting Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure gateways. The vulnerabilities impact all supported versions (9.x and 22.x) and can be used in a chain of exploits to enable malicious cyber threat actors to bypass authentication, craft malicious requests, and execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges.
During multiple incident response engagements associated with this activity, CISA identified that Ivanti’s internal and previous external ICT failed to detect compromise. In addition, CISA has conducted independent research in a lab environment validating that the Ivanti ICT is not sufficient to detect compromise and that a cyber threat actor may be able to gain root-level persistence despite issuing factory resets.
The authoring organizations encourage network defenders to (1) assume that user and service account credentials stored within the affected Ivanti VPN appliances are likely compromised, (2) hunt for malicious activity on their networks using the detection methods and indicators of compromise (IOCs) within this advisory, (3) run Ivanti’s most recent external ICT, and (4) apply available patching guidance provided by Ivanti as version updates become available. If a potential compromise is detected, organizations should collect and analyze logs and artifacts for malicious activity and apply the incident response recommendations within this advisory.
Based upon the authoring organizations’ observations during incident response activities and available industry reporting, as supplemented by CISA’s research findings, the authoring organizations recommend that the safest course of action for network defenders is to assume a sophisticated threat actor may deploy rootkit level persistence on a device that has been reset and lay dormant for an arbitrary amount of time. For example, as outlined in PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure), sophisticated actors may remain silent on compromised networks for long periods. The authoring organizations strongly urge all organizations to consider the significant risk of adversary access to, and persistence on, Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure gateways when determining whether to continue operating these devices in an enterprise environment.
This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 14. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques in Appendix C for a table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.
Overview
On January 10, 2024, Volexity reported on two vulnerabilities in Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure gateways observed being chained to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE):[1]
Volexity first identified active exploitation in early December 2023, when they detected suspicious lateral movement [TA0008] on the network of one of their network security monitoring service customers. Volexity identified that threat actors exploited the vulnerabilities to implant web shells, including GLASSTOKEN and GIFTEDVISITOR, on internal and external-facing web servers [T1505.003]. Once successfully deployed, these web shells are used to execute commands on compromised devices.[1]
After Ivanti provided initial mitigation guidance in early January, threat actors developed a way to bypass those mitigations to deploy BUSHWALK, LIGHTWIRE, and CHAINLINE web shell variants.[2] Following the actors’ developments, Ivanti disclosed three additional vulnerabilities:
CVE-2024-21893 is a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the SAML component of Ivanti Connect Secure (9.x, 22.x) Ivanti Policy Secure (9.x, 22.x), and Ivanti Neurons for ZTA that allows an attacker to access restricted resources without authentication.
CVE-2024-22024 is an XML vulnerability in the SAML component of Ivanti Connect Secure (9.x, 22.x), Ivanti Policy Secure (9.x, 22.x), and ZTA gateways that allows an attacker to access restricted resources without authentication.
CVE-2024-21888 is a privilege escalation vulnerability found in the web component of Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure. This vulnerability allows threat actors to gain elevated privileges to that of an administrator.
Observed Threat Actor Activity
CISA has responded to multiple incidents related to the above vulnerabilities in Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure Gateways. In these incidents, actors exploited these CVEs for initial access to implant web shells and to harvest credentials stored on the devices. Post-compromise, the actors moved laterally into domain environments and have been observed leveraging tools that are native to the Ivanti appliances—such as freerdp, ssh, telnet, and nmap libraries—to expand their access to the domain environment. The result, in some cases, was a full domain compromise.
During incident response investigations, CISA identified that Ivanti’s internal and external ICT failed to detect compromise. The organizations leveraged the integrity checker to identify file mismatches in Ivanti devices; however, CISA incident response analysis confirmed that both the internal and external versions of the ICT were not reliable due to the existence of web shells found on systems that had no file mismatches according to the ICTs. Additionally, forensic analysis showed evidence the actors were able to clean up their efforts by overwriting files, time-stomping files, and re-mounting the runtime partition to return the appliance to a “clean state.” This reinforces that ICT scans are not reliable to indicate previous compromise and can result in a false sense of security that the device is free of compromise.
As detailed in Appendix A, CISA conducted independent research in a lab environment validating that the ICT is likely insufficient for detecting compromise and that a cyber threat actor may be able to maintain root level persistence despite issuing factory resets and appliance upgrades.
INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE
See Tables 1 – 4 in Appendix B for IOCs related to cyber actors exploiting multiple CVEs related to Ivanti appliances.
For additional indicators of compromise, see:
Memory and disk forensics were used during forensic analysis, combined with the Integrity Checker Tool, to identify malicious files on the compromised Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliance. This advisory provides a list of combined authoring organization IOCs and open source files identified by Volexity via network analysis.
Disclaimer: Some IP addresses in this advisory may be associated with legitimate activity. Organizations are encouraged to investigate the activity around these IP addresses prior to taking action such as blocking. Activity should not be attributed as malicious without analytical evidence to support it is used at the direction of, or controlled by, threat actors.
The authoring organizations encourage you to assess your organization’s user interface (UI) software and systems for evidence of compromise and to hunt for malicious activity using signatures outlined within this advisory. If compromise is suspected or detected, organizations should assume that threat actors hold full administrative access and can perform all tasks associated with the Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliance as well as executing arbitrary code and installing malicious payloads.
Note: These are vendor-managed appliances and systems may be encrypted with limited access. Thus, collecting artifacts may be limited on some versions of appliances. The authoring organizations recommend investigating associated devices on the network to identify lateral movement in the absence of access to the Secure Connect appliance.
If a potential compromise is detected, organizations should:
Quarantine or take offline potentially affected hosts.
Reimage compromised hosts.
Reset all credentials that may have been exposed during the compromise, including user and service accounts.
Identify Ivanti hosts with Active Directory (AD) access, threat actors can trivially export active domain administrator credentials during initial compromise. Until there is evidence to the contrary, it is assumed that AD access on compromised systems is connected to external authentication systems such as Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) and AD.
Collect and review artifacts such as running processes/services, unusual authentications, and recent network connections.
Note: Removing malicious administrator accounts may not fully mitigate risk considering threat actors may have established additional persistence mechanisms.
Report the compromise to FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) at IC3.gov, local FBI field Office, or CISA via the agency’s Incident Reporting System or its 24/7 Operations Center (report@cisa.gov or 888-282-0870). State, local, tribal, or territorial government entities can also report to MS-ISAC (SOC@cisecurity.org or 866-787-4722). Organizations outside of the United States should contact their national cyber center. (See the Reporting section.)
MITIGATIONS
These mitigations apply to all critical infrastructure organizations and network defenders using Ivanti Connect Secure VPN and Ivanti Policy Secure. The authoring organizations recommend that software manufacturers incorporate Secure by Design principles and tactics into their software development practices. These principles and tactics can limit the impact of exploitation—such as threat actors leveraging newly discovered, unpatched vulnerabilities within Ivanti appliances—thus, strengthening the secure posture for their customers.
The authoring organizations recommend organizations implement the mitigations below to improve your cybersecurity posture based on threat actor activity and to reduce the risk of compromise associated with Ivanti vulnerabilities. These mitigations align with the cross-sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Visit CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.
As organizations make risk decisions in choosing a VPN, to include decisions regarding continued operation of Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure gateways, avoid VPN solutions that use proprietary protocols or non-standard features. VPNs as a class of devices carry some specific risks that a non-expert implementer may trigger (e.g., authentication integration and patching). When choosing a VPN, organizations should consider vendors who:
Provide a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) to proactively identify, and enable remediation of, embedded software vulnerabilities, such as deprecated operating systems.
Allow a restore from trusted media to establish a root of trust. If the software validation tooling can be modified by the software itself, there is no way to establish a root of trust other than returning the device to the manufacturer (return material authorization [RMA]).
Are a CVE Numbering Authority (CNA) so that CVEs are assigned to emerging vulnerabilities in a timely manner.
Have a public Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (VDP) to enable security researchers to proactively share and disclose vulnerabilities through coordinated vulnerability disclosure (CVD).
Have in place a clear end-of-life policy (EoL) to prepare customers for updating to supported product versions.
Limit outbound internet connections from SSL VPN appliances to restrict access to required services. This will limit the ability of an actor to download tools or malware onto the device or establish outbound connections to command and control (C2) servers.
Ensure SSL VPN appliances configured with Active Directory or LDAP authentication use low privilege accounts for the LDAP bind.
Limit SSL VPN connections to unprivileged accounts only to help limit the exposure of privileged account credentials.
Keep all operating systems, software, and firmware up to date. Timely patching is one of the most efficient and cost-effective steps an organization can take to minimize its exposure to cybersecurity threats. Organizations should patch vulnerable software and hardware systems within 24 to 48 hours of vulnerability disclosure. Prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems [CPG 1.E].
Secure remote access tools.
Implement application controls to manage and control execution of software, including allowlisting remote access programs. Application controls should prevent installation and execution of portable versions of unauthorized remote access and other software. A properly configured application allowlisting solution will block any unlisted application execution. Allowlisting is important because antivirus solutions may fail to detect the execution of malicious portable executables when the files use any combination of compression, encryption, or obfuscation.
Strictly limit the use of Remote Desktop Protocols (RDP) and other remote desktop services. If RDP is necessary, rigorously apply best practices, for example [CPG 2.W]:
Configure the Windows Registry to require User Account Control (UAC) approval for any PsExec operations requiring administrator privileges to reduce the risk of lateral movement by PsExec.
Implement a recovery plan to maintain and retain multiple copies of sensitive or proprietary data and servers in a physically separate, segmented, and secure location (e.g., hard drive, storage device, or the cloud).
Require all accounts with password logins (e.g., service account, admin accounts, and domain admin accounts) to comply with NIST’s standards for developing and managing password policies.
Use longer passwords consisting of at least 15 characters [CPG 2.B].
Store passwords in hashed format using industry-recognized password managers.
Add password user “salts” to shared login credentials.
In addition to applying mitigations, the authoring organizations recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. The authoring organizations recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how the controls perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.
To get started:
Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (Appendix C).
Align your security technologies against the technique.
Test your technologies against the technique.
Analyze your detection and prevention technologies’ performance.
Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.
The authoring organizations recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.
REPORTING
U.S. organizations should report every potential cyber incident to the U.S. government. When available, each report submitted should include the date, time, location, type of activity, number of people, and type of equipment used for the activity, the name of the submitting company or organization, and a designated point of contact. Reports can be submitted to the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), local FBI Field Office, or CISA via the agency’s Incident Reporting System or its 24/7 Operations Center at report@cisa.gov or (888) 282-0870.
The FBI encourages organizations to report information concerning suspicious or criminal activity to their local FBI Field Office.
Australian organizations that have been impacted or require assistance regarding Ivanti compromise, contact ASD’s ACSC via 1300 CYBER1 (1300 292 371), or by submitting a report to cyber.gov.au.
UK organizations that have been impacted by Ivanti compromise, should report the incident to the National Cyber Security Centre.
Organizations outside of the United States or Australia should contact their national cyber center.
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. CISA and authoring organizations do not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by CISA and authoring organizations.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Volexity, Mandiant, and Ivanti contributed to this advisory.
VERSION HISTORY
February 29, 2024: Initial version.
APPENDIX A: CISA’S PRODUCT EVALUATION FINDINGS
Research Approach
As part of ongoing efforts to effectively serve the cybersecurity community with actionable insights and guidance, CISA conducted research by using a free and downloadable version of the Ivanti Connect Secure virtual appliance to assess potential attack paths and adversary persistence mechanisms. The virtual appliances were not connected to the internet, and were deployed in a closed virtualized network, with a non-internet connected Active Directory. This research included a variety of tests on version 22.3R1 Build 1647, connected to Active Directory credentials, to leverage the access obtained through CVE-2023-46805, CVE-2024-21887 and CVE-2024-21893. Put simply, CISA’s research team wanted to answer the question: “How far could an attacker go if they set were to exploit these CVEs remotely?”
Persistent Post-Reset and -Upgrade Access
Leveraging these vulnerabilities, CISA researchers were able to exfiltrate domain administrator cleartext credentials [TA0006], gain root-level persistence [TA0003], and bypass integrity checks used by the Integrity Checker application. CISA’s Incident Response team observed these specific techniques leveraged during the agency’s incident response engagements, along with the native tools and libraries to conduct internal reconnaissance and compromise domains behind the Ivanti appliances. CISA researchers assess that threat actors are able to use the credentials to move deeper into the environment.
The ability to exfiltrate domain administrator cleartext credentials, if saved when adding an “Active Directory Authentication server” during setup, was accomplished by using the root-level access obtained from the vulnerabilities to interface directly with the internal server and retrieve the cached credentials as shown in Figure 4, APPENDIX A. Users who currently have active sessions to the appliance could have their base64 encoded active directory cleartext passwords, in addition to the New Technology LAN Manager (NTLM) password hashes, retrieved with the same access, as shown in Figure 10, APPENDIX A. In addition to users with active sessions, users previously authenticated can have base64 encoded active directory plaintext passwords and NTLM hashes harvested from the backups of the data.mdb database files stored on the appliance, as shown in Figure 15 and 16, APPENDIX A.
The root-level access allows adversaries to maintain persistence despite issuing factory resets and appliance upgrades while deceiving the provided integrity checkers, creating the illusion of a clean installation. Due to the persistence mechanism being stored on the encrypted partition of the drive and inaccurate integrity check results, it is untenable for network administrators to validate their application has not been compromised without also decrypting the partition and validating against a clean installation of the appliance, which are actions not easily accomplished at present. Without major alterations of the integrity checking process, it is conceivable that new vulnerabilities that afford root-level access to the appliance could also result in root-kit level persistence to the appliance.
Below is proof of concept being released by CISA, which demonstrates the capacity of and opportunity for a threat actor to exfiltrate Domain Administrator credentials that were used during appliance configuration:
Figure 1: Ivanti Domain Join Configuration with “Save Credentials”Figure 2: CVE-2023-46805 Exploitation for Reverse Netcat ConnectionFigure 3: Upgrade Netcat Connection to Sliver ImplantFigure 4: Leverage Sliver Implant to Run Perl Script for Retrieval of Cached Domain Administrator Credentials
Below is a demonstration of the capacity for post exploitation exfiltration of base64 encoded cleartext credentials for active directory users and their associated NTLM password hashes:
Figure 5: Configuration of User RealmFigure 6: User Realm Configuration to DomainFigure 7: Configuration of User Realm MappingFigure 8: Login as “vpnuser1” to Establish an Active SessionFigure 9: Using Sliver Implant as Shown in Figure 3, Execute Perl Script to Retrieve base64 Encoded Cleartext Password and NTLM Password Hash for Authenticated UserFigure 10: Decode base64 Encoded Blob to Display User’s Plaintext CredentialsFigure 11: Using Mimikatz Validate NTLM Password Hash Obtained in Figure 10 Matches Active Directory User Credential HashFigure 12: Inactive Sessions for “vpnuser2” and “vpnuser3” Appear in Server LogsFigure 13: Exfiltrate “lmdb/data” and “lmdb-backup/data” data.mb Database Files Containing Credentials for Active and Inactive SessionsFigure 14: Parse Database Files to Disclose base64 Encoded Plaintext Credentials from LMDB Database FilesFigure 15: Parse Database Files to Disclose NTLM Hashes from LMDB Database FilesFigure 16: Parse Backup Database Files to Disclose Additional base64 Encoded Plaintext Credentials from LMDB-Backup Database FilesFigure 17: Decode Credentials from LMDB-Backup Database FilesFigure 18: Parse Database Files to Disclose NTLM Hashes for Additional Users from LMDB-Backup Database Files
APPENDIX B: INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE
Table 1: Ivanti Connect Secure VPN Indicators of Compromise
Filename
Description
Purpose
/home/perl/DSLogConfig.pm
Modified Perl module.
Designed to execute sessionserver.pl.
/usr/bin/a.sh
gcore.in core dump script.
/bin/netmon
Sliver binary.
/home/venv3/lib/python3.6/site-packages/*.egg
Python package containing WIREFIRE among other files.
/home/etc/sql/dsserver/sessionserver.pl
Perl script to remount the filesystem with read/write access.
Make sessionserver.sh executable, execute it, then restore original mount settings.
/home/etc/sql/dsserver/sessionserver.sh
Script executed by sessionserver.pl.
Uses regular expressions to modify compcheckresult.cgi to insert a web shell into it; also creates a series of entries into files associated with the In-build Integrity Checker Tool to evade detection when periodic scans are run.
Modified legitimate component of the ICS VPN appliance, with new Perl module imports added and a one-liner to execute commands based on request parameters.
Allows remote code execution over the Internet if the attacker can craft a request with the correct parameters.
Cyber actors leverage code execution from request parameters that are decoded from hex to base64 decoded, then passed to Assembly.Load(). Which is used to execute arbitrary powershell commands.
Cyber actors will exploit software vulnerabilities such as command-injection and achieve unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE).
APPENDIX D: DETECTION METHODS
rule apt_webshell_pl_complyshell: UTA0178 { meta: author = "threatintel@volexity.com" date = "2023-12-13" description = "Detection for the COMPLYSHELL webshell." hash1 = "8bc8f4da98ee05c9d403d2cb76097818de0b524d90bea8ed846615e42cb031d2" os = "linux" os_arch = "all" report = "TIB-20231215" scan_context = "file,memory" last_modified = "2024-01-09T10:05Z" license = "See license at https://github.com/volexity/threat-intel/blob/main/LICENSE.txt" rule_id = 9995 version = 4
strings: $s = "eval{my $c=Crypt::RC4->new("
condition: $s }
rule apt_webshell_aspx_glasstoken: UTA0178 { meta: author = "threatintel@volexity.com" date = "2023-12-12" description = "Detection for a custom webshell seen on external facing server. The webshell contains two functions, the first is to act as a Tunnel, using code borrowed from reGeorg, the second is custom code to execute arbitrary .NET code." hash1 = "26cbb54b1feb75fe008e36285334d747428f80aacdb57badf294e597f3e9430d" os = "win" os_arch = "all" report = "TIB-20231215" scan_context = "file,memory" last_modified = "2024-01-09T10:08Z" license = "See license at https://github.com/volexity/threat-intel/blob/main/LICENSE.txt" rule_id = 9994 version = 5
condition: for any i in (0..#s1): ( $re in (@s1[i]..@s1[i]+512) ) }
rule webshell_aspx_regeorg { meta: author = "threatintel@volexity.com" date = "2018-08-29" description = "Detects the reGeorg webshell based on common strings in the webshell. May also detect other webshells which borrow code from ReGeorg." hash = "9d901f1a494ffa98d967ee6ee30a46402c12a807ce425d5f51252eb69941d988" os = "win" os_arch = "all" reference = "https://github.com/L-codes/Neo-reGeorg/blob/master/templates/tunnel.aspx" report = "TIB-20231215" scan_context = "file,memory" last_modified = "2024-01-09T10:04Z" license = "See license at https://github.com/volexity/threat-intel/blob/main/LICENSE.txt" rule_id = 410 version = 7
From February 27 to February 29, the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Deputy Secretary Kristie Canegallo and Indian Home Secretary Ajay Bhalla met in New Delhi to co-chair the U.S.-India Homeland Security Dialogue. The Homeland Security Dialogue deepens the strategic partnership between the United States and India on issues ranging from counternarcotics cooperation and Customs-to-Customs collaboration, to combatting terrorism and cybercrime and addressing irregular migration.
During the meeting, the leaders reaffirmed the commitment of the United States and India to strengthen access to lawful immigration pathways while enforcing immigration law to include returns of individuals who do not have a legal basis to remain in the United States. They also agreed to work together to expand law enforcement cooperation to target smugglers who prey and profit on vulnerable migrants.
The Homeland Security Dialogue acknowledged the work of the U.S.-India Counternarcotics Working Group, which guides our joint efforts to address drug regulatory issues, law enforcement cooperation and collaboration, coordination in multilateral fora, and drug demand reduction efforts. The leaders reaffirmed the need to deepen information sharing efforts to prevent diversion of pharmaceuticals and other chemicals of concern used as precursors for illicit fentanyl and other illicit synthetic drugs.
At the conclusion of the Dialogue, the leaders signed a Memorandum of Cooperation to expand law enforcement collaboration between the United States and India. The new Memorandum between the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers and India’s National Police Academy institutionalizes police training cooperation between our governments through the sharing of best practices and joint programming.
DHS looks forward to building upon these productive discussions and commitments as we continue working to strengthen our partnership with India to further our shared security interests.
Note:This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visitstopransomware.govto see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) are releasing this joint CSA, to disseminate known TTPs and IOCs associated with the Phobos ransomware variants observed as recently as February 2024, according to open source reporting. Phobos is structured as a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model. Since May 2019, Phobos ransomware incidents impacting state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments have been regularly reported to the MS-ISAC. These incidents targeted municipal and county governments, emergency services, education, public healthcare, and other critical infrastructure entities to successfully ransom several million U.S. dollars.[1],[2]
The FBI, CISA, and the MS-ISAC encourage organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood and impact of Phobos ransomware and other ransomware incidents.
Download the PDF version of this report:
For a downloadable copy of indicators of compromise (IOCs), see:
TECHNICAL DETAILS
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework, version 14. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section for a table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK® tactics and techniques. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.
Overview
According to open source reporting, Phobos ransomware is likely connected to numerous variants (including Elking, Eight, Devos, Backmydata, and Faust ransomware) due to similar TTPs observed in Phobos intrusions. Phobos ransomware operates in conjunction with various open source tools such as Smokeloader, Cobalt Strike, and Bloodhound. These tools are all widely accessible and easy to use in various operating environments, making it (and associated variants) a popular choice for many threat actors.[3],[4]
Reconnaissance and Initial Access
Phobos actors typically gain initial access to vulnerable networks by leveraging phishing campaigns [T1598] to drop hidden payloads or using internet protocol (IP) scanning tools, such as Angry IP Scanner, to search for vulnerable Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) ports [T1595.001] or by leveraging RDP on Microsoft Windows environments.[5],[6]
Once they discover an exposed RDP service, the actors use open source brute force tools to gain access [T1110]. If Phobos actors gain successful RDP authentication [T1133][T1078] in the targeted environment, they perform open source research to create a victim profile and connect the targeted IP addresses to their associated companies [T1593]. Threat actors leveraging Phobos have notably deployed remote access tools to establish a remote connection within the compromised network [T1219].[7]
Alternatively, threat actors send spoofed email attachments [T1566.001] that are embedded with hidden payloads [T1204.002] such as SmokeLoader, a backdoor trojan that is often used in conjunction with Phobos. After SmokeLoader’s hidden payload is downloaded onto the victim’s system, threat actors use the malware’s functionality to download the Phobos payload and exfiltrate data from the compromised system.
Execution and Privilege Escalation
Phobos actors run executables like 1saas.exe or cmd.exe to deploy additional Phobos payloads that have elevated privileges enabled [TA0004]. Additionally, Phobos actors can use the previous commands to perform various windows shell functions. The Windows command shell enables threat actors to control various aspects of a system, with multiple permission levels required for different subsets of commands [T1059.003][T1105].[8]
Smokeloader Deployment
Phobos operations feature a standard three phase process to decrypt a payload that allows the threat actors to deploy additional destructive malware.[9]
For the first phase, Smokeloader manipulates either VirtualAlloc or VirtualProtect API functions—which opens an entry point, enabling code to be injected into running processes and allowing the malware to evade network defense tools [T1055.002]. In the second phase, a stealth process is used to obfuscate command and control (C2) activity by producing requests to legitimate websites [T1001.003].[10]
Within this phase, the shellcode also sends a call from the entry point to a memory container [T1055.004] and prepares a portable executable for deployment in the final stage [T1027.002][T1105][T1140].
Finally, once Smokeloader reaches its third stage, it unpacks a program-erase cycle from stored memory, which is then sent to be extracted from a SHA 256 hash as a payload.[7] Following successful payload decryption, the threat actors can begin downloading additional malware.
Additional Phobos Defense Evasion Capabilities
Phobos ransomware actors have been observed bypassing organizational network defense protocols by modifying system firewall configurations using commands like netsh firewall set opmode mode=disable [T1562.004]. Additionally, Phobos actors can evade detection by using the following tools: Universal Virus Sniffer, Process Hacker, and PowerTool [T1562].
Persistence and Privilege Escalation
According to open source reporting, Phobos ransomware uses commands such as Exec.exe or the bcdedit[.]exe control mechanism. Phobos has also been observed using Windows Startup folders and Run Registry Keys such as C:/UsersAdminAppDataLocaldirectory [T1490][T1547.001] to maintain persistence within compromised environments.[5]
Additionally, Phobos actors have been observed using built-in Windows API functions [T1106] to steal tokens [T1134.001], bypass access controls, and create new processes to escalate privileges by leveraging the SeDebugPrivilege process [T1134.002]. Phobos actors attempt to authenticate using cached password hashes on victim machines until they reach domain administrator access [T1003.005].
Discovery and Credential Access
Phobos actors additionally use open source tools [T1588.002] such as Bloodhound and Sharphound to enumerate the active directory [T1087.002]. Mimikatz and NirSoft, as well as Remote Desktop Passview to export browser client credentials [T1003.001][T1555.003], have also been used. Furthermore, Phobos ransomware is able to enumerate connected storage devices [T1082], running processes [T1057], and encrypt user files [T1083].
Exfiltration
Phobos actors have been observed using WinSCP and Mega.io for file exfiltration.[11] They use WinSCP to connect directly from a victim network to an FTP server [T1071.002] they control [TA0010]. Phobos actors install Mega.io [T1048] and use it to export victim files directly to a cloud storage provider [T1567.002]. Data is typically archived as either a .rar or .zip file [T1560] to be later exfiltrated. They target legal documentation, financial records, technical documents (including network architecture), and databases for commonly used password management software [T1555.005].
Impact
After the exfiltration phase, Phobos actors then hunt for backups. They use vssadmin.exe and Windows Management Instrumentation command-line utility (WMIC) to discover and delete volume shadow copies in Windows environments. This prevents victims from recovering files after encryption has taken place [T1047][T1490].
Phobos.exe contains functionality to encrypt all connected logical drives on the target host [T1486]. Each Phobos ransomware executable has unique build identifiers (IDs), affiliate IDs, as well as a unique ransom note which is embedded in the executable. After the ransom note has populated on infected workstations, Phobos ransomware continues to search for and encrypt additional files.
Most extortion [T1657] occurs via email; however, some affiliate groups have used voice calls to contact victims. In some cases, Phobos actors have used onion sites to list victims and host stolen victim data. Phobos actors use various instant messaging applications such as ICQ, Jabber, and QQ to communicate [T1585]. See Figure 2 for a list of email providers used by the following Phobos affiliates: Devos, Eight, Elbie, Eking, and Faust.[6]
The commands above are observed during the execution of a Phobos encryption executable. A Phobos encryption executable spawns a cmd.exe process, which then executes the commands listed in Table 1 with their respective Windows system executables. When the commands above are executed on a Windows system, volume shadow copies are deleted and Windows Firewall is disabled. Additionally, the system’s boot status policy is set to boot even when there are errors during the boot process, and automatic recovery options, like Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE), are disabled for the given boot entry. The system’s backup catalog is also deleted. Finally, the Phobos ransom note is displayed to the end user using mshta.exe.
Table 3: Observed Phobos Registry Keys
Registry Keys
HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun
C:/UsersAdminAppDataLocaldirectory
Table 4: Observed Phobos Actor Email Addresses
Email Addresses
AlbetPattisson1981@protonmail[.]com
henryk@onionmail[.]org
atomicday@tuta[.]io
info@fobos[.]one
axdus@tuta[.]io
it.issues.solving@outlook[.]com
barenuckles@tutanota[.]com
JohnWilliams1887@gmx[.]com
Bernard.bunyan@aol[.]com
jonson_eight@gmx[.]us
bill.g@gmx[.]com
joshuabernandead@gmx[.]com
bill.g@msgsafe[.]io
LettoIntago@onionmail[.]com
bill.g@onionmail[.]org
Luiza.li@tutanota[.]com
bill.gTeam@gmx[.]com
MatheusCosta0194@gmx[.]com
blair_lockyer@aol[.]com
mccreight.ellery@tutanota[.]com
CarlJohnson1948@gmx[.]com
megaport@tuta[.]io
cashonlycash@gmx[.]com
miadowson@tuta[.]io
chocolate_muffin@tutanota[.]com
MichaelWayne1973@tutanota[.]com
claredrinkall@aol[.]com
normanbaker1929@gmx[.]com
clausmeyer070@cock[.]li
nud_satanakia@keemail[.]me
colexpro@keemail[.]me
please@countermail[.]com
cox.barthel@aol[.]com
precorpman@onionmail[.]org
crashonlycash@gmx[.]com
recovery2021@inboxhub[.]net
everymoment@tuta[.]io
recovery2021@onionmail[.]org
expertbox@tuta[.]io
SamuelWhite1821@tutanota[.]com
fastway@tuta[.]io
SaraConor@gmx[.]com
fquatela@techie[.]com
secdatltd@gmx[.]com
fredmoneco@tutanota[.]com
skymix@tuta[.]io
getdata@gmx[.]com
sory@countermail[.]com
greenbookBTC@gmx[.]com
spacegroup@tuta[.]io
greenbookBTC@protonmail[.]com
stafordpalin@protonmail[.]com
helperfiles@gmx[.]com
starcomp@keemail[.]me
helpermail@onionmail[.]org
xdone@tutamail[.]com
helpfiles@onionmail[.]org
xgen@tuta[.]io
helpfiles102030@inboxhub[.]net
xspacegroup@protonmail[.]com
helpforyou@gmx[.]com
zgen@tuta[.]io
helpforyou@onionmail[.]org
zodiacx@tuta[.]io
Table 5: Observed Phobos Actor Telegram Username
Telegram Username
@phobos_support
Table 6: Observed Phobos Actor Wickr Address
Wickr Address
Disclaimer: Organizations are encouraged to investigate the use of the IOCs in Table 7 for related signs of compromise prior to performing remediation actions.
Table 7: Phobos IOCs from September through December 2023
Disclaimer: Organizations are encouraged to investigate the use of the file hashes in Tables 8 and 9 for related signs of compromise prior to performing remediation actions.
Table 8: Phobos Actor File Hashes Observed in October 2023
Following successful RDP authentication, Phobos actors search for IP addresses and pair them with their associated computer to create a victim profile.
Phobos actors use Smokeloader to inject code into running processes to identify an entry point through enabling a VirtualAlloc or VirtualProtect process.
Phobos threat actors may delete or remove backups to include volume shadow copies from Windows environments to prevent victim data recovery response efforts.
Phobos threat actor’s extort victims for financial gain.
MITIGATIONS
Secure by Design and Default Mitigations:
These mitigations apply to all critical infrastructure organizations and network defenders. The FBI, CISA, and MS-ISAC recommend that software manufacturers incorporate secure by design and default principles and tactics into their software development practices limiting the impact of ransomware techniques, thus, strengthening the secure posture for their customers.
The FBI, CISA, and MS-ISAC recommend organizations implement the mitigations below to improve your organization’s cybersecurity posture against actors’ activity. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Visit CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.
Implement application controls to manage and control execution of software, including allowlisting remote access programs.
Application controls should prevent installation and execution of portable versions of unauthorized remote access and other software. A properly configured application allowlist solution will block any unlisted application execution. Allowlisting is important because antivirus solutions may fail to detect the execution of malicious portable executables when the files use any combination of compression, encryption, or obfuscation.
Implement log collection best practices and use intrusion detection systems to defend against threat actors manipulating firewall configurations through early detection [CPG 2.T].
Implement EDR solutions to disrupt threat actor memory allocation techniques.
Strictly limit the use of RDP and other remote desktop services. If RDP is necessary, rigorously apply best practices, for example [CPG 2.W]:
Disable command-line and scripting activities and permissions [CPG 2.N].
Review domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories for new and/or unrecognized accounts [CPG 4.C].
Audit user accounts with administrative privileges and configure access controls according to the principle of least privilege (PoLP) [CPG 2.E].
Reduce the threat of credential compromise via the following:
Place domain admin accounts in the protected users’ group to prevent caching of password hashes locally.
Refrain from storing plaintext credentials in scripts.
Implement time-based access for accounts at the admin level and higher [CPG 2.A, 2.E].
In addition, the authoring authorities of this CSA recommend network defenders apply the following mitigations to limit potential adversarial use of common system and network discovery techniques, and to reduce the impact and risk of compromise by ransomware or data extortion actors:
Implement a recovery plan to maintain and retain multiple copies of sensitive or proprietary data and servers in a physically separate, segmented, and secure location (i.e., hard drive, storage device, or the cloud).
Maintain offline backups of data and regularly maintain backup and restoration (daily or weekly at minimum). By instituting this practice, an organization limits the severity of disruption to its business practices [CPG 2.R].
Require all accounts with password logins (e.g., service account, admin accounts, and domain admin accounts) to comply with NIST’s standards for developing and managing password policies.
Use longer passwords consisting of at least 15 characters and no more than 64 characters in length [CPG 2.B].
Store passwords in hashed format using industry-recognized password managers.
Add password user “salts” to shared login credentials.
Refrain from requiring password changes more frequently than once per year. Note: NIST guidance suggests favoring longer passwords instead of requiring regular and frequent password resets. Frequent password resets are more likely to result in users developing password “patterns” cyber criminals can easily decipher.
Require administrator credentials to install software.
Require phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA) for all services to the extent possible, particularly for webmail, virtual private networks (VPNs), and accounts that access critical systems [CPG 2.H].
Segment networks to prevent the spread of ransomware. Network segmentation can help prevent the spread of ransomware by controlling traffic flows between—and access to—various subnetworks and by restricting adversary lateral movement [CPG 2.F].
Identify, detect, and investigate abnormal activity and potential traversal of the indicated ransomware with a networking monitoring tool. To aid in detecting the ransomware, implement a tool that logs and reports all network traffic and activity, including lateral movement, on a network. Endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools are particularly useful for detecting lateral connections as they have insight into common and uncommon network connections for each host [CPG 3.A].
Install, regularly update, and enable real time detection for antivirus software on all hosts.
Consider adding an email banner to emails received from outside your organization [CPG 2.M].
Disable hyperlinks in received emails.
Ensure all backup data is encrypted, immutable (i.e., ensure backup data cannot be altered or deleted), and covers the entire organization’s data infrastructure [CPG 2.K, 2.L, 2.R].
VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS
In addition to applying mitigations, the FBI, CISA, and MS-ISAC recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. The FBI, CISA, and MS-ISAC recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.
To get started:
Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Tables 4-16).
Align your security technologies against the technique.
Test your technologies against the technique.
Analyze your detection and prevention technologies’ performance.
Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.
The FBI, CISA, and MS-ISAC recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.
The FBI is seeking any information that can be shared, to include boundary logs showing communication to and from foreign IP addresses, a sample ransom-note, communications with Phobos actors, Bitcoin wallet information, decryptor files, and/or a benign sample of an encrypted file.
Additional details requested include: a targeted company point of contact, status and scope of infection, estimated loss, operational impact, transaction IDs, date of infection, date detected, initial attack vector, and host and network-based indicators.
The FBI and CISA do not encourage paying ransom as payment does not guarantee victim files will be recovered. Furthermore, payment may also embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. Regardless of whether you or your organization have decided to pay the ransom, the FBI and CISA urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents to the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), a local FBI Field Office, or to CISA at report@cisa.gov or (888) 282-0870.
DISCLAIMER
The FBI does not conduct its investigative activities or base attribution solely on activities protected by the First Amendment. Your company has no obligation to respond or provide information back to the FBI in response to this engagement. If, after reviewing the information, your company decides to provide referral information to the FBI, it must do so in a manner consistent with federal law. The FBI does not request or expect your company to take any particular action regarding this information other than holding it in confidence due to its sensitive nature.
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. The FBI and CISA not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by CISA, the FBI, and the MS-ISAC.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The California Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC, CA) and Israel National Cyber Directorate (INCD) contributed to this CSA.
The text of the following statement was released by the Governments of the United States of America, Mexico, and Guatemala on the occasion of a Trilateral Ministerial Meeting in Washington, D.C.
Senior officials from the United States, Guatemala, and Mexico met today at the State Department for a trilateral ministerial meeting to enhance cooperation on hemispheric migration management and regional development. Led by Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas, and White House Homeland Security Advisor Liz Sherwood Randall of the United States, Foreign Minister Carlos Ramiro Martinez and Minister of the Interior Francisco José Jiménez Irungaray of Guatemala, and Foreign Secretary Alicia Bárcena Ibarra of Mexico, the meeting solidified key areas of collaboration between the three partners, including on issues related toa root causes and development, border enforcement, labor mobility pathways and orderly, humane, and regular migration in the region. During the meeting, Foreign Minister Martinez announced Guatemala will host the next Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection ministerial meeting in the near future.
The U.S. and Mexican delegations congratulated the Guatemalan delegation on a successful democratic transition and pledged to work closely with President Bernardo Arévalo’s administration to help strengthen institutions and democratic values in Guatemala.
The three delegations agreed on the urgency of addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displacement. To that end, participants discussed the importance of encouraging investments in Guatemala that develop infrastructure and expand access to health, education, electricity and housing. Participants also emphasized the need to foster economic productivity, foster supply chains between our countries, and create jobs in the region.
The delegations committed to expand access to labor mobility pathways as a strategic response to migration challenges in the region. All three countries emphasized the importance of upholding international human rights and protection standards, ensuring the dignity and well-being of migrants and refugees, and maintaining consular cooperation as a means of defending labor rights.
The three countries discussed efforts to combat human trafficking and the importance of trafficking prevention programs. The participants committed to strengthen joint law enforcement efforts, including by enhancing information sharing and working collectively to investigative and prosecute human trafficking and migrant smuggling networks.
Discussion also focused on the need to increase coordinated joint efforts on humane border management and enforcement, including at the U.S. – Mexico and Mexico – Guatemala borders. The three delegations committed to share data about migration flows by launching a new dashboard, which will enhance data-driven decision-making and coordination.
The three delegations also committed to establish an operationally focused trilateral working group which will work to improve security, law enforcement, processes, and infrastructure along their international borders. Law enforcement authorities from the three countries will work together to identify security gaps, share information, and develop coordinated operational plans. This effort will build on and expand existing partnerships to address shared challenges at our borders.
The participants reaffirmed their commitment to other regional cooperation initiatives, including the Summit on Labor Migration Pathways, which will be co-hosted by Mexico, Colombia and the International Organization for Migration in May. This forum will help foster regional cooperation to address migration challenges in an effective manner that upholds the rights and dignity of all migrants.
How SVR-Attributed Actors are Adapting to the Move of Government and Corporations to Cloud Infrastructure
OVERVIEW
This advisory details recent tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of the group commonly known as APT29, also known as Midnight Blizzard, the Dukes, or Cozy Bear.
The UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and international partners assess that APT29 is a cyber espionage group, almost certainly part of the SVR, an element of the Russian intelligence services. The US National Security Agency (NSA), the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the US Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC), the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), and New Zealand Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) agree with this attribution and the details provided in this advisory.
This advisory provides an overview of TTPs deployed by the actor to gain initial access into the cloud environment and includes advice to detect and mitigate this activity.
To download the PDF version of this report, click here.
PREVIOUS ACTOR ACTIVITY
The NCSC has previously detailed how Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) cyber actors have targeted governmental, think tank, healthcare, and energy targets for intelligence gain. It has now observed SVR actors expanding their targeting to include aviation, education, law enforcement, local and state councils, government financial departments, and military organizations.
SVR actors are also known for:
EVOLVING TTPs
As organizations continue to modernize their systems and move to cloud-based infrastructure, the SVR has adapted to these changes in the operating environment.
They have to move beyond their traditional means of initial access, such as exploiting software vulnerabilities in an on-premises network, and instead target the cloud services themselves.
To access the majority of the victims’ cloud hosted network, actors must first successfully authenticate to the cloud provider. Denying initial access to the cloud environment can prohibit SVR from successfully compromising their target. In contrast, in an on-premises system, more of the network is typically exposed to threat actors.
Below describes in more detail how SVR actors are adapting to continue their cyber operations for intelligence gain. These TTPs have been observed in the last 12 months.
ACCESS VIA SERVICE AND DORMANT ACCOUNTS
Previous SVR campaigns reveal the actors have successfully used brute forcing [T1110] and password spraying to access service accounts. This type of account is typically used to run and manage applications and services. There is no human user behind them so they cannot be easily protected with multi-factor authentication (MFA), making these accounts more susceptible to a successful compromise. Service accounts are often also highly privileged depending on which applications and services they’re responsible for managing. Gaining access to these accounts provides threat actors with privileged initial access to a network, to launch further operations.
SVR campaigns have also targeted dormant accounts belonging to users who no longer work at a victim organization but whose accounts remain on the system [T1078.004].
Following an enforced password reset for all users during an incident, SVR actors have also been observed logging into inactive accounts and following instructions to reset the password. This has allowed the actor to regain access following incident response eviction activities.
CLOUD-BASED TOKEN AUTHENTICATION
Account access is typically authenticated by either username and password credentials or system-issued access tokens. The NCSC and partners have observed SVR actors using tokens to access their victims’ accounts, without needing a password [T1528].
The default validity time of system-issued tokens varies dependent on the system; however, cloud platforms should allow administrators to adjust the validity time as appropriate for their users. More information can be found on this in the mitigations section of this advisory.
ENROLLING NEW DEVICES TO THE CLOUD
On multiple occasions, the SVR have successfully bypassed password authentication on personal accounts using password spraying and credential reuse. SVR actors have also then bypassed MFA through a technique known as “MFA bombing” or “MFA fatigue,” in which the actors repeatedly push MFA requests to a victim’s device until the victim accepts the notification [T1621].
Once an actor has bypassed these systems to gain access to the cloud environment, SVR actors have been observed registering their own device as a new device on the cloud tenant [T1098.005]. If device validation rules are not set up, SVR actors can successfully register their own device and gain access to the network.
By configuring the network with device enrollment policies, there have been instances where these measures have defended against SVR actors and denied them access to the cloud tenant.
RESIDENTIAL PROXIES
As network-level defenses improve detection of suspicious activity, SVR actors have looked at other ways to stay covert on the internet. A TTP associated with this actor is the use of residential proxies [T1090.002]. Residential proxies typically make traffic appear to originate from IP addresses within internet service provider (ISP) ranges used for residential broadband customers and hide the true source. This can make it harder to distinguish malicious connections from typical users. This reduces the effectiveness of network defenses that use IP addresses as indicators of compromise, and so it is important to consider a variety of information sources such as application and host-based logging for detecting suspicious activity.
CONCLUSION
The SVR is a sophisticated actor capable of carrying out a global supply chain compromise such as the 2020 SolarWinds, however the guidance in this advisory shows that a strong baseline of cyber security fundamentals can help defend from such actors.
For organizations that have moved to cloud infrastructure, a first line of defense against an actor such as SVR should be to protect against SVR’s TTPs for initial access. By following the mitigations outlined in this advisory, organizations will be in a stronger position to defend against this threat.
Once the SVR gain initial access, the actor is capable of deploying highly sophisticated post compromise capabilities such as MagicWeb, as reported in 2022. Therefore, mitigating against the SVR’s initial access vectors is particularly important for network defenders.
Some of the TTPs listed in this report, such as residential proxies and exploitation of system accounts, are similar to those reported as recently as January 2024 by Microsoft.
MITRE ATT&CK®
This report has been compiled with respect to the MITRE ATT&CK® framework, a globally accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations.
Accounts that cannot use 2SV should have strong, unique passwords. User and system accounts should be disabled when no longer required with a “joiners, movers, and leavers” process in place and regular reviews to identify and disable inactive/dormant accounts. See NCSC guidance: 10 Steps to Cyber Security.
System and service accounts should implement the principle of least privilege, providing tightly scoped access to resources required for the service to function.
Canary service accounts should be created which appear to be valid service accounts but are never used by legitimate services. Monitoring and alerting on the use of these account provides a high confidence signal that they are being used illegitimately and should be investigated urgently.
Session lifetimes should be kept as short as practical to reduce the window of opportunity for an adversary to use stolen session tokens. This should be paired with a suitable authentication method that strikes a balance between regular user authentication and user experience.
Ensure device enrollment policies are configured to only permit authorized devices to enroll. Use zero-touch enrollment where possible, or if self-enrollment is required then use a strong form of 2SV that is resistant to phishing and prompt bombing. Old devices should be prevented from (re)enrolling when no longer required. See NCSC guidance: Device Security Guidance.
Consider a variety of information sources such as application events and host-based logs to help prevent, detect and investigate potential malicious behavior. Focus on the information sources and indicators of compromise that have a better rate of false positives. For example, looking for changes to user agent strings that could indicate session hijacking may be more effective than trying to identify connections from suspicious IP addresses. See NCSC guidance: Introduction to Logging for Security Purposes.
DISCLAIMER
This report draws on information derived from NCSC and industry sources. Any NCSC findings and recommendations made have not been provided with the intention of avoiding all risks and following the recommendations will not remove all such risk. Ownership of information risks remains with the relevant system owner at all times.
This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation.
New logging increases security by default and enhances cyber defense
WASHINGTON – The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Office of the National Cyber Director (ONCD) and Microsoft announce today further progress in ensuring that Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies have access to necessary logging capabilities. Over the past six months, Microsoft has worked closely with CISA, OMB, and ONCD to roll out expanded logs to a pilot group of agencies. Beginning this month, expanded logging will be available to all agencies using Microsoft Purview Audit regardless of license tier.
As described in CISA’s Secure by Design guidance, all technology providers should provide “high-quality audit logs to customers at no extra charge or additional configuration.” Today’s announcement is a further step in this direction. Microsoft will automatically enable the logs in customer accounts and increase the default log retention period from 90 days to 180 days. Also, this data will provide new telemetry to help more federal agencies meet logging requirements mandated by OMB Memorandum M-21-31.
To help agencies more effectively use available logs to detect and remediate cyber threats, CISA has developed a new Expanded Cloud Log Implementation Playbook in close coordination with Microsoft, which provides further detail on each newly available log and how these logs can be used to support threat hunting and incident-response operations.
“Last summer, we were glad to see Microsoft’s commitment to make necessary logging available to federal agencies and the broader cybersecurity community. I am pleased that we have made real progress toward this goal,” said CISA Executive Assistant Director for Cybersecurity Eric Goldstein. “We look forward to continued progress with our partners to ensure that every organization has access to necessary security logs– a core tenet of our Secure by Design guidance in support of the National Cybersecurity Strategy. Every organization has the right to safe and secure technology, and we continue to make progress toward this goal.”
“As the federal government continues our transition to cloud environments, we must ensure we are following secure-by-design and secure-by-default principles,” said Chris DeRusha, Federal Chief Information Security Officer and Deputy National Cyber Director. “The upgraded logging features now available to Microsoft’s government community cloud customers will provide greater visibility, and enable our network defenders to enhance their threat detection capabilities.”
“We recognize the vital importance that advanced logging plays in enabling federal agencies to detect, respond to, and prevent even the most sophisticated cyberattacks from well-resourced, state-sponsored actors. For this reason, we have been collaborating across the federal government to provide access to advanced audit logs,” said Candice Ling, Senior Vice President, Microsoft Federal. “Microsoft will continue to play a critical role in partnering with the federal government to reinforce our commitment to secure by design and further enhance the security baseline of our nation.”
In July 2023, a federal agency observed suspicious, unexpected activity in unclassified Microsoft 365 audit logs and reported it to Microsoft and CISA. The agency detected the activity using one of the logs Microsoft is expanding access to with this announcement. The importance of having critical cybersecurity logs that provided timely information was clearly demonstrated by this incident. CISA continues our work to ensure every organization has access to key security data by default so they can better defend their networks from malicious cyber actors.
As the nation’s cyber defense agency and national coordinator for critical infrastructure security, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency leads the national effort to understand, manage, and reduce risk to the digital and physical infrastructure Americans rely on every hour of every day.
VIENNA – On February 18, Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro N. Mayorkas met with People’s Republic of China (PRC) State Councilor and Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong in Vienna, Austria to advance cooperation with the PRC in the fight against the scourge of fentanyl, its precursor chemicals, and associated equipment.
This meeting builds upon the commitments made at the Woodside Summit between President Biden and President Xi last November, the January 10 virtual meeting between Secretary Mayorkas and State Councilor Wang, and the January 30 inaugural meeting of the U.S.-PRC Counternarcotics Working Group.
The two sides had a candid and constructive discussion on the steps needed to combat the spread of precursor chemicals and the transnational criminal organizations that profit off the production, distribution, and sale of illicit synthetic drugs. The two sides also made commitments with respect to continued law enforcement cooperation, technical bilateral exchanges between scientists and other experts, scheduling of precursor chemicals, and furthering multilateral cooperation.
Secretary Mayorkas and State Councilor Wang discussed areas of concern within the bilateral relationship and committed to ongoing discussion on those and other issues.
The two sides also discussed expanding their law enforcement cooperation in the fight to protect children from online child sexual exploitation and abuse. This heinous crime is global in scope and predators do not draw geographic boundaries that limit the reach of this cruelty.
The Secretary reiterated that the United States will stand up for our interests and values and those of our allies and partners.
Secretary Mayorkas was joined in the meeting by senior officials from the Department of Homeland Security, Department of State, Department of Justice, Department of the Treasury, National Security Council, Office of National Drug Control Policy, the Drug Enforcement Administration, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Multi-State Information Sharing & Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) conducted an incident response assessment of a state government organization’s network environment after documents containing host and user information, including metadata, were posted on a dark web brokerage site. Analysis confirmed that an unidentified threat actor compromised network administrator credentials through the account of a former employee—a technique commonly leveraged by threat actors—to successfully authenticate to an internal virtual private network (VPN) access point, further navigate the victim’s on-premises environment, and execute various lightweight directory access protocol (LDAP) queries against a domain controller.[1] Analysis also focused on the victim’s Azure environment, which hosts sensitive systems and data, as well as the compromised on-premises environment. Analysis determined there were no indications the threat actor further compromised the organization by moving laterally from the on-premises environment to the Azure environment.
CISA and MS-ISAC are releasing this Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) to provide network defenders with the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by the threat actor and methods to protect against similar exploitation of both unnecessary and privileged accounts.
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TECHNICAL DETAILS
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework, version 14. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section for a table of the threat actor’s activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK® tactics and techniques. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.
Overview
A state government organization was notified that documents containing host and user information, including metadata, were posted on a dark web brokerage site. After further investigation, the victim organization determined that the documents were accessed via the compromised account of a former employee. Threat actors commonly leverage valid accounts, including accounts of former employees that have not been properly removed from the Active Directory (AD), to gain access to organizations.[1] CISA and MS-ISAC assessed that an unidentified threat actor likely accessed documents containing host and user information to post on the dark web for profit after gaining access through the account of a former employee.
The scope of this investigation included the victim organization’s on-premises environment, as well as their Azure environment, which hosts sensitive systems and data. Analysis determined the threat actor did not move laterally from the compromised on-premises network to the Azure environment and did not compromise sensitive systems.
Untitled Goose Tool
Incident responders collected Azure and Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) logs using CISA’s Untitled Goose Tool—a free tool to help network defenders detect potentially malicious activity in Microsoft Azure, Azure Active Directory (AAD), and Microsoft 365 (M365) environments. CISA developed the Untitled Goose Tool to export and review AAD sign-in and audit logs, M365 unified audit logs (UAL), Azure activity logs, and MDE data. By exporting cloud artifacts, Untitled Goose Tool supports incident response teams with environments that do not ingest logs into a security information and event management (SIEM) tool.
Threat Actor Activity
The logs revealed the threat actor first connected from an unknown virtual machine (VM) to the victim’s on-premises environment via internet protocol (IP) addresses within their internal VPN range. CISA and MS-ISAC assessed that the threat actor connected to the VM through the victim’s VPN [T1133] with the intent to blend in with legitimate traffic to evade detection.
Initial Access: Compromised Domain Accounts
USER1: The threat actor gained initial access through the compromised account of a former employee with administrative privileges (USER1) [T1078.002] to conduct reconnaissance and discovery activities. The victim organization confirmed that this account was not disabled immediately following the employee’s departure.
The threat actor likely obtained the USER1 account credentials in a separate data breach due to the credentials appearing in publicly available channels containing leaked account information [T1589.001].
USER1 had access to two virtualized servers including SharePoint and the workstation of the former employee. The workstation was virtualized from a physical workstation using the Veeam Physical to Virtual (P2V) function within the backup software.
USER2: The threat actor likely obtained the USER2 account credentials from the virtualized SharePoint server managed by USER1 [T1213.002]. The victim confirmed that the administrator credentials for USER2 were stored locally on this server [T1552.001].
Through connection from the VM, the threat actor authenticated to multiple services [T1021] via the USER1 account, as well as from an additional compromised global domain administrator account (USER2) [T1078.002].
The threat actor’s use of the USER2 account was impactful due to the access it granted to both the on-premises AD and Azure AD [T1021.007], thus enabling administrative privileges [T1078.004].
Following notification of the dark web posting, the victim organization immediately disabled the USER1 account and took the two virtualized servers associated with the former employee offline. The victim also changed the password for the USER2 account and removed administrator privileges. Neither of the administrative accounts had multifactor authentication (MFA) enabled.
LDAP Queries
Through connection from the VM, the threat actor conducted LDAP queries of the AD, likely using the open source tool AdFind.exe, based on the format of the output. CISA and MS-ISAC assess the threat actor executed the LDAP queries [T1087.002] to collect user, host [T1018], and trust relationship information [T1482]. It is also believed the LDAP queries generated the text files the threat actor posted for sale on the dark web brokerage site: ad_users.txt, ad_computers.txt, and trustdmp.txt.
Table 1 lists all queries that were conducted between 08:39:43-08:40:56 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC).
Table 1: LDAP Queries Conducted by the Threat Actor
Query
Description
LDAP Search Scope: WholeSubtree, Base Object: dc=[REDACTED],dc=local, Search Filter: (objectCategory=CN=Person,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=[REDACTED],DC=local)
Collects names and metadata of users in the domain.
LDAP Search Scope: WholeSubtree, Base Object: dc=[REDACTED],dc=local, Search Filter: (objectCategory=CN=Computer,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=[REDACTED],DC=local)
Collects names and metadata of hosts in the domain.
LDAP Search Scope: WholeSubtree, Base Object: dc=[REDACTED],dc=local, Search Filter: (objectCategory=CN=Trusted-Domain,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=[REDACTED],DC=local)
Collects Domain Administrators and Service Principals in the domain.
Service Authentication
Through the VM connection, the threat actor was observed authenticating to various services on the victim organization’s network from the USER1 and USER2 administrative accounts. In all instances, the threat actor authenticated to the Common Internet File Service (CIFS) on various endpoints [T1078.002],[T1021.002]—a protocol used for providing shared access to files and printers between machines on the network. This was likely used for file, folder, and directory discovery [T1083], and assessed to be executed in an automated manner.
USER1 authenticated to four services, presumably for the purpose of network and service discovery [T1046].
USER2 authenticated to twelve services. Note: This account had administrative privileges to both the on-premises network and Azure tenant.
MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES
See Tables 2-9 for all referenced threat actor’s tactics and techniques for enterprise environments in this advisory. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.
The actor gained initial access through the compromised account of a former employee with administrative privileges (USER1). The employee’s account was not immediately disabled after their departure.
The actor authenticated to multiple services from a compromised Global Domain Administrator account (USER2). The actor also authenticated to the Common Internet File Service (CIFS) on various endpoints.
The actor used a compromised account (USER2) which was synced to both the on-premises AD and Azure AD, thus enabling administrative privileges to both the on-premises network and Azure tenant.
The actor likely obtained the USER2 account credentials from the virtualized SharePoint server managed by USER1.
MITIGATIONS
Note: These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), which apply to all critical infrastructure organizations and network defenders. The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Visit CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.
Secure and Monitor Administrator Accounts
The threat actor gained access to the network via compromised administrator accounts that did not have MFA enabled. The compromised USER2 Global Domain Administrator account could have enabled the threat actor to move laterally from the on-premises environment to the Azure tenant. In response to the incident, the victim organization removed administrator privileges for USER2. Additionally, the victim organization disabled unnecessary administrator accounts and enabled MFA for all administrator accounts. To prevent similar compromises, CISA and MS-ISAC recommend the following:
Review current administrator accounts to determine their necessity and only maintain administrator accounts that are essential for network management. This will reduce the attack surface and focus efforts on the security and monitoring of necessary accounts.
Restrict the use of multiple administrator accounts for one user.
Create separate administrator accounts for on-premises and Azure environments to segment access.
Implement the principle of least privilege to decrease threat actor’s ability to access key network resources. Enable just-in-time and just enough access for administrator accounts to elevate the minimum necessary privileges for a limited time to complete tasks.
Use phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA) [CPG 2.H] (e.g., security tokens) for remote access and access to any sensitive data repositories. Implement phishing-resistant MFA for as many services as possible—particularly for webmail and VPNs—for accounts that access critical systems and privileged accounts that manage backups. MFA should also be used for remote logins [M1032]. For additional guidance on secure MFA configurations, visit CISA’s More than a Password webpage and read CISA’s Implementing Phishing-Resistant MFA fact sheet.
Reduce Attack Surface
Unnecessary accounts, software, and services in the network create additional vectors for a threat actor to compromise. CISA and MS-ISAC recommend the following:
Establish policy and procedure for the prompt removal of unnecessary accounts and groups from the enterprise, especially privileged accounts. Organizations should implement a robust and continuous user management process to ensure accounts of offboarded employees are removed and can no longer access the network.
Maintain a robust asset management policy through comprehensive documentation of assets, tracking current version information to maintain awareness of outdated software, and mapping assets to business and critical functions.
Determine the need and functionality of assets that require public internet exposure [CPG 1.A].
Follow a routine patching cycle for all operating systems, applications, and software (including all third-party software) to mitigate the potential for exploitation.
Restrict personal devices from connecting to the network. Personal devices are not subject to the same group policies and security measures as domain joined devices.
Evaluate Tenant Settings
By default, in Azure AD all users can register and manage all aspects of applications they create. Users can also determine and approve what organizational data and services the application can access. These default settings can enable a threat actor to access sensitive information and move laterally in the network. In addition, users who create an Azure AD automatically become the Global Administrator for that tenant. This could allow a threat actor to escalate privileges to execute malicious actions. CISA and MS-ISAC recommend the following:
Evaluate current user permissions in the Azure tenant to restrict potentially harmful permissions including:
Restrict users’ ability to register applications. By default, all users in Azure AD can register and manage the applications they create and approve the data and services the application can access. If this is exploited, a threat actor can access sensitive information and move laterally in the network.
Restrict non-administrators from creating tenants. Any user who creates an Azure AD automatically becomes the Global Administrator for that tenant. This creates an opportunity for a threat actor to escalate privileges to the highest privileged account.
Restrict access to the Azure AD portal to administrators only. Users without administrative privileges cannot change settings, however, they can view user info, group info, device details, and user privileges. This would allow a threat actor to gather valuable information for malicious activities.
Create a Forensically Ready Organization
Collect access- and security-focused logs (e.g., intrusion detection systems/intrusion prevention systems, firewall, data loss prevention, and virtual private network) for use in both detection and incident response activities [CPG 2.T].
Enable complete coverage of tools, including Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR), across the environment for thorough analysis of anomalous activity and remediation of potential vulnerabilities.
Assess Security Configuration of Azure Environment
CISA created the Secure Cloud and Business Applications (SCuBA) assessment tool to help Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies to verify that a M365 tenant configuration conforms to a minimal viable secure configuration baseline. Although the SCuBA assessment tool was developed for FCEB, other organizations can benefit from its output. CISA and MS-ISAC recommend the following:
Use tools that identify attack paths. This will enable defenders to identify common attack paths used by threat actors and shut them down before they are exploited.
Review the security recommendations list provided by Microsoft 365 Defender. Focus remediation on critical vulnerabilities on endpoints that are essential to mission execution and contain sensitive data.
Evaluate Conditional Access Policies
Conditional access policies require users who want to access a resource to complete an action. Conditional access policies also account for common signals, such as user or group memberships, IP location information, device, application, and risky sign-in behavior identified through integration with Azure AD Identity Protection.
Review current conditional access policies to determine if changes are necessary.
Reset All Passwords and Establish Secure Password Policies
In response to the incident, the victim organization reset passwords for all users.
Employ strong password management alongside other attribute-based information, such as device information, time of access, user history, and geolocation data. Set a password policy to require complex passwords for all users (minimum of 16 characters) and enforce this new requirement as user passwords expire [CPG 2.A],[CPG 2.B],[CPG 2.C].
Store credentials in a secure manner, such as with a credential manager, vault, or other privileged account management solution [CPG 2.L].
CISA recommends that vendors incorporate secure by design principles and tactics into their practices, limiting the impact of threat actor techniques and strengthening the secure posture for their customers.
Prioritize secure by default configurations, such as eliminating default passwords and providing high-quality audit logs to customers with no additional configuration, at no extra charge. Secure by default configurations should be prioritized to eliminate the need for customer implementation of hardening guidance.
Implement multifactor authentication (MFA), ideally phishing-resistant MFA, as a default (rather than opt-in) feature for all products.
VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS
In addition to applying mitigations, CISA and MS-ISAC recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. CISA recommends testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.
To get started:
Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see table 2-9).
Align your security technologies against the technique.
Test your technologies against the technique.
Analyze your detection and prevention technologies’ performance.
Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.
CISA and MS-ISAC recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. CISA and MS-ISAC do not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by CISA or MS-ISAC.
Department Strengthens Commitment to Advancing Equity in its Policies, Programs, and Operations
WASHINGTON – Today, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced the release of the 2023 Update to the DHS Equity Action Plan, which builds on the progress made in the 2022 inaugural plan to further embed equity at the center of the Department’s mission. The 2023 Update highlights DHS’s accomplishments over the past three years and identifies nine focus areas to comprehensively advance equity across the Department’s policies, programs, and operations.
DHS selected the nine focus areas in the 2023 Update based on feedback from external stakeholders representing underserved communities. These nine areas include the following strategies and initiatives:
Advance equity through the planned updates to the FEMA Individual Assistance Program, which will create opportunities for underserved communities by increasing accessibility and eligibility for post-disaster support.
Reduce barriers to citizenship and naturalization through continued evaluation of programs, policies, and outreach opportunities.
Promote equitable use of AI technology across the Department through the development and application of new guidance as well as intra-agency coordination.
Counter Domestic Violent Extremism and targeted violence through a public health-informed approach.
Advance equity for persons who are Limited English Proficient (LEP) by strengthening language access programs.
Advance equity in DHS’s screening activities at airport checkpoints and ports of entry through updates to training and enhanced technologies.
Advance equity for the 574 federally recognized Tribal Nations and their citizens by ensuring appropriate Tribal consideration and representation in the Department’s work.
Advance equity for persons seeking humanitarian protection during immigration processing by strengthening programs available to assist them.
Advance equity through Community Disaster Resilience Zones.
The 2023 Update also notes the following accomplishments, among many others:
Exceeded all small business prime and socioeconomic goals as negotiated with the Small Business Administration in FY 2023. This equates to $9.94 billion awarded to small businesses, including $4.69 billion to small disadvantaged businesses. DHS is the largest spending agency to have achieved this goal.
Deployed TSA’s new software to over 1,000 Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) screening systems at airports across the country: Updates to the software algorithm eliminate the need for security officers to determine a passenger’s gender prior to AIT screening, enhance accuracy, and significantly reduce false alarms and pat downs for all passengers. It is projected to reduce instances of enhanced screening for members of underserved communities.
Updated medical certification for disability exceptions and related policy guidance: Applicants for naturalization with a physical or developmental disability or mental impairment may request an exception to the English and civics testing requirements for naturalization. This form and policy update streamlines the process for applicants to claim and substantiate a disability by eliminating unnecessary and duplicative questions.