IAEA Concludes Long Term Operational Safety Review at Unit 1 of the Angra Nuclear Power Plant in Brazil

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team of experts completed a review of long term operational safety at Unit 1 of the Angra Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) in Brazil.

The Safety Aspects of Long Term Operation (SALTO) review mission was requested by the Eletronuclear S.A, the public entity that owns and operates Angra NPP. Two IAEA pre-SALTO missions in 2013 and 2018, followed by a pre-SALTO follow-up in 2022, were previously conducted to review the long term safety of the unit.

Eletronuclear submitted a license renewal application to the Brazilian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (CNEN) in 2019 to extend the operating lifetime of the 640 Megawatt electric (MWe) Unit 1 from 40 to 60 years. The plant, located 150 kilometres west of Rio de Janeiro, went into commercial operation in 1985 and its current operating licence expires in December of 2024. The two other units of Angra NPP, the 1350 MWe Unit 2, which started its commercial operation in 2001, and the 1405 Mwe Unit 3, which is under construction, were not part of the review.

During the ten-day mission from 4 to 13 June, the team reviewed the plant’s preparedness, organization and programmes for safe long term operation (LTO). The mission was conducted by a twelve-person team comprising experts from Argentina, Bulgaria, Finland, Japan, Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, Slovakia, and the United States, as well as two IAEA staff members. The team held discussions with staff from Angra NPP and conducted plant walkdowns during the review.

“The team noted the progress in measures taken by the operator to ensure the safe LTO of the plant. The professionalism, openness and receptiveness for improvements to meet and move beyond the IAEA safety standards in operation are commendable,” said Gabor Petofi, team leader and IAEA Senior Nuclear Safety Officer. He added that “most of the ageing management and LTO activities are already in alignment with IAEA Safety Standards. We encourage the plant to address the review findings and proceed with the implementation of all remaining activities for safe LTO.”

The team identified several good practices and good performances at the Angra NPP that will be shared with the nuclear industry globally, including:

  • The confirmation process to regularly evaluate and improve ageing management programmes.
  • The software tool developed to determine opportunistic inspections of components.
  • The use of artificial intelligence to determine the qualified life of plant equipment.

The team also provided recommendations to further enhance the preparations for  safe LTO, including for the plant to consider:

  • Consistently addressing and implementing all ageing management programme attributes for civil structures.
  • Improving the process of temporary design modifications for LTO.
  • Implementing a comprehensive equipment qualification programme.

The plant management expressed determination to address the areas identified for improvement and to invite a SALTO follow-up mission in 2026.

“Eletronuclar is strongly committed to satisfy all regulatory requirements and implement all possible improvements that can be derived from international best practices and IAEA Safety Standards” said Abelardo da Cruz Viera, Angra Unit 1 plant manager. “The SALTO findings will help us ensure a safe and reliable completion of LTO activities and improve performance for the next cycle of operation of the plant”.

The team provided its draft report to the plant management and CNEN at the end of the mission. The plant management and CNEN will have an opportunity to make factual comments on the draft. The final report will be submitted to the plant management, CNEN and the Brazilian Government within three months.

This mission was supported by the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Programme which assists Member States in the use of nuclear technology for sustainable socioeconomic development.

Background

Information on SALTO missions can be found here.

A SALTO peer review is a comprehensive safety review addressing strategy and key elements for the safe long term operation of nuclear power plants. They complement OSART missions, which are designed as a review of programmes and activities essential to operational safety. Neither SALTO nor OSART reviews are regulatory inspections, nor are they design reviews or substitutes for an exhaustive assessment of a plant’s overall safety status.

LTO of nuclear power plants is defined as operation beyond an established time frame determined by the license term, the original plant design, relevant standards or national regulations. As stated in IAEA safety standards, to maintain a plant’s fitness for service, consideration should be given to life limiting processes and features of systems, structures and components (SSC), as well as to reasonably practicable safety upgrades to enhance the safety of the plant to a level approaching that of modern plants.

Update 232 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

The International Atomic Energy Agency rotated its teams at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) today. Since the Agency established a continued presence at the site in September 2022, 20 teams of experts have crossed the frontline of the conflict in Ukraine to reach the plant, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said.

The rotation took place one day after Director General Grossi met with Swiss Foreign Minister Ignazio Cassis, ahead of the Swiss-hosted Summit on Peace in Ukraine, scheduled for June 15 and 16. Director General Grossi briefed Foreign Minister Cassis on the IAEA’s unique role in preventing a nuclear or radiological accident amid the ongoing military conflict.

“The IAEA is the only international organization with a permanent presence at nuclear facilities in Ukraine, including the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant. We continue to provide technical support and independent information to the world,” said Director General Grossi. “I urge all states attending the Peace Summit to strengthen and support the unique, independent, and technical role of the IAEA.”

On the ground, the IAEA team at ZNPP reported hearing explosions, including close to the plant, on several days over the past week. They confirmed with the plant that one of the mines located next to the ZNPP cooling pond area exploded on 11 June.  There were no physical damage or casualties from the explosion and the cause of the explosion was not shared with the IAEA team.

“This latest explosion, so close to the plant, is of grave concern and is aggravating an already fragile situation,” said Director General Grossi, who continued that “nuclear safety and security of the ZNPP cannot be compromised.”

On Monday, the IAEA experts visited one of the electrical sub-stations located in the nearby town of Enerhodar. The purpose was to observe the impact of an alleged shelling which, according to the ZNPP, occurred on 8 June. The alleged shelling resulted in a fire and damage to the substation which serves the Enerhodar city council building where the main communication hub between the ZNPP and Enerhodar is located. The ZNPP confirmed that the damage did not interrupt the communication lines.

Last week, the IAEA team observed testing of one of the safety trains in Unit 2 at the plant. Nuclear power reactors, such as those at the ZNPP, each have three separate and independent redundant systems – known as safety trains – comprising their safety systems. The planned test simulated the loss of regular power supply to one of the safety trains, which required the emergency diesel generator of that safety train to activate to supply the power required. The team was informed by the ZNPP that the test was successful, and no issues were identified.

During meetings with the ZNPP over the past week, the IAEA team discussed the number and qualification of staff working in the main control room of the plant. The ZNPP confirmed that, with all six units being in cold shutdown, three authorized personnel would be on duty for each shift in the main control room, with a minimum requirement for two to be present at all times.

As part of its regular walk downs of the plant, the team earlier this week visited the pumping station of Unit 4 where one circulation pump is used to maintain the flow of cooling water between the ZNPP discharge and intake channels. The operation of the circulation pumps is dependent on the overall water level in the ZNPP cooling pond, which continues to drop after the destruction of the Kakhovka dam in June 2023. The IAEA experts were recently informed that the ZNPP has installed a submersible pump near the isolation gate of the discharge channel of the Zaporizhzhya Thermal Power Plant, which is capable of pumping 100 m3 of water per hour from the Kakhovka reservoir into the channel, which is then pumped into the ZNPP cooling pond. The 12 sprinkler ponds used to cool the six reactors and safety systems continue to be fed with approximately 250 m3 of water per hour from 11 groundwater wells.

This week, the team also observed the real-time monitoring system of the storage casks, containing spent fuel from all six reactors, at the ZNPP dry spent fuel storage facility.

Emergency preparedness and response arrangements are crucial for nuclear safety at any nuclear power plant. The IAEA team engaged in discussions with ZNPP regarding the outcomes of the emergency drill conducted at the plant on 15 May. ZNPP confirmed that the drill successfully achieved its objectives and identified several valuable lessons. An action plan is being implemented to address the areas identified for improvement during the drill.

At Ukraine’s other nuclear power plants – Khelmnytskyy, Rivne and South Ukraine, and the Chornobyl site – IAEA teams continue to perform routine walkdowns and conduct meetings with the facilities to assess nuclear safety and security. The teams reported that despite the effects of the ongoing conflict, including air raid alarms over the past week, nuclear safety and security is being maintained. Nevertheless, the IAEA is continuing to follow the situation with regard to external power very closely at each of these plants, where a loss of off-site power event has the potential to be serious given the higher nuclear fuel temperatures for reactors in operation in Ukraine. 

The teams reported that one reactor unit at both the Rivne and South Ukraine NPPs remains shut down for planned maintenance and refuelling, while one other unit at the South Ukraine NPP resumed operations after the completion of its scheduled maintenance and refuelling, which concluded safely and successfully.

Over the past two days, the IAEA experts observed a large scale emergency exercise conducted at the South Ukraine NPP which also included participation from the Khelmnytskyy and Rivne NPPs.

The teams at Khelmnytskyy, Rivne and South Ukraine have all rotated over the last week.

IAEA Mission Recognizes Canada’s Robust Regulatory Framework for Safety, Encourages Continued Improvements

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team of experts said Canada has a comprehensive and robust regulatory framework for nuclear and radiation safety. The team also encouraged continued efforts to further align regulatory policies with the IAEA safety standards.

The Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) follow-up mission was conducted from 4 to 10 June at the request of the Government of Canada and hosted by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC). The team found that Canada has addressed most of the four recommendations and 16 suggestions made during the initial IRRS mission in 2019.

Using IAEA safety standards and international good practices, IRRS missions are designed to strengthen the effectiveness of the national legal and regulatory infrastructures while recognizing the responsibility of each country to ensure nuclear and radiation safety.

The IRRS team – comprised of 7 regulatory experts from 7 IAEA Member States, and three IAEA staff members – met with the CNSC and other representatives from Natural Resources Canada and Health Canada at CNSC headquarters in Ottawa during the seven-day follow-up mission.

Canada has a comprehensive nuclear safety regulatory framework covering facilities and activities. Its 19 operating nuclear power reactors – situated at four sites – generate about 13 per cent of Canada’s electricity. Canada also has uranium mines and mills, processing and fuel fabrication facilities, and waste storage sites. Canada also uses radiation sources in medical, industrial, scientific, and research applications, and has five research reactors.

The IRRS team said Canada strives to continuously upgrade its regulatory framework to address new challenges and upcoming technologies such as the development of small modular reactors and repositories for radioactive waste.

“The team recognizes the hard work and progress in strengthening the regulatory framework on nuclear, waste, and transport safety in Canada,” said Mission Team Leader, Ritva Bly, Principal Advisor, Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, STUK. “The joint efforts of CNSC, Natural Resources Canada, and Health Canada have further enhanced radiation safety.”

The CNSC human resources plan was recognized as a good performance. The team said it clearly and transparently addresses challenges and risks and includes a wide range of diverse strategies and actions, as well as performance indicators to track and measure outcomes in line with the organization’s strategic objectives.

Of the 4 recommendations and 16 suggestions made in 2019, 2 recommendations and 10 suggestions have been closed. Notable achievements have been made in: 

  • The radioactive waste management framework through the publication of the Integrated Strategy for Radioactive Waste and the revision of Canada’s Policy for Radioactive Waste Management and Decommissioning.
  • The conduct and processes for inspections of facilities and activities through further formalization of the CNSC programme guidance.
  • The consolidation of CNSC’s safety policy elements and the development of a process for performing regulatory policy review and analysis.
  • The revision and publication of regulatory and guidance documents in the areas of the transport of nuclear and radioactive materials and fuel cycle facilities, so that they are consistent with IAEA safety standards.

The team highlighted the remaining areas identified by the initial mission for alignment with the IAEA safety standards. These areas include:

  • Explicit justification of facilities and activities whereby radiation risks must be considered in terms of the overall benefit, in line with IAEA safety standards;
  • Full alignment of Radiation Protection Regulations with IAEA safety standards;
  • Implementation of constraints on dose or on risk, to be used in the optimization of protection for members of the public for nuclear facilities.

Speaking at the closing session of the mission, Anna Hajduk Bradford, Director of the IAEA Division of Nuclear Installation Safety, emphasized the collaborative spirit of the mission. “This comprehensive review underscores the commitment of Canada to enhancing its nuclear and radiation safety measures,” she said. “I commend Canada for requesting the mission.”

“The comprehensive review conducted by the IAEA IRRS team during this follow up mission has validated the effectiveness of Canada’s regulatory framework for nuclear and radiation safety,” said Ramzi Jammal, acting Chief Executive Officer of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission. “More importantly, the resulting assessment from this diverse team of nuclear and radiation safety experts has provided us with different views and perspectives to help ensure our standards remain aligned with international best practices. The hard work we dedicated toward closing the mission’s recommendations and suggestions led to many enhancements, including the modernization of our radioactive waste management and decommission policy, a testament to our commitment to enhancing the safety, security and safeguard frameworks in Canada.”

The final mission report will be provided to the Government in about three months.

IAEA safety standards

The IAEA safety standards provide a robust framework of fundamental principles, requirements and guidance to ensure safety. They reflect an international consensus and serve as a global reference for protecting people and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation.

Update 231 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

The challenging nuclear safety and security situation in Ukraine was in the spotlight again this week at the International Atomic Energy Agency, with its Board of Governors discussing recent developments detailed in a new IAEA report and Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi meeting the country’s energy minister.

Director General Grossi and Energy Minister German Galushchenko discussed the IAEA’s ongoing efforts to support nuclear safety and security in Ukraine in their meeting today on the sidelines of the regularly scheduled June Board session at IAEA headquarters, where the Director General earlier in the week made clear his continued deep concerns about the situation.

Nuclear safety and security remains especially precarious at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), and is potentially also fragile elsewhere in Ukraine following attacks on its energy infrastructure in recent months, including on electricity sub-stations which are vital in providing off-site power to the operating nuclear power stations, as well as to the ZNPP, Director General Grossi said after his talks with Minister Galushchenko.

Nuclear power plants (NPPs) need reliable access to off-site power in order to cool their reactors and for other essential nuclear safety and security functions, as underlined in the Seven Pillars of Nuclear Safety and Security. However, Ukraine’s electricity grid has been severely impacted by the conflict, with the ZNPP repeatedly losing connections to all its power lines.

“For the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant in particular, the external power situation remains extremely vulnerable, prone to frequent outages. But it is also a wider concern in the current circumstances, where a loss of off-site power event has the potential to be even more serious given the higher nuclear fuel temperatures for reactors in operation in Ukraine.  We are continuing to follow the situation very closely in this regard, as I also informed Minister Galushchenko in today’s meeting,” Director General Grossi said.

Director General Grossi, who had met with Rosatom head Alexey Likhachev in the Russian city of Kaliningrad last week, reiterated to Ukraine’s energy minister that there was an understanding that the ZNPP would not be re-started as long as nuclear safety and security remained in jeopardy due to the conflict.

“In these circumstances, operating this major nuclear plant would not be advisable,” he said.

Ahead of this week’s Board meeting, the Director General issued the 11th report on nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine since the conflict began in February 2022, covering developments in the three months to 24 May this year.

At the ZNPP this week, the IAEA team of experts stationed at the site has continued to conduct regular walkdowns to monitor nuclear safety and security at the plant.

At the same time, the team has continued to hear explosions some distance away from the site, a regular reminder of the ZNPP’s frontline location.

A year after the destruction of the downstream Kakhovka dam disrupted the ZNPP’s supplies of cooling water, the team visited the site’s cooling pond and observed that its height was almost 1.5 metres below the level before the dam was destroyed.

The plant, whose six reactors are all in cold shutdown, receives the cooling water it needs, for the reactors in the current shutdown state, from 11 groundwater wells that were built to supply about 250 m3 of water per hour to the site’s sprinkler ponds.

The IAEA team continues to closely monitor the maintenance activities at the plant, another area highlighted by the Director General as posing a potential risk to nuclear safety and security in his Board statement on Monday.

As part of these activities, the IAEA experts visited the 750 kilovolt (kV) open switchyard and discussed ongoing maintenance on the relay protections for the transformer of reactor unit 2, among other activities.  

They saw that some of the switchyard components, for one of the 750 kV lines, that were damaged in 2022 had been dismantled. However, the ZNPP is not currently planning to complete repairs, at this time, as the line itself remains unavailable due to damage sustained earlier in the conflict, away from the site. The ZNPP had four 750 kV lines available before the conflict, but only one is remaining.

The IAEA experts were informed that western-supplied switchyard equipment, installed before the conflict, remained in good condition. The ZNPP also stated that some spare parts remain available on site from western supplies and, if required, it can order similar equipment through suppliers from the Russian Federation. 

The IAEA team of experts also visited the two fresh fuel storage facilities and the turbine building of unit 6, once again without being granted access to the western side of the building.

In addition, the ZNPP informed the IAEA experts on the status of its on- and off-site radiation monitoring stations. The team was informed that all four on-site radiation monitoring stations are operational, but that three of the 14 off-site stations remain damaged as a result of military activities in 2022.

The ZNPP said that manual radiation monitoring measurements are also carried out, and that there are plans to purchase new radiation monitoring stations consistent with the regulations of the Russian Federation, and a mobile radiation measurement laboratory for use in case of a nuclear or radiological emergency.

The IAEA experts present at Ukraine’s other NPPs – Khelmnytskyy, Rivne and South Ukraine – and the Chornobyl site continue to perform routine walkdowns and assess nuclear safety and security. The teams reported that nuclear safety and security is being maintained despite the effects of the ongoing conflict, including air raid alarms on several days over the past week.

One reactor unit at each of the Rivne and the South Ukraine NPPs were in shutdown over the last week for planned maintenance and refuelling, while one other unit at the South Ukraine NPP is in planned outage. 

IAEA Mission Concludes Site and External Events Design Review for Nuclear Power Plant in Sri Lanka

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team of experts has concluded a seven-day safety review of Sri Lanka’s selection process to identify potential sites to build its first nuclear power plant. The South Asian country is pursuing the introduction of nuclear power to increase its low carbon power production to meet energy demand, tackle climate change and increase energy security.

The Site and External Events Design Review Service (SEED) mission, which took place from 30 May to 5 June, reviewed Sri Lanka’s adherence to IAEA guidance on site selection, including exclusion and screening criteria. Sri Lanka has completed the site survey stage and identified six candidate sites from three different regions. The next phase, which is ongoing, includes evaluation, comparison and ranking studies of the candidate sites.

The SEED mission was carried out at the request of the Government of Sri Lanka and hosted by the Sri Lanka Atomic Energy Board (SLAEB) under the purview of the Ministry of Power and Energy.

The team comprised of three experts from Canada, Pakistan and Türkiye, as well as one IAEA staff. They reviewed the site survey report, together with the siting process, siting criteria, data collection process and application of the management system for siting activities. The team also visited and observed one of the candidate sites in Pulmoddai, near the Trincomalee region.

“Sri Lanka is comprehensively screening site-specific external hazards in the site selection process, while following the IAEA safety standards and adopting best practices,” said mission team leader Ayhan Altinyollar, an IAEA Nuclear Safety Officer.

The team provided recommendations to optimize the site evaluation process to select the most favourable site. In particular, the IAEA team recommended that SLAEB:

As a good practice, the team noted that SLAEB has been conducting collaborative siting studies in an open and transparent manner with stakeholder organizations, such as the Geological Survey and Mines Bureau, Central Environmental Authority and the Department of Geology of University of Peradeniya.

“Sri Lanka has identified nuclear as a clean and green energy source to fulfil the future electricity demand in Sri Lanka. In March 2024, the Cabinet of Ministers made a strategic and knowledgeable commitment towards the country’s nuclear power planning programme. Interpretation and application of IAEA safety standards within the context of site selection for a nuclear power plant is crucial for a strong nuclear power programme in Sri Lanka,” said Professor Rexy Denzil Rosa, Chairman of SLAEB.

The mission team briefed the Secretary of the Ministry of Power and Energy, Sulakshana Jayawardhana, and the Director General of the Geological Survey and Mines Bureau, Ranjith Premasiri, about the review of Sri Lanka’s selection process and findings of the SEED mission.

Sri Lanka also hosted a national workshop on nuclear law in November 2023, as well as an IAEA Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR) mission in April 2022, which reviewed the country’s infrastructure development for a nuclear power programme.

The final SEED mission report will be delivered to the Government of Sri Lanka within three months.

About Site and External Events Design Review Service (SEED) missions

SEED missions are expert review missions that assist countries going through different stages in the development of a nuclear power programme. The service offers a choice of modules on which to focus the review, such as site selection, site assessment and design of structures, systems and components, taking into consideration site specific external and internal hazards.

In the case of site selection review, SEED missions assess the appropriate consideration of the safety issues in the site selection process.

Update 230 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi met with senior Russian officials this week as part of the continuing efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to help prevent a nuclear accident at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).

During Tuesday’s meeting in Kaliningrad with Alexey Likhachev, head of Russian state nuclear company Rosatom, Director General Grossi again raised those factors that the IAEA believes remain a real challenge for nuclear safety. Specifically, these include the vulnerability of the ZNPP’s off-site power lines, its need for reliable water supplies to ensure reactor cooling and other essential functions, and the situation related to staffing and equipment maintenance.

As Director General Grossi has repeatedly stressed, the IAEA must engage with both Ukraine and the Russian Federation on matters related to nuclear safety and security, which remains precarious, especially at the ZNPP.

“The Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant is continuing to face serious nuclear safety and security risks. We can’t afford to let our guard down for a single minute,” Director General Grossi said after the meeting in the Russian city. “In view of these challenging and unprecedented circumstances – with Europe’s largest nuclear power plant located in a war zone – there is an understanding that its six reactors should remain in cold shutdown for the time being.”

“Even with all six reactors in cold shutdown, plant safety and security remain extremely fragile. Any decision to re-start the ZNPP’s reactors in the future – when it is safe to do so – must be preceded by a very careful and detailed examination of all operational and regulatory aspects relevant for nuclear safety and security to ensure that the plant is not further put in jeopardy,” he said.

On the ground at the ZNPP, the IAEA experts stationed at the site have continued to hear explosions on most days over the past week, normally at distances away from the plant. However, on Sunday, the team was awakened by four explosions near the site. The ZNPP informed the team that there was no damage to the plant.

Also this week, the IAEA experts have conducted regular walkdowns to monitor nuclear safety and security, including ongoing and planned maintenance activities on parts of the safety systems, such as the emergency core cooling system of the unit 1 reactor, and on the main electrical transformer of unit 2.

The IAEA team visited the ZNPP’s maintenance workshop, where they were told that all machines are in operational condition and able to perform necessary maintenance tasks.

During a visit to the reactor building and safety systems rooms of unit 4, the IAEA experts observed equipment including steam generators and the main cooling pumps. They noted that generally the housekeeping was good, but they did observe some oil on the floor of the reactor hall coming from the overhead cranes, as well as boron deposits on the floors of some of the safety systems rooms, which are not uncommon for such facilities. The ZNPP confirmed these would be addressed through cleaning and maintenance.

Over the past week, the IAEA team also observed the successful performance of routine testing of emergency diesel generators of units 4 and 6.

The experts visited four levels of the turbine building of unit 5 where they observed the status of different types of equipment, including the main feedwater pumps, main steam valves and the main condenser, but once again were denied access to the western side of the building.

The IAEA experts also met with the site’s Chemistry Control Division, where they were informed of the technological process used for water treatment and were also told that all necessary consumables and chemical reagents have been supplied from the Russian Federation. The team was further informed that the division has sufficient staff, including personnel that have come from Russian nuclear power plants (NPPs).

While visiting the ZNPP’s thermal mechanical warehouse, the IAEA team saw its diesel generator spare parts and electrical equipment. The team observed spare parts from various manufacturers, including from Western suppliers before the conflict, as well as some from the Russian Federation. The ZNPP informed the team that it had completed its transition to a Russian-based spare parts and equipment database.

The IAEA experts also went to the temporary shelters located inside each reactor building, which were established by the ZNPP in 2022 due to the unavailability of the original shelters. The team was informed that up to 1000 people can be sheltered on site in these temporary shelters.

As the summer approaches, the warmer temperatures and drier climate have contributed to wildfires in the areas around the ZNPP. Late last week, the IAEA experts could both see and smell smoke from what the ZNPP said was a forest fire on the other side of the Dnipro river. On Tuesday, the IAEA team saw a wildfire south of the 750 kilovolt (kV) open switchyard, but it appeared to have been extinguished later in the week and did not cause any damage to electrical systems.

Elsewhere in Ukraine, the IAEA experts present at the Khelmnytskyy, Rivne and South Ukraine NPPs and the Chornobyl site reported that nuclear safety and security is being maintained despite the effects of the ongoing conflict, including air raid alarms on several days over the past week.

Over the past week, two reactor units at the Rivne NPP successfully re-started after the planned outages for refuelling and maintenance were safely completed ahead of schedule. The Rivne NPP now has three units in full power operation, while the fourth reactor is being prepared for shutdown for planned refuelling and maintenance. Meanwhile, the planned maintenance activities at one of the reactor units at the South Ukraine NPP are continuing according to schedule.

The IAEA continues with the delivery of much-needed equipment and supplies for maintaining nuclear safety and security in Ukraine. This week, the Agency organized two deliveries of nuclear safety and security equipment to Ukraine, bringing the total number of deliveries to 49 since the start of the armed conflict. The KhNPP, SUNPP and USIE Izotop – a Ukrainian state enterprise involved in the management of radioactive material intended for medical, industrial and other purposes – received physical protection equipment and atmospheric probing systems. The equipment was procured using extrabudgetary contributions from the European Union and the United Kingdom.

Update 229 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) temporarily lost the connection to its sole remaining 750 kilovolt (kV) off-site power line this afternoon due to a reported short-circuit, leaving it reliant on a single back-up line for more than three hours, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said today.

The disconnection of the 750kV Dniprovksa line once again underlines the extremely precarious nuclear safety and security situation at the ZNPP during the armed conflict. It occurred at 1:31pm local time around six kilometres away from the ZNPP’s 750 kV open switchyard, in Russian-controlled territory. The ZNPP informed the IAEA experts stationed at the site that it was caused by a short-circuit, without providing further details. The line was re-connected at 4:49pm, the plant said.

The event also amplifies concerns around attacks on the electrical power infrastructure elsewhere in Ukraine, as indicated last week, highlighting the risk to the ZNPP as well to the other operating nuclear power plants (NPPs) in the country. When the 750 kV line was disconnected, the ZNPP received external electricity from its only 330 kV back-up line and it is particularly vulnerable to such disruptions, as illustrated by today’s event. Before the conflict, the plant had four 750 kV and six 330 kV lines available.

“For Europe’s largest nuclear power plant to depend on one or two power lines is a deep source of concern and clearly not sustainable. Our concerns also extend to the operating NPPs across Ukraine, where a disruption to off-site power supplies could have very serious implications for nuclear safety,” Director General Grossi said.

Earlier this week, the ZNPP also informed the IAEA of a drone attack on a transport workshop in the nearby industrial area, reportedly causing some damage but no casualties, Director General Grossi said. If confirmed, Wednesday’s purported strike, around four kilometres from the ZNPP site, would further underline the continuing military-related risks facing this major nuclear facility, following last month’s drone attacks targeting the site itself, Director General Grossi said.

The ZNPP said a civil communications network antenna was damaged in the attack at the transport workshop, where buses used for transporting plant personnel to the nearby town of Enerhodar are kept.

In addition, the IAEA team of experts stationed at the ZNPP have continued to hear explosions at various distances from the plant over the past week.

“For the outside world, the situation at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant may have appeared relatively calm in recent weeks, since the drone attacks on the site confirmed by our experts in mid-April. But this is not the way we see the situation on the ground. The stark reality is one of constant danger. The nuclear safety and security situation at the site remains extremely vulnerable,” Director General Grossi said.

Over the past week, the IAEA team of experts has continued to carry out walkdowns across the site, visiting the reactor building and safety systems rooms of unit 3, where they observed key equipment including steam generators and a main cooling pump, as well as a planned change of the duty spent fuel pool pump.

The team did not observe any boron deposits but noted a small water leak from the ventilation system piping, which the ZNPP stated would be serviced as part of planned upcoming maintenance. The team also visited the turbine hall of unit 3, where they were able to observe some of the equipment but were – once again – not granted access to the western side of the hall.

The IAEA experts are continuing to monitor the maintenance activities at the ZNPP, which are crucial for long-term nuclear safety and security, as the Director General has repeatedly emphasized.

Maintenance work on part of the safety systems of unit 1 resumed this week, after it was postponed in March, as previously reported. Electrical maintenance activities on the unit 2 main transformer as well as on one of the plant’s backup power transformers, began this week. The cleaning of one of the sprinkler ponds, which supplies water for the cooling of unit 6 and its safety systems has been completed while the cleaning of a unit 5 sprinkler pond is expected to finish today.

In addition, the IAEA team observed the successful performance of routine testing of an emergency diesel generator for unit 1, activities that need to be carried out regularly, especially in view of the site’s fragile off-site power situation.

With all six reactor units in cold shutdown – and therefore no longer generating heat or steam – the ZNPP informed the IAEA team that it had, once again, put two of the nine mobile diesel boilers back in operation to generate hot water for the site’s own needs.

In addition, the IAEA experts visited the ZNPP training centre where they observed main control room staff undergoing training on the full-scope simulators, while also having some discussions on the training of personnel.

Also this week, the team went to the site’s main warehouse facility, located outside of the ZNPP perimeter, to examine a range of electrical spare parts including small and medium sized transformers and electrical control cabinets, as well as larger electrical and mechanical equipment, all stored properly and in good condition.

However, the team noted that much of the electrical equipment originated from western suppliers and was delivered prior to the start of the armed conflict. The ZNPP representative explained that the transition to a new software system for managing spare parts is almost complete and that the plant is now able to publish tenders for the procurement of new spare parts and equipment from potential suppliers in the Russian Federation.

The IAEA experts present at the Khelmnytskyy, Rivne and South Ukraine NPPs and the Chornobyl site reported that nuclear safety and security is being maintained despite the effects of the ongoing conflict, including air raid alarms on several days over the past week.

Two of the four reactor units at the Rivne NPP have completed refuelling activities and are expected to resume generating power in the near future, while the maintenance and refuelling activities at one unit at the South Ukraine NPP are progressing according to schedule.

At the Chornobyl site, the IAEA experts visited the State Specialized Enterprise Ecocentre (SSE-Ecocentre) to discuss the activities performed to monitor the radiological situation in the area and the challenges faced as a result of the armed conflict.

The IAEA teams at the Khelmnytskyy, Rivne and South Ukraine NPPs have all rotated over the past week.

The Agency continues with the delivery of much-needed equipment and supplies for maintaining nuclear safety and security in Ukraine. In the 47th delivery since the start of the armed conflict, Ukraine’s USIE Izotop, a Ukrainian state enterprise involved in management of radioactive material intended for medical, industrial and other purposes, this week received a physical protection system funded by the United Kingdom. With this delivery, Ukraine received almost €9.4 million worth of nuclear safety and security equipment thanks to the support provided by a number of donors to the Agency.

IAEA Conference Focusses on Strengthening and Sustaining Nuclear Security Amid Emerging Threats

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Over 130 countries meet at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) this week to strengthen nuclear security efforts to counter the threat of nuclear terrorism and other malicious acts in the face of emerging risks.

At yesterday’s opening session of the International Conference on Nuclear Security, a major nuclear security event happening every four years, the Co-Presidents released a joint statement recognising how the growing use of nuclear science and technology requires robust nuclear security measures to enhance and protect nuclear material and other radioactive material against theft and nuclear facilities against sabotage.

The joint statement from Tim Watts, Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, and Sungat Yessimkhanov, Vice-Minister of Energy of Kazakhstan, the Co-Presidents of the Conference, was finalised following negotiations with all IAEA Member States. It highlights how emerging and innovative technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI), present both challenges and benefits for nuclear security.

The joint statement reaffirmed that nuclear security measures may enhance public confidence in the peaceful use of nuclear applications. The global application of nuclear technology continues to expand, spanning from clean energy to life-saving advancements such as radiotherapy for cancer patients, and even the development of novel crop varieties through irradiation.

Nuclear security is a national responsibility and involves preventing, detecting and responding to malicious acts with nuclear material, radioactive substances or their associated facilities. The increasing global use of digital technologies means that concrete vigilance is needed to precisely address computer security threats, cyberattacks and any potential vulnerabilities that digital technologies have and are presenting.

“The many benefits from nuclear applications depend on a strong and adaptive global nuclear security regime and laser-focused vigilance. Groups with malicious intent must not be given a chance to use nuclear and radioactive material to cause panic or harm,” said IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi at the opening of the week-long conference at IAEA headquarters.

The joint statement reaffirms the common goals of nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy and recognizes that nuclear security contributes to international peace and security.

National statements delivered messages on achievements in nuclear security since the last ICONS conference in 2020 and supported the central role of the IAEA in assisting Member States, upon request, in establishing and improving effective and sustainable national nuclear security regimes, including through guidance development, peer review and advisory services and capacity building.

“Our attendance at ICONS, a key event for our global nuclear security community, signals our shared commitment to strengthening nuclear security,” said Assistant Minister Watts. “It provides an opportunity for us to progress aligned commitments and priorities and to work closely on our respective national nuclear security regimes.”

“Despite some risks and challenges — from climate change and natural disasters to global pandemics — AI products and advanced computing technologies offer new opportunities to strengthen nuclear security regimes,” said Vice-Minister Yessimkhanov. “Strengthening national nuclear security regimes helps to prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material.”

About the International Conference on Nuclear Security

Over 2000 participants from more than 130 IAEA Member States and organizations are gathering for the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Shaping the Future (ICONS2024). It follows earlier high-level IAEA nuclear security conferences held in 2013, 2016 and 2020. The conference covers topics including policy, law and regulations for nuclear security; technology and infrastructure for nuclear security prevention, detection and response; capacity building for nuclear security, as well as other cross-cutting nuclear security topics.

Since the ICONS 2020 conference (February 2020), the IAEA has expanded its nuclear security work. A Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre was inaugurated in October 2023, and 28 events have already been held in this the first international training centre on nuclear security. The Agency has provided support to 22 major public events, including the 28th United Nations Conference of the Parties (COP) held in Dubai in December 2023 and the Africa Cup of Nations held in Cote D’Ivoire in January 2024.

The Agency yesterday also released the 2024 Factsheet for the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB), citing 168 incidents reported by 31 States in 2023. A total of 4243 incidents of illegal or unauthorized activities involving nuclear and other radioactive material have been reported since 1993.

IAEA Database on Trafficking of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Records 4243 Incidents Since 1993

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

A total of 4243 incidents of illegal or unauthorized activities involving nuclear and other radioactive material have been reported in the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) since 1993, according to a new factsheet released by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) today. In 2023, 168 incidents were reported by 31 States, in line with historical averages.

The ITDB receives information on incidents ranging from illegal possession, attempted sale and smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive material to unauthorized disposal of material and discovery of lost radioactive sources. Six of the incidents reported in 2023 were likely related to trafficking or malicious use. There was insufficient information to determine the intent of ten incidents. The 152 incidents that were not connected to trafficking or malicious use primarily resulted from unauthorized disposal, unauthorized shipment or the discovery of radioactive material.

“The reoccurrence of incidents confirms the need for vigilance and continuous improvement of the regulatory oversight to control, secure and properly dispose radioactive material,” said Elena Buglova, Director of the IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Security. “The ITDB is a valuable resource that allows for the identification of potential threats and trends to support international cooperation and to improve the implementation of nuclear security.”

An analysis of the types of material involved in reported incidents indicates a decline in incidents involving nuclear material, such as uranium, plutonium and thorium. Since 1993, 14 per cent of all incidents involved nuclear material, 59 per cent involved other radioactive material and about 27 per cent involved radioactively contaminated and other material.

More than half – 52 per cent – of all thefts reported since 1993 have occurred during authorized transport, and in the last decade, transport-related thefts accounted for almost 65 per cent of all thefts.

“Nuclear and other radioactive material remain vulnerable to security threats during transport. Figures from the ITDB highlight the ongoing importance of strengthening transport security measures,” Buglova said. “The IAEA assists States with strengthening their national nuclear security regimes to guard nuclear and other radioactive material with physical protection and computer security measures to ensure it does not fall into the wrong hands.”

The release of the ITDB factsheet coincides with this week’s International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS). ICONS 2024 provides a forum for ministers, policymakers, senior officials and nuclear security experts to discuss the future of nuclear security worldwide, while providing an opportunity to exchange information, share best practices and foster international cooperation.

About the ITDB

With 145 participating States, the ITDB fosters global information exchange about incidents that involve nuclear and other radioactive material falling out of regulatory control because they were lost, stolen, improperly disposed of, or otherwise neglected. The ITDB’s data is voluntarily reported, and only participating States and relevant international organizations, such as the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), can access it. Somalia and Togo most recently joined the ITDB in 2023.

The ITDB covers incidents involving nuclear material, radioisotopes and radioactively contaminated material such as scrap metal. By reporting lost or stolen material to the ITDB, countries increase the chances of its recovery and reduce the opportunities for it to be used in criminal activities. States can also report scams or hoaxes where the material is purported to be nuclear or otherwise radioactive.

States wishing to join the ITDB need to submit the request, by post or email (official.mail@iaea.org), to the IAEA Division of Nuclear Security through the official channels (i.e. Permanent Mission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs or a national competent authority for nuclear security matters).

Tritium Level in Sixth Batch of ALPS Treated Water Far Below Japan’s Operational Limit, IAEA Confirms

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

The tritium concentration in the sixth batch of diluted ALPS treated water, which the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) began discharging on 17 May, is far below Japan’s operational limit, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) experts have confirmed.

The treated water was sampled and assessed by IAEA experts stationed at the Agency’s office at the site of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (FDNPS). After conducting an independent on-site analysis, the IAEA confirmed that the tritium concentration in the diluted water is far below the operational limit of 1500 becquerels per litre.

Japan is discharging the ALPS-treated water from the FDNPS in batches. The IAEA has earlier confirmed that the tritium concentrations in the previous five batches, totalling 38,900 cubic meters of water, were far below operational limits.

In a comprehensive report issued on 4 July 2023, the IAEA’s safety review found that Japan’s plan for handling the treated water was consistent with international safety standards and that the release as planned would have a negligible radiological impact to people and the environment.

All reports on sampling, independent analysis, data evaluation, as well as timeline, will be available on the IAEA website.