Category: Press Release

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Ukraine’s three operating nuclear power plants (NPPs) have largely restored their electricity production after sharply reducing output last week as a precautionary step due to renewed attacks on the country’s increasingly fragile energy grid, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said today.

The NPPs – Khmelnytskyy, Rivne and South Ukraine – have nine reactors, of which eight are currently operating while one is in shutdown. Over the past week, most of them have gradually increased output again, even though some units operated below full capacity for several days after the military strikes on 28 November, which affected electrical infrastructure that is essential for nuclear safety. Still, some of the off-site power lines that the plants use both for receiving and transmitting electricity remain disconnected.

“A stable electricity grid that provides secure off-site power is essential to ensure nuclear safety at Ukraine’s operating nuclear power plants, which are vital for producing the electricity the country needs, especially during the cold winter months. The operators have demonstrated significant resilience during and after this latest period of grid instability so that these plants can maintain nuclear safety and generate electricity following last week’s output cuts,“ Director General Grossi said.

“However, the fragile grid situation remains a source of deep concern and we will continue to closely monitor relevant developments, including with follow-up expert visits to the electrical substations on which the nuclear power plants depend. Once again, I call for maximum restraint, so that no action affecting the external power supply and nuclear safety is taken,” he said.

Despite the effects of the military conflict, including frequent air raid alarms, the IAEA teams at the Khmelnytskyy, Rivne and South Ukraine NPPs and the Chornobyl site reported that nuclear safety and security at these facilities is being maintained.

At the Khmelnytskyy NPP, the IAEA team members were required to shelter at the site for a short period of time on Tuesday, but without any impact on the site itself. At the South Ukraine NPP, the IAEA team was informed that a total of 17 drones were detected earlier this week, some three kilometres from the site.

Ukraine’s largest NPP – the Zaporizhzhya site – has not produced electricity for more than two years. Its six units are all in cold shutdown but still require off-site power for reactor cooling and other essential nuclear safety and security functions. However, the situation in this regard remains precarious, with both remaining power lines prone to frequent outages.

In the latest instances highlighting the precarious external power situation, the ZNPP’s last remaining 750 kilovolt (kV) power line was disconnected between 21-23 November, followed last weekend by a two-day disconnection of the 330 kV back-up power line.

Also related to the external power situation, the IAEA team was informed that the voltage stabilizer for the ZNPP’s 750 kV power line, located in an open switchyard outside the plant, was being repaired after it was automatically disconnected by the activation of a protection mechanism. The ZNPP expects to return the voltage stabilizer to operation within the next month. The 750 kV connection was not affected.  

The IAEA team has continued to closely follow the maintenance activities at the ZNPP, including  related to elements of the safety systems of reactor units 2, 3 and 6. The team also visited unit 1 to observe the repairs conducted last month on one leaking impulse line. The team was informed that gamma radiography had been performed on approximately 30 other locations in unit 1, which identified one more weld that had degraded, but without any leak. Both welds were repaired and tested again. The IAEA team will continue to monitor this issue.

The IAEA team continues to be denied access to the external spare parts warehouse and diesel fuel storage facility. However, it has been informed that the diesel fuel storage tank that was damaged more than two years ago has been repaired.

The IAEA team at the ZNPP has continued to hear explosions on most days, mostly at distances far away from the site, and no damage to the plant was reported.

As part of the IAEA’s comprehensive programme of assistance in support of nuclear safety and security, it arranged new deliveries of equipment to Ukraine, bringing the total to 86. The State Enterprise VostGok, an uranium ore mining and processing plant in Ukraine, received a dosimetry system to enhance the capacity to monitor individual doses for their staff exposed to ionizing radiation. The equipment was procured with funds from Japan. With funds provided by Denmark, the country’s Hydrometeorological Center and the Hydrometeorological organizations of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine received three portable liquid nitrogen generators. In addition, one Cisco integrated services router with 10 connecting switches was delivered to the Rivne NPP, made possible with funds provided by Ireland.

Separately, in partnership with France and Ukraine’s Energoatom, the IAEA assisted in the delivery of spare parts and rubber products needed for the timely maintenance of emergency diesel generators at the South Ukraine NPP.

With these deliveries, equipment related to nuclear safety and security worth more than 14 million euros has been delivered to Ukraine since the start of the conflict.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team of experts has commended Ghana for its commitment to the continuous improvement of nuclear and radiation safety as the country advances its plans to develop a nuclear power programme. The team emphasized that maintaining the effective independence of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA) in making safety-related decisions is crucial and urged the Government to ensure this independence is upheld and protected.

The ten-day full scope Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission – that took place from 25 November to 4 December – was conducted at the request of the Government of Ghana and hosted by the NRA in Accra. It was the first IRRS mission conducted in the country. Its purpose was to perform a peer review of Ghana’s legal and regulatory framework for nuclear, radiation, radioactive waste and transport safety, as well as the interface between safety and nuclear security.

IRRS missions are designed to strengthen the effectiveness of the national nuclear and radiation safety regulatory infrastructure, based on IAEA Safety Standards and international good practices, while recognizing the responsibility of each country to ensure nuclear and radiation safety.

Ghana is embarking on a nuclear power programme and is currently conducting preparatory work to develop the required safety infrastructure for a nuclear power plant, including drafting national policies for nuclear and radiation safety, as well radioactive waste management. Ghana also uses nuclear and radiation technologies in healthcare, agriculture, research and industry.

The IRRS team – comprised of 14 regulatory experts from 13 countries, as well as three IAEA staff members – engaged primarily with the management and staff of the NRA, as well as with representatives from the Ministry of Environment, Science, Technology and Innovation (MESTI) and the Ministry of Energy. Members of the IRRS team also undertook site visits to and observed regulatory inspection activities at the GHARR-1 Research Reactor facility, the Radioactive Waste Management Centre, an industrial facility using radiation sources and a hospital. During the site visits, the IRRS team members held discussions with management and staff of the facilities.

The IRRS team recognized that the NRA is committed to ensuring continuous improvement of safety and the protection of people and the environment. The IRRS team found that Ghana has affirmed its commitment to nuclear and radiation safety by initiating the development of its management system and regulatory guidance to ensure the consistent implementation of regulatory functions and activities, as well as by inviting an initial IRRS peer review mission.

“The efforts and constructive engagement of NRA staff during the peer review process enabled the IRRS team to gain a comprehensive understanding of Ghana’s regulatory framework,” said Thiagan Pather, IRRS mission Team Leader from the National Nuclear Regulator in South Africa. “As a country with ambitions for a nuclear power programme, it is important that the Government of Ghana and the Nuclear Regulatory Authority work together to deliver the improvements identified during the mission.”

The IRRS team highlighted Ghana’s commitment to safety, in line with international best practices through:

• Establishing the NRA as an independent nuclear regulatory authority;
• Delivering on Ghana’s national obligations under the various international instruments for nuclear and radiation safety;
• Initiating the strengthening of the regulatory framework for nuclear and radiation safety through the development of regulations and guides; and
• Providing support and advocacy for the NRA, through the provision of financial and human resources commensurate with the current national nuclear and radiation programme. This commitment aims to further enhance the regulatory capacity in line with the expanding nuclear power programme, enabling the NRA to grow its capability and capacity to maintain effective regulatory control of all nuclear and radiation facilities and activities in Ghana.

The IRRS team considers that Ghana’s primary challenge is the completion and issuance of regulations and guides to support the consistent and stable implementation of the National Regulatory Act, considering both the existing nuclear and radiation programme in the country and the envisaged nuclear power programme.

Recommendations and suggestions for further improvement include:

• The Government should establish and implement national policies strategies for safety and for radioactive waste management.

• The Government should ensure that all the elements for safety are established through legislation consistent with the IAEA Safety Standards.
• NRA should expedite the development and approval of the management system.
• NRA should establish and implement an enforcement policy and process, including criteria for corrective actions, for responding to non-compliance with regulatory requirements.
• NRA should develop an emergency plan and procedures for the functions assigned to it regarding preparedness and response to nuclear or radiological emergencies.

“The NRA appreciates the efforts of the IAEA to review its nuclear and radiation safety infrastructure within the context of this IRRS mission for Ghana,” said Aba Bentil Andam, NRA Board Chairperson. “The mission has provided the NRA with a clear understanding of the state of its regulatory infrastructure with reference to the IAEA Safety Standards. The results of the mission will be helpful to the NRA in its quest to improve the nuclear and radiation safety infrastructure to adequately ensure the protection of people and the environment.” The final mission report will be provided to the Government of Ghana in about three months.

“I am confident that the recommendations and suggestions by the IRRS review mission will be implemented by Ghana to strengthen their national regulatory framework for safety, and they intend to invite the IAEA for a follow-up mission within the next few years.” said Hildegarde Vandenhove, Director of the IAEA Division of Radiation, Transport and Waste Safety.

IAEA Safety Standards

The IAEA Safety Standards provide a robust framework of fundamental principles, requirements and guidance to ensure safety. They reflect an international consensus and serve as a global reference for protecting people and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team of experts said Bulgaria has a comprehensive and robust regulatory framework for nuclear and radiation safety covering all facilities and activities. The mission found that the overall performance of Bulgaria’s regulatory system would be enhanced with the adoption of a national safety policy and strategy in line with IAEA safety standards.

The Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission was conducted at the request of the Government of Bulgaria and hosted by the Bulgarian Nuclear Regulatory Agency (BNRA), the regulatory body for nuclear and radiation safety in Bulgaria, and the Ministry of Health (MoH). Taking place from 17 to 29 November, the IRRS reviewed Bulgaria’s national regulatory framework for nuclear, radiation, radioactive waste and transport safety.

Using IAEA safety standards and international good practices, IRRS missions are designed to strengthen the effectiveness of the national legal and regulatory infrastructures, while recognizing the responsibility of each country to ensure nuclear and radiation safety. This is the second IRRS mission that Bulgaria has hosted since the IAEA’s IRRS programme began in 2006.

The IRRS team consisted of 16 senior regulatory experts from 15 IAEA Member States, two observers and three IAEA staff members.

In Bulgaria, nuclear energy provides roughly 40 per cent of the country’s electricity through the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), which has two pressurized-water reactor units each providing an installed power of approximately 1000 MWe. The Bulgarian nuclear programme plans to construct two new nuclear power units utilizing AP1000 technology at the Kozloduy NPP site. The country also uses nuclear and radiation technologies in medicine, industry and research.

During the 12-day mission, the team met with officials from the BNRA and MoH and made site visits to observe regulatory inspections at the Kozloduy NPP; Kozloduy State Enterprise Radioactive Waste Management (SE RAW); Controltest Ltd., a company working in destructive and non-destructive testing; Theta Consult Ltd., working in radiation control and radiation protection; and Acibadem City Clinic.

“Bulgaria has a comprehensive and mature regulatory infrastructure for nuclear and radiation safety. The challenge for BNRA will be to prepare itself for the regulatory oversight of the expected expansion of Bulgaria’s nuclear power programme,” said IRRS team leader Zia Hussain Shah, Director General of Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority. “We recommend that Bulgaria further improve its radiation protection framework, especially in the medical sector.”

The IRRS team observed that BNRA has a culture of continuous improvement and is a mature and competent regulator, which fulfils its statutory obligations without undue influence. The team identified several areas of good performances, including:

• The BNRA, through its Communication Policy, proactively engages key stakeholders by using its website, social media and dedicated regular press conferences to provide updated information on nuclear and radiation safety in Bulgaria.
• Daily communications between site inspectors and BNRA headquarters staff ensure that BNRA is consistently updated on the safety status of nuclear installations, enabling timely regulatory responses when necessary.
• The BNRA maintains a comprehensive registry and database for radiation sources with direct inputs from licensees, enabling BNRA to systematically check the status of radiation sources in facilities and to track the import and export of those sources in real time.
• The Regulation on Protection during Medical Exposure outlines the provisions for justification of medical exposure involving both the prescribing physician and the radiological medical practitioner, especially in the case of fetuses, children and asymptomatic individuals.

The team also provided recommendations and suggestions to help Bulgaria enhance its regulatory framework, including for the Government to:

• Adopt the national policy and strategy for safety addressing all elements in line with IAEA safety fundamentals.
• Adequately increase BNRA’s budget to cater for regulatory activities associated with the planned expansion of Bulgaria’s nuclear power programme.
• Ensure that there is a comprehensive long term strategy for human resource development for BNRA and MoH, with consideration of adequate remuneration of regulatory staff in comparison with other national nuclear organizations.
• Finalize the revision of the Strategy for Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste Management.

Additional recommendations and suggestions were made specifically for BNRA and the MoH, including:

• BNRA should conduct an independent assessment of leadership for safety and safety culture throughout the organization.
• BNRA should consider implementing processes of review and revision of regulation and guides in a systematic and timely manner.
• MoH should consider developing guidelines for the release of patients who have undergone therapeutic radiological procedures with implanted sealed sources.

“We extend our heartfelt gratitude to the IRRS team and our Bulgarian counterparts for their dedicated efforts over the past two weeks,” said Tsanko Bachiyski, Chairman of BNRA. “The IRRS mission reaffirms our commitment to the continuous enhancement of nuclear and radiation safety. BNRA will leverage the mission’s outcomes to further strengthen our regulatory capabilities and national safety infrastructure.”

The IRRS team’s final report will be provided to the Government of Bulgaria in about three months.

IAEA Safety Standards

The IAEA Safety Standards provide a robust framework of fundamental principles, requirements and guidance to ensure safety. They reflect an international consensus and serve as a global reference for protecting people and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Ukraine’s three operating nuclear power plants (NPPs) reduced their electricity generation this morning following renewed attacks on the country’s energy infrastructure that further endangered nuclear safety during the military conflict, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said.

For a second time in less than two weeks, the Khmelnytskyy, Rivne and South Ukraine NPPs lowered their power levels as a precautionary step during widespread military activities in the country, while air raid alarms sounded at the three sites, Director General Grossi said. Two of the IAEA teams deployed in Ukraine were forced to seek shelter.

The operating NPPs have a total of nine reactors, all of which decreased output. One reactor, at the Rivne NPP, was also disconnected from the grid. The NPPs continued to receive external electricity, even though the Khmelnytskyy site lost the connection to two of its power lines.

“Ukraine’s energy infrastructure is extremely fragile and vulnerable, putting nuclear safety at great risk,” Director General Grossi said. “Once again, I call for maximum military restraint in areas with major nuclear energy facilities and other sites on which they depend.”

There were no reports of direct damage to the NPPs, but the IAEA was informed by Ukraine that the strikes once again impacted the electrical substations which the plants use both to transmit and receive off-site power.

These substations, identified by the IAEA as important for nuclear safety and security, have been damaged in previous attacks, including in August.

IAEA teams visited seven substations – located outside the NPPs across Ukraine – in September and October to assess the situation there following the August strikes, finding “extensive damage” and “concluding that the grid’s capability to provide a reliable off-site power supply to Ukrainian NPPs has been significantly reduced,” Director General Grossi told the IAEA Board of Governors last week.

“The IAEA will continue to assess the extent of damage to facilities and power lines that are essential for nuclear safety and security,” he said today. “The IAEA will continue to do everything in its power to reduce the risk of a nuclear incident during this tragic war.”

NPPs need reliable connections to the grid both to distribute the electricity they produce and to obtain off-site power for reactor cooling. The increasing fragility of the grid has been one of the main challenges for nuclear safety and security throughout the armed conflict.

The Director General has repeatedly underlined the importance of adhering to the seven indispensable pillars of nuclear safety and security, one of which states that there must be a secure off-site power supply from the grid for all nuclear sites.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team of experts today completed a review of long term operational safety of the Borssele Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) in the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

The Pre-Safety Aspects of Long Term Operation (Pre-SALTO) review mission was requested by the country’s Authority for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection (ANVS). During the ten-day mission, held from 19 to 28 November, the team reviewed the plant’s preparedness, organization and programmes for safe long-term operation (LTO).

Borssele NPP, operated by Elektriciteits-Produktiemaatschappij Zuid-Nederland (EPZ), is situated on the country’s coast, roughly 165 kilometres south of Amsterdam. The plant’s single unit is a pressurized water reactor with a net electrical output of 485 MW(e), contributing 3.2% of the total electricity generation in the country. It was put into commercial operation in 1973 with a design life of 40 years. The plant had previously received approval to extend the operational period to 2033, and the plant’s intention – as requested by the Dutch government – is to extend the operation for a subsequent period until 2054.

The mission was conducted by a twelve-person team consisting of experts from Argentina, France, Slovenia, Spain, and the United States, as well as four observers from Hungary, South Korea, Sweden, and Switzerland, and two IAEA staff members. The team held discussions with staff from the Borssele NPP and conducted site walkdowns during the review.    

“The team observed that EPZ is preparing for safe continued long-term operation and the plant staff are cooperative, professional, and open to suggestions for improvement,” said team leader and IAEA Senior Nuclear Safety Officer Gabor Petofi. “We encourage the plant to address the review findings and implement the remaining LTO-related activities as planned.”

The team identified two good practices that will be shared with the nuclear industry globally, including:

• Use of a 360 degree imaging system for enhanced planning of ageing management activities to reduce radiation dose to plant personnel.  
• Use of a portable tablet for field inspectors to conduct ageing management inspections of civil structures and record findings.

The team also provided 15 recommendations and suggestions to further improve safe subsequent LTO, including that:

• The plant should complete the development and implementation of the ageing management programmes for mechanical and electrical components.
• The plant should enhance the ageing management of civil structures.
• The plant should effectively update and implement the human resources strategy to support LTO.

The plant management expressed a determination to implement the mission findings. “We appreciate the IAEA’s support to our plant in ageing management and preparation for safe subsequent LTO,” said Carlo Wolters, CEO of EPZ. “It is very important for us to get an external view of our preparations in an early phase. The competencies and experience of the IAEA team enabled an effective identification of our areas for improvements.  The results of this mission will help us to improve our activities for safe subsequent LTO and to further align them with IAEA safety standards.”

The team provided a draft report to the plant management and to the ANVS. The plant management and ANVS will have an opportunity to make factual comments on the draft. A final report will be submitted to the plant management, ANVS and the Dutch Government within three months.

Background

A SALTO peer review is a comprehensive safety review addressing strategy and key elements for the safe long term operation of nuclear power plants. They complement OSART missions, which are designed as a review of essential operational safety programmes and activities. Neither SALTO nor OSART reviews are regulatory inspections, nor are they design reviews or substitutes for an exhaustive assessment of a plant’s overall safety status.

A Pre-SALTO mission reviews ageing management for safe LTO at an early stage of the preparation prior to the complete implementation of the ageing management activities.

LTO of nuclear power plants is defined as operation beyond an established time frame determined by the license term, the original plant design, relevant standards, or national regulations. As stated in IAEA safety standards, to maintain a plant’s fitness for service, consideration should be given to life limiting processes and features of systems, structures, and components (SSC), as well as to reasonably practicable safety upgrades to enhance the safety of the plant to a level approaching that of modern plants.

General information about SALTO missions can be found on the IAEA Website.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Nuclear safety and security “remains in jeopardy” at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi told this week’s IAEA Board of Governors meeting, as the facility twice lost the connection to its only remaining 750 kilovolt (kV) power line within a few days.

Caused by unspecified damage that occurred approximately 17 km from the plant, the first disconnection lasted for just over 30 hours from Saturday morning until it was repaired and restored around noon the following day, Director General Grossi said, citing information from the IAEA’s team stationed at the ZNPP site. The line was lost again this morning.

As a result of the disconnections, the ZNPP relied on its sole 330 kV back-up power line for the electricity it needs for reactor cooling and other key nuclear safety functions. The ZNPP’s connection to this line was itself lost twice in October, further underlining the fragility of its power supplies. Before the military conflict, Europe’s largest nuclear power plant (NPP) had four 750 and six 330 kV lines available.

Noting that the armed conflict this week passed its one-thousandth day, Director General Grossi said the IAEA had been supporting nuclear safety and security in Ukraine from the start, with 155 missions having so far been deployed as part of a continued presence at all five NPP sites.

The largest of them, the ZNPP, “continues to face challenges not least because of the vulnerability of its limited off-site power supply lines,” Director General Grossi said in his introductory statement to the Board on Wednesday. “All six reactors remain in cold shutdown and the Agency’s continued stipulation is that no reactor is to be re-started as long as the nuclear safety and security situation at the Zaporizhzhya NPP remains in jeopardy.”

Ukraine’s power system is also a growing concern for nuclear safety at its three operating NPPs – Khmelnytskyy, Rivne and South Ukraine – which require a reliable and stable connection to the national grid both to transmit the electricity they generate and to receive the off-site power they need for vital nuclear safety functions.

The risks they are facing were highlighted last weekend, when Ukraine’s energy infrastructure was reportedly targeted in widespread attacks, less than three months after military strikes caused extensive damage to a number of electrical substations across the country, which the IAEA has identified as important for nuclear safety.

Four of these substations and their power lines were impacted again by the attacks during the night of 16 November and early morning of 17 November, prompting Ukraine’s operating NPPs to reduce their power output as a precautionary measure. The NPPs in recent days gradually started restoring the power lines and began increasing output, but again lowered power generation this morning as a precaution, before it was once again restored.

Separately, the South Ukraine NPP this morning disconnected from its two 750 kV power lines for maintenance. It still received power from its back-up systems.

“The growing instability of the power grid is a deepening source of concern for nuclear safety, affecting all the nuclear power plants,” Director General Grossi said.

Before the latest attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, IAEA teams visited seven substations in September and October to assess the damage caused by the attacks in August, as part of their wider efforts to help the country ensure nuclear safety and security.

They “documented extensive damage to all the substations visited, concluding that the grid’s capability to provide a reliable off-site power supply to Ukrainian NPPs has been significantly reduced. Repairs and additional protective measures are being implemented by Ukraine,” Director General Grossi told this week’s Board.

The Director General has repeatedly underlined the importance of adhering to the seven indispensable pillars of nuclear safety and security, one of which states that there must be a secure off-site power supply from the grid for all nuclear sites.

The IAEA teams present at the Khmelnytskyy, Rivne and South Ukraine NPPs and the Chornobyl site reported that nuclear safety and security is being maintained despite the grid instability and the effects of the ongoing conflict, including a number of air raid alarms over the past week.

The Agency continues to deliver on its comprehensive programme of assistance to Ukraine.

Further to Tuesday’s delivery of ambulances to Chornobyl and the Varash hospital, medical equipment including blood and urine analysers, defibrillators as well as electrocardiograph, X-ray and glucose monitoring systems will help the Slavutich health centre, the Varash and Netishyn hospitals and the National Research Centre for Radiation Medicine, Haematology and Oncology strengthen their health care capabilities.

In a separate delivery, the Centralised Spent Fuel Storage Facility, a subdivision of the Ukrainian operator Energoatom, received a dosimetry system to monitor individual doses of staff.

The deliveries were supported with funding from Austria, Denmark, Switzerland and the United States. Since the start of the conflict, the IAEA has coordinated 82 deliveries of equipment and supplies to Ukraine, with a total value of more than 12.4 million euro.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team of experts stated that the operator of Paks Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) in Hungary has demonstrated a commitment to operational safety. The team also encouraged the operator to continue improvements in areas such as training on preventative measures and documentation to reduce the risk of human error.

The Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) concluded today an 18-day mission to the Paks NPP. The mission, conducted at the request of the Government of Hungary, took place from 4 November to 21 November 2024. Hungary hosted its first OSART in 1988. This was followed by subsequent OSART missions in 2001 and 2014.

OSART missions independently assess safety performance against IAEA safety standards. The aim is to advance operational safety by proposing recommendations and, where appropriate, suggestions for improvement.

Paks NPP, owned by Magyar Villamos Művek (MVM), is located about 100 kilometres southwest of Budapest. The plant is Hungary’s first and only nuclear power plant, and it has four 506 MWe pressurized water reactor units that were commissioned between 1982 and 1987. Last year, Paks NPP generated almost half of Hungary’s electricity.

The team made daily visits to Paks NPP to observe regular plant activities in areas such as:  maintenance and surveillance, radiation work permits, and training, and to interview personnel. The 13-member team comprised experts from Argentina, Bulgaria, China, Czech Republic, Russian Federation, South Africa, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, and United States of America, as well as three IAEA officials.

“The team was pleased to see that the plant was very well prepared and cooperated fully and openly with IAEA experts during the mission,” said team leader Yury Martynenko, Senior Nuclear Safety Officer at the IAEA. “The managers and staff of Paks NPP are committed to improving the operational safety and reliability of their plant, and we were pleased to see many actions in progress.”

The team identified good practices to be shared with the nuclear industry globally, including:

• The development and implementation of a monitoring and repair programme for confinement systems.
• The storage of geospatial information on plant structures and components and the sharing of data on different platforms.
• The development of software to predict potential initiating emergency events and the progression of events.

The mission also provided some suggestions to further improve safety, including that:

• The plant should consider enhancing measures to maintain its measurement equipment, including inspections, calibrations, storage and traceability – arrangements to ensure plant and personnel safety.
• The plant should consider reinforcing its plant programmes and work practices to ensure that, in the event of an earthquake, the potential impact of non-fixed items on safety-related equipment is minimized.
• The plant should consider enhancing its processes, procedures and practices to provide personnel with the necessary instructions in the industrial areas of the plant.

“It was in the spirit of continuous learning that we had requested the IAEA review. The OSART mission has allowed us to make an in-depth assessment of our work. The recommendations and suggestions will help us to continuously improve the plant’s operational safety, and thanks to the expertise of our team, we can also contribute to the enrichment of global best practices,” said Péter János Horváth, CEO of MVM Paks Nuclear Power Plant Ltd.

The team provided a draft report of the mission to the plant management. They will have the opportunity to make factual comments on the draft. These comments will be reviewed by the IAEA, and the final report will be submitted to the Government of Hungary within three months.

Background

General information about OSART missions can be found on the IAEA website. An OSART mission is designed as a review of programmes and activities essential to operational safety. It is not a regulatory inspection, nor is it a design review or a substitute for an exhaustive assessment of the plant’s overall safety status.

Follow-up missions are standard components of the OSART programme and are typically conducted within two years of the initial mission.

The IAEA Safety Standards provide a robust framework of fundamental principles, requirements, and guidance to ensure safety. They reflect an international consensus and serve as a global reference for protecting people and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation.