Category: Press Release

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) lost its immediate back-up power supply to the reactor units for several hours this week, in the latest incident underlining persistent nuclear safety and security risks at the site, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said today.

Thursday’s failure of two of the ZNPP’s back-up power electrical transformers showed the continuing vulnerability in the availability of external power, which the plant needs to cool its six reactors and for other essential nuclear safety and security functions.

Even though the back-up 330 kilovolt (kV) line remained available and could have provided power to the ZNPP if the 750 kV line was lost, the failure reduced the redundancy of the already fragile power supply. These two power lines are the only ones that remain available for Europe’s largest nuclear power plant (NPP), compared to four 750 kV lines and six 330 kV lines before the conflict.

The back-up power supply was restored eight hours later when two other back-up power electrical transformers were put into operation. The ZNPP is investigating the cause of the failure, informing the IAEA experts at the site that there was no sign of external transformer damage.

The incident came just a few weeks after the ZNPP – following discussions with the IAEA – carried out work on the back-up power electrical transformers so that the 330 kV line could immediately deliver electricity if the 750 kV line were to fail, as has happened repeatedly during the armed conflict.

“The plant’s vulnerable power status remains one of the main dangers for nuclear safety and security at the site. The situation remains extremely worrying in this respect. The site has already lost all off-site power eight times since August 2022, forcing it to rely on emergency diesel generators,” Director General Grossi said.

During the past week, the IAEA experts discussed the plant’s maintenance activities with the ZNPP and were shown its high-level 2024 maintenance plan for such work, which is vital for nuclear safety and security. The ZNPP informed the IAEA team that the priority is to perform maintenance on the site’s safety systems as well as important activities not conducted last year. The annual maintenance plan includes the safety systems, diesel generators, unit transformers and the 750 kV electrical switchyard.

The IAEA team did not receive a copy of the maintenance plan for a detailed review. However, based on discussions and information provided to the team, the IAEA concludes that the ZNPP will not be implementing a comprehensive maintenance plan during 2024.

“A well-established maintenance plan and its timely implementation are essential to ensure plant safety and security,” Director General Grossi said. “This maintenance needs to be performed to ensure nuclear safety, especially in the current situation where the six reactors have been shut down for an extended period. It is important that the IAEA has a thorough understanding of the maintenance plans to be able to fully assess nuclear safety at the ZNPP. We will continue to monitor the maintenance situation closely.”

The IAEA team has continued to conduct walkdowns at the site, including to all six main control rooms yesterday, where the experts were able to observe staffing levels but could not ask questions about their qualifications and experience.

After being granted access to the reactor hall of unit 6 earlier this week, the IAEA experts are still seeking access to the other reactor halls, as well as to parts of all six turbine halls that they have not yet been able to visit, as well as to some of the reactor rooftops. Such access is needed to monitor nuclear safety and security as well as adherence to the five concrete principles for the protection of the ZNPP, Director General Grossi said.

The IAEA team has continued to monitor the situation and gather information regarding boric acid deposits in some of the safety system rooms of unit 6, which were first observed on 22 December. During yesterday’s visit to its main control room, the team confirmed that the level of boric acid in the storage tank was above the minimum level in the technical specifications, despite the previously observed leak of boric acid.

Mines along the perimeter of the ZNPP, in a buffer zone between the facility’s internal and external fences, which were previously identified by the IAEA team and were removed in November 2023, are now back in place. This is a restricted area inaccessible to operational plant personnel. Director General Grossi reiterated that the presence of mines is inconsistent with the IAEA safety standards.

Elsewhere in Ukraine, the IAEA teams at the Rivne, Khmelnitsky, and South Ukraine NPPs as well as the Chornobyl site continue to report that nuclear safety and security is maintained despite multiple air raid alarms heard over the past week. The IAEA experts at the Khmelnitsky, Rivne and South Ukraine NPPs have reported air-raids on a near-daily basis with the teams at the Khmelnitsky and Rivne NPPs required to take shelter on several occasions. 

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) experts were yesterday granted access to the reactor hall of unit 6 of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) after previously having not been given access, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said.

On Friday last week, the ZNPP had not given permission for the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to the ZNPP (ISAMZ) team to access the unit 6 reactor hall, proposing instead that the team enter the area in about a week’s time. However, access was granted yesterday. Director General Grossi welcomes this constructive step.

While in the reactor hall, the team observed main components of the reactor, confirming the cold shutdown state of the reactor. While the team was present in the reactor hall, the operators transferred the operation of the cooling pumps of the spent fuel pool from one safety train to another.

During a walkdown to the other areas of unit 6 yesterday, the team visited the turbine hall of unit 6 but were once again denied access to some areas of the hall. The IAEA ISAMZ teams have been unable to access all parts of the turbine hall of each unit since 18 October last year.

The team also visited the safety system rooms of unit 6 to again assess the status of the boric acid deposits previously found. During its visit, the team observed the presence of boric acid deposits in three rooms. The IAEA experts also visited the unit 6 emergency diesel generators.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) experts at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) have not yet been given access to the reactor halls of units 1, 2 and 6, hindering their ability to monitor the nuclear safety and security situation at the plant, as well as the five concrete principles established at the United Nations Security Council, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said today.

Following a successful rotation of IAEA experts yesterday – the fifteenth team of experts to arrive at the plant since the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to the ZNPP (ISAMZ) was established in September 2022 – the new team repeated the request for access to the reactor hall of unit 6.

The ZNPP did not give permission for that access today, stating that the reactor hall is “sealed”. The ZNPP informed the team that it was not denying access and has instead proposed that the team access the area in about a week’s time.

In December 2023, the ISAMZ team was refused access to the reactor hall of units 1, 2 and 6 which was the first time that the IAEA experts have not been granted timely access to a reactor hall that was in cold shutdown. Until then, all ISAMZ teams had been able to access the reactor hall of any unit in cold shutdown, without the plant making any reference to the status of containment as being “sealed”.

“These restrictions on the experts’ timely access to the ZNPP are impeding the IAEA’s ability to assess the safety and security situation, including confirming the reported status of the reactor units, spent fuel ponds and associated safety equipment, independently and effectively,” Director General Grossi said.

Also, since 18 October last year, ISAMZ teams have been unable to access parts of the turbine hall of each unit. Most recently, access was again restricted at the turbine halls of units 1 and 2 on Wednesday, 10 January.

“The nuclear safety and security situation remains very precarious, and I reiterate my request for unhindered access so that the IAEA can assess the Seven Pillars for nuclear safety and security and monitor adherence to the five concrete principles to help ensure nuclear safety and security at the ZNPP in order to prevent a nuclear accident and ensure the integrity of the plant,” Director General Grossi added.

The new team of IAEA experts will observe the ongoing maintenance situation at the ZNPP. Following observation of deposits of boric acid on the valves, a pump and on the floors of several of the safety system rooms of unit 6 on 22 December, the IAEA team conducted a follow-up walkdown on 9 January to assess the status. Borated water is used in the primary coolant to help maintain nuclear safety functions. Although leaks may occur, prompt investigation, repair, and clean-up are crucial to prevent further damage and avoid any impact on safety.

During its walkdown, the team noted a significant reduction in boric acid deposits compared to the December 22 walkdown, with the leak also considerably diminished. However, some deposits persisted in three rooms of the unit 6 containment building, one at the same level and two showing significantly reduced levels.

The team was informed that the cause of the leak was due to micro-cracks in the boron tank due to ageing, and a blockage in the leak detection pipe. Whilst the blockage has been repaired, some smaller leaks persist as a result of the micro-cracks in the boron tank. The ZNPP stated that the leak rate is currently within technical specifications, and that the micro-cracks can be repaired after draining the tank, which will be addressed during scheduled maintenance. The IAEA team will continue to monitor the situation.

Additionally, this week the IAEA experts at the ZNPP accessed the pumping stations for units 3 and 4 and the main control rooms of units 1 to 6. All nine mobile diesel boilers installed at the plant were utilised during the past week to provide additional heating needs during winter. 

As the winter weather gets colder, IAEA experts reported that the ambient temperature at the ZNPP has dropped as low as -10°C in the mornings. The team reported that this fall in temperature had no impact on the operation of the 11 wells providing cooling water for the sprinkler ponds used for reactor cooling and other nuclear safety and security functions. The flow level of water remained constant.

Five of the ZNPP’s six reactors remain in cold shutdown, while unit 4 is in hot shutdown to produce steam and heat, including for the nearby town of Enerhodar, where most plant staff live.

The new ISAMZ team continues to pay close attention to the staffing situation at the plant, in particular the staff operating in the main control rooms and those responsible for maintenance of critical safety infrastructure and processes. 

Today, the new team of experts conducted a walkdown of the site including the four new diesel boilers. They observed the new equipment and were informed that the installation has been completed and commissioning activities have commenced. These new diesel boilers are intended to generate steam to meet the ZNPP’s needs.

In daily reminders of the physical proximity of the conflict to the ZNPP, the IAEA experts there continue to hear loud explosions at varying distances to the plant.

The IAEA teams at the Rivne, Khmelnitsky, South Ukraine nuclear power plants (NPPs) and the Chornobyl site continue to report that nuclear safety and security is maintained despite challenges related to the multiple missile attacks on Ukraine in the past week.

The IAEA experts at the Khmelnitsky NPP were once again required to take shelter several times over the weekend of 6 and 7 January. The teams at the Rivne and South Ukraine NPPs were also required to take shelter last Saturday.  At the Chornobyl site, the team reported hearing explosions in the distance throughout the past week.

Director General Grossi has reiterated that everything should be done to prevent a nuclear accident during this war. “It is essential that nuclear power plants and their related infrastructure are not impacted. No one would gain from a nuclear accident and it must be avoided,” he said.

Also this week, the IAEA delivered radiocommunication systems to the Rivne and South Ukraine NPPs. The equipment was procured using funding from the United Kingdom. This was the 34th IAEA delivery of nuclear safety and security-related equipment to Ukraine that aims at ensuring diverse and reliable communication means are available at the sites when needed.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Kenya has made significant progress in the development of the national nuclear infrastructure for the country’s new research reactor programme, according to an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) review mission.

An IAEA team of experts concluded a nine-day mission to review the preparations for a research reactor programme in Kenya. The Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review for Research Reactors (INIR-RR) was conducted at the invitation of the Kenyan Government, from 11 to 19 December 2023.

Mission team members reviewed the status of the country’s nuclear infrastructure development in accordance with the Phase 1 criteria and conditions of the IAEA’s Milestones Approach for research reactors.

Some countries embarking on a nuclear power programme, including Kenya, are pursuing the development of their first research reactor, which can serve as a stepping stone towards their future nuclear power programme. Kenya plans to commission its first research reactor between 2030 and 2034.

Recommendations and suggestions were provided by the IAEA team for the further development of the nuclear infrastructure for the new research reactor programme.

“Kenya has demonstrated a sustained and very professional approach to the development of its research reactor programme,” said Andrey Sitnikov, who led the IAEA review mission and is the Technical Lead of the IAEA Research Reactor Section. “We noted that before making the final decision, Kenya did a great job of developing and preparing laws and regulatory documents, actively involving interested stakeholders in the programme, and developing human resources of both the future operator and the regulator.

The INIR-RR review team comprised two experts from India and the United States of America, and six IAEA staff members.

About INIR-RR missions

INIR-RR missions are designed to assist countries in determining the status of their national nuclear infrastructure and to identify further development needs to support a new research reactor project. They follow the IAEA’s Milestones Approach for research reactors, which provides guidance on the preparation of a research reactor project by addressing 19 issues, ranging from nuclear safety and security to the nuclear fuel cycle, waste management, and funding and financing.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in cooperation with Argentina, launched its first scientific research expedition today to investigate the presence of microplastics in Antarctica as part of efforts to combat this growing environmental problem, even in the planet’s most remote areas.

The President of Argentina, Javier Milei, and IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi joined the IAEA scientific team at the Marambio and Esperanza Argentine Antarctic Bases to mark the start of their mission. Defence Minister Luis Petri, Interior Minister Guillermo Francos and Foreign Minister Diana Mondino were also present. The two-person research team will then set off for one month to assess the impact of microplastics by investigating its occurrence and distribution in seawater, lakes, sediments, sand, discharge water and animals of the Antarctic ecosystem near the Argentine Carlini scientific research station.

The IAEA mission to Antarctica, the world’s southernmost continent, is being carried out through the IAEA’s NUTEC plastics initiative. Established in 2020, NUTEC is an IAEA flagship initiative to fight plastic pollution with nuclear technologies. Through a network of NUTEC Plastic Monitoring Laboratories, nuclear and isotopic techniques are being used to produce data on marine microplastics distribution by sampling and analysing the prevalence of microplastics in the environment. These precise scientifi­c data represent important information for developing plastic mitigation and disposal measures and policies.

The first evidence of microplastics – plastic particles below 5 mm in diameter- found in Antarctic coastal fast ice, dates to 2009 when researchers from the University of Tasmania sampled sea ice in East Antarctica.  However, there is still almost no information available on where and how much microplastics arrive in the Antarctic and how much is taken up by Antarctic organisms. There is also very little data existing on the types of microplastics reaching this pristine area through ocean currents, atmospheric deposition and the presence of humans in the Antarctic.

At an event to launch the mission on 5 January at the Argentine Antarctic Base Marambio, Director General Grossi said that the discovery of microplastics in the once untouched Antarctic environment serves as a testament to the influence of the widespread and detrimental pollutant. “Microplastics are a global problem, but the international community still lacks the scientific data needed to make informed decisions. This is the goal of NUTEC plastics: by understanding the plastic origin, movement and impact, we can make informed decisions on how to address the problem.”

The presence of microplastics can contribute to accelerating the ice-loss in Antarctica by reducing ice reflectivity, altering surface roughness, promoting microbial activity, acting as thermal insulators, and contributing to mechanical weakening of the ice structure. When combined with climate change, atmospheric conditions, and oceanic influences, the presence of microplastics will deepen the devastating impact of polar ice melting in Antarctica. In addition, microplastics entering the food chain of Antarctic organisms negatively affects the health of Antarctic life and their resilience to climate change.

International Treaty 

In a resolution from March 2022, Member States of the United Nations pledged to initiate negotiations for a new global treaty on banning plastic pollution including in the marine environment, with the objective of formal adoption by 2025.

The IAEA’s expanding NUTEC network of laboratories for monitoring marine (micro-) plastic pollution, including in polar areas, will play a crucial role in providing essential scientific evidence to support for informed decision-making during the treaty negotiations and contribute to its effective implementation, particularly in the marine environment.

Director General Grossi emphasized, “the well-being of Antarctica, a true wilderness on Earth, is vital for the overall health of the planet. Extending our presence throughout the globe, we have brought our specialized expertise to Antarctica where our efforts can bring about much needed change.”

Harnessing the precision of nuclear science

Over the next month, two IAEA experts will monitor the presence of microplastics in the environment at 22 sites near the Carlini research base in different environments: the Antarctic Ocean water, Antarctic lakes, and Antarctic land. They will take seawater samples from 12 sites, sediment samples from four sites, three samples from lakes and sample three different sandy beaches. The team will also monitor the presence of microplastic in organisms by collecting clams and limpets, and the faeces of penguins.

The IAEA’s work to address and monitor the presence of microplastics in Antarctica is carried out in cooperation with Argentina’s Instituto Antartico Argentino (IAA), the office in charge of advising, addressing and performing scientific and technical research and studies in Antarctica, and the Dirección Nacional del Antártico (DNA) which is responsible for guiding, directing and controlling scientific and technical activity in the Antarctic.

During the next month, samples will be collected and prepared by the IAEA team and sent to the IAEA’s Marine Environment Laboratories in Monaco to be analysed. Vibrational spectroscopy will be used to count the number of microparticles of plastic and to characterize the type of polymers to potentially assess the source of microplastic pollution.

Samples will also be sent to the IAA in Buenos Aires where, under the NUTEC initiative, a state-of-the-art microscope and a spectrometer have been installed, as well as a series of trainings provided, to strengthen Argentina’s microplastics research capabilities.

Since its establishment in 1961, the IAEA Environment Laboratories in Monaco have provided IAEA Member States with the tools and knowledge necessary to understand and tackle pressing marine environmental challenges. The IAEA hosts the only marine environment laboratory of the UN system.

NUTEC Plastics (NUclear TEChnology for Controlling Plastic Pollution) builds on the IAEA’s efforts to deal with plastic pollution through recycling using radiation technology and marine monitoring using isotopic tracing techniques. It provides science-based evidence to characterize and assess marine microplastic pollution, while also demonstrating the use of ionizing radiation in plastic recycling, transforming plastic waste into reusable resources.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Following discussions with the International Atomic Energy Agency, Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) has taken action to ensure an immediate supply of back-up electricity in case its main external power line is lost, as has happened repeatedly during the military conflict, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said today.

Frequent power cuts have remained a source of serious concern for safety and security at Europe’s largest nuclear power plant (NPP) as it needs electricity to cool its reactors and for other essential functions, even when all reactor units have been shut down. Since August 2022, the ZNPP has suffered eight events with a complete loss of off-site power.

When the ZNPP’s only remaining 750 kilovolt (kV) line is cut, the plant may still have access to off-site power through a 330 kV back-up line, if it remains connected to the grid. However, since mid-2023, this line has required manual intervention to become operational.

In discussions with the plant, the IAEA experts present at the ZNPP stressed that it was important for nuclear safety and security to address this matter. As a result, the plant carried out work on its back-up electrical transformers and two out of three are now operational, of which one is permanently connected to the on-site back-up power lines – known as busbars – of all six reactor units.

“This means that if the main power supply through the 750 kV switchyard is lost, the back-up line will automatically be able to provide electricity to the plant without manual, and hence delayed, intervention, provided it remains operational,” Director General Grossi said. “This is a significant development, as it enables independence and redundancy in the site’s power supply scheme, even though the overall off-site power situation at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant remains extremely fragile. This solution will only be effective if the 330 kV power line remains available, which – as we know from experience – is far from guaranteed.”

Underlining the continued dangers facing the plant, the IAEA team has in recent weeks continued to hear regular explosions some distance away from the site.

Five of the ZNPP’s six reactors remain in cold shutdown, while unit 4 is in hot shutdown to produce steam and heat, including for the nearby town of Enerhodar, where most plant staff live.

The IAEA team has continued to conduct walkdowns across the site as part of activities to monitor the nuclear safety and security situation at the ZNPP, as well as adherence to the five concrete principles for the protection of this major facility.

However, the IAEA experts remain unable to gain access to all parts of the site, and for the past two weeks they have not been allowed to access the reactor halls of units 1, 2 and 6. This is the first time that IAEA experts have not been granted access to a reactor hall of a unit that was in cold shutdown. This is where the reactor core and spent fuel are located. The team will continue to request this access.

In addition, access to some parts of the ZNPP’s turbine halls continues to be restricted, including those areas of reactor units 3, 4 and 6 over the past week. Also, the IAEA experts still await the access to the reactor rooftops planned on 19 December that didn’t happen due to stated security concerns.

In a separate development during a walkdown of the safety system rooms of unit 6 on 22 December, the IAEA experts observed boric acid deposits on valves, a pump and on the floors of several rooms in the containment building. The plant informed the team that the source of the leak is one of the boric acid storage tanks and that considering the small magnitude of the leak it is not planned to be repaired immediately, but rather as part of the planned maintenance of the impacted system. This type of leak can occur during the operation of a plant. However, this kind of event requires proper and timely attention, investigation and response from the operator, to prevent further and potentially more severe safety implications. The team will closely follow developments regarding this issue.

As reported earlier, the IAEA team continues to ask the plant for the maintenance schedule for 2024, which has not yet been provided.

The IAEA team has over the past two weeks continued to observe progress in the installation of four mobile diesel boilers at the site. As reported previously, the new units will generate additional steam needed for various nuclear safety functions at the site, including for waste treatment.

The site currently has nine mobile boilers, of which at least eight have been operating, providing additional heating during the winter.

The IAEA teams of experts at the Rivne, Khmelnitsky, South Ukraine NPPs and the Chornobyl site continue to report that nuclear safety and security is being maintained, despite wide-ranging missile attacks on Ukraine in the past week, which forced the IAEA experts at the Khmelnitsky NPP to take shelter three times.  

The IAEA experts at the Rivne NPP were informed that a cruise missile flew close to the plant on 29 December, and their colleagues at the South Ukraine NPP were informed that missiles and drones crossed the region where the plant is located.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) completed an advisory service mission to Cambodia focused on assessing the country’s nuclear security regime for nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control (MORC). The team said the country has implemented measures to detect and respond to criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving such material and encouraged Cambodia to further improve its legal and regulatory framework. The team also identified several examples of good practice.

The mission, carried out at the request of the Royal Government of Cambodia, took place from 11 to 22 December and involved a team of nine international experts from Finland, Hungary, Japan, Morocco, Pakistan, the United States of America, Viet Nam and the IAEA. It is the second mission of this kind to Cambodia.

International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) missions aim to help States to better prevent, detect and respond to criminal and intentional unauthorized acts involving nuclear or other radioactive material, known as MORC, which is lost, missing, stolen, improperly disposed of, or not adequately stored or handled.

The mission aimed to review the current state of nuclear security in relation to MORC in Cambodia and provide recommendations on how to strengthen it in accordance with international guidance and best practices.

The team conducted a series of meetings with officials from the Ministry of Mines and Energy, the General Department of Customs and Excise, the Secretariat of the National Counter Terrorism Committee, and the National Authority for the Prohibition of Chemical, Nuclear, Biological and Radiological Weapons (NACW).

The INSServ team visited the Phnom Penh Autonomous Port (PPAP), the Sihanoukville Autonomous Port (PAS) and the Phnom Penh International Airport (PPIA) to assess the detection and response measures in place. The team also went to the NACW Institute of Explore and Experiment on Substance in Kampong Chhnang Province.

“Cambodia established a solid basis for a comprehensive nuclear security regime, ” said Team Leader Khammar Mrabit, former Director General of the Moroccan Agency for Nuclear and Radiological Safety and Security and member of the Moroccan Parliament. “We welcome Cambodia’s cooperation in this mission and hope our recommendations and suggestions will be helpful for further improvements.”

The team said that Cambodia had implemented many elements of a legal and regulatory framework related to MORC. Still, it recommended the country to establish a national nuclear law and ratify the Amendment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Further recommendations include the establishment of national infrastructure to support sustainable training to enhance Cambodia’s existing detection and response capabilities.

Several good practices were identified, including the categorization of offences in the country’s legal framework,  the radiation detection scan of all import and export cargo containers at PPAP and PAS, the use of the IAEA mobile app TRACE (Tool for Radiation Alarm and Commodity Evaluation), as well as the establishment of knowledge management and professional development measures for the staff with nuclear security detection responsibilities.

“We are ready to provide continued support to Cambodia as they implement the IAEA INSServ mission recommendations and suggestions to enhance the nuclear security detection and response systems and measures relevant to MORC,” said Elena Buglova, Director of the IAEA Division of Nuclear Security.

The IAEA’s INSServ mission is part of its ongoing efforts to assist Member States in strengthening their nuclear security regimes in relation to MORC. The Agency provides a range of services in this area, including expert advice, training, and equipment support, to help Member States protect against criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving such materials.

“This second INSServ mission will assist us in the upgrade of Cambodia’s nuclear security regime by taking into account the international practice and expertise,” said Keo Rottanak, Minister of Mines and Energy. “We firmly believe that no single nation can address the complex challenges of nuclear security in isolation. A secure world starts by cooperation of all countries, relevant agencies and individuals.”

The draft findings and recommendations were presented to the Royal Government of Cambodia, and the final report will be presented in about three months.

Background

The mission was the 86th INSServ mission conducted by the IAEA since the programme began in 2006.

INSServ missions, based on the INSServ guidelines published in 2019, assist States in establishing, maintaining and strengthening their nuclear security regime related to nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control.

The missions provide independent advice on implementing international instruments, along with IAEA guidance on the prevention and detection of and response to criminal and intentional unauthorized acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

In my opening statement to the Board on 22 November, I reported that we had observed increased levels of activity at, and near, the Light Water Reactor (LWR) at Yongbyon, and also – since mid-October – a strong water outflow from its cooling system. These observations were consistent with the commissioning of the LWR.

More recent observations indicate that this water discharge is warm, which is also consistent with ongoing commissioning of the LWR, a process that takes some time for any new reactor. However, the discharge of warm water is indicative the reactor has reached criticality.  It remains the case that without access to the facility the Agency cannot confirm its operational status.

The LWR, like any nuclear reactor, can produce plutonium in its irradiated fuel, which can be separated during reprocessing, so this is a cause for concern.

Concerning the safety of the LWR, we do not have sufficient information to make an assessment. Of course, safety should always be the paramount issue when starting a new reactor.  Nuclear safety is a sovereign responsibility of the State and the IAEA supports the States in this area.

I repeat that the further development of the DPRK’s nuclear programme, including the construction and operation of the LWR, is a violation of UN Security Council resolutions and is deeply regrettable.

I call upon the DPRK to comply fully with its obligations under Security Council resolutions, to cooperate promptly with the Agency in the full and effective implementation of its NPT Safeguards Agreement and to resolve all outstanding issues, especially those that have arisen during the absence of Agency inspectors from the country. The Agency is ready to engage  on any of the above issues, including safety.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) is installing four new mobile diesel boilers to generate additional steam needed for various nuclear safety functions at the site, including for waste treatment, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said today.

The IAEA team of experts present at the ZNPP observed the installation work during a walkdown last Sunday and were subsequently informed that the new boilers will be ready soon. The site currently has nine mobile boilers, eight of which are operating to provide heating during the winter.

“Nuclear power plants need significant amounts of steam to conduct important operational activities at the sites. This remains the case also for the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant, even though it has not produced electricity for well over a year now. The IAEA has encouraged the plant to install diesel boilers for this purpose and we welcome the planned additional capacity,” Director General Grossi said.

Five reactors remain in cold shutdown, while unit 4 is in hot shutdown to produce steam and heat, including for the nearby town of Enerhodar, where most plant staff live.

Nearly three weeks after it suffered its eighth complete loss of off-site power during the conflict, the ZNPP remains connected to two external power sources: the main 750 kilovolt (kV) power line, and a back-up 330 kV power line.

The IAEA experts have over the past week continued to monitor the nuclear safety and security situation across the site of Europe’s largest nuclear power plant (NPP), conducting walkdowns to the reactor hall and electrical safety system rooms of unit 3 and to the main control room of unit 5, where they observed a successful test of the safety systems.

In recent days, they also went to the site’s 750 kV electrical switchyard, entry point for the off-site power needed at the plant, and the onsite water treatment facility. In another walkdown, they saw the ZNPP’s cooling pond, cooling towers, inlet and outlet channels as well as the outlet channel of the nearby Zaporizhzhya Thermal Power Plant. However, they were not allowed this time to access the isolation gate of the cooling pond.

Separately, the IAEA experts were informed by the ZNPP that they could not access the reactor rooftops as planned on 19 December due to security concerns.  No alternative date has so far been provided. The IAEA has previously this year been given access to three of the reactor roofs – of units 2, 3 and 4 – but not the others.

In addition, the IAEA team was once again not granted access to the north-western part of the turbine hall of reactor unit 5 during a walkdown there last Monday, despite a request made before the visit. The IAEA has not been able to visit the north-western part of any of the six turbine halls since mid-October.

The team continues to pay close attention to the maintenance situation at the plant, particularly the maintenance plan for next year, and also to the electrical equipment related to the safety systems of the reactor units following a power loss at unit 6 in mid-November. The IAEA experts have been informed that the 2024 maintenance plan is almost complete, but they have so far not been able to study it as requested.

An unannounced fire drill was conducted at the ZNPP site on Wednesday morning, following last week’s emergency communication exercise. The drill scenario involved a hypothetical oil leakage at the transformer of reactor unit 2, which resulted in a fire. The drill’s participants included regional, city and on-site fire departments. The IAEA team was only made aware of the drill afterwards.  

As usual in recent months, the IAEA team has continued to hear explosions from outside the ZNPP site, including six powerful blasts on Wednesday evening.

IAEA experts at the Rivne, Khmelnitsky, South Ukraine NPPs and the Chornobyl site continue to report that nuclear safety and security is being maintained despite challenging circumstances. A successful rotation of IAEA staff took place during the week at the Rivne, South Ukraine and Khmelnitsky sites.

Last week, the IAEA arranged the 33rd delivery of nuclear safety and security-related equipment to Ukraine, using contributions from Australia. It was the first delivery under a new system requiring entities in Ukraine to register in the national electronic system as recipients of humanitarian aid.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team of experts found that Belgium demonstrates commitment to the safe management of its radioactive waste and spent fuel, while also noting opportunities to enhance the national policies and arrangements for eventual disposal.

The Integrated Review Service for Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Management, Decommissioning and Remediation (ARTEMIS) team this week concluded an eleven-day mission to Belgium. The mission was carried out from 3 to 13 December at the request of Belgium and hosted by ONDRAF/NIRAS, the Belgian National Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile Material management.

Belgium manages high-level waste from the five nuclear reactors in operation today in the Doel and Tihange nuclear power plants (NPPs) which provided in 2022 roughly 47,3 per cent of the country’s electricity. Waste is also managed from the additional two reactors which have been permanently shut down. Belgium delayed plans to close its nuclear reactors by 2025 and reached a Government agreement with Engie – operator of the two NPPs – to extend operation of Doel 4 and Tihange 3 nuclear reactors to 2035 and address the transfer of nuclear waste liabilities to the Federal Government.

Low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste is generated from the production and use of radiation sources in medical and industrial applications, as well as in science and research activities such as at the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre (SCK CEN). Waste is also generated from the decommissioning of research reactors such as BR2 and BR3 and the decommissioning of industrial facilities that covered almost all activities in the nuclear fuel cycle, including the Eurochemic pilot reprocessing plant, Belgonucléaire mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) fabrication facility and the FBFC International UO2 fuel fabrication facility.

Radioactive waste and spent fuel in Belgium are managed by the ONDRAF/NIRAS after acceptance. The Belgian National Programme for the Management of Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste, adopted in October 2015, comprises a national strategy for the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste. It is expected that Belgium will publish an update of the National Programme in due time after the ARTEMIS mission and the finalization of the intermediate Government agreement with Engie to extend the life of Doel 4 and Tihange 3 nuclear reactors.

ARTEMIS missions provide independent expert advice from an international team of specialists convened by the IAEA to support a country with the management of radioactive waste and spent fuel. Reviews are based on the IAEA Safety Standards and technical guidance as well as international good practices. Results from the IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission to Belgium, conducted in June 2023, were taken into account by the ARTEMIS team during its review, where relevant.

The team was comprised of seven experts from Austria, Finland, France, Slovenia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, as well as three IAEA staff members. The team met with officials from the ONDRAF/NIRAS, the Federal Agency for Nuclear Control (FANC), the SCK CEN, the Directorate-General for Energy, Synatom – the organization in charge of the management of the fuel cycle of Belgian nuclear power plants – and the Commission for Nuclear Provisions (CNP). One expert from the European Commission was invited to observe the mission.

The ARTEMIS team said that Belgium has established a robust national infrastructure for the management of radioactive waste and spent fuel and the implementation of decommissioning and remediation activities over the last decades. It found that ONDRAF/NIRAS demonstrates strong commitment to the long-term management of high-level and long-lived waste and spent fuel. This includes management of waste from historical radium production, spent fuel management options and the establishment of geological disposal plans for the preparation of a deep geological repository that will require continuing research and development activities and wide public consultations.

“The team saw that the responsible organizations in Belgium are strongly committed to the radioactive waste and spent fuel management. They have put in place a waste management system that is well adapted to the current situation and are preparing to take the necessary measures until the end of the life cycle of their nuclear facilities,” said the ARTEMIS team leader, Jussi Heinonen, Director at the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) in Finland. “Further progress is still needed in the comprehensive coverage of national policies guiding the implementation of the programme.”

The ARTEMIS Review Team identified good practices in the Belgian approach towards centralized management of all radioactive waste by Belgoprocess (a subsidiary of ONDRAF/NIRAS) contributing to the minimization of radioactive waste, as well as in the approach for remediation of the former Olen radium and uranium production site leading to waste minimization.

The challenges identified by the team to be addressed by Belgium in waste management include the need for consolidated policies for specific waste streams such as radium-bearing waste and spent fuel, and decision making on the geological repository. The team said the provision of adequate financial and human resources will be crucial to ensure timely implementation of such policies.

The main recommendations and suggestions provided by the Team included:

• The Government should formulate well-defined national policies on spent fuel management options and the management of radioactive waste from radium production.
• The Government should ensure that waste streams that are non-conforming – those requiring further processing – or have no clear end point should be included in the National Programme with proposed management options.
• The Government should establish a comprehensive geological disposal policy for the management of high-level waste and spent fuel and complete the process of establishing safety requirements and a licensing scheme specific to disposal facilities.
• ONDRAF/NIRAS should focus main resources on solutions that are technically feasible and internationally acknowledged for the long-term management of high-level waste and spent fuel of the Belgian inventory.
• The Government should consider enhancing the harmonization and justification of financial parameters to be used by all actors in the management of radioactive waste.

Hildegarde Vandenhove, IAEA Director of the Division of Radiation, Transport and Waste Safety, speaking at the closing session on 13 December, said she was confident that recommended improvements related to the safe management of radioactive waste and spent fuel, such as to enhance the national policies and arrangements for eventual disposal, will be considered and implemented by the respective stakeholder.

“Belgium values the review and its outcomes in the current framework of our national programme where we have on the one hand significant recent evolutions and progress, in particular concerning the license for a surface disposal facility, the decision-in-principle for deep geological disposal as well as the launching of the project for radium-bearing waste, said Marc Demarche, Director General of ONDRAF/NIRAS. “But we are also facing important and difficult challenges for continued progress, in particular about the operationalization of the low-level waste repository or the pursuit of the deep disposal project”.

The final mission report will be provided to the Government in two months.

About ARTEMIS

ARTEMIS is an integrated expert review service for radioactive waste and spent fuel management, decommissioning and remediation programmes. This service is intended for facility operators and organizations responsible for radioactive waste management, as well as for regulators, national policy makers and other decision makers.

The IAEA Safety Standards provide a robust framework of fundamental principles, requirements, and guidance to ensure safety. They reflect an international consensus and serve as a global reference for protecting people and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation. Additional IAEA documents such as Nuclear Energy Series publications can be included in the review basis. They include practical examples to be used by owners and operators of utilities, implementing organizations, academia, and government officials in Member States, among others.