Category: Nuclear Weapons

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IAEA Launches Management System Advisory Service to Support the Introduction of Nuclear Power, Conducts First Mission to Saudi Arabia

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

An IAEA team of experts visited the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to conduct the first IAEA Management Systems Advisory Service (IMSAS) mission. (Photo: DNEC).

The IAEA conducted its first-ever management systems advisory service in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from 19 to 22 May 2025.

The IAEA Management Systems Advisory Service (IMSAS) was established to support newcomer countries in developing robust and effective nuclear infrastructure, in response to findings from the Agency’s Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR) missions that highlighted inconsistencies in the implementation of management systems among countries embarking on new nuclear power programmes.

As part of the IAEA’s broader commitment to support countries in introducing nuclear power in their energy mix, IMSAS helps nuclear organizations develop and maintain management systems appropriate to the current phase of the nuclear power programme. A management system is a set of interrelated or interacting elements — including organizational structure, responsibilities, resources, and processes — established to achieve organizational objectives in an efficient and effective manner.

Saudi Arabia is embarking on a nuclear power programme as part of its strategy to transition towards a diversified energy sector and building national capabilities in advanced energy technologies, all as part of its Vision 2030. In support of this plan, Saudi Arabia is following the IAEA’s Milestones Approach and actively cooperates with the IAEA through a coordinated Integrated Workplan to support its nuclear infrastructure development.

In November 2024, Duwayhin Nuclear Energy Company (DNEC), which is designated as the owner/operator for the first nuclear power plant, requested the IAEA to conduct the IMSAS mission to review whether the current management system in DNEC is appropriate and adequate to support its current and planned activities.

During its review, the IMSAS team – comprised of four external experts from Hungary, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, as well as three IAEA staff members – reviewed documentation and conducted technical discussions with the DNEC in Riyadh.

“The IMSAS team found that DNEC has a well-developed management system that effectively supports the organization in carrying out its current and future activities. We commend DNEC on the efforts undertaken to date to develop its management system, which will help support the safe and effective implementation Saudi Arabia’s nuclear power programme,” said Liliya Dulinets, Section Head of the IAEA Nuclear Infrastructure Development Section.

In its draft final report, issued at the closing session, the mission team identified four good practices by DNEC. These included the development of its management system using a structured, project-based approach that ensures effective planning and coordination; the clear documentation of governance and management frameworks, which provides staff with a solid understanding of roles and responsibilities; and the transition to a fully electronic management system to enhance accessibility and usability.

Two recommendations and four suggestions were also noted. These included opportunities for improvement related to enhancing the consistency of the management system documentation, formalizing the approach to process development, and elevating the level of ownership of the management system within the organization.

“Our objective in requesting the mission was to have the IAEA conduct a cold-eye review of how we manage our day-to-day operations, particularly our management system,” said Khalid Al Gazlan, DNEC CEO. “The results of the mission were excellent, and the recommendations and suggestions provided will greatly support our continuous improvement efforts. We remain committed to cooperating with the IAEA through the Integrated Work Plan across all phases of our project, to ensure the establishment of a competent Owner-Operator; we thank the IAEA and the IMSAS team for this constructive and productive mission. This mission was a testament that the Kingdom is moving confidently towards building a sustainable civil nuclear program, supported by national competencies and strong international partnership.”

The final mission report will be provided to DNEC within three months.

About IMSAS

IMSAS was established to support the review of management systems in countries embarking on new nuclear power programmes. It provides a structured approach for the self-assessment of the management systems of the regulatory body and owner/operator organization, as well as an independent review conducted by IAEA and international experts.

IMSAS missions help organizations develop and maintain effective management systems consistent with the current phase of the nuclear power programme. It assists these organizations in aligning their management systems with IAEA standards and international good practices to support the implementation of current and planned activities. Additionally, IMSAS enables the identification of strengths and weaknesses through a combination of self-assessment and independent review, providing recommendations for improvement and highlighting good practices.

The IAEA offers its Member States a wide array of review services. For the introduction of nuclear power, the Agency’s peer review service include, for example, the Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR) and the Stakeholder Engagement Advisory Service for Nuclear Power Programmes (SEAS).

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Update on Developments in Iran (6)

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi has welcomed today’s announcements regarding the situation in Iran and stressed the need for a resumption of the IAEA’s indispensable safeguards verification work in the country following a 12-day military conflict that severely damaged several of its nuclear sites.

In a letter to Iranian Foreign Minister Dr Abbas Araghchi, Director General Grossi also proposed that they meet soon.

“Resuming cooperation with the IAEA is key to a successful diplomatic agreement to finally resolve the dispute over Iran’s nuclear activities. I’ve written to Foreign Minister Araghchi stressing the importance of us working together and proposing to meet soon,” he said.

IAEA inspectors have remained in Iran throughout the conflict and are ready to start working as soon as possible, going back to the country’s nuclear sites and verifying the inventories of nuclear material – including more than 400 kg of uranium enriched to 60% – which they last verified a few days before the Israeli air strikes began on 13 June.

Even though the conflict interrupted safeguards inspections in the country, the IAEA has been closely monitoring the impact of the military strikes on Iranian nuclear sites at Arak, Esfahan, Fordow and Natanz as well as the possible consequences for human health and the environment, based on relevant information received from Iran’s Nuclear Regulatory Authority.

“As I have repeatedly stated – before and during the conflict – nuclear facilities should never be attacked due to the very real risk of a serious radiological accident,” Director General Grossi said.

“During these attacks, we have seen extensive damage at several nuclear sites in Iran, including its uranium conversion and enrichment facilities. Our assessment is that there has been some localized radioactive as well as chemical release inside the affected facilities that contained nuclear material – mainly uranium enriched to varying degrees – but there has been no report of increased off-site radiation levels,” he said.  

Still, the IAEA is aware of concerns in the region regarding any radiological consequences as a result of the strikes on nuclear facilities.

“Based on the data available to us, the IAEA can provide assurances that there has been no radiological impact to the population and the environment in neighbouring countries. Crucially in terms of nuclear safety, Iran’s research and power reactors were not targeted,” Director General Grossi said.

In addition to the detailed assessment that Director General Grossi provided to the IAEA Board of Governors on Monday, the IAEA has identified additional impact points at nuclear sites at Fordow and Natanz as a result of strikes carried out before today’s announcements on the situation in Iran.

Regarding the additional strikes to Fordow that were reported early on Monday – after the U.S. bombing of the facility early on Sunday – the IAEA assesses that access roads close to the underground facility and one of its entrances were hit.

At Natanz, the IAEA has identified two impact holes from the U.S. strikes above the underground halls that had been used for enrichment as well as for storage. Based on its knowledge of what these halls contained, the IAEA assesses that this strike may have caused localized contamination and chemical hazards.

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IAEA and Romania to Launch Global Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Fire trucks and an emergency response helicopter are positioned to provide support during a national nuclear emergency exercise in Romania in October 2023. (Photo: C. Torres Vidal/IAEA)

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Romania will launch tomorrow, 24 June, the world’s largest and most complex international nuclear emergency exercise, simulating a severe accident at Romania’s Cernavodă Nuclear Power Plant.

Such exercises are held every three to five years and are based on simulated events hosted by IAEA Member States.

Over two days, more than 75 countries and 10 international organizations will take part in the ConvEx-3 (2025)—a full-scale exercise designed to test global readiness for a nuclear or radiological emergency with cross-border consequences. Participation will occur both on-site in Romania and remotely from other countries.

As nuclear use expands globally, its success hinges on strong safety standards and constant vigilance, said IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi. “This exercise is a clear demonstration of the international community’s commitment to protect people and the environment by working together, across borders and systems, when every minute counts.”

“Hosting ConvEx-3 is both a responsibility and an opportunity for Romania,” said Cantemir Ciurea-Ercău, President, National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN). “Two decades after we hosted the first ConvEx-3, we are proud to again contribute to strengthening global nuclear emergency preparedness. In today’s interconnected world, effective preparedness must transcend borders—this exercise reflects our shared commitment to safety, cooperation and transparency.”

Romania, bordering five countries, last hosted such an exercise in 2005. Cernavodă is the country’s only nuclear power plant, situated roughly 160 kilometres east of Bucharest, close to the Black Sea. During the 36-hour exercise, participants will simulate real-time decisions, emergency communications and international coordination under the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (Early Notification Convention) and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (Assistance Convention). These will include protective actions such as simulated evacuation and iodine distribution, public outreach and communication, medical response coordination, and the management of food and trade restrictions based on radiological assessments.

The IAEA will activate its Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC) and test critical tools like the Unified System for Information Exchange (USIE), a secure platform for designated contact points from IAEA Member States, and the International Radiation Monitoring System (IRMIS) platform. Member States will also activate their national emergency centres, request or offer assistance, share monitoring data, and coordinate cross-border protective actions and messaging to their populations.

The ConvEx-3 (2025) was developed by SNN Nuclearelectrica and CNCAN, with international coordination by the Inter-Agency Committee on Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies (IACRNE), which includes the World Health Organization, World Meteorological Organization, European Commission, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, INTERPOL and others.

About Convention Exercises

Convention Exercises, or ConvEx, are held to test the operational arrangements of the Early Notification Convention and the Assistance Convention.  The goal is to evaluate and further improve the international framework for emergency preparedness and response. ConvEx are prepared at three levels of complexity:

  • ConvEx-1 is designed to test emergency communication links with contact points in Member States that need to be available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and to test the response times of these contact points.
  • ConvEx-2 is designed to test specific parts of the international framework for emergency preparedness and response, for example to rehearse the appropriate use of communication procedures; to practice procedures for international assistance; and to test the arrangements and tools used for assessment and prognosis in a nuclear or radiological emergency.
  • ConvEx-3 is a full-scale exercise designed to evaluate international emergency response arrangements and capabilities for a severe nuclear or radiological emergency over several days, regardless of its cause.

Photos from the ConvEx-3 will be made available here.

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Update on Developments in Iran (5)

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can confirm that the Iranian nuclear sites of Fordow, Natanz and Esfahan have been hit, following U.S. aerial attacks overnight, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said today.

Based on an analysis of the information available to it, the IAEA assessed that there has been extensive additional damage at the sprawling Esfahan site, which had already been struck several times by Israel since it began targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities on 13 June, Director General Grossi said.

The IAEA had previously reported that several buildings at the Esfahan complex were damaged, some of which may have contained nuclear material.

“The latest attacks early this morning damaged other buildings in Esfahan. In addition, we have established that entrances to underground tunnels at the site were impacted,” Director General Grossi said.

The extent of damage to the Fordow uranium enrichment facility – built deep inside a mountain in central Iran – was not immediately possible to assess in view of its underground location and the penetrating nature of the bombs used.

“It is clear that Fordow was also directly impacted, but the degree of damage inside the uranium enrichment halls can’t be determined with certainty,” Director General Grossi said.

Iran’s other enrichment site, Natanz, which has previously been extensively damaged, was again attacked during the strikes last night with ground-penetrating munitions.

The Director General said the IAEA has been informed by the Iranian regulatory authorities that there has been no increase in off-site radiation levels after the latest attacks on the three Iranian nuclear sites.

Director General Grossi stressed the paramount importance of the countries involved urgently embarking on a diplomatic path aimed at ending the hostilities.

This would also enable the IAEA to resume its crucial verification activities in Iran, including of its stockpile of more than 400 kg of highly enriched uranium, which Agency inspectors last verified a few days before the military conflict began.

“We need to try to go back to the negotiating table as soon as possible. We have to allow the IAEA inspectors to return. The IAEA is ready to play its indispensable role in this process. We have been talking to Iran, we have been talking to the United States. We have to work for peace,” Director General Grossi said.

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Press Arrangements for IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, 23 June 2025

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

The IAEA Board of Governors will convene a meeting at the Agency’s headquarters starting at 10:00 CEST on Monday, 23 June, in Board Room C, Building C, 4th floor, in the Vienna International Centre (VIC).

IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi has requested that a meeting of the Board be convened to consider the situation in Iran.

The Board of Governors meeting is closed to the press.

IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi will open the meeting with an introductory statement, which will be released to journalists after delivery and posted on the IAEA website. The IAEA will provide video footage of the Director General’s opening statement here and will make photos available on Flickr.  

Photo Opportunity

There will be a photo opportunity with the IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi and the Vice-Chair of the Board, Ambassador Caroline Vermeulen of the Kingdom of Belgium, before the start of the Board meeting, on 23 June at 10:00 CEST in Board Room C, in the C building in the VIC.

Accreditation

Journalists are requested to register with the Press Office by 08:00 CEST on Monday, 23 June. Please email press@iaea.org.

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Update on Developments in Iran (4)

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said he will call an emergency meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors on Monday in light of the “urgent situation” in Iran following the latest attacks on the country’s nuclear facilities.

“In view of the increasingly serious situation in terms of nuclear safety and security, the Board of Governors will meet in an extraordinary session tomorrow, which I will address,” Director General Grossi said.

The Director General said the IAEA has been informed by the Iranian regulatory authorities that there has been no increase in off-site radiation levels after the recent attacks on three Iranian nuclear facilities, including the Fordow uranium enrichment site.

“As of this time, we don’t expect that there will be any health consequences for people or the environment outside the targeted sites,” he said. “We will continue to monitor and assess the situation in Iran and provide further updates as additional information becomes available.”

According to the most recent information verified by the IAEA before the attacks on Iran began on 13 June, the three sites targeted by the United States – also including Esfahan and Natanz – contained nuclear material in the form of uranium enriched to different levels, which may cause radioactive and chemical contamination within the facilities that were hit.

As he did in his statement to the United Nations Security Council on Friday, Director General Grossi reiterated his call for military restraint and “indispensable work towards” a diplomatic solution.

“I have repeatedly stated that nuclear facilities should never be attacked,” he said.

There is a need for a cessation of hostilities so that the IAEA can resume its vital inspection work in the country, including the necessary verification of its stockpile of highly enriched uranium, he added.

Director General Grossi also stressed the importance of a continued and timely exchange of information with Iran regarding issues related to nuclear safety, security and safeguards.

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Update on Developments in Iran (3)

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

A large nuclear complex in Esfahan has been targeted for a second time during Israel’s attacks on Iran over the past nine days, with several more buildings struck, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said today.

The site in central Iran was first hit on 13 June when four buildings were damaged: the central chemical laboratory, a uranium conversion facility, a reactor fuel manufacturing plant, and an enriched uranium metal processing facility under construction. No increase of off-site radiation levels was reported.

Based on information available to the IAEA today, six other buildings at the same site have now also been attacked: a natural and depleted uranium metal production facility which had not yet begun operations, a fuel rod production facility, a building with low-enriched uranium pellet production as well as a laboratory and nuclear material storage, another laboratory building, a workshop handling contaminated equipment and an office building with no nuclear material.

The same Esfahan complex includes a centrifuge manufacturing workshop that the IAEA earlier today reported had also been hit by Israel.

The facilities targeted today either contained no nuclear material or small quantities of natural or low enriched uranium, meaning any radioactive contamination is limited to the buildings that were damaged or destroyed.

“This nuclear complex in Esfahan – one of the key sites of the Iranian nuclear programme – has repeatedly been attacked and extensively damaged. Based on our analysis of the nuclear material present, we don’t see any risk of off-site contamination. Nevertheless, as I have repeatedly stated, nuclear facilities should never be attacked,” Director General Grossi said.   

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Update on Developments in Iran (2)

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

A centrifuge manufacturing workshop has been hit in Esfahan, the third such facility that has been targeted in Israel’s attacks on Iran’s nuclear-related sites over the past week, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said today, citing information available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The workshop – which made the machines used to enrich uranium – was previously under IAEA monitoring and verification as part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), including with installed Agency cameras.

“We know this facility well. There was no nuclear material at this site and therefore the attack on it will have no radiological consequences,” Director General Grossi said.

It came a few days after the IAEA on 18 June reported that the Tehran Research Center, where advanced centrifuge rotors were manufactured and tested, had been hit, as had a workshop in the city of Karaj where different centrifuge components were manufactured. There was no radiological impact, internally or externally.

The IAEA has closely been monitoring the situation at Iran’s nuclear sites since Israel began its attacks early on 13 June, providing regular updates on military strikes on facilities in Arak, Esfahan, Karaj, Natanz and Tehran.

Director General Grossi told the United Nations Security Council on Friday that “attacks on nuclear sites in the Islamic Republic of Iran have caused a sharp degradation in nuclear safety and security” in the country, adding: “Though they have not so far led to a radiological release affecting the public, there is a danger this could occur.”

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IAEA Director General Grossi’s Statement to UNSC on Situation in Iran

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

(As prepared for delivery)

Attacks on nuclear sites in the Islamic Republic of Iran have caused a sharp degradation in nuclear safety and security in Iran. Though they have not so far led to a radiological release affecting the public, there is a danger this could occur.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has been monitoring closely the situation at Iran’s nuclear sites since Israel began its attacks a week ago. As part of its mission, the IAEA is the global nerve centre for information on nuclear and radiological safety, and we can respond to any nuclear or radiological emergency.

Based on information available to the IAEA, the following is the current situation at Iran’s nuclear sites. Which I offer as a follow up to my most recent report to this Security Council.

The Natanz enrichment site contains two facilities. The first is the main Fuel Enrichment Plant. Initial attacks on the 13th of June targeted and destroyed electricity infrastructure at the facility, including an electrical sub-station, the main electric power supply building, and emergency power supply and back-up generators. On the same day, the main cascade hall appears to have been attacked using ground-penetrating munitions.

The second facility at Natanz is the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant. It consists of aboveground and underground cascade halls. On the 13th of June the above-ground part was functionally destroyed and the strikes on the underground cascade halls were seriously damaging.

The level of radioactivity outside the Natanz site has remained unchanged and at normal levels, indicating no external radiological impact on the population or the environment.

However, within the Natanz facility there is both radiological and chemical contamination. It is possible that Uranium isotopes contained in Uranium Hexafluoride, Uranyl Fluoride and Hydrogen Fluoride are dispersed inside the facility. The radiation, primarily consisting of alpha particles, poses a significant danger if inhaled or ingested. This risk can be effectively managed with appropriate protective measures, such as using respiratory devices. The main concern inside the facility is chemical toxicity.

Fordow is Iran’s main enrichment location for enriching uranium to 60%. The Agency is not aware of any damage at Fordow at this time.

At the Esfahan nuclear site, four buildings were damaged in last Friday’s attack: the central chemical laboratory, a uranium conversion plant, the Tehran reactor-fuel manufacturing plant, and the enriched uranium metal processing facility, which was under construction.

No increase of off-site radiation levels was reported. As in Natanz, the main concern is chemical toxicity.  

The Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor under construction in Arak, was hit on the 19th of June. As the reactor was not operational and did not contain any nuclear material, no radiological consequence is expected. The nearby Heavy Water Production Plant is also assessed to have been hit, and similarly no radiological consequence is expected.

As stated in the IAEA’s update of the 18th of June, at the Tehran Research Center, one building, where advanced centrifuge rotors were manufactured and tested, was hit. At the Karaj workshop, two buildings, where different centrifuge components were manufactured, were destroyed. There was no radiological impact, internally or externally.

Let me now refer to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. This is the nuclear site in Iran where the consequences of an attack could be most serious. It is an operating nuclear power plant and as such it hosts thousands of kilograms of nuclear material. Countries of the region have reached out directly to me over the past few hours to express their concerns, and I want to make it absolutely and completely clear: In case of an attack on the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant a direct hit could result in a very high release of radioactivity to the environment.

Similarly, a hit that disabled the only two lines supplying electrical power to the plant could cause its reactor’s core to melt, which could result in a high release of radioactivity to the environment. In their worst-case, both scenarios would necessitate protective actions, such as evacuations and sheltering of the population or the need to take stable iodine, with the reach extending to distances from a few to several hundred kilometres. Radiation monitoring would need to cover distances of several hundred kilometres and food restrictions may need to be implemented.

Any action against the Tehran Nuclear Research Reactor could also have severe consequences, potentially for large areas of the city of Tehran and its inhabitants. In such a case, protective actions would need to be taken.

I will continue to provide public updates about the developments at all these sites and their possible health and environmental consequences.

The Agency is, as madame Undersecretary kindly reminded, and will remain present in Iran and inspections there will resume, as required by Iran’s safeguards obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement, as soon as safety and security conditions allow.

In this context, let me restate that the safety of our inspectors is of utmost importance. The host country has a responsibility in this regard, and we expect every effort to be made to ensure that their security and their communication lines with the IAEA headquarters will be maintained.

As stated in my most recent report to the Agency’s Board of Governors and based on inspections conducted at the relevant facilities since then, Iran’s uranium stockpiles remain under safeguards in accordance with Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement. You may recall that more than 400kg of this stockpile is uranium enriched up to 60% U-235. It is essential that the Agency resumes inspections as soon as possible to provide credible assurances that none of it has been diverted.

Importantly, any special measures by Iran to protect its nuclear materials and equipment must be done in accordance with Iran’s safeguards obligations and the Agency.  

Therefore, it is of paramount importance that the Agency’s inspectors are allowed to verify that all relevant materials, especially those enriched to 60%, are accounted for. Beyond the potential radiological risks, attacks on such materials would make this effort of course more difficult.

Madame President,

The IAEA has consistently underlined, as stated in its General Conference resolution, that armed attacks on nuclear facilities should never take place, and could result in radioactive releases with grave consequences within and beyond the boundaries of the State which has been attacked.

I therefore again call on maximum restraint. Military escalation threatens lives and delays indispensable work towards a diplomatic solution for the long-term assurance that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon.

Madame President,

The presence, support, analysis and inspections of technical experts are crucial to mitigating risks to nuclear safety and security – that is true during peacetime and even more so during military conflict.

For the second time in three years, we are witnessing a dramatic conflict between two UN and IAEA Member States in which nuclear installations are coming under fire and nuclear safety is being compromised. The IAEA, just as has been the case with the military conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, will not stand idle during this conflict.

As I stated in this chamber just a few days ago, I am ready to travel immediately and to engage with all relevant parties to help ensure the protection of nuclear facilities and the continued peaceful use of nuclear technology in accordance with the Agency mandate, including by deploying Agency nuclear safety and security experts, in addition to our safeguards inspectors in Iran, wherever necessary.

For the IAEA to act, a constructive, professional dialogue is needed. I urge the Members of this Council to support us in making it happen sooner rather than later.

The IAEA must receive timely and regular technical information about affected nuclear facilities and their respective sites. I urge in this regard the Iranian regulatory authorities to continue a constructive dialogue with the IAEA Incident and Emergency Centre, which has been operating 24/7 since the beginning of this conflict.

Nuclear facilities and material must not be shrouded by the fog of war.

Yesterday there was an incorrect statement to the media by an Israeli military official that Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant had been attacked. Though the mistake was quickly identified and the statement retracted, the situation underscored the vital need for clear and accurate communication, and the Agency’s unique role in providing it in a technically accurate and politically impartial way is obvious.

Let me conclude by assuring the international community of the IAEA’s continued support at this very grave time.

A diplomatic solution is within reach if the necessary political will is there. Elements for an agreement have been discussed. The IAEA can guarantee, through a watertight inspections system, that nuclear weapons will not be developed in Iran.  They can form the basis of a long-standing agreement that brings peace and avoids a nuclear crisis in the Middle East. This opportunity should not be missed. The alternative would be a protracted conflict and a looming threat of nuclear proliferation that, while emanating from the Middle East, would effectively erode the NPT and the non-proliferation regime as a whole.

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IAEA Mission Observes Commitment to Safety at Research Reactor in Malaysia, Recommends Further Improvement

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

An IAEA team of experts visited Malaysia’s nuclear research reactor, the Reaktor TRIGA PUSPATI, during an Integrated Safety Assessment for Research Reactors mission. (Photo: Nuklear Malaysia)

An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team of experts said Malaysia is committed to the safe operation of its sole nuclear research reactor, the Reaktor TRIGA PUSPATI (RTP). The team also identified the need to further enhance the effectiveness of the reactor’s safety committee, the management of refurbishment and modernization of the reactor’s safety systems and components, and operating procedures.

The five-day Integrated Safety Assessment for Research Reactors (INSARR) mission to the RTP facility, which concluded on 20 June, was conducted at the request of Malaysian Nuclear Agency (Nuklear Malaysia). The mission team comprised three experts from Slovenia, South Africa, and Thailand, and two IAEA staff.

RTP is located in Bangi, Selangor, about 30 kilometres south of Kuala Lumpur. Two INSARR missions were conducted at RTP in 1997 and 2014. Since then, the reactor has undergone modifications, including replacement of the rotary rack, refurbishment of the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems and the upgrading of the stack monitoring system.

RTP was constructed in 1979 and began operation in 1982. RTP was designed for various fields of nuclear research, education and training, and it incorporates facilities for neutron and gamma radiation studies, as well as isotope production and sample activation.

The INSARR team visited the reactor and its associated facilities and met with the research reactor staff and management. “Nuklear Malaysia has shown a commitment to safety by requesting an IAEA INSARR mission,” said Kaichao Sun, team leader and Nuclear Safety Officer at the IAEA. “Ageing management of reactor systems and components that are important to safety can be challenging. Effective application of the IAEA safety standards, including the establishment of effective leadership and management for safety and the utilization of operating experience feedback, helps address this challenge.”

The mission team made recommendations and suggestions to Nuklear Malaysia for further improvements, including the need for:

  • Improving the reactor safety committee’s oversight of all activities important to safety, including reactor modifications and operational safety programmes such as refurbishment and modernization of the reactor’s safety systems and components;   
  • Strengthening procedures to respond to abnormal situations and events, such as loss of electrical power, fire and earthquakes;      
  • Establishing procedures for learning from operating experience; and     
  • Strengthening radiological protection practices by improving the classification of different areas of the workplace.  

“The INSARR mission is a valuable opportunity for us to engage in a peer-review process,” said Julia Abdul Karim, Director of Technical Support Division at Nuklear Malaysia. “It enables us to benchmark our programmes and activities against the IAEA safety standards and the international best practices and to strengthen our operational safety of our research reactor.”

Background

INSARR missions are an IAEA peer review service, conducted at the request of a Member State, to assess and evaluate the safety of research reactors based on IAEA safety standards. Follow-up missions are standard components of the INSARR programme and are typically conducted within two years of the initial mission. General information about INSARR missions can be found on the IAEA website.

The IAEA Safety Standards provide a robust framework of fundamental principles, requirements, and guidance to ensure safety. They reflect an international consensus and serve as a global reference for protecting people and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation.