Category: Nuclear Weapons

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) completed an advisory service mission to Cambodia focused on assessing the country’s nuclear security regime for nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control (MORC). The team said the country has implemented measures to detect and respond to criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving such material and encouraged Cambodia to further improve its legal and regulatory framework. The team also identified several examples of good practice.

The mission, carried out at the request of the Royal Government of Cambodia, took place from 11 to 22 December and involved a team of nine international experts from Finland, Hungary, Japan, Morocco, Pakistan, the United States of America, Viet Nam and the IAEA. It is the second mission of this kind to Cambodia.

International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) missions aim to help States to better prevent, detect and respond to criminal and intentional unauthorized acts involving nuclear or other radioactive material, known as MORC, which is lost, missing, stolen, improperly disposed of, or not adequately stored or handled.

The mission aimed to review the current state of nuclear security in relation to MORC in Cambodia and provide recommendations on how to strengthen it in accordance with international guidance and best practices.

The team conducted a series of meetings with officials from the Ministry of Mines and Energy, the General Department of Customs and Excise, the Secretariat of the National Counter Terrorism Committee, and the National Authority for the Prohibition of Chemical, Nuclear, Biological and Radiological Weapons (NACW).

The INSServ team visited the Phnom Penh Autonomous Port (PPAP), the Sihanoukville Autonomous Port (PAS) and the Phnom Penh International Airport (PPIA) to assess the detection and response measures in place. The team also went to the NACW Institute of Explore and Experiment on Substance in Kampong Chhnang Province.

“Cambodia established a solid basis for a comprehensive nuclear security regime, ” said Team Leader Khammar Mrabit, former Director General of the Moroccan Agency for Nuclear and Radiological Safety and Security and member of the Moroccan Parliament. “We welcome Cambodia’s cooperation in this mission and hope our recommendations and suggestions will be helpful for further improvements.”

The team said that Cambodia had implemented many elements of a legal and regulatory framework related to MORC. Still, it recommended the country to establish a national nuclear law and ratify the Amendment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Further recommendations include the establishment of national infrastructure to support sustainable training to enhance Cambodia’s existing detection and response capabilities.

Several good practices were identified, including the categorization of offences in the country’s legal framework,  the radiation detection scan of all import and export cargo containers at PPAP and PAS, the use of the IAEA mobile app TRACE (Tool for Radiation Alarm and Commodity Evaluation), as well as the establishment of knowledge management and professional development measures for the staff with nuclear security detection responsibilities.

“We are ready to provide continued support to Cambodia as they implement the IAEA INSServ mission recommendations and suggestions to enhance the nuclear security detection and response systems and measures relevant to MORC,” said Elena Buglova, Director of the IAEA Division of Nuclear Security.

The IAEA’s INSServ mission is part of its ongoing efforts to assist Member States in strengthening their nuclear security regimes in relation to MORC. The Agency provides a range of services in this area, including expert advice, training, and equipment support, to help Member States protect against criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving such materials.

“This second INSServ mission will assist us in the upgrade of Cambodia’s nuclear security regime by taking into account the international practice and expertise,” said Keo Rottanak, Minister of Mines and Energy. “We firmly believe that no single nation can address the complex challenges of nuclear security in isolation. A secure world starts by cooperation of all countries, relevant agencies and individuals.”

The draft findings and recommendations were presented to the Royal Government of Cambodia, and the final report will be presented in about three months.

Background

The mission was the 86th INSServ mission conducted by the IAEA since the programme began in 2006.

INSServ missions, based on the INSServ guidelines published in 2019, assist States in establishing, maintaining and strengthening their nuclear security regime related to nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control.

The missions provide independent advice on implementing international instruments, along with IAEA guidance on the prevention and detection of and response to criminal and intentional unauthorized acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

In my opening statement to the Board on 22 November, I reported that we had observed increased levels of activity at, and near, the Light Water Reactor (LWR) at Yongbyon, and also – since mid-October – a strong water outflow from its cooling system. These observations were consistent with the commissioning of the LWR.

More recent observations indicate that this water discharge is warm, which is also consistent with ongoing commissioning of the LWR, a process that takes some time for any new reactor. However, the discharge of warm water is indicative the reactor has reached criticality.  It remains the case that without access to the facility the Agency cannot confirm its operational status.

The LWR, like any nuclear reactor, can produce plutonium in its irradiated fuel, which can be separated during reprocessing, so this is a cause for concern.

Concerning the safety of the LWR, we do not have sufficient information to make an assessment. Of course, safety should always be the paramount issue when starting a new reactor.  Nuclear safety is a sovereign responsibility of the State and the IAEA supports the States in this area.

I repeat that the further development of the DPRK’s nuclear programme, including the construction and operation of the LWR, is a violation of UN Security Council resolutions and is deeply regrettable.

I call upon the DPRK to comply fully with its obligations under Security Council resolutions, to cooperate promptly with the Agency in the full and effective implementation of its NPT Safeguards Agreement and to resolve all outstanding issues, especially those that have arisen during the absence of Agency inspectors from the country. The Agency is ready to engage  on any of the above issues, including safety.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) is installing four new mobile diesel boilers to generate additional steam needed for various nuclear safety functions at the site, including for waste treatment, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said today.

The IAEA team of experts present at the ZNPP observed the installation work during a walkdown last Sunday and were subsequently informed that the new boilers will be ready soon. The site currently has nine mobile boilers, eight of which are operating to provide heating during the winter.

“Nuclear power plants need significant amounts of steam to conduct important operational activities at the sites. This remains the case also for the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant, even though it has not produced electricity for well over a year now. The IAEA has encouraged the plant to install diesel boilers for this purpose and we welcome the planned additional capacity,” Director General Grossi said.

Five reactors remain in cold shutdown, while unit 4 is in hot shutdown to produce steam and heat, including for the nearby town of Enerhodar, where most plant staff live.

Nearly three weeks after it suffered its eighth complete loss of off-site power during the conflict, the ZNPP remains connected to two external power sources: the main 750 kilovolt (kV) power line, and a back-up 330 kV power line.

The IAEA experts have over the past week continued to monitor the nuclear safety and security situation across the site of Europe’s largest nuclear power plant (NPP), conducting walkdowns to the reactor hall and electrical safety system rooms of unit 3 and to the main control room of unit 5, where they observed a successful test of the safety systems.

In recent days, they also went to the site’s 750 kV electrical switchyard, entry point for the off-site power needed at the plant, and the onsite water treatment facility. In another walkdown, they saw the ZNPP’s cooling pond, cooling towers, inlet and outlet channels as well as the outlet channel of the nearby Zaporizhzhya Thermal Power Plant. However, they were not allowed this time to access the isolation gate of the cooling pond.

Separately, the IAEA experts were informed by the ZNPP that they could not access the reactor rooftops as planned on 19 December due to security concerns.  No alternative date has so far been provided. The IAEA has previously this year been given access to three of the reactor roofs – of units 2, 3 and 4 – but not the others.

In addition, the IAEA team was once again not granted access to the north-western part of the turbine hall of reactor unit 5 during a walkdown there last Monday, despite a request made before the visit. The IAEA has not been able to visit the north-western part of any of the six turbine halls since mid-October.

The team continues to pay close attention to the maintenance situation at the plant, particularly the maintenance plan for next year, and also to the electrical equipment related to the safety systems of the reactor units following a power loss at unit 6 in mid-November. The IAEA experts have been informed that the 2024 maintenance plan is almost complete, but they have so far not been able to study it as requested.

An unannounced fire drill was conducted at the ZNPP site on Wednesday morning, following last week’s emergency communication exercise. The drill scenario involved a hypothetical oil leakage at the transformer of reactor unit 2, which resulted in a fire. The drill’s participants included regional, city and on-site fire departments. The IAEA team was only made aware of the drill afterwards.  

As usual in recent months, the IAEA team has continued to hear explosions from outside the ZNPP site, including six powerful blasts on Wednesday evening.

IAEA experts at the Rivne, Khmelnitsky, South Ukraine NPPs and the Chornobyl site continue to report that nuclear safety and security is being maintained despite challenging circumstances. A successful rotation of IAEA staff took place during the week at the Rivne, South Ukraine and Khmelnitsky sites.

Last week, the IAEA arranged the 33rd delivery of nuclear safety and security-related equipment to Ukraine, using contributions from Australia. It was the first delivery under a new system requiring entities in Ukraine to register in the national electronic system as recipients of humanitarian aid.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team of experts found that Belgium demonstrates commitment to the safe management of its radioactive waste and spent fuel, while also noting opportunities to enhance the national policies and arrangements for eventual disposal.

The Integrated Review Service for Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Management, Decommissioning and Remediation (ARTEMIS) team this week concluded an eleven-day mission to Belgium. The mission was carried out from 3 to 13 December at the request of Belgium and hosted by ONDRAF/NIRAS, the Belgian National Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile Material management.

Belgium manages high-level waste from the five nuclear reactors in operation today in the Doel and Tihange nuclear power plants (NPPs) which provided in 2022 roughly 47,3 per cent of the country’s electricity. Waste is also managed from the additional two reactors which have been permanently shut down. Belgium delayed plans to close its nuclear reactors by 2025 and reached a Government agreement with Engie – operator of the two NPPs – to extend operation of Doel 4 and Tihange 3 nuclear reactors to 2035 and address the transfer of nuclear waste liabilities to the Federal Government.

Low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste is generated from the production and use of radiation sources in medical and industrial applications, as well as in science and research activities such as at the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre (SCK CEN). Waste is also generated from the decommissioning of research reactors such as BR2 and BR3 and the decommissioning of industrial facilities that covered almost all activities in the nuclear fuel cycle, including the Eurochemic pilot reprocessing plant, Belgonucléaire mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) fabrication facility and the FBFC International UO2 fuel fabrication facility.

Radioactive waste and spent fuel in Belgium are managed by the ONDRAF/NIRAS after acceptance. The Belgian National Programme for the Management of Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste, adopted in October 2015, comprises a national strategy for the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste. It is expected that Belgium will publish an update of the National Programme in due time after the ARTEMIS mission and the finalization of the intermediate Government agreement with Engie to extend the life of Doel 4 and Tihange 3 nuclear reactors.

ARTEMIS missions provide independent expert advice from an international team of specialists convened by the IAEA to support a country with the management of radioactive waste and spent fuel. Reviews are based on the IAEA Safety Standards and technical guidance as well as international good practices. Results from the IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission to Belgium, conducted in June 2023, were taken into account by the ARTEMIS team during its review, where relevant.

The team was comprised of seven experts from Austria, Finland, France, Slovenia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, as well as three IAEA staff members. The team met with officials from the ONDRAF/NIRAS, the Federal Agency for Nuclear Control (FANC), the SCK CEN, the Directorate-General for Energy, Synatom – the organization in charge of the management of the fuel cycle of Belgian nuclear power plants – and the Commission for Nuclear Provisions (CNP). One expert from the European Commission was invited to observe the mission.

The ARTEMIS team said that Belgium has established a robust national infrastructure for the management of radioactive waste and spent fuel and the implementation of decommissioning and remediation activities over the last decades. It found that ONDRAF/NIRAS demonstrates strong commitment to the long-term management of high-level and long-lived waste and spent fuel. This includes management of waste from historical radium production, spent fuel management options and the establishment of geological disposal plans for the preparation of a deep geological repository that will require continuing research and development activities and wide public consultations.

“The team saw that the responsible organizations in Belgium are strongly committed to the radioactive waste and spent fuel management. They have put in place a waste management system that is well adapted to the current situation and are preparing to take the necessary measures until the end of the life cycle of their nuclear facilities,” said the ARTEMIS team leader, Jussi Heinonen, Director at the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) in Finland. “Further progress is still needed in the comprehensive coverage of national policies guiding the implementation of the programme.”

The ARTEMIS Review Team identified good practices in the Belgian approach towards centralized management of all radioactive waste by Belgoprocess (a subsidiary of ONDRAF/NIRAS) contributing to the minimization of radioactive waste, as well as in the approach for remediation of the former Olen radium and uranium production site leading to waste minimization.

The challenges identified by the team to be addressed by Belgium in waste management include the need for consolidated policies for specific waste streams such as radium-bearing waste and spent fuel, and decision making on the geological repository. The team said the provision of adequate financial and human resources will be crucial to ensure timely implementation of such policies.

The main recommendations and suggestions provided by the Team included:

• The Government should formulate well-defined national policies on spent fuel management options and the management of radioactive waste from radium production.
• The Government should ensure that waste streams that are non-conforming – those requiring further processing – or have no clear end point should be included in the National Programme with proposed management options.
• The Government should establish a comprehensive geological disposal policy for the management of high-level waste and spent fuel and complete the process of establishing safety requirements and a licensing scheme specific to disposal facilities.
• ONDRAF/NIRAS should focus main resources on solutions that are technically feasible and internationally acknowledged for the long-term management of high-level waste and spent fuel of the Belgian inventory.
• The Government should consider enhancing the harmonization and justification of financial parameters to be used by all actors in the management of radioactive waste.

Hildegarde Vandenhove, IAEA Director of the Division of Radiation, Transport and Waste Safety, speaking at the closing session on 13 December, said she was confident that recommended improvements related to the safe management of radioactive waste and spent fuel, such as to enhance the national policies and arrangements for eventual disposal, will be considered and implemented by the respective stakeholder.

“Belgium values the review and its outcomes in the current framework of our national programme where we have on the one hand significant recent evolutions and progress, in particular concerning the license for a surface disposal facility, the decision-in-principle for deep geological disposal as well as the launching of the project for radium-bearing waste, said Marc Demarche, Director General of ONDRAF/NIRAS. “But we are also facing important and difficult challenges for continued progress, in particular about the operationalization of the low-level waste repository or the pursuit of the deep disposal project”.

The final mission report will be provided to the Government in two months.

About ARTEMIS

ARTEMIS is an integrated expert review service for radioactive waste and spent fuel management, decommissioning and remediation programmes. This service is intended for facility operators and organizations responsible for radioactive waste management, as well as for regulators, national policy makers and other decision makers.

The IAEA Safety Standards provide a robust framework of fundamental principles, requirements, and guidance to ensure safety. They reflect an international consensus and serve as a global reference for protecting people and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation. Additional IAEA documents such as Nuclear Energy Series publications can be included in the review basis. They include practical examples to be used by owners and operators of utilities, implementing organizations, academia, and government officials in Member States, among others.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) has been re-connected to its only remaining back-up power line after it was suddenly lost two weeks ago, but the site’s overall supply of off-site electricity remains fragile and vulnerable to further disruptions, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said today.

During the military conflict, frequent power cuts have remained a source of serious concern for safety and security at Europe’s largest nuclear power plant (NPP) as it needs electricity to cool its reactors and for other essential functions, even when all units have been shut down.

Earlier this month, the ZNPP suffered its eighth complete loss of external electricity in less than 18 months, caused by grid events outside the plant itself. Since 2 December, it has depended on a single 750 kilovolt (kV) line, until the back-up 330 kV line could be repaired and restored this week. Before the conflict, the ZNPP had four 750 kV lines available as well as several back-up options.

“Since yesterday, the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant once again has two alternative sources of external electricity. But we know only too well just how risky the power situation continues to be. Unfortunately, we can’t rule out more external power blackouts as long as this war continues,” Director General Grossi said.

Further underlining the potential dangers facing the plant, the IAEA experts at the site have continued to hear explosions relatively close to the plant, indicating ongoing military activities in the region where it is located.

Over the past week, the IAEA team has continued to conduct regular walkdowns, including to the plant’s temporary emergency response centre, dry spent fuel storage area, and the reactor building of unit 5 as well as to the main control rooms of all six reactors, one after the other.

On Tuesday, the ZNPP conducted an emergency communication drill, involving on-site and off-site representatives from different Russian organisations. The IAEA experts observed part of the drill. It was the latest in a series of emergency exercises conducted at Ukraine’s nuclear facilities, including at the ZNPP last month.

The IAEA team at the ZNPP again this week requested access to the 330 kV switchyard at the nearby thermal power plant to assess the situation regarding external back-up electrical connections there. As per previous requests, they were not granted such access this time either.

However, the IAEA team was informed that they will be able to access the reactor rooftops in the coming days. The IAEA has previously been given access to three of the reactor roofs – of units 2, 3 and 4 – but not the others. Last week, the experts were granted partial access to the turbine halls of all six reactor units.

The IAEA team is continuing to pay close attention to maintenance activities at the site, including actions taken by the ZNPP following last month’s detection of boron in the secondary circuit of a steam generator of unit 5. The IAEA experts were recently informed that the boron concentration levels in the secondary circuits of all the plant’s 24 steam generators were within the established limits, and that no further action would be taken at this time.

Of the site’s six reactors, five remain in cold shutdown, while unit 4 is in hot shutdown to produce steam and heat, including for the nearby town of Enerhodar, where most plant staff live. The ZNPP has informed the IAEA that there are currently no plans to return unit 5 to hot shut down. Additional heating is provided by mobile diesel boilers installed at the ZNPP together with boilers located in the nearby industrial zone and in Enerhodar.

The IAEA teams of experts present at Ukraine’s Rivne, Khmelnitsky, South Ukraine NPPs and the Chornobyl site continue to report that nuclear safety and security is being maintained despite the challenging circumstances.

However, the IAEA teams at the Rivne and Khmelnitsky NPPs reported earlier this week that the mobile phone network had occasionally been disrupted in recent days. The teams were informed that the cause was a cyber attack on Ukraine’s communications network that affected most of the country. The IAEA experts were still able to carry out their work and communicate with headquarters in Vienna. Communications were also maintained between the NPPs, the national nuclear operator Energoatom and the state nuclear regulatory body.