Category: Nuclear Weapons

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team of experts said Bulgaria has a comprehensive and robust regulatory framework for nuclear and radiation safety covering all facilities and activities. The mission found that the overall performance of Bulgaria’s regulatory system would be enhanced with the adoption of a national safety policy and strategy in line with IAEA safety standards.

The Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission was conducted at the request of the Government of Bulgaria and hosted by the Bulgarian Nuclear Regulatory Agency (BNRA), the regulatory body for nuclear and radiation safety in Bulgaria, and the Ministry of Health (MoH). Taking place from 17 to 29 November, the IRRS reviewed Bulgaria’s national regulatory framework for nuclear, radiation, radioactive waste and transport safety.

Using IAEA safety standards and international good practices, IRRS missions are designed to strengthen the effectiveness of the national legal and regulatory infrastructures, while recognizing the responsibility of each country to ensure nuclear and radiation safety. This is the second IRRS mission that Bulgaria has hosted since the IAEA’s IRRS programme began in 2006.

The IRRS team consisted of 16 senior regulatory experts from 15 IAEA Member States, two observers and three IAEA staff members.

In Bulgaria, nuclear energy provides roughly 40 per cent of the country’s electricity through the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), which has two pressurized-water reactor units each providing an installed power of approximately 1000 MWe. The Bulgarian nuclear programme plans to construct two new nuclear power units utilizing AP1000 technology at the Kozloduy NPP site. The country also uses nuclear and radiation technologies in medicine, industry and research.

During the 12-day mission, the team met with officials from the BNRA and MoH and made site visits to observe regulatory inspections at the Kozloduy NPP; Kozloduy State Enterprise Radioactive Waste Management (SE RAW); Controltest Ltd., a company working in destructive and non-destructive testing; Theta Consult Ltd., working in radiation control and radiation protection; and Acibadem City Clinic.

“Bulgaria has a comprehensive and mature regulatory infrastructure for nuclear and radiation safety. The challenge for BNRA will be to prepare itself for the regulatory oversight of the expected expansion of Bulgaria’s nuclear power programme,” said IRRS team leader Zia Hussain Shah, Director General of Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority. “We recommend that Bulgaria further improve its radiation protection framework, especially in the medical sector.”

The IRRS team observed that BNRA has a culture of continuous improvement and is a mature and competent regulator, which fulfils its statutory obligations without undue influence. The team identified several areas of good performances, including:

• The BNRA, through its Communication Policy, proactively engages key stakeholders by using its website, social media and dedicated regular press conferences to provide updated information on nuclear and radiation safety in Bulgaria.
• Daily communications between site inspectors and BNRA headquarters staff ensure that BNRA is consistently updated on the safety status of nuclear installations, enabling timely regulatory responses when necessary.
• The BNRA maintains a comprehensive registry and database for radiation sources with direct inputs from licensees, enabling BNRA to systematically check the status of radiation sources in facilities and to track the import and export of those sources in real time.
• The Regulation on Protection during Medical Exposure outlines the provisions for justification of medical exposure involving both the prescribing physician and the radiological medical practitioner, especially in the case of fetuses, children and asymptomatic individuals.

The team also provided recommendations and suggestions to help Bulgaria enhance its regulatory framework, including for the Government to:

• Adopt the national policy and strategy for safety addressing all elements in line with IAEA safety fundamentals.
• Adequately increase BNRA’s budget to cater for regulatory activities associated with the planned expansion of Bulgaria’s nuclear power programme.
• Ensure that there is a comprehensive long term strategy for human resource development for BNRA and MoH, with consideration of adequate remuneration of regulatory staff in comparison with other national nuclear organizations.
• Finalize the revision of the Strategy for Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste Management.

Additional recommendations and suggestions were made specifically for BNRA and the MoH, including:

• BNRA should conduct an independent assessment of leadership for safety and safety culture throughout the organization.
• BNRA should consider implementing processes of review and revision of regulation and guides in a systematic and timely manner.
• MoH should consider developing guidelines for the release of patients who have undergone therapeutic radiological procedures with implanted sealed sources.

“We extend our heartfelt gratitude to the IRRS team and our Bulgarian counterparts for their dedicated efforts over the past two weeks,” said Tsanko Bachiyski, Chairman of BNRA. “The IRRS mission reaffirms our commitment to the continuous enhancement of nuclear and radiation safety. BNRA will leverage the mission’s outcomes to further strengthen our regulatory capabilities and national safety infrastructure.”

The IRRS team’s final report will be provided to the Government of Bulgaria in about three months.

IAEA Safety Standards

The IAEA Safety Standards provide a robust framework of fundamental principles, requirements and guidance to ensure safety. They reflect an international consensus and serve as a global reference for protecting people and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Ukraine’s three operating nuclear power plants (NPPs) reduced their electricity generation this morning following renewed attacks on the country’s energy infrastructure that further endangered nuclear safety during the military conflict, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said.

For a second time in less than two weeks, the Khmelnytskyy, Rivne and South Ukraine NPPs lowered their power levels as a precautionary step during widespread military activities in the country, while air raid alarms sounded at the three sites, Director General Grossi said. Two of the IAEA teams deployed in Ukraine were forced to seek shelter.

The operating NPPs have a total of nine reactors, all of which decreased output. One reactor, at the Rivne NPP, was also disconnected from the grid. The NPPs continued to receive external electricity, even though the Khmelnytskyy site lost the connection to two of its power lines.

“Ukraine’s energy infrastructure is extremely fragile and vulnerable, putting nuclear safety at great risk,” Director General Grossi said. “Once again, I call for maximum military restraint in areas with major nuclear energy facilities and other sites on which they depend.”

There were no reports of direct damage to the NPPs, but the IAEA was informed by Ukraine that the strikes once again impacted the electrical substations which the plants use both to transmit and receive off-site power.

These substations, identified by the IAEA as important for nuclear safety and security, have been damaged in previous attacks, including in August.

IAEA teams visited seven substations – located outside the NPPs across Ukraine – in September and October to assess the situation there following the August strikes, finding “extensive damage” and “concluding that the grid’s capability to provide a reliable off-site power supply to Ukrainian NPPs has been significantly reduced,” Director General Grossi told the IAEA Board of Governors last week.

“The IAEA will continue to assess the extent of damage to facilities and power lines that are essential for nuclear safety and security,” he said today. “The IAEA will continue to do everything in its power to reduce the risk of a nuclear incident during this tragic war.”

NPPs need reliable connections to the grid both to distribute the electricity they produce and to obtain off-site power for reactor cooling. The increasing fragility of the grid has been one of the main challenges for nuclear safety and security throughout the armed conflict.

The Director General has repeatedly underlined the importance of adhering to the seven indispensable pillars of nuclear safety and security, one of which states that there must be a secure off-site power supply from the grid for all nuclear sites.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team of experts today completed a review of long term operational safety of the Borssele Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) in the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

The Pre-Safety Aspects of Long Term Operation (Pre-SALTO) review mission was requested by the country’s Authority for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection (ANVS). During the ten-day mission, held from 19 to 28 November, the team reviewed the plant’s preparedness, organization and programmes for safe long-term operation (LTO).

Borssele NPP, operated by Elektriciteits-Produktiemaatschappij Zuid-Nederland (EPZ), is situated on the country’s coast, roughly 165 kilometres south of Amsterdam. The plant’s single unit is a pressurized water reactor with a net electrical output of 485 MW(e), contributing 3.2% of the total electricity generation in the country. It was put into commercial operation in 1973 with a design life of 40 years. The plant had previously received approval to extend the operational period to 2033, and the plant’s intention – as requested by the Dutch government – is to extend the operation for a subsequent period until 2054.

The mission was conducted by a twelve-person team consisting of experts from Argentina, France, Slovenia, Spain, and the United States, as well as four observers from Hungary, South Korea, Sweden, and Switzerland, and two IAEA staff members. The team held discussions with staff from the Borssele NPP and conducted site walkdowns during the review.    

“The team observed that EPZ is preparing for safe continued long-term operation and the plant staff are cooperative, professional, and open to suggestions for improvement,” said team leader and IAEA Senior Nuclear Safety Officer Gabor Petofi. “We encourage the plant to address the review findings and implement the remaining LTO-related activities as planned.”

The team identified two good practices that will be shared with the nuclear industry globally, including:

• Use of a 360 degree imaging system for enhanced planning of ageing management activities to reduce radiation dose to plant personnel.  
• Use of a portable tablet for field inspectors to conduct ageing management inspections of civil structures and record findings.

The team also provided 15 recommendations and suggestions to further improve safe subsequent LTO, including that:

• The plant should complete the development and implementation of the ageing management programmes for mechanical and electrical components.
• The plant should enhance the ageing management of civil structures.
• The plant should effectively update and implement the human resources strategy to support LTO.

The plant management expressed a determination to implement the mission findings. “We appreciate the IAEA’s support to our plant in ageing management and preparation for safe subsequent LTO,” said Carlo Wolters, CEO of EPZ. “It is very important for us to get an external view of our preparations in an early phase. The competencies and experience of the IAEA team enabled an effective identification of our areas for improvements.  The results of this mission will help us to improve our activities for safe subsequent LTO and to further align them with IAEA safety standards.”

The team provided a draft report to the plant management and to the ANVS. The plant management and ANVS will have an opportunity to make factual comments on the draft. A final report will be submitted to the plant management, ANVS and the Dutch Government within three months.

Background

A SALTO peer review is a comprehensive safety review addressing strategy and key elements for the safe long term operation of nuclear power plants. They complement OSART missions, which are designed as a review of essential operational safety programmes and activities. Neither SALTO nor OSART reviews are regulatory inspections, nor are they design reviews or substitutes for an exhaustive assessment of a plant’s overall safety status.

A Pre-SALTO mission reviews ageing management for safe LTO at an early stage of the preparation prior to the complete implementation of the ageing management activities.

LTO of nuclear power plants is defined as operation beyond an established time frame determined by the license term, the original plant design, relevant standards, or national regulations. As stated in IAEA safety standards, to maintain a plant’s fitness for service, consideration should be given to life limiting processes and features of systems, structures, and components (SSC), as well as to reasonably practicable safety upgrades to enhance the safety of the plant to a level approaching that of modern plants.

General information about SALTO missions can be found on the IAEA Website.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA