Category: Nuclear Industry

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New National Cancer Centre in Mauritius to Deliver Advanced Nuclear Medicine in the Country and Region

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Mauritius inaugurated its new National Cancer Centre in Solferino on 8 May, marking the culmination of close to a decade of IAEA support to advance nuclear medicine in the country. Expected to radically change cancer care for patients in Mauritius, the new centre will house all oncology services under one roof, including nuclear medicine.

“This ambitious project will undoubtedly improve our healthcare delivery system, providing free healthcare to all citizens and helping position Mauritius as a centre of excellence for cancer care in the region,” said Dr Kailesh Jagutpal, Minister of Health and Wellness of Mauritius, at the inauguration ceremony.

A small island in the Indian Ocean, Mauritius’ 1.2 million population faces a growing cancer burden. While traditional diagnostic methods like CT scans and MRIs were already available in the country, the specific nature and complexity of the cancers that are currently on the rise in Mauritius (head and neck, prostate, thyroid, and neuroendocrine tumours) have been placing a strain on existing medical facilities. The country required more advanced and precise diagnostic tools.

In 2018, a comprehensive imPACT Review carried out in collaboration with the World Health Organization and the International Agency for Research on Cancer helped to inform the government’s policy of boosting national diagnostic capacity. Since then, the government of Mauritius has been taking steps to further expand nuclear medicine services within the national healthcare system.

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Statement by IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi on the Occasion of the International Conference on Nuclear Security 2024

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

(As prepared for delivery)

When we met the last time, at ICONS 2020, many of us could not have imagined the momentous change we would experience between then and today, change that would affect billions of people, international peace and security, and nuclear security. A global pandemic was in the making and a war – in Ukraine – for first time soon would be fought among the facilities of one of Europe’s biggest nuclear power programmes.

Meanwhile, profound technological advances have been made. Assessing their impact on nuclear security is a crucial task. Artificial Intelligence, and unmanned vehicles pose both a threat to nuclear security and offer new tools with which to enhance it. In the nuclear field itself, Small Modular Reactors promise new opportunities for applications such as desalination and power brought to remote communities via barge, but also require us to consider new security elements.

The use of nuclear science and technology, often facilitated by the IAEA, has come on in leaps and bounds. Climate change and the drive for energy security are fuelling a desire for nuclear power. At this past Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, COP28, world leaders – those whose states use nuclear power and those whose do not – for the first time in nearly 30 years of COP meetings agreed nuclear power must be part of the transition to net zero. More than 20 countries have signed a pledge towards tripling nuclear power capacity and at the IAEA’s Nuclear Energy Summit in March heads of state agreed on the urgent need for conducive financial conditions. 

Nuclear security is relevant throughout all the steps of the nuclear fuel cycle and is part of the social contract that underpins the existence and growth of nuclear power. Nuclear power programmes require national nuclear security threat assessments and “security by design”. Nurturing relevant research and a strong security culture are key, not only in countries with NPPs.

The use of life-saving and life-affirming applications of nuclear science and technology is growing, from cancer patients gaining access to radiotherapy to farmers benefiting from new crop varieties developed with the help of irradiation. IAEA initiative such as Rays of Hope: Cancer care for all; Nutec Plastics; Zoonotic Disease Integrated Action (ZODIAC); and Atoms4Food are key vehicles facilitating wider access.

All these opportunities to use nuclear and radioactive material depend on a strong and adaptive global nuclear security regime. For countries new to using nuclear and radioactive material, this means building up legal infrastructure, practices and culture that bolster nuclear security.  Nationally and across borders, collaboration and laser-focused vigilance are key to preventing groups with malicious intent from using nuclear and radioactive material to cause panic and harm.

The threats to nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities are real and varied. The international nuclear security threat landscape keeps evolving. Today, anyone can type a few words into a computer and generative AI can create images of nuclear Armageddon, meaning it is now possible to spread panic about radiation fallout without a nuclear device. Risk scenarios include theft of nuclear and other radioactive material for use in improvised devices and sabotage at nuclear installations or during transport of nuclear and radioactive material. The risk of cyber-attacks requires the implementation of computer security programmes by those who use nuclear power and those who don’t. Risks come from outsiders and from those within the fold who are disgruntled or have been corrupted.

Nuclear security is the national responsibility of individual states, but it also benefits enormously from close collaboration and the enabling role of the IAEA.  ICONS, which started in 2013, has been the place for ministers, policymakers, senior officials, and experts to gather to assesses current priorities, prepare for new challenges, and engage in scenario-based policy discussions. ICONS 2024, presided over by the co-presidents, HE Tim Watts, Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia and HE Sungat Yessimkhanov, Vice-Minister of Energy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, covers the themes of policy, law and regulation; technology and infrastructure for prevention, detection and response; capacity building; and cross-cutting areas, such as the interface between nuclear security and nuclear safety. ICONS is the most important high-level international meeting on nuclear security. At this time of heightened tensions, it is imperative that there remains a unity of purpose and that nuclear security does not become a political football.

This year marks the 10-year anniversary of the IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Security. The IAEA is at the forefront of adapting nuclear security to new challenges, including war. The seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security have broad international support. They have brought crucial clarity at a time of war and are testament to the adaptiveness of the IAEA and the security regime.

Those seven pillars are backed up by an enormous ongoing effort by the IAEA to support Ukraine, including through the continuous presence of IAEA experts at all of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants, including Zaporizhzhya NPP on the front lines of the war. When there were allegations of nuclear security breaches, the IAEA was there to investigate with impartiality and science. We set the facts straight that no nuclear material had been diverted, cutting through the fog of war, and diffusing a tense situation.   

Not all our efforts require quite as much courage as our experts have shown in Ukraine, nor do they make international headlines. But every day, the IAEA – the Secretariat and the Member States – work together fastidiously to underpin nuclear security, never resting, always learning.

Radioactive sources are extensively used in many domains, including medicine, industry, agriculture and research. An incident in one State can have far-reaching consequences for others, so security for one is security for all. That means supporting States with no, or less developed nuclear security infrastructure makes everyone safer. That support, which often comes via the IAEA, includes making lawmakers aware of their responsibilities.

Nuclear Security requires the implementation of appropriate and robust legislative regulatory frameworks. In 2022, the first Conference of the Parties to the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (A/CPPNM) was held under the auspices of the IAEA. Reflecting the global importance of the legal framework and of nuclear security, parties managed to agree an outcome document and for the IAEA convene a subsequent conference. Since 2020, 14 new parties have joined the A/CPPNM bringing the total to 136. Five new Parties joined the CPPNM, bringing that total to 164. In addition to the A/CPPNM, political commitment to legally non-binding instruments, like the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary guidance, is a strong indication of radiation safety and nuclear security culture.

But legal frameworks are just the beginning. They must be implemented. The IAEA plays a central role in assisting its Members States so they are able to do that. Last year we inaugurated the most visible symbol of our collaboration: the Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre (NSTDC). This first-of-its-kind space, made possible by 15 donors, is a cornerstone for capacity building amid the growing need for sophisticated hands-on nuclear security training using advanced, specialized equipment. The NSTDC is part of a wide range of services offered by the IAEA, including peer reviews, such as the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS), of which there have now been more than 100, and Advisory Missions on Regulatory Infrastructure for Radiation Safety and Nuclear Security (RISS), a service we launched in 2022. Our Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) now has 145 members and has enabled the reporting of more than 600 incidents in which nuclear or radioactive material went out of regulatory control.  Almost 8,000 people have benefited from our training in nuclear security, and we continue to work very hard to remove barriers that prevent talent from entering the field.  In March 2021, we launched the Women in Nuclear Security Initiative (WINSI) to support the achievement of gender equality in nuclear security. Meanwhile, the IAEA’s Marie Sklodowska Curie Fellowship Programme financially supports women pursuing a master’s degree in nuclear subjects and offers them internships, while our Lise Meitner offers women in the early and middle part of their career enriching opportunities within the field.   

As the use of nuclear and other radioactive material around the world increases, more and more States are needing to increase their level of nuclear security. Nuclear security is as important as nuclear safety – we must put it on equal footing in terms of reliability of funding and the robustness of implementation.

At ICONS 2024 we are – as the name of the conference indicates – “shaping the future”, not only of nuclear security, but of the world our children will inherit. That is because nuclear security is about more than preventing nuclear terrorism. It is an enabler to providing, through nuclear science and technology, the clean energy; cutting-edge medicine; nutritious food and hope for a better tomorrow.

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IAEA Database on Trafficking of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Records 4243 Incidents Since 1993

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

A total of 4243 incidents of illegal or unauthorized activities involving nuclear and other radioactive material have been reported in the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) since 1993, according to a new factsheet released by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) today. In 2023, 168 incidents were reported by 31 States, in line with historical averages.

The ITDB receives information on incidents ranging from illegal possession, attempted sale and smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive material to unauthorized disposal of material and discovery of lost radioactive sources. Six of the incidents reported in 2023 were likely related to trafficking or malicious use. There was insufficient information to determine the intent of ten incidents. The 152 incidents that were not connected to trafficking or malicious use primarily resulted from unauthorized disposal, unauthorized shipment or the discovery of radioactive material.

“The reoccurrence of incidents confirms the need for vigilance and continuous improvement of the regulatory oversight to control, secure and properly dispose radioactive material,” said Elena Buglova, Director of the IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Security. “The ITDB is a valuable resource that allows for the identification of potential threats and trends to support international cooperation and to improve the implementation of nuclear security.”

An analysis of the types of material involved in reported incidents indicates a decline in incidents involving nuclear material, such as uranium, plutonium and thorium. Since 1993, 14 per cent of all incidents involved nuclear material, 59 per cent involved other radioactive material and about 27 per cent involved radioactively contaminated and other material.

More than half – 52 per cent – of all thefts reported since 1993 have occurred during authorized transport, and in the last decade, transport-related thefts accounted for almost 65 per cent of all thefts.

“Nuclear and other radioactive material remain vulnerable to security threats during transport. Figures from the ITDB highlight the ongoing importance of strengthening transport security measures,” Buglova said. “The IAEA assists States with strengthening their national nuclear security regimes to guard nuclear and other radioactive material with physical protection and computer security measures to ensure it does not fall into the wrong hands.”

The release of the ITDB factsheet coincides with this week’s International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS). ICONS 2024 provides a forum for ministers, policymakers, senior officials and nuclear security experts to discuss the future of nuclear security worldwide, while providing an opportunity to exchange information, share best practices and foster international cooperation.

About the ITDB

With 145 participating States, the ITDB fosters global information exchange about incidents that involve nuclear and other radioactive material falling out of regulatory control because they were lost, stolen, improperly disposed of, or otherwise neglected. The ITDB’s data is voluntarily reported, and only participating States and relevant international organizations, such as the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), can access it. Somalia and Togo most recently joined the ITDB in 2023.

The ITDB covers incidents involving nuclear material, radioisotopes and radioactively contaminated material such as scrap metal. By reporting lost or stolen material to the ITDB, countries increase the chances of its recovery and reduce the opportunities for it to be used in criminal activities. States can also report scams or hoaxes where the material is purported to be nuclear or otherwise radioactive.

States wishing to join the ITDB need to submit the request, by post or email (official.mail@iaea.org), to the IAEA Division of Nuclear Security through the official channels (i.e. Permanent Mission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs or a national competent authority for nuclear security matters).

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Tritium Level in Sixth Batch of ALPS Treated Water Far Below Japan’s Operational Limit, IAEA Confirms

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

The tritium concentration in the sixth batch of diluted ALPS treated water, which the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) began discharging on 17 May, is far below Japan’s operational limit, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) experts have confirmed.

The treated water was sampled and assessed by IAEA experts stationed at the Agency’s office at the site of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (FDNPS). After conducting an independent on-site analysis, the IAEA confirmed that the tritium concentration in the diluted water is far below the operational limit of 1500 becquerels per litre.

Japan is discharging the ALPS-treated water from the FDNPS in batches. The IAEA has earlier confirmed that the tritium concentrations in the previous five batches, totalling 38,900 cubic meters of water, were far below operational limits.

In a comprehensive report issued on 4 July 2023, the IAEA’s safety review found that Japan’s plan for handling the treated water was consistent with international safety standards and that the release as planned would have a negligible radiological impact to people and the environment.

All reports on sampling, independent analysis, data evaluation, as well as timeline, will be available on the IAEA website.

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International Community Meets to Discuss the Future of Nuclear Security

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Over 2000 Ministers, high-ranking officials, experts and delegates from all over the world will convene at the IAEA hosted,  International Conference on Nuclear Security: Shaping the Future (ICONS 2024), next week in Vienna. Taking place from 20 to 24 May, the focus of the conference will be on how to further strengthen global nuclear security and addressing challenges related to new risks, threats and emerging technologies.

“Nuclear security is about more than preventing nuclear terrorism. It is about providing clean energy, cutting-edge medicine, nutritious food and hope for a better tomorrow,” says IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi. “The IAEA is where the world comes together to make sure we keep making that possible.”

As the world’s only international conference on nuclear security with a ministerial and a scientific component, ICONS 2024: Shaping the Future will provide a global forum to discuss the future of nuclear security, while providing opportunities for exchanging information, sharing best practices and fostering international cooperation.

The conference will comprise two segments: a two-day ministerial segment featuring national statements, interactive sessions, and high level policy discussions for Ministers. The four-day scientific and technical programme will start in parallel with the second day of the ministerial segment, and includes daily plenary panels with invited speakers, high level policy discussions and parallel technical sessions.

“A strong and sustainable nuclear security system has never been more imperative. Co-chaired by Australia and Kazakhstan, ICONS 2024 will bring together Ministers, policymakers, and technical and legal experts, to renew and strengthen collective nuclear security commitments. I’m excited to see countries come together to drive the nuclear security agenda forward and tackle the challenges ahead,” says Tim Watts, Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia and ICONS Co-President.

Diving into nuclear security

As part of a comprehensive programme, experts will discuss a wide range of technical and scientific nuclear security topics. These include global perspectives on nuclear security regulations for small modular reactors, the role of nuclear forensics in bolstering international nuclear security, practical uses and potential threats of artificial intelligence, preparing for and defending against cyber-attacks to sensitive infrastructure and developing national strategies for nuclear security events.

The conference boasts record-breaking participation with over 700 abstracts submitted, spanning four key thematic areas including policy, technology, capacity building and cross-cutting nuclear security topics, such as communication and safety-security interface, among others. The ministerial segment, including national statements, is open to media, and they can also attend all plenary sessions throughout the weeklong conference.  The ministerial and plenary sessions will be available on live video streaming.

“ICONS 2024 is a major event for the global nuclear security community and comes at a critical time for international nuclear security. Despite some risks and challenges — from climate change and natural disasters to global pandemics — artificial intelligence products and advanced computing technologies offer new opportunities to strengthen nuclear security regimes,” says Sungat Yessimkhanov, Vice-Minister of Energy of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

The programme includes 52 technical sessions, a ministerial plenary panel on nuclear security and the Sustainable Development Goals, a ministerial interactive session on scenario-based policy, and four technical plenary sessions, each on one of the main themes of the conference. 45 side events are planned and organized by Member States, international and other organizations, working groups and networks, and the IAEA.

Additionally, the inaugural “Nuclear Security Delegation for the Future” will convene in person, providing 24 selected delegates from more than 200 applicants in the field of nuclear security the opportunity to present the results of their deliberations conducted over the previous weeks leading up to the conference.

Further, the ICONS 2024 Photography Contest “Nuclear Security Through the Lens”, aligns with the overarching goals of ICONS 2024, aiming to raise awareness of nuclear security initiatives globally and foster creative engagement of a broad audience. Eight finalists will have their photographs showcased, along with a narrative explaining their perspectives on nuclear security.

ICONS 2024 is the fourth conference in this series. Previous ICONS were hosted by the IAEA in 2013, 2016 and 2020. The conference is supported by funding from Australia, Canada, the Republic of Korea, Pakistan, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

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IAEA DG Visits Nigeria, Pledges Increased Cancer Care Support

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

The Director General was shown a Linear Accelerator radiotherapy machine that had already treated 50 patients that day, but was out of order regularly due to ongoing maintenance issues. He also saw a brachytherapy machine for providing internal radiotherapy, which is the only one available to treat 60 million people in the area. Nigeria has asked the IAEA to coordinate an imPACT review this year to help improve its cancer control programme.

At the end of his visit, Mr Grossi said: “It is very clear that Nigerians need more access to cancer treatment than is currently available. We need to amplify the support. You can count on us.”

Dr Emmanuella Nwachukwu, Head of the Radiotherapy and Oncology Department, agreed: “We were immensely pleased to receive the Director General and take him on a tour of the facility, showing him how we have put to good use the various benefits we received from the IAEA in the last two decades, while sharing our challenges, as well as our requests that we need to improve radiotherapy services and cancer care at the National Hospital Abuja.”

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Update 228 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

A new team of experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency arrived at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) today, crossing the frontline to reach the site as part of the IAEA’s indispensable mission to help prevent a nuclear accident during the armed conflict, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said.

Replacing colleagues who have been monitoring nuclear safety and security at the ZNPP for the past several weeks, it is the 19th team of IAEA experts stationed at the site in southern Ukraine since Director General Grossi established a permanent presence there more than 20 months ago.

“The IAEA will remain present at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant for as long as it is needed. The nuclear safety and security situation at the plant remains extremely precarious and challenging. Thanks to our experts at the site, we can inform the world about developments there. We will continue to do everything in our power to keep this major nuclear facility safe and secure,” Director General Grossi said.

The potential dangers facing the plant are constant and the situation can take a sudden turn for the worse at any moment. Over the past week, the IAEA experts have continued to hear indications of military activity in the areas around the ZNPP. These included outgoing artillery and rocket fire at some distance away as well as small arms fire closer to the site. Late last week, an air raid alarm restricted movement outside the ZNPP’s buildings for 24 hours, but no explosions were heard during this time.

Having robust emergency preparedness and response arrangements in place is crucial at nuclear power plants (NPPs). On Wednesday, the IAEA experts observed an emergency drill at the ZNPP, based on a hypothetical scenario of damage to a pipe connected to one of the sprinkler ponds providing water to cool reactor unit 1 and its safety systems. Under the exercise scenario, plant staff pumped water into the sprinkler pond and repaired the damaged pipe, while also ensuring that the safety systems and diesel generators remained operational.

The IAEA team’s opinion was that the exercise was well organized and that the personnel responded effectively.

“It is essential for all nuclear facilities to have effective emergency preparedness and response arrangements. For this purpose, regular drills and exercises are necessary. Clearly, for the Zaporizhhya Nuclear Power Plant, they are especially important in view of the extraordinary risks it is currently facing,” Director General Grossi said.

The IAEA experts have also continued to perform regular walkdowns across the site, including to all six main control rooms, to observe the activities of staff with roles and responsibilities that are vital for nuclear safety and security at the plant. However, the experts were still not permitted to talk to the main control room personnel, reducing their ability to fully assess staff experience and expertise.

The IAEA team this week also went to reactor unit 2 and its safety systems rooms where they observed the steam generators, pressurizer, and the successful start-up of a spent fuel pool pump as part of a scheduled switch from another pump. The team noted that no leaks of boron were observed and that the general situation in the areas was satisfactory, except for an oil leak coming from the crane.

In addition, the IAEA experts carried out walkdowns within the site perimeter and other buildings, which they are permitted to access to monitor adherence to the five concrete principles for the protection of the plant during the conflict. They did not observe any heavy weapons or indications that drones could have been launched from the ZNPP. However, the IAEA experts are still not permitted to access all areas of the ZNPP.

The IAEA experts present at the Khelmnytskyy, Rivne and South Ukraine NPPs and the Chornobyl site reported that nuclear safety and security is being maintained despite the effects of the ongoing conflict, including air raid alarms on several days over the past week.

At the Rivne NPP, the IAEA team reported that attacks last week on the electrical power infrastructure elsewhere in Ukraine had resulted in instability in the back-up power lines connected to the plant. The scheduled maintenance and refuelling activities are progressing according to schedule at two of the four reactor units at the Rivne NPP and one unit of the South Ukraine NPP.

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What Is Food Fraud, and How Can Nuclear Science Detect It?

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Every element around us has its own chemical identity. This identity is based on its atomic composition, which consists of neutrons, protons, and electrons. Atoms with the same number of protons but different number of neutrons are called isotopes – these can help scientists to determine if a product is genuine.

Stable isotope ratios in food can vary because of different factors, such as: when, where, and under what environmental conditions the food was produced. For example, stable carbon isotope ratios of tomatoes from Northern Europe grown in a winter greenhouse will vary from the carbon isotope ratios of soil grown tomatoes, harvested in summer in South America.

Stable isotopes are measured using specialized equipment, that can detect the very small differences in the ratios of their heavy and light forms. This information can be used to detect the origin of food. Stable isotope ratios are like nature’s ‘fingerprints’ or signatures on food. This hidden evidence can provide information on whether the foods we are buying consist of the authentic ingredients described on the label or have been falsified. By tracing these isotopic fingerprints, scientists can also track the geographical or botanical provenance of food.

Isotopes also allow to detect the adulteration, or complete substitution, of food with cheap ingredients that have identical chemical structures, but different isotopic signatures. For example, synthetic flavors instead of natural; high fructose corn syrup in honey; or orange juice made from concentrate instead of freshly squeezed.

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Nuclear security through the eyes of the Co-Presidents of ICONS 2024

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Kairat Umarov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, and Tim Watts, Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, are the Co-Presidents of the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Shaping the Future (ICONS 2024).

The conference has become a key event for the global nuclear security community. It provides a platform for ministers, policymakers, senior officials and nuclear security experts to come together and deliberate on the future of global nuclear security, and facilitates information exchange, the sharing of best practices, and the promotion of international cooperation.

The Co-Presidents share their views about the significance of the conference, the contribution of nuclear security to sustainable development, and how the future will be shaped by emerging technologies such as AI and by emerging risks and threats in nuclear security.

Q: Why do you think participation at ICONS 2024 is important at the ministerial level?

Tim Watts: A strong and sustainable nuclear security system has never been more imperative. In Australia, nuclear science and technology is used in medicine, research and industry. Strong ministerial leadership informed by diverse experiences and perspectives, current approaches, and a greater understanding of technology is required to navigate the challenges and uncertainty that could impact nuclear security.

The conference is a key event for the global nuclear security community. Ministerial involvement is critical to demonstrating our collective commitment to strengthening nuclear security globally. It provides an opportunity for countries to progress aligned commitments and priorities and work closely on their national nuclear security regimes.

The past four years have been a time of momentous change for nuclear security. If there was ever a time for strong ministerial attendance and commitments, that time is now.

Kairat Umarov: ICONS 2024 is a major event for the global nuclear security community and comes at a critical time for international nuclear security. Despite some risks and challenges — from climate change and natural disasters to global pandemics — AI products and advanced computing technologies offer new opportunities to strengthen nuclear security regimes.

Given that the responsibility for nuclear security rests entirely with States, ICONS 2024 provides a unique opportunity to reaffirm, at the ministerial level, States’ commitments to promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy and fulfilling all of their international obligations in the field of nuclear security.

Q: What changes would you like to see in nuclear security and what is needed to make them happen?

Tim Watts: Nuclear science and technology can make a considerable difference to people’s lives. Their development enables us to address some of the most pressing challenges of our time, including those related to health and wellbeing, and food security.

As a world leading producer of nuclear medicines to diagnose and treat cancer and other diseases, Australia recognizes the important role of nuclear security in facilitating the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. On average, every Australian will need at least two nuclear medicine procedures during their lifetime.

As the world continues to leverage nuclear science and technology, we must ensure that nuclear security standards are upheld to prevent the exploitation of this technology for harmful purposes.

Building resilience in all countries by sharing diverse experiences and knowledge is key. All countries can contribute to creating and maintaining a durable and resilient global nuclear security system.

We welcome the increasing number of training activities offered by the Agency. Fair access to knowledge and resources is a crucial aspect of future planning, fortifying against threats, and seizing opportunities. The underlying principles of fair access are instrumental in Australia’s collaborative efforts with our regional partners on nuclear security.

The theme of ICONS 2024 is “Shaping the Future”. Ensuring that all countries have the capability to future-proof their nuclear security architecture also strengthens a country’s contribution to, and sovereignty in, these global conversations. This progress leads toward collective commitments at the national and international levels to enhance nuclear security standards for the benefit of all.

Kairat Umarov: Kazakhstan has gained unique experience in bringing its largest nuclear weapons testing facility, the former Semipalatinsk test site, into a secure state. Specialists from the National Nuclear Center of the Republic of Kazakhstan (NNC) carried out a wide range of work at this facility to strengthen security measures and install physical barriers to prevent access to test sites, decommissioned wells and tunnels.

Improving nuclear security is a critical task involving multiple stakeholders, including governments, international organizations, the nuclear industry and the public. There are several key elements that should be continuously addressed to ensure robust nuclear security, including personnel development, enhanced regulation and control and the strengthening of international cooperation.

Increased cooperation and information sharing among countries helps to prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and technologies. International agreements such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions play a crucial role in this regard.

Investing in research and development (R&D) for advanced technologies for nuclear security, such as better methods for detecting nuclear materials, improved surveillance systems and robust cybersecurity measures can strengthen the overall security posture. On the other hand, as technology evolves, new threats to nuclear security may emerge, such as cyber-attacks or the use of drones for malicious purposes. Continually monitoring and adapting security measures to address these evolving threats must be a priority for States and must be supported by the international community.

Q: How can countries prepare their nuclear security regimes for emerging technologies such as AI?

Tim Watts: International events like ICONS play a fundamental role in creating an environment for collaboration. They help us to prepare our nuclear security system so as to capitalize on, and minimize the harm of, emerging technologies such as AI. We need to shape AI rules and norms related to the nuclear security architecture to protect it from malicious cyberactivity.

A global effort is required to manage these complex and evolving challenges. The diverse expertise of conference attendees, including policymakers, academics, the private sector and non-governmental organizations, will create an environment in which we can work together on shared challenges and respond collectively.

Getting these fundamentals right in domestic frameworks, policies and initiatives creates a sound platform on which to build international cooperation and resilience.

At ICONS 2024, countries will have the opportunity to share how they are building their capacity to respond to AI opportunities that will be of assistance in getting things done in more efficient, economic, effective and equitable ways. Experts’ best practices will inform Member States’ domestic nuclear security regimes.

Kairat Umarov: As emerging technologies such as AI continue to evolve, countries will need to adapt their nuclear security measures to mitigate potential risks and reap the benefits.

Governments and relevant organizations should conduct comprehensive risk assessments to identify potential vulnerabilities and threats that may arise from the integration of AI into nuclear security systems. Understanding these risks is essential to developing effective mitigation strategies.

It’s important to develop regulatory frameworks and guidelines by updating existing regulations or creating new ones to address the unique challenges posed by AI technologies in the nuclear security domain. By ensuring that robust cybersecurity measures are in place, countries can protect themselves from cyber-threats and cyber-attacks. This includes implementing encryption, access controls, and regular security updates.

Q: What are the major emerging risks and threats in nuclear security around the world?

Tim Watts: The global community is grappling with emerging risks and threats to nuclear security. As they evolve, so must our nuclear security frameworks and responses.

ICONS 2024 will provide an opportunity for countries to share how they are developing their capabilities and technologies to address risks and threats. It will facilitate discussions to shape the Agency’s Nuclear Security Plan for the period 2026–2029 to advance the global nuclear security agenda.

Australia is focused on working closely with its international partners to address supply chain security. Industry is at the forefront of R&D. Ensuring that the principles of nuclear security can be adopted early by industry and government is critical to ensuring nuclear security isn’t compromised.

Australia’s commitment to the Women, Peace and Security agenda is steadfast and enduring. With ten United Nations Security Council resolutions that many countries, including Australia, have tailored to their contexts through national and regional action plans, we know that diversity, equity and inclusion are central to establishing and maintaining peace and security. This applies to nuclear security, in which the full, equal and meaningful participation and leadership of women is an essential element.

Australia is proud to partner with Kazakhstan to host a side event at ICONS 2024, providing practical insights and actionable guidance on gender equality and inclusive leadership as positive drivers of the future of nuclear security.

Kairat Umarov: Indeed, the rapid development of new technologies such as AI, quantum computing and uncrewed systems poses new challenges and vulnerabilities in terms of nuclear security. Malicious actors may target critical infrastructure such as power plants or nuclear research facilities to disrupt operations, steal sensitive information or sabotage systems.

With the ever-increasing spread of disinformation, special attention should be paid to the protection of materials that are not highly radioactive and not suitable for making nuclear weapons, but whose use for malicious purposes could have a negative impact on the public, causing ‘radiophobia’ and undermining confidence in the nuclear industry.

Non-State actors, including terrorist organizations, may seek to acquire nuclear materials or technology to build improvised nuclear devices or radiological dispersal devices, also known as ‘dirty bombs’.

The proliferation of nuclear materials and technologies through illicit trafficking networks remains a concern. Trafficking activities may involve the smuggling of radioactive materials, nuclear weapons components or sensitive nuclear technology across borders, potentially enabling State or non-State actors to acquire nuclear capabilities.

Insider threats, which include unauthorized access by employees or contractors with malicious intent, pose a significant challenge to nuclear security. These threats can include theft, sabotage or damage to nuclear materials, facilities or information.

Q: How can nuclear security support sustainable development initiatives around the world in the coming years?

Tim Watts: Nuclear security underpins and enables sustainable development initiatives. For example, food irradiation enables countries to export food products across borders and enhance food safety by eliminating germs and pests. Additionally, radiation equipment used in cancer treatment is a crucial element of initiatives such as Rays of Hope, aimed at reducing the cancer care gap in low and middle income countries. These peaceful uses of radiation to enhance food security and treat cancer are supported by strong and sustainable nuclear security regimes.

Nuclear security needs to be built into our sustainable development initiatives from the outset, and must not be an afterthought or something that is worked on in isolation outside of our social and economic development programmes.

It is time for nuclear security to advance and become embedded in our programmes.

Kairat Umarov: As the world’s leading exporter of uranium, providing 43% of the global supply, Kazakhstan plays a crucial role in carbon-free power generation on a global scale. The establishment of robust national nuclear security regimes will ensure a guaranteed nuclear energy chain for humanity and promote the implementation of sustainable development initiatives around the world.

Kazakhstan has contributed to the non-proliferation regime and the sustainable development of nuclear energy by hosting the unique IAEA Low Enriched Uranium Bank. In addition, we continue to implement research reactor conversion projects aimed at converting highly enriched uranium fuel to low enriched uranium fuel, thereby helping to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation. Only last year, we successfully completed the conversion of another research reactor at NNC, which is now fully operating on low enriched fuel.

In this context, strengthening national nuclear security regimes helps to prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials, enhances public confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear and radiation technologies, and promotes sustainable nuclear energy development strategies worldwide.

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IAEA Ministerial Conference to Focus on the Future of Nuclear Security Worldwide

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

The International Atomic Energy Agency will host an international ministerial conference next week to discuss the future of nuclear security globally, while providing an opportunity to exchange information, share best practices and foster international cooperation on countering the threat of nuclear terrorism.

The International Conference on Nuclear Security: Shaping the Future (#ICONS2024) will take place from 20 to 24 May at IAEA headquarters in Vienna. About 2000 participants have registered to attend the conference, including 110 ministers, heads of delegations and high-ranking officials. About 122 IAEA Member States and four organizations will be represented at the conference. The conference is the fourth IAEA ministerial conference on nuclear security, following those held in 2020, 2016 and 2013. In recent years, ICONS has become a key event for the nuclear security community around the world.

The conference will feature two main parts: a ministerial segment with national statements on the first two days; and a scientific and technical programme comprising policy discussions and parallel technical sessions on technical, legal and regulatory issues concerning nuclear security. The themes of the conference include:

  • Policy, law and regulations for nuclear security
  • Technology and infrastructure for nuclear security prevention, detection and response
  • Capacity Building for nuclear security
  • Cross-cutting nuclear security topics

A ministerial declaration reiterating Member States’ commitment to nuclear security is expected to be adopted on 20 May.

Press Opportunities

The ministerial segment, including national statements, on 20 and 21 May, is open to media, and they can also attend all plenary sessions throughout the weeklong conference. The provisional conference programme is available here. The ministerial and plenary sessions will be available on live video streaming.

The M-Building Press Room on the ground floor will be available as a press working area.

News from the conference can be found on the IAEA website. Follow the IAEA and #ICONS2024 on Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn, Twitter (X) and Weibo for updates. Photos of the conference will be available on Flickr. B-roll footage from the conference will be available, upon request. Please contact Multimedia.Contact-Point@iaea.org and copy press@iaea.org.

Accreditation

All journalists are requested to inform the IAEA Press Office of their plans to attend. Journalists with permanent credentials to the VIC need no additional credentials. We encourage journalists who do not have permanent accreditation to request it at UNIS Vienna.

Other journalists who only intend to attend this event should email press@iaea.org stating their name and affiliation as soon as possible but not later than 12:00 CEST on Thursday, 16 May.

Please plan your arrival to allow sufficient time to pass through the VIC security.