Category: Nuclear Energy

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Update 197 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) lost the connection to its main off-site power line today, forcing it to rely on back-up electricity for reactor cooling in the latest incident underlining the precarious nuclear safety and security situation at the site during the ongoing military conflict, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said.

Separately today, the IAEA experts present at the ZNPP heard several rockets that appeared to have been fired from close to the plant. The IAEA team did not see the projectiles because of clouds but the distinctive sound indicated they were fired from a Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) nearby.

“Today’s events once again clearly demonstrate the extremely fragile nuclear safety and security situation at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant. Europe’s largest nuclear power plant – located on the frontline – continues to face many potential threats as a result of this tragic war,” Director General Grossi said.

“I remain deeply concerned about nuclear safety and security at the plant, both when it comes to its vulnerable off-site power supplies – which can be affected by attacks far away from the site – and the more direct military risks it is facing, potentially undermining the principles that I set out at the United Nations Security Council in May. In this context, the apparent firing of rockets from near the plant is a special source of concern,” he said.

The ZNPP said a short circuit that occurred around 100 kilometres north of the plant caused the cut in the connection to its sole remaining 750 kilovolt (kV) power line – out of the four that existed before the conflict – at around 10:30am local time.

The plant continues to receive external power from its only available 330 kV back-up power line. However, one emergency diesel generator also started operating to supply reactor unit 4 after the power loss, indicating a possible issue with its electrical configuration. The diesel generator was manually shut down after ten minutes.

The plant said the 750 kV line is being repaired but it was not clear when it will be reconnected.

The ZNPP has lost external power supplies repeatedly during the conflict, including seven complete loss of off-site power events. On each of those occasions, the operation of emergency diesel generators at the site was required to provide the electricity needed by the plant for vital nuclear safety and security functions, including reactor cooling. The connection to the 750 kV line was last lost on 10 August, when the line disconnected and was reconnected twice on the same day.

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Update 196 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) experts observed an emergency exercise conducted at  Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) this week, the latest such drill in the country’s nuclear facilities during the military conflict, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said today.

Thursday’s exercise focused on actions that should be taken in response to a hypothetical break of a pipe containing radioactive wastewater and the disconnection of power from one reactor unit.

The IAEA experts followed the two-hour exercise from the ZNPP’s temporary emergency centre, observing the coordination of emergency response actions. They also observed field activities during the exercise, including radiation and contamination monitoring as well as preparations for the evacuation of some plant staff. After the exercise was completed, the IAEA team observed the standard debriefing. Overall, the IAEA experts said the exercise scenario was carried out as planned.

Last week, the IAEA team based at Ukraine’s Rivne Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) observed an emergency exercise at that site. Also this week, the IAEA team at the Chornobyl site observed an emergency drill at the radioactive liquid waste treatment plant.

“Having effective emergency preparedness and response arrangements is one of the seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security in an armed conflict. It is vital that the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant tests its emergency response arrangements. We encourage  the plants in Ukraine to conduct more exercises in future to further test their emergency preparedness,” Director General Grossi said.

The ZNPP has throughout the conflict been at the centre of the IAEA’s concerns about nuclear safety and security in Ukraine. It is located on the frontline and has lost all off-site power as many as seven times. Director General Grossi told the IAEA Board of Governors on Wednesday that the situation at the plant remained challenging, with six out of the seven pillars of nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict “compromised either fully or partially”.

Earlier this week, the ZNPP’s unit 5 reached cold shutdown, leaving one of the plant’s six reactors in hot shutdown to produce steam and heating. The plant decided to move the unit from hot shutdown after boron was detected in a secondary cooling circuit, albeit at levels below the limits set by its technical specifications. No radioactivity has been detected in the secondary cooling circuit. Borated water is used in the primary coolant to help maintain nuclear safety functions.

After the cold shutdown state was reached at unit 5, the ZNPP informed the IAEA team that it will not immediately investigate the cause of the presence of boron in the secondary cooling circuit of one of the unit’s steam generators. The IAEA experts will continue to monitor this issue during its discussions with ZNPP and walkdowns of the plant. 

The IAEA experts are also continuing to gather information to fully understand why unit 6 temporarily lost power on 14 November and relied on a diesel generator for 90 minutes. They held multiple discussions on this issue with the ZNPP’s electrical department this week.

Unit 4 remains in hot shutdown to provide steam for nuclear safety related activities at the ZNPP and also for heating at the site and the nearby town of Enerhodar, where most plant staff live. Additional heating is provided by mobile diesel boilers installed at the ZNPP together with boilers located in the nearby industrial zone. Reactor units 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 are now in cold shutdown.

Elsewhere in Ukraine, the IAEA experts at the Chornobyl site have successfully conducted a planned rotation today, with a new team arriving from headquarters in Vienna.

The IAEA teams at the Khmelnitsky, Rivne and South Ukraine NPPs and the Chornobyl site report safe and secure operations of these nuclear facilities despite the continuation of the conflict.

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Japan’s Reports on Conditions at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, 21 November 2023

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

On 21 November 2023, Japan provided the IAEA with a copy of a report on the discharge record and the seawater monitoring results at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station during October, which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has sent to all international Missions in Japan.

The report contains information on discharges from the subdrain and groundwater drain systems, as well as on groundwater bypassing conducted during the month of October. In both cases, in advance of the action, TEPCO analyzes the quality of the groundwater to be discharged and announces the results. These results confirm that the radiation level of sampled water are substantially below the operational targets set by TEPCO.

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IAEA Sees Operational Safety Commitment at Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Plant in Russia, Encourages Continued Improvement

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team of experts said that the operator of the Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) in the Russian Federation has shown a commitment to enhancing operational safety. The team also encouraged the operator to further improve safety in areas including accident management and safety assessments.

Requested by the Government of Russian Federation, the Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) mission ran from 6 to 23 November. The Team reviewed operational safety in Unit 4 of the Beloyarsk NPP.

OSART missions independently assesses safety performance against the IAEA’s safety standards. The aim is to advance operational safety by proposing recommendations and, where appropriate, suggestions for improvement. Safety is an essential element during commissioning and the subsequent safe operation of a nuclear power plant.

The Beloyarsk NPP is located at Zarechny, in the Sverdlovsk region, roughly 1800 kilometres east of Moscow. The plant is owned by State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom (ROSATOM) and operated by Beloyarsk NPP, a subsidy of the Rosenergoatom Joint Stock Company. The plant consists of four units. Units 1 and 2 – both light water graphite reactors – are permanently shutdown. Units 3 and 4 are two fast neutron reactors with gross electrical capacity of 600 and 885 megawatt electrical (MW(e)), respectively. Russia has 37 nuclear power reactors in operation, providing almost 20 per cent of the country’s total electrical production. 

The team reviewed operating practices in Unit 4 in the areas of leadership and management for safety, training and qualification, operations, maintenance, technical support, radiation protection, chemistry and accident management. The team was composed of six experts from Armenia, Belarus, China and the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as four IAEA staff members and three observers from Russia.

To make its assessment, the team reviewed documents from the Beloyarsk plant on its main technical features, staff organization and responsibilities, and its operational programmes, procedures and performance prior to the mission. During the mission, the team observed the plant in operation, examined indicators of its performance and held in-depth discussions with plant personnel.

The OSART team observed that the staff at the plant are knowledgeable and professional, and are committed to improving the operational safety and reliability of the plant. The team said that the technical exchanges with the plant’s staff were fruitful and that there was a good exchange of experience and knowledge on how the common goal of excellence in operational safety could be further enhanced.

The team identified one area of good practice to be shared with the nuclear industry globally. They said the connection used by the plant to sample gases in the reactor circuit minimizes the potential for impurities to impact the gas analysis, whilst ensuring that the gas does not escape into the work area.

The mission also provided some suggestions to further improve safety, including that:

  • The plant should consider enhancing its accident management programme to include the full range of ‘beyond design’ external hazards for all modes and states of operation and all fuel locations on site.
  • The plant should consider extending the scope of its probabilistic safety assessments (PSA) to ensure that all potential failure scenarios are identified to cover all operational modes, all fuel locations on site as well as the full spectrum of external hazards.
  • The plant should consider improving the effectiveness of the checks carried out during field operator walkdowns, so all deficiencies and adverse conditions are identified to ensure safe and reliable operation of plant structures, systems and components.

“It is the first time an IAEA OSART mission was held at the power unit of a BN-800 fast neutron reactor,” said Ivan Sidorov, Director of Beloyarsk NPP. “For three weeks, the reviewers and the counterparts have worked hard, performing dozens of plant tours, interviews and observations, and analysing plant documentation for all reviewing areas. We appreciate the reviewers’ professional point of view, and we are ready to learn from their experience to improve safety at Beloyarsk NPP.”

The team provided a draft report of the mission to the plant management. They will have the opportunity to make factual comments on the draft. These comments will be reviewed by the IAEA, and the final report will be submitted to the Government within three months.

Background

General information about OSART missions can be found on the IAEA website. An OSART mission is designed as a review of programmes and activities essential to operational safety. It is not a regulatory inspection, nor is it a design review or a substitute for an exhaustive assessment of the plant’s overall safety status.

Follow-up missions are standard components of the OSART programme and are typically conducted within two years of the initial mission.

The IAEA Safety Standards provide a robust framework of fundamental principles, requirements and guidance to ensure safety. They reflect an international consensus and serve as a global reference for protecting people and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation.

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IAEA Director General Briefs Board of Governors: Atoms4Food initiative, Ukraine, Iran, COP28 and Nuclear Energy Summit

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Mr Grossi said that many of the IAEA’s initiatives relied on the IAEA’s laboratories in Seibersdorf. He announced the “very good news” that fundraising was now complete for the renewal of the Nuclear Application Laboratories (ReNuAL) initiative, describing them as “a unique asset” for countries around the world in his statement.  

Mr Grossi thanked the countries who had donated to the ReNuAL initiative for their generosity. To celebrate the achievement and to recognize recent contributions from Canada, the Czech Republic, France, Ireland, and the United States, the IAEA is planning a ReNuAL side event on the margins of the March 2024 Board of Governors meeting.

He thanked Germany and South Africa for acting as co-chairs and facilitating the successful completion of the project.

The IAEA’s Technical Cooperation department was also praised by Mr Grossi, which was the focus of a Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee (TACC) meeting earlier this week. “Our technical cooperation programme is a major vehicle for the delivery of IAEA development support to Member States, and a core component of ‘Atoms for Peace and Development’,” he said in his statement.

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IAEA Director General’s Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

(As prepared for delivery)

Mr Chairperson,

All of us are following with great concern current conflicts and the IAEA is playing its role towards peace and security where it can. Today I would like to begin my remarks by addressing another tragedy, which affects many IAEA Member States. Over the past three years the number of people who go hungry in the world has increased by almost a fifth. Today it stands at more than 700 million. Hunger is still on the rise in many regions, including Western Asia, the Caribbean, and all of Africa. It is an acute problem, especially in conflict zones, as well as a long-term issue that is being made worse because of climate change. 

Nuclear technology and science offer some of the best tools available to improve nutrition and food security. For decades Member States have relied on the IAEA to put them to use. I am determined to maximize the impact of our assistance to Member States through the Joint FAO/IAEA Centre of Nuclear Techniques in Food and Agriculture. That is why I launched Atoms4Food, together with FAO Director-General Qu Dongyu, during the World Food Forum in Rome last month.

Food security is a top priority for our Member States and many have voiced interest in this initiative. Last week, the Secretariat convened a briefing for Member States to provide more information about the seven essential services Atoms4Food will provide.

I would like to thank Member States for their continuing strong support for the Agency’s technical cooperation activities. Our technical cooperation programme is a major vehicle for the delivery of IAEA development support to Member States, and a core component of ‘Atoms for Peace and Development’. It is also an important channel for the delivery of support under the IAEA major initiatives ZODIAC, NUTEC Plastics, Rays of Hope and Atoms4Food.

We have worked closely with Member States to develop the new TC programme, building on Country Programme Frameworks, and on national and regional development priorities. We continue to seek opportunities for partnerships with other organizations and with non-traditional partners and development agencies.

For the 2024–2025 TC cycle, 458 new projects have been proposed – 397 national, 51 regional and 10 interregional projects. Seventy percent of the proposed programme focuses on food and agriculture, health and nutrition, and safety, reflecting the priorities of Member States.

As of the end of September this year, we have received €83 million in contributions to the TCF, which represents a rate of attainment of 88.6%. I encourage all Member States to pay their contributions to the TCF in full and on time. I also invite Member States that are in a position to do so to support the programme with extrabudgetary contributions.

Mr Chairperson,

The initiatives we have implemented continue to make tangible progress. The IAEA has formally established the first five Rays of Hope Anchor Centres. These regional leaders in cancer care in Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan and Türkiye will work with us to build the capacities of neighbouring countries and increase access to cancer treatment.

Last week, I attended a ceremony to lay a foundation stone of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) first public radiotherapy centre. Afterwards, I met with the countries’ president His Excellency Félix Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo to discuss the IAEA’s assistance to DRC, which was one of the first Member States to work with us under this flagship initiative. Cancer claims too many lives, and the IAEA is changing this, one radiotherapy centre at a time. 

NUTEC Plastics, the Agency’s flagship initiative to monitor plastic pollution of the ocean and reduce plastic waste through improved recycling processes, continues to strengthen public-private collaborations. Two national stakeholder meetings in Thailand and the Philippines promoted the benefits of radiation technology in plastics recycling to potential private end-users. Meanwhile, in October, the IAEA Marine Environment Laboratories in Monaco inaugurated a NUTEC Plastics reference laboratory for the preparation and chemical analysis of seawater and sediment samples. This new lab will improve our research capability, advance our knowledge, and increase our training capacity to monitor marine microplastic pollution.  

Engagement in ZODIAC continues to grow as does its collaboration with key partner organizations. The IAEA participates regularly in Joint External Evaluations organized by the World Health Organization to assess the capacities of countries to prevent, detect and rapidly respond to public health risks. So far, we have taken part in missions in Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Tanzania (Zanzibar) and Thailand, which also offered an opportunity to promote ZODIAC to national authorities.

Many of our initiatives rely on our laboratories in Seibersdorf, which are such a unique asset to our Member States.

Last month we signed a contract to build new greenhouses for our Seibersdorf Nuclear Applications laboratories.  All major construction elements under the ReNuAL2 modernization initiative are now under contract.  With that, I am pleased to announce we have completed fundraising for ReNuAL2.  To celebrate the achievement and to recognize recent contributions from Canada, the Czech Republic, France, Ireland, and the United States, we are planning a ReNuAL2 side event on the margins of the March 2024 Board of Governors meeting. We will also ceremonially close our ReNuAL2 donor display at that time.  I thank Member States for their strong and consistent support and the co-chairs of Germany and South Africa for their adept facilitation.

With regards to emergency assistance following the devastating earthquake that hit Syria and Türkiye in February, the Agency continues to procure and deliver medical equipment. Currently the value amounts to more than €2m in total.

Mr Chairperson,

The IAEA has an important role to play in assisting countries towards their priority objectives of addressing climate change and energy security. Achieving these two important goals globally requires steadfast resolve and a long-term outlook that includes both nuclear fission and fusion energy.

Last month, I opened the 29th International Fusion Energy Conference in London, with more than 2,000 participants from more than 80 countries. Fusion scientists and engineers are making significant strides and the interest and investment in the sector are growing. I am determined that the IAEA should continue to play its central role in this field as this promising technology enters its next chapter towards providing the abundant low-carbon energy the world needs. During the conference, we released the first IAEA World Fusion Outlook, a global reference for authoritative information on the latest developments in fusion energy.  I also announced the inaugural meeting of the World Fusion Energy Group, which will convene in 2024. This group will bring together, not just fusion scientists and engineers from laboratories and experimental centres, but also policy makers, financiers, regulators and private companies.

Artificial Intelligence is bringing new opportunities to the nuclear sector, where its use will continue to grow. At the same time, the rapid development and deployment of AI present challenges to information security, privacy, public safety and global security. These matters are receiving increased attention in international forums, with many suggesting the need to establish some form of AI governance.

Last month, on the margins of the 67th General Conference, we took a closer look at the role of AI in nuclear fields, with particular focus on its use in diagnostic imaging and nuclear power plant operation. AI’s power to help us address climate change will be a topic of discussion at the 28th Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP28) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) next month.

More and more countries are turning to nuclear power to address energy security and climate change. But the full potential of nuclear as part of a low-carbon energy mix, is still too often overlooked in a world where financial incentives remain unevenly distributed among low-carbon technologies. That is why IAEA and dozens of Member States who support the use of nuclear power, will make a clear and bold statement at COP28: Net zero needs nuclear power. Together we will assert that all available low-emission technologies should be recognized and actively supported.

On 21 and 22 March leaders from around the world will gather at a Nuclear Energy Summit in Brussels to highlight the role of nuclear energy in addressing the global challenges to reduce the use of fossil fuels. Hosted jointly by the IAEA and Belgium, the Summit will be the highest-level meeting to date exclusively focused on the topic of nuclear energy. It will consist of a segment with heads of state and government as well as scientific and policy debates. The Summit will also showcase the IAEA’s Atoms4NetZero initiative, which provides decision makers with comprehensive, data-driven energy scenario modelling that includes the full potential of nuclear power in contributing to net zero emissions. This important initiative can fill a gap in studies used by governments and financial institutions in support of new nuclear power projects. I encourage those Member States that support nuclear energy, to participate in this historic summit at the highest level of government.

Today, 412 nuclear power reactors operating in 31 countries make up more than 370 gigawatts of installed capacity, providing almost 10 per cent of the world’s total electricity and a quarter of its low-carbon supply. Nuclear electricity generating capacity will more than double by 2050 in our high case projection, according to the IAEA’s latest outlook on the future of nuclear power, released at last month’s 2nd International Conference on Climate Change and the Role of Nuclear Power.

Mr Chairperson,

A total of 75 missions comprising 168 Agency staff members have been deployed as part of the continued presence at all five nuclear sites in Ukraine.

IAEA staff continued to monitor and assess the situation at Ukraine’s nuclear power sites against the seven indispensable pillars of nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict and to observe the five concrete principles for protecting the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant.

The situation at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant remains challenging, with six out of the Seven Pillars compromised either fully or partially. Issues concerning staffing at the site, the conduct of regular maintenance activities, and special measures taken for securing stable cooling water supply, pose continued and significant risks to the overall nuclear safety and security of the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant.

There were no indications of non-observance of the five concrete principles at the ZNPP. However, limitations on the timely and unrestricted access by the Agency’s experts have affected the ability of the Agency to fully confirm all five concrete principles are being observed at all times.

I note in my report that very recently there has been a positive development in this regard and I strongly encourage the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant site to ensure that timely access and information sharing takes place regularly.

Since September, the Agency has arranged 10 deliveries of nuclear safety and security equipment to Ukraine. With this, since the start of the armed conflict, a total of 32 deliveries ensured over €7 million worth of equipment reached different organizations in Ukraine to support the safe and secure operation of facilities and activities amid the armed conflict.

During these months, the Agency initiated delivery of the mental health support programme for staff at Ukrainian nuclear power plants, assessing the needs of mental health support teams at each NPP and initiating a series of workshops focusing on trauma, post-traumatic stress disorder and the strain of living with the armed conflict.

The Agency is grateful to all 23 donor states and the European Union for their extrabudgetary contributions to support all of the Ukraine-related activities and would welcome any further support in this regard to help meet the remaining needs shared during my statement at the last Board meeting.

At Seibersdorf, the IAEA’s new Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre is fully operational. Since its inauguration on 3 October, nine training courses and meetings have been held in its premises, attended by about 260 trainees and participants.

This month, invitations were sent to Ministers for the fourth International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS) to be held in Vienna 20-24 May 2024. I urge all Member States to participate at the highest level possible.

With regards to the Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, the Agency is providing continuous live data from Japan on the release of treated water from the site. Currently the data that we are receiving is within the expected levels.

Since the discharge began, our experts have been at the site to ensure the relevant international safety standards continue to be applied. All our independent sampling and analysis of the seawater near the power plant continue to show that tritium levels are far below Japan’s regulatory limits. Our independent monitoring and corroboration activities will continue during the entirety of the discharge, with our first Task Force Mission since the start of the discharge and inter-laboratory comparison sampling having taken place in the last few weeks.

Mr Chairperson,

Regarding the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme, you have before you my latest report on Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015).

You will note that Iran’s stockpiles of uranium enriched up to 5%, enriched up to 20% and enriched up to 60% – high enriched uranium – have all increased since we met in September with the increase of the 60% continuing at the same rate as I reported at the time of the last Board.  

You also have before you my report on the NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran. I regret that no further progress has been made in implementing the Joint Statement signed in Tehran on 4 March.

Iran also still needs to provide the Agency with technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin at Varamin and Turquzabad and inform the Agency of the current location(s) of the nuclear material and/or of contaminated equipment. It also still needs to resolve the discrepancy in the nuclear material balance evaluation relating to the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) and to implement modified Code 3.1 which is a legal obligation for Iran.

These outstanding safeguards issues stem from Iran’s obligations under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and need to be resolved for the Agency to be in a position to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.

In addition, I am seriously concerned that the implementation of the Joint Statement of 4 March 2023 has come to a standstill. A way forward must include an honest and cooperative implementation of the commitments we agreed.

I continue to strongly condemn Iran’s sudden withdrawal of the designations of several experienced inspectors. Iran’s stance is unprecedented and contrary to the cooperation that is required and expected in order to facilitate the effective implementation of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and in contradiction of the spirit of cooperation agreed in the Joint Statement of March 2023. I note Vice-President Eslami’s reply to a letter from me saying he is exploring possibilities to address the request mentioned in my letter, and I express the hope that this matter will be resolved promptly.  

Mr Chairperson,

The Board has before it for approval a draft Additional Protocol for Nauru.

The number of States with safeguards agreements in force remains 190 with 141 of these States having brought additional protocols into force. I call upon the remaining four States Parties to the NPT without comprehensive safeguards agreements to bring such agreements into force without delay. I also encourage States that have not yet concluded additional protocols to do so as soon as possible, and I reiterate my call for States with small quantities protocols (SQP) based on the old standard text to amend or rescind them. At present 78 States have an operative SQP based on the revised standard text. Let me assure you that I will continue to use my good offices to strengthen the indispensable legal framework on which the continued peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology rest.

Since my report to the Board and General Conference in August this year we have continued to monitor the DPRK nuclear programme.

The Nuclear Test Site at Punggye-ri remains prepared to support a new nuclear test, the conduct of which would contravene UN Security Council resolutions and would be a cause for serious concern.

Activities are continuing at the Yongbyon site. The 5MW(e) reactor was shut down for three to four weeks during September and early-October 2023, however there are now indications of operation. There are also indications of ongoing operation of the reported centrifuge enrichment facility and its annex.

Increased levels of activity have been observed at, and near, the LWR, and since mid-October 2023, a strong water outflow has been observed from the LWR cooling system. These observations are consistent with the commissioning of the LWR.

I repeat the obvious, the continuation of the DPRK’s nuclear programme is a clear violation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions and is deeply regrettable. I call upon the DPRK to comply fully with its obligations under relevant UN Security Council resolutions, to cooperate promptly with the Agency in the full and effective implementation of its NPT Safeguards Agreement and to resolve all outstanding issues, especially those that have arisen during the absence of Agency inspectors from the country. The Agency continues to maintain its enhanced readiness to play its essential role in verifying the DPRK’s nuclear programme.

Last week, the Agency participated in the fourth session of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, held between 13 and 17 November at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. Following past practice, we shared, in the background documentation and discussions during the session, the Agency’s previously undertaken work on the application of nuclear safeguards in the Middle East as well as our experience regarding the Agency’s role related to nuclear-weapon-free zones established in other regions of the world. To avoid factual mistakes and misinterpretations about the mandate and function of the IAEA in nuclear verification, we also provided conference participants with technical clarifications.

Mr Chairperson,

The second cohort of the IAEA’s Lise Meitner Programme was hosted last month by the Oak Ridge and Idaho National Laboratories, in the United States of America. Named after Meitner, the eminent Austrian-Swedish physicist, the Lise Meitner Programme provides early and mid‑career women professionals in the nuclear field with opportunities to enhance their careers. The next professional visit is expected to take place in the Republic of Korea next year. Both the Lise Meitner Programme and the Marie Sklodowska-Curie Fellowship Programme are funded by extra-budgetary and in-kind contributions. I encourage Member States to continue supporting both these programmes, including by hosting Lise Meitner Programme visits.

By the end of this year there will be more than 550 Marie Sklodowska-Curie Fellows. Many of them will gather for the first time in Vienna for International Women’s Day 2024. The event, which will also include women from the Lise Meitner programme, will occur on 7 and 8 March.

This will be an opportunity for Member States to meet with the indispensable community of female nuclear experts and express their ongoing support for their and our efforts.

Within the Secretariat, we remain on track to achieve gender parity by 2025. By the end of the third quarter, overall representation of women in the Professional and higher categories at the Secretariat was just shy of 44%.

Diversity is core to the IAEA and I am pleased to deliver to you my report on Multilingualism at the IAEA. It highlights the commitment of the Secretariat to facilitating communication with Member States and fostering the exchange – in multiple languages – of scientific and technical information, as well as the considerable progress achieved since my previous report in 2021. For example, the 2022 edition of the IAEA Safeguards Glossary was made available in all IAEA languages in September this year.

Mr Chairperson,

In September I reported to the Board that the Agency was facing a serious liquidity challenge due to delays in receiving Regular Budget assessed contributions from Member States, and I underlined the importance of paying any outstanding assessments without further delay to avoid the situation impacting our programmes.

As a result of my urgent calls, I am pleased to report Member States have made significant payments of Regular Budget assessed contributions, and that with these payments we are now in a much better position to end 2023 without interruption to our operations. The Secretariat appreciates the assistance of those Member States that have paid, including those that have paid in advance, in keeping the Agency’s operations running. 

However, this is still not a permanent solution. Because we are still waiting to receive outstanding Regular Budget contributions totalling approximately €125 million, we could again find ourselves in a precarious situation in which delays in payment impact the normal operations of the Agency. This situation may repeat itself in 2024 if these payments, or those of the 2024 assessments, are not received in a timely manner.

The Agency needs a stable and predictable financial foundation for the Regular Budget to meet its statutory and legal obligations. The Regular Budget underpins all programmes, including Safeguards and Technical Cooperation.  The Agency is doing all that it can in this regard.  Close coordination with Member States by the Division of Budget and Finance is continuing, and it is most appreciated that Member States continue to work with them, as they forecast expected contributions to assess the need for additional mitigation measures in 2024.

The lack of sufficient working capital is also adding to the instability of the Agency’s liquidity situation.  The Agency’s Working Capital Fund has been at the same level, €15.2 million, since 1997, which does not cover even half a month of current expenses.  In contrast, the standard for UN organizations is that it covers at least one month. The Secretariat is therefore continuing to analyse possible mitigation measures to address the liquidity issue. We will continue to consult with Member States to work to identify possible solutions.

I appeal to those Member States with outstanding contributions to settle their overdue payments as soon as possible, and I call on all Member States to honour their obligation to pay their assessed contributions in a timely manner.

At a time of many uncertainties and challenges across the world, the IAEA is an indispensable asset to the international community. You have my assurance that we are doing everything possible to maximize the benefit we provide in all our endeavours.

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Update 195 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) is transitioning its reactor unit 5 to cold from hot shutdown and intends to determine the cause of boron detected in a cooling circuit, still leaving one of the plant’s six reactors in hot shutdown to produce steam and heating, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said today.

The unit’s transition to cold shutdown began yesterday and is expected to be completed later today, according to the ZNPP. Unit 4 will remain in hot shutdown. There are currently no plans to bring a second unit into hot shutdown to replace unit 5, the plant said.

Once in cold shutdown, the ZNPP will carry out tests to identify why low levels of boron were found in the secondary cooling circuit of one of the unit’s steam generators.

The ZNPP informed the IAEA experts at the site that the boron concentration in the affected cooling circuit remained below the limits permitted by its technical specifications. In addition, no radioactivity has been detected in the secondary cooling circuit. Borated water is used in the primary coolant to help maintain nuclear safety.

The ZNPP decided to move the unit to cold shutdown after one of the three 17.4 megawatt diesel boilers located off-site started operating on 17 November, providing additional heating to the nearby town of Enerhodar, where many plant staff live.

The ZNPP had been keeping reactor units 4 and 5 in hot shutdown to provide heating and steam for nuclear safety purposes on site, as well as heating for Enerhodar. The IAEA continues to follow the ZNPP’s progress to find an alternative source of steam generation. Ukraine’s national regulator, the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU), issued regulatory orders in June to limit the operation of all six units of the ZNPP to a cold shutdown state.

Separately, the IAEA experts on the site are continuing to gather information to fully understand the cause of the event that occurred last week which resulted in unit 6 losing power and relying on a diesel generator for 90 minutes.

Later this week, the IAEA team has been invited to observe the ZNPP’s planned emergency exercise.

“We look forward to observing the emergency response exercise at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant from both the temporary emergency control centre and in the field,” Director General Grossi said. “Emergency exercises are very important for nuclear safety, especially in these times of heightened risk caused by the conflict.”

The IAEA team at the Rivne Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) last week observed an emergency exercise at that plant and today the IAEA team at the Chornobyl site observed an emergency drill at the radioactive liquid waste treatment plant.

The IAEA teams at the Khmelnitsky, Rivne and South Ukraine NPPs and the Chornobyl site report safe and secure operations of these nuclear facilities despite the continuation of the conflict.

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Floating Nuclear Power Plants: Benefits and Challenges discussed at IAEA Symposium

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

How can we provide a reliable supply of energy far out to sea, or on an island, or in a coastal community?  The typical answer is by using fossil-fuelled generators.  But as efforts to decarbonize global energy systems expand, one of the answers could be to use a floating nuclear power plant (FNPP).

Interest is growing in installing small modular reactors (SMRs) on floating barges or platforms to provide clean electricity and heat for remote coastal locations, to decarbonize offshore oil and gas or mining activities, or even to provide grid scale electricity production, unlocking cost reductions through serial production in shipyards. At an IAEA symposium on floating nuclear power plants that took place from 14-15 November 2023 in Vienna, legal experts, nuclear and maritime regulators, and industry leaders discussed the benefits and challenges of FNPPs and exactly what role they could play in the fight against climate change and the transition to Net Zero.

Opening the meeting, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said that in many countries “there is active consideration of floating nuclear power plants”.  However, as part of discussions about their viability and potential applications, the Director General said that safeguards and the international legal and regulatory implications needed to be thoroughly analysed.

Nuclear energy has already been in use for about 60 years in naval ships and icebreakers propulsion. However, FNPPs are different since they will produce low-carbon power and heat for different applications, including district heating, desalination and hydrogen production.

Floating NPPs can be built in a factory, assembled in a shipyard and transported to a site, all of which may help to speed up construction and keep costs down. Canada, China, Denmark, South Korea, Russia and the USA are each working on marine small modular reactor designs, some are in advanced development, and Russia even has one FNPP, the Akademik Lomonosov, in commercial operation in the far east of the country. The Akademik Lomonosov FNPP has been in operation, producing electricity and district heating, since 2020. It has replaced the shut down Bilibino NPP and the aging Chaunsk coal power plant.

However, it is the very mobility of these FNPPs that raises new questions, particularly when they move across international borders or operate in international, rather than territorial, waters. For example, how does the licensing and regulation process work when a FNPP is built and fuelled in one country’s jurisdiction, and then transported to another jurisdiction?

“The IAEA is working with our Member States to determine what further guidance and standards might be needed to ensure the safety of floating nuclear power plants”, IAEA Deputy Director General and Head of the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security, Lydie Evrard, said. “The IAEA’s safety standards serve as the global reference for protecting people and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation. There are also considerable legal and regulatory challenges that must be addressed if a truly international floating nuclear power market is to emerge,” she said.

Topan Setiadipura, the Co-Chair of the Symposium and Head of the Research Centre for Nuclear Reactor Technology (BRIN) in Indonesia said, “to some extent, floating NPPs are an interesting option for Indonesia as many power or utilities companies have floating diesel power plants or floating gas power plants”. However, acquiring more information and knowledge is essential to understanding whether embarking countries like Indonesia could use FNPPs in the future to replace fossil-fuelled floating power plants, he said.

During the symposium, discussions focused on current and future designs of FNPPs and their uses, including, for example, as a floating offshore installation for production of clean hydrogen to be converted into green ammonia for use in agriculture or as a low carbon shipping fuel. Participants also examined the specific challenges that the movability of FNPPs pose for their licensing, regulation, transportation and application of safeguards. Nuclear safety and security were discussed, including the extent to which the current standards and practices can, or cannot, be applied to FNPPs. The symposium’s concluding session identified the next possible steps to enable the deployment of floating nuclear power plants, including the establishment of a mechanism to improve communication between the nuclear and maritime industry on one hand, and regulators on the other, with focus on application of security and safeguards by design. 

“Getting to Net Zero requires the use of all clean energies available,” Mikhail Chudakov, IAEA Deputy Director General and Head of the Department of Nuclear Energy, told the gathering. “Floating nuclear power plants are not in competition with land-based SMRs but extend the use and potential of such nuclear technology to reach our Net Zero targets.”

The symposium was organized in the frame of the Agency-wide Platform on SMRs and their Applications which aims at providing consistent and coordinated support to Member States for the development, deployment and oversight of SMRs. Through the Nuclear Harmonization and Standardization Initiative (NHSI), the IAEA also brings together policy makers, regulators, designers, vendors and operators to harmonize and standardize regulatory and industrial approaches to enable the effective global deployment of safe and secure advanced nuclear reactors.

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IAEA Mission Observes Commitment to Safety at Research Reactor in the Philippines, Recommends Further Improvement

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team of experts said the Philippines is committed to the safe operation of the Philippine Research Reactor-1 (PRR-1) Subcritical Assembly for Training, Education and Research (SATER) facility, following completion of recent commissioning tests and the start of its utilization for training and education. The team also found the need for further improvement of the effectiveness of the reactor’s operational organization structure, its maintenance and operating procedures.

The five-day Integrated Safety Assessment for Research Reactors (INSARR) mission to the PRR-1 SATER facility was conducted at the request of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI), part of the Department of Science and Technology. The mission team comprised three experts from China, the Netherlands and the United States of America, and one IAEA staff member.

The INSARR team visited the PRR-1 SATER facility and met with the PNRI management.

The mission, which concluded on 17 November, reviewed regulatory supervision, the management system, and training and qualification. It also covered technical aspects, such as the commissioning results, maintenance, operating procedures, utilization and experiments, radiation protection, and emergency planning.

PRR-1 SATER is operated by the PNRI and housed in the building of the original PRR-1 – located at the University of the Philippines in Quezon City, northeast of Manila – which was shut down in 1988. Construction work on PRR-1 SATER began in 2017 and concluded in 2021. Commissioning began in June 2022, when PNRI started to load TRIGA (Training, Research, Isotopes General Atomics) fuel elements into the subcritical assembly. Following PNRI’s review of the commissioning tests, PRR-1 SATER was granted authorization for operation and began operating in March 2023.

The facility is subcritical, meaning that the chain nuclear fission reaction is initiated and maintained through an external neutron source, as opposed to a critical facility where the nuclear chain reaction is self-sustaining. The facility is used for training and education programmes initiated by PNRI at universities in the Philippines and permits researchers to conduct experiments and demonstrate neutron activation analysis and operation of a nuclear installation.

The INSARR team observed that the established practices in the use of the facility and experiments, as well as in radiation protection and waste management, are in line with the IAEA safety standards. It also noted improvement in safety documents following the commissioning tests.

“PNRI has shown a commitment to safety by requesting an IAEA INSARR mission,” said Kaichao Sun, team leader and Nuclear Safety Officer at the IAEA. “Transition from commissioning to routine operation of a nuclear installation could be challenging. Continued implementation of measures of effective leadership and management for safety, in accordance with the IAEA safety standards, ensures this challenge is addressed.”

The mission team made recommendations and suggestions for further improvements, including the need for:

  • Enhancing the effectiveness of the safety committee of the facility by including in its scope the review of proposed changes in operational procedures, new experiments and modifications projects.
  • Establishing procedures for qualification of the operating personnel with an assessment of the capabilities of the personnel to be authorized, including a comprehensive examination based on the training programme.
  • Establishing a maintenance programme for safety-related systems and components, based on the design and surveillance requirements and manufacturers’ instructions.
  • Including requirements on periodic testing of safety-related systems and components in the operational rules.  

“The PNRI requested the INSARR mission under the support of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme. With the recent start of operation of PRR-1 SATER, the facility operator welcomed the significant inputs from the INSARR team to improve the safety of the facility and to ensure its efficient and safe operation and utilization,” said Ryan Olivares, the reactor manager of PRR-1 SATER. “Operating this newly repurposed training facility is a significant milestone for the Philippines after almost four decades of extended reactor shutdown. Notwithstanding the significant steps undertaken and efforts invested for continuous advancement, the INSARR mission still provided the operator with valuable inputs, and the team remains committed to implement safety improvements.”

PNRI plans to request a follow-up INSARR mission in 2025.

About INSARR Missions

INSARR missions are an IAEA peer review service, conducted at the request of a Member State, to assess and evaluate the safety of research reactors based on IAEA safety standards. Follow-up missions are standard components of the INSARR programme and are typically conducted within two years of the initial mission. More information about INSARR missions can be found on the IAEA website.

The IAEA Safety Standards provide a robust framework of fundamental principles, requirements and guidance to ensure safety. They reflect an international consensus and serve as a global reference for protecting people and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation.

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IAEA Concludes Long Term Operational Safety Review at Sweden’s Forsmark Nuclear Power Plant

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team of experts last week completed a review of long term operational safety at the Forsmark Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) in Sweden.

Unit 1 and 2 at Forsmark NPP went into commercial operation in 1980 and 1981, respectively. They were designed with an initial operational life of 40 years and entered their long term operation (LTO) phase in 2020 and 2021. Vattenfall AB, the operator, has decided to extend their operational life to 60 years.

Swedish NPP licenses are not time-limited, but regulatory consent to operate is subject to a periodic safety review every ten years.  

The mission, requested by the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM), continues a comprehensive, multi-year evaluation of the two units. In 2016, SSM invited an IAEA pre-SALTO mission to review the long term safety of the two units, followed by another pre-SALTO mission in 2019 and a follow-up mission in 2021.

During the recent ten-day mission from 7 to 16 November, the team reviewed the plant’s preparedness, organization and programmes for safe LTO of the two units. The mission was conducted by a ten-person team comprising experts from Argentina, Canada, Germany, France, the Netherlands and Switzerland, as well as two observers from Armenia and the United Kingdom and two IAEA staff members. The team met and had in depth discussions with staff from the Forsmark NPP and   conducted a plant walkdown during the review.  

“The team observed that the operator is implementing measures for safe LTO in a timely manner and the staff at the plant are professional, open and receptive to suggestions for improvement,” said team leader and IAEA Nuclear Safety Officer Martin Marchena, adding that “most of the ageing management and LTO activities are already in alignment with IAEA safety standards. We encourage the plant to address the review findings and implement all remaining activities for safe LTO as planned.”

The team identified good practices and good performances that will be shared with the nuclear industry globally, including:

  • The plant developed and implemented a detailed process for the identification of components not directly important to safety that may influence intended functions of safety components.
  • The plant developed and implemented a comprehensive obsolescence management programme.
  • The plant developed a programme to coordinate specialist activities to foster the growth of a specialized workforce in specific areas, such as ageing management.

The team also provided recommendations to further enhance the preparations for LTO safety:

  • The plant should address some of the remaining elements in plant programmes to ensure effectiveness in ageing management.  
  • The plant should improve the grouping of components for implementation of ageing management activities (so called commodity groups).  
  • The plant should improve ageing management programmes for civil structures, systems and components for LTO.

The plant management expressed a determination to address the areas identified for improvement and to continue its cooperation with the IAEA.

“The review has assured us that we are on the right track for safe and reliable operation in the long term perspective,” said Johan Börjesson, Deputy Managing Director at Forsmark NPP. “The results of the mission will help us to further develop and improve our abilities that will ensure safe and long operation at Forsmark. I would also like to thank the IAEA for their knowledge and efforts in order to help us improve.” 

The team provided a draft report to the plant management and to SSM at the end of the mission. The plant management and SSM will have an opportunity to make factual comments on the draft. A final report will be submitted to the plant management, SSM and the Swedish Government within three months.

Background

Information on SALTO missions can be found here.

A SALTO peer review is a comprehensive safety review addressing strategy and key elements for the safe long term operation of nuclear power plants. They complement OSART missions, which are designed as a review of programmes and activities essential to operational safety. Neither SALTO nor OSART reviews are regulatory inspections, nor are they design reviews or substitutes for an exhaustive assessment of a plant’s overall safety status.

LTO of nuclear power plants is defined as operation beyond an established time frame determined by the license term, the original plant design, relevant standards or national regulations. As stated in IAEA safety standards, to maintain a plant’s fitness for service, consideration should be given to life limiting processes and features of systems, structures and components (SSC), as well as to reasonably practicable safety upgrades to enhance the safety of the plant to a level approaching that of modern plants.