Japan’s Reports on Conditions at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, 27 December 2023

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

On 27 December 2023, Japan provided the IAEA with a copy of a report on the discharge record and the seawater monitoring results at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station during October, which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has sent to all international Missions in Japan.

The report contains information on discharges from the subdrain and groundwater drain systems, as well as on groundwater bypassing conducted during the month of October. In both cases, in advance of the action, TEPCO analyzes the quality of the groundwater to be discharged and announces the results. These results confirm that the radiation level of sampled water are substantially below the operational targets set by TEPCO.

Norway Joins the IAEA’s Member State Support Programme for Nuclear Verification

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Norway is the latest IAEA Member State to team up with the Agency’s Department of Safeguards by establishing a Member State Support Programme (MSSP). The partnership, formally signed on 27 September 2023, will see Norway working closely with the IAEA to address challenges and opportunities in the field of nuclear safeguards.

Nuclear safeguards are technical measures, embedded in bilateral agreements between the IAEA and a State, which are implemented by the IAEA to provide the international community with assurances that nuclear material remains in peaceful use.

“By establishing a MSSP, Norway intends to help the IAEA strengthen the Agency’s nuclear verification system,” said Per Strand, Director General of the Norwegian Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority. “Norway has a long association with the IAEA and was the very first country to have an IAEA safeguards inspection in 1962. I’m delighted that the new MSSP with the IAEA bolsters this long relationship.”

MSSPs extend support to the IAEA in various forms, including knowledge exchange, technology transfer, expert collaboration and financial support. These efforts collectively assist the IAEA in its mission to verify the peaceful use of nuclear materials while staying at the forefront of advancements in nuclear technology.

“MSSPs are one of the primary ways States can help strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of Agency safeguards,” said Massimo Aparo, Deputy Director General and Head of the Department of Safeguards.   “By leveraging the impressive array of expertise and talent from Norway, I am confident we can accomplish great things together.”

The establishment of Norway’s MSSP marks a significant addition to the network of active support programmes across the world, which has now reached 24. This partnership will allow the IAEA to work closely with Norway on a range of projects including advancing safeguards by design for new or modified facilities; training of IAEA safeguards inspectors; and developing and testing new spent fuel measurement methods. 

“Norway recognizes the paramount importance of the IAEA maintaining the highest standards in international nuclear safeguards,” said Susan Eckey, Permanent Representative of Norway to the International Organizations in Vienna. “By joining the IAEA’s Member State Support Programme, we aim to contribute to global efforts in this critical area. This partnership underscores our dedication to verifying the peaceful use of nuclear material worldwide.”

Top “Nuclear Explained” Reads in 2023

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

A radioactive gas that has no colour, smell or taste, radon is produced in the ground from uranium and diffuses into the atmosphere. Accounting for around a half of all human exposure to radiation, this gas is also the most common cause of lung cancer after smoking. It occurs naturally in significant quantities in three different chemical variations, or isotopes, but only two of these present a risk. In this article we explain the facts about radon and address the most common concerns: Read the full article

Find more “Nuclear Explained” articles, as well as videos and podcasts in this series, here.  

IAEA Highlights and Achievements in 2023 – A Year in Review

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

This year saw several key events which underscored the IAEA’s commitment to nuclear safety and security.  

The international community was given scientific assurances on the negligible environmental impact of the treated water release from Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. In the first independent sampling since the start of treated water discharges at the power plant, the IAEA found tritium levels well below Japan’s limits. This effort aligned with IAEA’s decade-long commitment to assisting Japan in credible and transparent marine monitoring following  2011’s nuclear accident.  

The IAEA carried on with its important work in Ukraine, with multiple in-person continued expert missions to nuclear power plants across the country, including Zaporizhzhia NPP, with the goal of lowering the risk of a nuclear accident despite the active conflict situation. 

The Director General led a number of missions in person and promoted key safety principles at the highest international levels. 

Enhancing Global Nuclear Security through Specialized Training  

A major highlight was the inauguration of IAEA Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre on 3 October. Since its opening, the centre has held nine training sessions, engaging about 260 participants.  

This unique facility is designed to address countries’ needs in capacity building. It offers 23 specialized training courses using the state-of-the-art technical infrastructure. Covering aspects like physical protection and detection and response to criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving nuclear or other radioactive material, the centre fosters expertise and supports global efforts against nuclear terrorism. Additionally, it includes specialized training for countries involved in or planning to join ‘Rays of Hope’, focusing on securing radioactive materials and facilities in cancer care. 

Global Collaboration on Nuclear Safety and Security  

An IAEA conference in Abu Dhabi addressed evolving challenges in the nuclear regulatory field, emphasizing safety amidst rapid technological advances, shifting regulatory landscapes, and emerging threats like climate-related hazards. 

Another significant event, the International Conference on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, Decommissioning, Environmental Protection and Remediation attracted over 600 stakeholders. Collaboration with multiple international and national bodies as well as representatives from institutions and organizations ensured an informative exchange on safety and sustainability of topical areas discussed during this event.  

In addition, the 20th Anniversary of the IAEA’s Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources celebrated ongoing collaborative efforts among 149 countries to ensure the safety and security of radioactive sources throughout their lifecycle. 

Upcoming in 2024: The IAEA is preparing for the International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS 2024) in Vienna. This event will gather global policymakers and experts to discuss policy, technology, capacity building, and cross-cutting topics in nuclear security. ICONS aims to foster collaboration, share best practices, and reinforce the IAEA’s pivotal role in global nuclear security efforts. 

IAEA adds four States for the new COMPASS cycle

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cameroon and Ghana will participate in the next cycle of the IAEA Comprehensive Capacity-Building Initiative for State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSACs) and State and Regional Authorities responsible for safeguards implementation (SRAs). The initiative, commonly known as COMPASS, involves partnering with the State to help them strengthen the effectiveness of their SSAC and SRA.

“I am delighted to welcome the next group of States to receive safeguards support through COMPASS,” said Rafael Mariano Grossi, Director General of the IAEA. “Cooperation between the State and the IAEA is a crucial element in the implementation of safeguards. Based on the results and lessons learned from COMPASS’s pilot phase, we will work closely with this new group of States to provide the tools and knowledge they need to fulfil their safeguards obligations effectively and efficiently.”

Through safeguards, the IAEA verifies that States are honouring their international legal commitments to use nuclear material and technology only for peaceful purposes. Launched in September 2020 by the Director General, COMPASS provides comprehensive safeguards assistance tailored to a State’s needs. During its initial pilot phase, seven States received support from the IAEA and COMPASS’s implementing partners in the areas of outreach; legal and regulatory frameworks; training; information technology; procurement; and related expertise. The IAEA successfully concluded the pilot phase in March 2023.

The individual needs of new COMPASS States will be assessed through an IAEA Safeguards and SSAC advisory service (ISSAS) mission at the start of the new implementation phase, which will begin in January 2024. COMPASS activities will then be conducted collaboratively between the State and the IAEA, with the in-kind and/or financial support of individual IAEA Member States and Member State Support Programmes.  

“I am excited that Ghana has been chosen to take part in the next phase of COMPASS”, said Nii Kwashie Allotey, the Director General of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority for Ghana. “Ghana is committed to working with the IAEA to fulfil its international nuclear verification obligations. We believe that being part of COMPASS will provide Ghana the support it needs to facilitate the optimal implementation of Agency safeguards.”

As per their respective comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, 182 States are obliged to establish and maintain an SSAC. As the State’s mechanism through which it declares to the IAEA the location, uses and quantities of nuclear material in the country, SSACs are important components of IAEA-State cooperation. The need for a robust SSAC becomes particularly evident when a State is at a pivotal juncture in the development of its nuclear fuel cycle or associated legislation. This includes the planning and construction of a new nuclear facility, agreeing to the revised text of a small quantities protocol, or bringing into force an additional protocol — each of which entail new reporting obligations for the State.

“The COMPASS initiative has been a game changer for Malaysia”, said Nurul Hafiza binti Mohamed Aliasrudin, Assistant Director of the Nuclear Installation Division at the Malaysian Department of Atomic Energy. Malaysia was one of the seven States who participated in the pilot phase of COMPASS. “In two years, COMPASS helped us review safeguards regulations, develop technical guidelines and license conditions, and also enhance the training within the national safeguards authority,” said Nurul Hafiza binti Mohamed Aliasrudin.

The IAEA provides a suite of safeguards assistance to States. In addition to COMPASS, States can request and access support including ISSAS missions; national, regional, and inter-regional training offerings; e-learning modules; and the safeguards traineeship programme.

Find out more about IAEA safeguards assistance for States

IAEA Mission to Cambodia Finds Progress in Nuclear Security Arrangements, Encourages Continued Improvement

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) completed an advisory service mission to Cambodia focused on assessing the country’s nuclear security regime for nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control (MORC). The team said the country has implemented measures to detect and respond to criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving such material and encouraged Cambodia to further improve its legal and regulatory framework. The team also identified several examples of good practice.

The mission, carried out at the request of the Royal Government of Cambodia, took place from 11 to 22 December and involved a team of nine international experts from Finland, Hungary, Japan, Morocco, Pakistan, the United States of America, Viet Nam and the IAEA. It is the second mission of this kind to Cambodia.

International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) missions aim to help States to better prevent, detect and respond to criminal and intentional unauthorized acts involving nuclear or other radioactive material, known as MORC, which is lost, missing, stolen, improperly disposed of, or not adequately stored or handled.

The mission aimed to review the current state of nuclear security in relation to MORC in Cambodia and provide recommendations on how to strengthen it in accordance with international guidance and best practices.

The team conducted a series of meetings with officials from the Ministry of Mines and Energy, the General Department of Customs and Excise, the Secretariat of the National Counter Terrorism Committee, and the National Authority for the Prohibition of Chemical, Nuclear, Biological and Radiological Weapons (NACW).

The INSServ team visited the Phnom Penh Autonomous Port (PPAP), the Sihanoukville Autonomous Port (PAS) and the Phnom Penh International Airport (PPIA) to assess the detection and response measures in place. The team also went to the NACW Institute of Explore and Experiment on Substance in Kampong Chhnang Province.

“Cambodia established a solid basis for a comprehensive nuclear security regime, ” said Team Leader Khammar Mrabit, former Director General of the Moroccan Agency for Nuclear and Radiological Safety and Security and member of the Moroccan Parliament. “We welcome Cambodia’s cooperation in this mission and hope our recommendations and suggestions will be helpful for further improvements.”

The team said that Cambodia had implemented many elements of a legal and regulatory framework related to MORC. Still, it recommended the country to establish a national nuclear law and ratify the Amendment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Further recommendations include the establishment of national infrastructure to support sustainable training to enhance Cambodia’s existing detection and response capabilities.

Several good practices were identified, including the categorization of offences in the country’s legal framework,  the radiation detection scan of all import and export cargo containers at PPAP and PAS, the use of the IAEA mobile app TRACE (Tool for Radiation Alarm and Commodity Evaluation), as well as the establishment of knowledge management and professional development measures for the staff with nuclear security detection responsibilities.

“We are ready to provide continued support to Cambodia as they implement the IAEA INSServ mission recommendations and suggestions to enhance the nuclear security detection and response systems and measures relevant to MORC,” said Elena Buglova, Director of the IAEA Division of Nuclear Security.

The IAEA’s INSServ mission is part of its ongoing efforts to assist Member States in strengthening their nuclear security regimes in relation to MORC. The Agency provides a range of services in this area, including expert advice, training, and equipment support, to help Member States protect against criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving such materials.

“This second INSServ mission will assist us in the upgrade of Cambodia’s nuclear security regime by taking into account the international practice and expertise,” said Keo Rottanak, Minister of Mines and Energy. “We firmly believe that no single nation can address the complex challenges of nuclear security in isolation. A secure world starts by cooperation of all countries, relevant agencies and individuals.”

The draft findings and recommendations were presented to the Royal Government of Cambodia, and the final report will be presented in about three months.

Background

The mission was the 86th INSServ mission conducted by the IAEA since the programme began in 2006.

INSServ missions, based on the INSServ guidelines published in 2019, assist States in establishing, maintaining and strengthening their nuclear security regime related to nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control.

The missions provide independent advice on implementing international instruments, along with IAEA guidance on the prevention and detection of and response to criminal and intentional unauthorized acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control.

IAEA Director General Statement on Recent Developments in the DPRK’s Nuclear Programme

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

In my opening statement to the Board on 22 November, I reported that we had observed increased levels of activity at, and near, the Light Water Reactor (LWR) at Yongbyon, and also – since mid-October – a strong water outflow from its cooling system. These observations were consistent with the commissioning of the LWR.

More recent observations indicate that this water discharge is warm, which is also consistent with ongoing commissioning of the LWR, a process that takes some time for any new reactor. However, the discharge of warm water is indicative the reactor has reached criticality.  It remains the case that without access to the facility the Agency cannot confirm its operational status.

The LWR, like any nuclear reactor, can produce plutonium in its irradiated fuel, which can be separated during reprocessing, so this is a cause for concern.

Concerning the safety of the LWR, we do not have sufficient information to make an assessment. Of course, safety should always be the paramount issue when starting a new reactor.  Nuclear safety is a sovereign responsibility of the State and the IAEA supports the States in this area.

I repeat that the further development of the DPRK’s nuclear programme, including the construction and operation of the LWR, is a violation of UN Security Council resolutions and is deeply regrettable.

I call upon the DPRK to comply fully with its obligations under Security Council resolutions, to cooperate promptly with the Agency in the full and effective implementation of its NPT Safeguards Agreement and to resolve all outstanding issues, especially those that have arisen during the absence of Agency inspectors from the country. The Agency is ready to engage  on any of the above issues, including safety.

Update 203 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) is installing four new mobile diesel boilers to generate additional steam needed for various nuclear safety functions at the site, including for waste treatment, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said today.

The IAEA team of experts present at the ZNPP observed the installation work during a walkdown last Sunday and were subsequently informed that the new boilers will be ready soon. The site currently has nine mobile boilers, eight of which are operating to provide heating during the winter.

“Nuclear power plants need significant amounts of steam to conduct important operational activities at the sites. This remains the case also for the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant, even though it has not produced electricity for well over a year now. The IAEA has encouraged the plant to install diesel boilers for this purpose and we welcome the planned additional capacity,” Director General Grossi said.

Five reactors remain in cold shutdown, while unit 4 is in hot shutdown to produce steam and heat, including for the nearby town of Enerhodar, where most plant staff live.

Nearly three weeks after it suffered its eighth complete loss of off-site power during the conflict, the ZNPP remains connected to two external power sources: the main 750 kilovolt (kV) power line, and a back-up 330 kV power line.

The IAEA experts have over the past week continued to monitor the nuclear safety and security situation across the site of Europe’s largest nuclear power plant (NPP), conducting walkdowns to the reactor hall and electrical safety system rooms of unit 3 and to the main control room of unit 5, where they observed a successful test of the safety systems.

In recent days, they also went to the site’s 750 kV electrical switchyard, entry point for the off-site power needed at the plant, and the onsite water treatment facility. In another walkdown, they saw the ZNPP’s cooling pond, cooling towers, inlet and outlet channels as well as the outlet channel of the nearby Zaporizhzhya Thermal Power Plant. However, they were not allowed this time to access the isolation gate of the cooling pond.

Separately, the IAEA experts were informed by the ZNPP that they could not access the reactor rooftops as planned on 19 December due to security concerns.  No alternative date has so far been provided. The IAEA has previously this year been given access to three of the reactor roofs – of units 2, 3 and 4 – but not the others.

In addition, the IAEA team was once again not granted access to the north-western part of the turbine hall of reactor unit 5 during a walkdown there last Monday, despite a request made before the visit. The IAEA has not been able to visit the north-western part of any of the six turbine halls since mid-October.

The team continues to pay close attention to the maintenance situation at the plant, particularly the maintenance plan for next year, and also to the electrical equipment related to the safety systems of the reactor units following a power loss at unit 6 in mid-November. The IAEA experts have been informed that the 2024 maintenance plan is almost complete, but they have so far not been able to study it as requested.

An unannounced fire drill was conducted at the ZNPP site on Wednesday morning, following last week’s emergency communication exercise. The drill scenario involved a hypothetical oil leakage at the transformer of reactor unit 2, which resulted in a fire. The drill’s participants included regional, city and on-site fire departments. The IAEA team was only made aware of the drill afterwards.  

As usual in recent months, the IAEA team has continued to hear explosions from outside the ZNPP site, including six powerful blasts on Wednesday evening.

IAEA experts at the Rivne, Khmelnitsky, South Ukraine NPPs and the Chornobyl site continue to report that nuclear safety and security is being maintained despite challenging circumstances. A successful rotation of IAEA staff took place during the week at the Rivne, South Ukraine and Khmelnitsky sites.

Last week, the IAEA arranged the 33rd delivery of nuclear safety and security-related equipment to Ukraine, using contributions from Australia. It was the first delivery under a new system requiring entities in Ukraine to register in the national electronic system as recipients of humanitarian aid.

IAEA Supports Removal of High-Activity Disused Radioactive Sources in Chile

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

A record number of 31 disused sealed radioactive sources (DSRSs) were removed from Chile earlier this year, and transferred to a recycling facility abroad, in a large removal operation supported by the IAEA. The removed radioactive sources were mainly cobalt sources previously used for cancer treatment in Chile’s hospitals and clinics. Since the end of their use in 1992, they have been in temporary storage at a specialized facility managed by the Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission (CCHEN). 

The DSRSs transfer operation is part of an IAEA interregional project aimed at improving nuclear safety and security by providing comprehensive technical assistance for the sustainable management of DSRSs.

“Chile’s case of DSRSs management is a successful example of how effective international cooperation can benefit national and global nuclear security,” said Elena Buglova, Director of the IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Security. “The IAEA strongly encourages countries to establish a national policy and strategy for safe and secure DSRSs management, and offers its assistance to those countries that would like to invest in a sustainable approach.”

In Chile, radioactive material and sealed radioactive sources are used mostly for industrial applications, for example in measuring parameters such as thickness and density of materials; in medicine for diagnosis and treatment purposes; as well as for research purposes. The DSRSs represent about half of the radioactive material received yearly in waste management facilities from different activities around the country.

“The removal of these sources has multiple benefits for the CCHEN and the whole country, and it is in line with the circular economy objectives, in terms of recycling and reuse,” said Luis Huerta Torchio, Executive Director at the Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission. “The removal has significantly reduced the risk for any type of incident associated with these disused sources. In addition, it freed up to 30 per cent of space in the national storage facility used for disused radioactive sources, and subsequently extended the possibility of its use for about ten more years,” he added.

The operational plan was agreed among involved parties, namely the IAEA, the end-user representing Chile, and the contractor, in December 2021. The operation involved the physical and the radiological verification of the radioactive sources, the appropriate packaging for transport, the transportation, and as a last step, the shipment and export to a recycling facility in Europe. The export of the first 17 sources was made in October 2022, while 14 more were exported in July 2023.

“The IAEA technically oversaw the removal of the sources from Chile to ensure that it was performed safely and securely. An operation of this scale cannot succeed without the dedicated efforts of organizations like CCHEN, skilled contractors, and the regulatory bodies involved,” said Olena Mykolaichuk, Director of the IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology, adding that “the experience gained is invaluable and represents a model that can be applied for future projects in other countries.”

IAEA project helps 34 countries with management of disused sealed radioactive sources

Effective and continuous regulatory and management control of radioactive sources is of utmost importance in preventing unauthorized use, accidents or malicious acts with harmful radiological consequences. Once sealed radioactive sources reach the end of their useful life, the safe, secure and sustainable long term management of DSRSs is essential to reduce radiation hazards to the public and the environment. This is because DSRSs may still contain large amounts of radioactivity and may emit ionizing radiation.

Common needs and goals for the safe, secure and sustainable management of DSRSs through their entire life cycles are addressed under an IAEA project launched in 2019 and funded by Canada, which is currently in its first phase and includes countries from Latin America, Africa and the Pacific region. Increased interest in this project has resulted in the implementation of a second phase of the project, inaugurated in November 2022 with 24 newcomer countries — more than double the number of countries which joined the first phase. The second phase of the project will last three years and will take on a broadened scope to address new needs related to the long-term management of DSRSs.

“The increase in the number of participating countries indicates the success of the first phase of the project, the global interest in the safe and secure handling of DSRSs and, at the same time, the amount of work that remains to be done in this field,” said Hildegarde Vandenhove, Director of the IAEA’s Division of Radiation, Transport and Waste Safety. “It also underscores the importance of collective efforts to support and sustain such a technical assistance mechanism. It is an IAEA priority to build sustainable capacity for the management of DSRSs.”

How Are Universal Ionizing Radiation Symbols Used Around the World?

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Increasing universal understanding — the additional symbol

The trefoil was initially created to mark radioactive material used in controlled environments, such as laboratories, where people who had access to the material would already know its meaning. Over the years, the use of radioactive material in medicine, agriculture and industry has become more widespread.

Consequently, radioactive material or radiation emitting devices can be found not just in research laboratories and nuclear power plants, but also in hospitals, as well as in industrial equipment, for example in X ray security equipment used in airports.

In the past, due to lack of knowledge people would endanger themselves and others because they did not understand the meaning of the symbol. For example, in a few instances around the world, scrap metal collectors and construction workers were exposed to radiation by taking and handling misplaced radioactive sources they had found in scrap yards or on construction sites, because they did not understand the ‘warning signage’.

To improve nuclear safety and security, in 2007 the IAEA and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) introduced a supplementary symbol designed to be universally understood as ‘Danger — Run Away — Do Not Touch!’.

To determine which symbol would better convey the radiation risk to the public, the IAEA conducted a survey covering 11 countries in different parts of the world. The result was the ‘Ionizing-radiation warning — Supplementary Symbol’, a red triangle that depicts radiation waves, a skull and a running human figure. It was launched as a supplement to the more commonly used ionizing radiation symbol with the intention of further reducing the possibility of accidental exposure to ionizing radiation.