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Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA
Adopting nuclear energy can help countries meet their climate goals, encourage young people to study science, technology, engineering and maths (STEM) subjects and drive gender empowerment. The United Arab Emirates (UAE)’s first nuclear power plant will soon enable the country to meet future energy needs while also contributing to UAE’s plans to reduce carbon emissions.
Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA
Following discussions with the International Atomic Energy Agency, Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) has taken action to ensure an immediate supply of back-up electricity in case its main external power line is lost, as has happened repeatedly during the military conflict, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said today.
Frequent power cuts have remained a source of serious concern for safety and security at Europe’s largest nuclear power plant (NPP) as it needs electricity to cool its reactors and for other essential functions, even when all reactor units have been shut down. Since August 2022, the ZNPP has suffered eight events with a complete loss of off-site power.
When the ZNPP’s only remaining 750 kilovolt (kV) line is cut, the plant may still have access to off-site power through a 330 kV back-up line, if it remains connected to the grid. However, since mid-2023, this line has required manual intervention to become operational.
In discussions with the plant, the IAEA experts present at the ZNPP stressed that it was important for nuclear safety and security to address this matter. As a result, the plant carried out work on its back-up electrical transformers and two out of three are now operational, of which one is permanently connected to the on-site back-up power lines – known as busbars – of all six reactor units.
“This means that if the main power supply through the 750 kV switchyard is lost, the back-up line will automatically be able to provide electricity to the plant without manual, and hence delayed, intervention, provided it remains operational,” Director General Grossi said. “This is a significant development, as it enables independence and redundancy in the site’s power supply scheme, even though the overall off-site power situation at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant remains extremely fragile. This solution will only be effective if the 330 kV power line remains available, which – as we know from experience – is far from guaranteed.”
Underlining the continued dangers facing the plant, the IAEA team has in recent weeks continued to hear regular explosions some distance away from the site.
Five of the ZNPP’s six reactors remain in cold shutdown, while unit 4 is in hot shutdown to produce steam and heat, including for the nearby town of Enerhodar, where most plant staff live.
The IAEA team has continued to conduct walkdowns across the site as part of activities to monitor the nuclear safety and security situation at the ZNPP, as well as adherence to the five concrete principles for the protection of this major facility.
However, the IAEA experts remain unable to gain access to all parts of the site, and for the past two weeks they have not been allowed to access the reactor halls of units 1, 2 and 6. This is the first time that IAEA experts have not been granted access to a reactor hall of a unit that was in cold shutdown. This is where the reactor core and spent fuel are located. The team will continue to request this access.
In addition, access to some parts of the ZNPP’s turbine halls continues to be restricted, including those areas of reactor units 3, 4 and 6 over the past week. Also, the IAEA experts still await the access to the reactor rooftops planned on 19 December that didn’t happen due to stated security concerns.
In a separate development during a walkdown of the safety system rooms of unit 6 on 22 December, the IAEA experts observed boric acid deposits on valves, a pump and on the floors of several rooms in the containment building. The plant informed the team that the source of the leak is one of the boric acid storage tanks and that considering the small magnitude of the leak it is not planned to be repaired immediately, but rather as part of the planned maintenance of the impacted system. This type of leak can occur during the operation of a plant. However, this kind of event requires proper and timely attention, investigation and response from the operator, to prevent further and potentially more severe safety implications. The team will closely follow developments regarding this issue.
As reported earlier, the IAEA team continues to ask the plant for the maintenance schedule for 2024, which has not yet been provided.
The IAEA team has over the past two weeks continued to observe progress in the installation of four mobile diesel boilers at the site. As reported previously, the new units will generate additional steam needed for various nuclear safety functions at the site, including for waste treatment.
The site currently has nine mobile boilers, of which at least eight have been operating, providing additional heating during the winter.
The IAEA teams of experts at the Rivne, Khmelnitsky, South Ukraine NPPs and the Chornobyl site continue to report that nuclear safety and security is being maintained, despite wide-ranging missile attacks on Ukraine in the past week, which forced the IAEA experts at the Khmelnitsky NPP to take shelter three times.
The IAEA experts at the Rivne NPP were informed that a cruise missile flew close to the plant on 29 December, and their colleagues at the South Ukraine NPP were informed that missiles and drones crossed the region where the plant is located.
Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA
The IAEA profiles employees to provide insight into the variety of career paths that support the Agency’s mission of Atoms for Peace and Development and to inspire and encourage readers, particularly women, to pursue careers in STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) or STEM-adjacent fields. Read more profiles of women at the IAEA.
Nora Zakaria comes from a humble background. At eight years old, in her home country of Malaysia, she would wake up before dawn to go rubber tapping to harvest latex with her mother and sister. With mosquito repellent coils placed on their heads, she complained about the tedious work to which her mother responded, “Study hard if you do not want to work like this.”
Zakaria took her mother’s advice to heart and prioritized her studies. At university, although she planned to study chemistry, she switched her major when the Government of Malaysia offered her a full scholarship to study chemical engineering in the United Kingdom.
Chemical engineering was not her first choice, but she took the opportunity, which opened the door to the world of nuclear energy and radioactive waste management. Her studies set her on course for a career that would eventually lead to her current role as Head of the Waste Technology Section at the IAEA.
Back then, there was minimal exposure to all the educational disciplines in the science, technology, engineering and Mathematics (STEM) fields, Zakaria explained. Today she is pleased to see that young women have more educational and professional prospects in STEM.
“With the advancement of communication and information technology, younger generations are exposed to vast possibilities. The choices nowadays are more diverse than just between the art stream and the science stream, and new, nonconventional study and career options are on the rise. In my experience, students with a genuine passion for science are out there, and together we should continue to nurture this interest,” Zakaria said.
Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA
On 27 December 2023, Japan provided the IAEA with a copy of a report on the discharge record and the seawater monitoring results at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station during October, which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has sent to all international Missions in Japan.
The report contains information on discharges from the subdrain and groundwater drain systems, as well as on groundwater bypassing conducted during the month of October. In both cases, in advance of the action, TEPCO analyzes the quality of the groundwater to be discharged and announces the results. These results confirm that the radiation level of sampled water are substantially below the operational targets set by TEPCO.
Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA
Norway is the latest IAEA Member State to team up with the Agency’s Department of Safeguards by establishing a Member State Support Programme (MSSP). The partnership, formally signed on 27 September 2023, will see Norway working closely with the IAEA to address challenges and opportunities in the field of nuclear safeguards.
Nuclear safeguards are technical measures, embedded in bilateral agreements between the IAEA and a State, which are implemented by the IAEA to provide the international community with assurances that nuclear material remains in peaceful use.
“By establishing a MSSP, Norway intends to help the IAEA strengthen the Agency’s nuclear verification system,” said Per Strand, Director General of the Norwegian Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority. “Norway has a long association with the IAEA and was the very first country to have an IAEA safeguards inspection in 1962. I’m delighted that the new MSSP with the IAEA bolsters this long relationship.”
MSSPs extend support to the IAEA in various forms, including knowledge exchange, technology transfer, expert collaboration and financial support. These efforts collectively assist the IAEA in its mission to verify the peaceful use of nuclear materials while staying at the forefront of advancements in nuclear technology.
“MSSPs are one of the primary ways States can help strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of Agency safeguards,” said Massimo Aparo, Deputy Director General and Head of the Department of Safeguards. “By leveraging the impressive array of expertise and talent from Norway, I am confident we can accomplish great things together.”
The establishment of Norway’s MSSP marks a significant addition to the network of active support programmes across the world, which has now reached 24. This partnership will allow the IAEA to work closely with Norway on a range of projects including advancing safeguards by design for new or modified facilities; training of IAEA safeguards inspectors; and developing and testing new spent fuel measurement methods.
“Norway recognizes the paramount importance of the IAEA maintaining the highest standards in international nuclear safeguards,” said Susan Eckey, Permanent Representative of Norway to the International Organizations in Vienna. “By joining the IAEA’s Member State Support Programme, we aim to contribute to global efforts in this critical area. This partnership underscores our dedication to verifying the peaceful use of nuclear material worldwide.”
Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA
A radioactive gas that has no colour, smell or taste, radon is produced in the ground from uranium and diffuses into the atmosphere. Accounting for around a half of all human exposure to radiation, this gas is also the most common cause of lung cancer after smoking. It occurs naturally in significant quantities in three different chemical variations, or isotopes, but only two of these present a risk. In this article we explain the facts about radon and address the most common concerns: Read the full article.
Find more “Nuclear Explained” articles, as well as videos and podcasts in this series, here.
Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA
This year saw several key events which underscored the IAEA’s commitment to nuclear safety and security.
The international community was given scientific assurances on the negligible environmental impact of the treated water release from Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. In the first independent sampling since the start of treated water discharges at the power plant, the IAEA found tritium levels well below Japan’s limits. This effort aligned with IAEA’s decade-long commitment to assisting Japan in credible and transparent marine monitoring following 2011’s nuclear accident.
The IAEA carried on with its important work in Ukraine, with multiple in-person continued expert missions to nuclear power plants across the country, including Zaporizhzhia NPP, with the goal of lowering the risk of a nuclear accident despite the active conflict situation.
The Director General led a number of missions in person and promoted key safety principles at the highest international levels.
Enhancing Global Nuclear Security through Specialized Training
A major highlight was the inauguration of IAEA Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre on 3 October. Since its opening, the centre has held nine training sessions, engaging about 260 participants.
This unique facility is designed to address countries’ needs in capacity building. It offers 23 specialized training courses using the state-of-the-art technical infrastructure. Covering aspects like physical protection and detection and response to criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving nuclear or other radioactive material, the centre fosters expertise and supports global efforts against nuclear terrorism. Additionally, it includes specialized training for countries involved in or planning to join ‘Rays of Hope’, focusing on securing radioactive materials and facilities in cancer care.
Global Collaboration on Nuclear Safety and Security
An IAEA conference in Abu Dhabi addressed evolving challenges in the nuclear regulatory field, emphasizing safety amidst rapid technological advances, shifting regulatory landscapes, and emerging threats like climate-related hazards.
Another significant event, the International Conference on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, Decommissioning, Environmental Protection and Remediation attracted over 600 stakeholders. Collaboration with multiple international and national bodies as well as representatives from institutions and organizations ensured an informative exchange on safety and sustainability of topical areas discussed during this event.
In addition, the 20th Anniversary of the IAEA’s Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources celebrated ongoing collaborative efforts among 149 countries to ensure the safety and security of radioactive sources throughout their lifecycle.
Upcoming in 2024: The IAEA is preparing for the International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS 2024) in Vienna. This event will gather global policymakers and experts to discuss policy, technology, capacity building, and cross-cutting topics in nuclear security. ICONS aims to foster collaboration, share best practices, and reinforce the IAEA’s pivotal role in global nuclear security efforts.
Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA
Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cameroon and Ghana will participate in the next cycle of the IAEA Comprehensive Capacity-Building Initiative for State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSACs) and State and Regional Authorities responsible for safeguards implementation (SRAs). The initiative, commonly known as COMPASS, involves partnering with the State to help them strengthen the effectiveness of their SSAC and SRA.
“I am delighted to welcome the next group of States to receive safeguards support through COMPASS,” said Rafael Mariano Grossi, Director General of the IAEA. “Cooperation between the State and the IAEA is a crucial element in the implementation of safeguards. Based on the results and lessons learned from COMPASS’s pilot phase, we will work closely with this new group of States to provide the tools and knowledge they need to fulfil their safeguards obligations effectively and efficiently.”
Through safeguards, the IAEA verifies that States are honouring their international legal commitments to use nuclear material and technology only for peaceful purposes. Launched in September 2020 by the Director General, COMPASS provides comprehensive safeguards assistance tailored to a State’s needs. During its initial pilot phase, seven States received support from the IAEA and COMPASS’s implementing partners in the areas of outreach; legal and regulatory frameworks; training; information technology; procurement; and related expertise. The IAEA successfully concluded the pilot phase in March 2023.
The individual needs of new COMPASS States will be assessed through an IAEA Safeguards and SSAC advisory service (ISSAS) mission at the start of the new implementation phase, which will begin in January 2024. COMPASS activities will then be conducted collaboratively between the State and the IAEA, with the in-kind and/or financial support of individual IAEA Member States and Member State Support Programmes.
“I am excited that Ghana has been chosen to take part in the next phase of COMPASS”, said Nii Kwashie Allotey, the Director General of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority for Ghana. “Ghana is committed to working with the IAEA to fulfil its international nuclear verification obligations. We believe that being part of COMPASS will provide Ghana the support it needs to facilitate the optimal implementation of Agency safeguards.”
As per their respective comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, 182 States are obliged to establish and maintain an SSAC. As the State’s mechanism through which it declares to the IAEA the location, uses and quantities of nuclear material in the country, SSACs are important components of IAEA-State cooperation. The need for a robust SSAC becomes particularly evident when a State is at a pivotal juncture in the development of its nuclear fuel cycle or associated legislation. This includes the planning and construction of a new nuclear facility, agreeing to the revised text of a small quantities protocol, or bringing into force an additional protocol — each of which entail new reporting obligations for the State.
“The COMPASS initiative has been a game changer for Malaysia”, said Nurul Hafiza binti Mohamed Aliasrudin, Assistant Director of the Nuclear Installation Division at the Malaysian Department of Atomic Energy. Malaysia was one of the seven States who participated in the pilot phase of COMPASS. “In two years, COMPASS helped us review safeguards regulations, develop technical guidelines and license conditions, and also enhance the training within the national safeguards authority,” said Nurul Hafiza binti Mohamed Aliasrudin.
The IAEA provides a suite of safeguards assistance to States. In addition to COMPASS, States can request and access support including ISSAS missions; national, regional, and inter-regional training offerings; e-learning modules; and the safeguards traineeship programme.
Find out more about IAEA safeguards assistance for States
Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) completed an advisory service mission to Cambodia focused on assessing the country’s nuclear security regime for nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control (MORC). The team said the country has implemented measures to detect and respond to criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving such material and encouraged Cambodia to further improve its legal and regulatory framework. The team also identified several examples of good practice.
The mission, carried out at the request of the Royal Government of Cambodia, took place from 11 to 22 December and involved a team of nine international experts from Finland, Hungary, Japan, Morocco, Pakistan, the United States of America, Viet Nam and the IAEA. It is the second mission of this kind to Cambodia.
International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) missions aim to help States to better prevent, detect and respond to criminal and intentional unauthorized acts involving nuclear or other radioactive material, known as MORC, which is lost, missing, stolen, improperly disposed of, or not adequately stored or handled.
The mission aimed to review the current state of nuclear security in relation to MORC in Cambodia and provide recommendations on how to strengthen it in accordance with international guidance and best practices.
The team conducted a series of meetings with officials from the Ministry of Mines and Energy, the General Department of Customs and Excise, the Secretariat of the National Counter Terrorism Committee, and the National Authority for the Prohibition of Chemical, Nuclear, Biological and Radiological Weapons (NACW).
The INSServ team visited the Phnom Penh Autonomous Port (PPAP), the Sihanoukville Autonomous Port (PAS) and the Phnom Penh International Airport (PPIA) to assess the detection and response measures in place. The team also went to the NACW Institute of Explore and Experiment on Substance in Kampong Chhnang Province.
“Cambodia established a solid basis for a comprehensive nuclear security regime, ” said Team Leader Khammar Mrabit, former Director General of the Moroccan Agency for Nuclear and Radiological Safety and Security and member of the Moroccan Parliament. “We welcome Cambodia’s cooperation in this mission and hope our recommendations and suggestions will be helpful for further improvements.”
The team said that Cambodia had implemented many elements of a legal and regulatory framework related to MORC. Still, it recommended the country to establish a national nuclear law and ratify the Amendment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Further recommendations include the establishment of national infrastructure to support sustainable training to enhance Cambodia’s existing detection and response capabilities.
Several good practices were identified, including the categorization of offences in the country’s legal framework, the radiation detection scan of all import and export cargo containers at PPAP and PAS, the use of the IAEA mobile app TRACE (Tool for Radiation Alarm and Commodity Evaluation), as well as the establishment of knowledge management and professional development measures for the staff with nuclear security detection responsibilities.
“We are ready to provide continued support to Cambodia as they implement the IAEA INSServ mission recommendations and suggestions to enhance the nuclear security detection and response systems and measures relevant to MORC,” said Elena Buglova, Director of the IAEA Division of Nuclear Security.
The IAEA’s INSServ mission is part of its ongoing efforts to assist Member States in strengthening their nuclear security regimes in relation to MORC. The Agency provides a range of services in this area, including expert advice, training, and equipment support, to help Member States protect against criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving such materials.
“This second INSServ mission will assist us in the upgrade of Cambodia’s nuclear security regime by taking into account the international practice and expertise,” said Keo Rottanak, Minister of Mines and Energy. “We firmly believe that no single nation can address the complex challenges of nuclear security in isolation. A secure world starts by cooperation of all countries, relevant agencies and individuals.”
The draft findings and recommendations were presented to the Royal Government of Cambodia, and the final report will be presented in about three months.
Background
The mission was the 86th INSServ mission conducted by the IAEA since the programme began in 2006.
INSServ missions, based on the INSServ guidelines published in 2019, assist States in establishing, maintaining and strengthening their nuclear security regime related to nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control.
The missions provide independent advice on implementing international instruments, along with IAEA guidance on the prevention and detection of and response to criminal and intentional unauthorized acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control.
Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA
In my opening statement to the Board on 22 November, I reported that we had observed increased levels of activity at, and near, the Light Water Reactor (LWR) at Yongbyon, and also – since mid-October – a strong water outflow from its cooling system. These observations were consistent with the commissioning of the LWR.
More recent observations indicate that this water discharge is warm, which is also consistent with ongoing commissioning of the LWR, a process that takes some time for any new reactor. However, the discharge of warm water is indicative the reactor has reached criticality. It remains the case that without access to the facility the Agency cannot confirm its operational status.
The LWR, like any nuclear reactor, can produce plutonium in its irradiated fuel, which can be separated during reprocessing, so this is a cause for concern.
Concerning the safety of the LWR, we do not have sufficient information to make an assessment. Of course, safety should always be the paramount issue when starting a new reactor. Nuclear safety is a sovereign responsibility of the State and the IAEA supports the States in this area.
I repeat that the further development of the DPRK’s nuclear programme, including the construction and operation of the LWR, is a violation of UN Security Council resolutions and is deeply regrettable.
I call upon the DPRK to comply fully with its obligations under Security Council resolutions, to cooperate promptly with the Agency in the full and effective implementation of its NPT Safeguards Agreement and to resolve all outstanding issues, especially those that have arisen during the absence of Agency inspectors from the country. The Agency is ready to engage on any of the above issues, including safety.