#StopRansomware: Black Basta

Source: US Department of Homeland Security

SUMMARY

Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) (hereafter referred to as the authoring organizations) are releasing this joint CSA to provide information on Black Basta, a ransomware variant whose actors have encrypted and stolen data from at least 12 out of 16 critical infrastructure sectors, including the Healthcare and Public Health (HPH) Sector.

This joint CSA provides TTPs and IOCs obtained from FBI investigations and third-party reporting. Black Basta is considered a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) variant and was first identified in April 2022. Black Basta affiliates have impacted a wide range of businesses and critical infrastructure in North America, Europe, and Australia. As of May 2024, Black Basta affiliates have impacted over 500 organizations globally.

Black Basta affiliates use common initial access techniques—such as phishing and exploiting known vulnerabilities—and then employ a double-extortion model, both encrypting systems and exfiltrating data. Ransom notes do not generally include an initial ransom demand or payment instructions. Instead, the notes provide victims with a unique code and instructs them to contact the ransomware group via a .onion URL (reachable through the Tor browser). Typically, the ransom notes give victims between 10 and 12 days to pay the ransom before the ransomware group publishes their data on the Black Basta TOR site, Basta News.

Healthcare organizations are attractive targets for cybercrime actors due to their size, technological dependence, access to personal health information, and unique impacts from patient care disruptions. The authoring organizations urge HPH Sector and all critical infrastructure organizations to apply the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood of compromise from Black Basta and other ransomware attacks. Victims of ransomware should report the incident to their local FBI field office or CISA (see the Reporting section for contact information).

Download the PDF version of this report:

TECHNICAL DETAILS

Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework, version 15. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section for a table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK® tactics and techniques. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.

Initial Access

Black Basta affiliates primarily use spearphishing [T1566] to obtain initial access. According to cybersecurity researchers, affiliates have also used Qakbot during initial access.[1]

Starting in February 2024, Black Basta affiliates began exploiting ConnectWise vulnerability CVE-2024-1709 [CWE-288] [T1190]. In some instances, affiliates have been observed abusing valid credentials [T1078].

Discovery and Execution

Black Basta affiliates use tools such as SoftPerfect network scanner (netscan.exe) to conduct network scanning. Cybersecurity researchers have observed affiliates conducting reconnaissance using utilities with innocuous file names such as Intel or Dell, left in the root drive C: [T1036].[1]

Lateral Movement

Black Basta affiliates use tools such as BITSAdmin and PsExec, along with Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), for lateral movement. Some affiliates also use tools like Splashtop, Screen Connect, and Cobalt Strike beacons to assist with remote access and lateral movement.

Privilege Escalation and Lateral Movement

Black Basta affiliates use credential scraping tools like Mimikatz for privilege escalation. According to cybersecurity researchers, Black Basta affiliates have also exploited ZeroLogon (CVE-2020-1472, [CWE-330]), NoPac (CVE-2021-42278 [CWE-20] and CVE-2021-42287 [CWE-269]), and PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-34527, [CWE-269]) vulnerabilities for local and Windows Active Domain privilege escalation [T1068].[1],[2]

Exfiltration and Encryption

Black Basta affiliates use RClone to facilitate data exfiltration prior to encryption. Prior to exfiltration, cybersecurity researchers have observed Black Basta affiliates using PowerShell [T1059.001] to disable antivirus products, and in some instances, deploying a tool called Backstab, designed to disable endpoint detection and response (EDR) tooling [T1562.001].[3] Once antivirus programs are terminated, a ChaCha20 algorithm with an RSA-4096 public key fully encrypts files [T1486]. A .basta or otherwise random file extension is added to file names and a ransom note titled readme.txt is left on the compromised system.[4] To further inhibit system recovery, affiliates use the vssadmin.exe program to delete volume shadow copies [T1490].[5]

Leveraged Tools

See Table 1 for publicly available tools and applications used by Black Basta affiliates. This includes legitimate tools repurposed for their operations.

Disclaimer: Use of these tools and applications should not be attributed as malicious without analytical evidence to support threat actor use and/or control.

Table 1: Tools Used by Black Basta Affiliates
Tool Name Description
BITSAdmin A command-line utility that manages downloads/uploads between a client and server by using the Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) to perform asynchronous file transfers.
Cobalt Strike A penetration testing tool used by security professions to test the security of networks and systems. Black Basta affiliates have used it to assist with lateral movement and file execution.
Mimikatz A tool that allows users to view and save authentication credentials such as Kerberos tickets. Black Basta affiliates have used it to aid in privilege escalation.
PSExec A tool designed to run programs and execute commands on remote systems.
PowerShell A cross-platform task automation solution made up of a command-line shell, a scripting language, and a configuration management framework, which runs on Windows, Linux, and macOS.
RClone A command line program used to sync files with cloud storage services such as Mega.
SoftPerfect A network scanner (netscan.exe) used to ping computers, scan ports, discover shared folders, and retrieve information about network devices via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP), HTTP, Secure Shell (SSH) and PowerShell. It also scans for remote services, registry, files, and performance counters. 
ScreenConnect Remote support, access, and meeting software that allows users to control devices remotely over the internet.
Splashtop Remote desktop software that allows remote access to devices for support, access, and collaboration.
WinSCP Windows Secure Copy is a free and open source SSH File Transfer Protocol, File Transfer Protocol, WebDAV, Amazon S3, and secure copy protocol client. Black Basta affiliates have used it to transfer data from a compromised network to actor-controlled accounts.

MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

See Tables 2–6 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory.

Table 2: Black Basta ATT&CK Techniques for Initial Access
Technique Title ID Use
Phishing T1566 Black Basta affiliates have used spearphishing emails to obtain initial access.
Exploit Public-Facing Application T1190 Black Basta affiliates have exploited ConnectWise vulnerability CVE-2024-1709 to obtain initial access.
Table 3: Black Basta ATT&CK Techniques for Privilege Escalation
Technique Title ID Use
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation T1068 Black Basta affiliates have used credential scraping tools like Mimikatz, Zerologon, NoPac and PrintNightmare for privilege escalation.
Table 4: Black Basta ATT&CK Techniques for Defense Evasion
Technique Title ID Use
Masquerading T1036 Black Basta affiliates have conducted reconnaissance using utilities with innocuous file names, such as Intel or Dell, to evade detection.
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools T1562.001

Black Basta affiliates have deployed a tool called Backstab to disable endpoint detection and response (EDR) tooling.

Black Basta affiliates have used PowerShell to disable antivirus products.

Table 5: Black Basta ATT&CK Techniques for Execution
Technique Title ID Use
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1059.001 Black Basta affiliates have used PowerShell to disable antivirus products.
Table 6: Black Basta ATT&CK Techniques for Impact
Technique Title ID Use
Inhibit System Recovery T1490 Black Basta affiliates have used the vssadmin.exe program to delete shadow copies. 
Data Encrypted for Impact T1486 Black Basta affiliates have used a public key to fully encrypt files. 

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

See Table 7 for IOCs obtained from FBI investigations.

Table 7: Malicious Files Associated with Black Basta Ransomware
Hash Description
0112e3b20872760dda5f658f6b546c85f126e803e27f0577b294f335ffa5a298 rclone.exe
d3683beca3a40574e5fd68d30451137e4a8bbaca8c428ebb781d565d6a70385e Winscp.exe
88c8b472108e0d79d16a1634499c1b45048a10a38ee799054414613cc9dccccc DLL
58ddbea084ce18cfb3439219ebcf2fc5c1605d2f6271610b1c7af77b8d0484bd DLL
39939eacfbc20a2607064994497e3e886c90cd97b25926478434f46c95bd8ead DLL
5b2178c7a0fd69ab00cef041f446e04098bbb397946eda3f6755f9d94d53c221 DLL
51eb749d6cbd08baf9d43c2f83abd9d4d86eb5206f62ba43b768251a98ce9d3e DLL
d15bfbc181aac8ce9faa05c2063ef4695c09b718596f43edc81ca02ef03110d1 DLL
5942143614d8ed34567ea472c2b819777edd25c00b3e1b13b1ae98d7f9e28d43 DLL
05ebae760340fe44362ab7c8f70b2d89d6c9ba9b9ee8a9f747b2f19d326c3431 DLL
a7b36482ba5bca7a143a795074c432ed627d6afa5bc64de97fa660faa852f1a6 DLL
86a4dd6be867846b251460d2a0874e6413589878d27f2c4482b54cec134cc737 DLL
07117c02a09410f47a326b52c7f17407e63ba5e6ff97277446efc75b862d2799 DLL
96339a7e87ffce6ced247feb9b4cb7c05b83ca315976a9522155bad726b8e5be ELF
1c1b2d7f790750d60a14bd661dae5c5565f00c6ca7d03d062adcecda807e1779 ELF
360c9c8f0a62010d455f35588ef27817ad35c715a5f291e43449ce6cb1986b98 ELF
0554eb2ffa3582b000d558b6950ec60e876f1259c41acff2eac47ab78a53e94a EXE
9a55f55886285eef7ffabdd55c0232d1458175b1d868c03d3e304ce7d98980bc EXE
62e63388953bb30669b403867a3ac2c8130332cf78133f7fd4a7f23cdc939087 EXE
7ad4324ea241782ea859af12094f89f9a182236542627e95b6416c8fb9757c59 EXE
350ba7fca67721c74385faff083914ecdd66ef107a765dfb7ac08b38d5c9c0bd EXE
90ba27750a04d1308115fa6a90f36503398a8f528c974c5adc07ae8a6cd630e7 EXE
fafaff3d665b26b5c057e64b4238980589deb0dff0501497ac50be1bc91b3e08 EXE
acb60f0dd19a9a26aaaefd3326db8c28f546b6b0182ed2dcc23170bcb0af6d8f EXE
d73f6e240766ddd6c3c16eff8db50794ab8ab95c6a616d4ab2bc96780f13464d EXE
f039eaaced72618eaba699d2985f9e10d252ac5fe85d609c217b45bc8c3614f4 EXE
723d1cf3d74fb3ce95a77ed9dff257a78c8af8e67a82963230dd073781074224 EXE
ae7c868713e1d02b4db60128c651eb1e3f6a33c02544cc4cb57c3aa6c6581b6e EXE
fff35c2da67eef6f1a10c585b427ac32e7f06f4e4460542207abcd62264e435f EXE
df5b004be71717362e6b1ad22072f9ee4113b95b5d78c496a90857977a9fb415 EXE
462bbb8fd7be98129aa73efa91e2d88fa9cafc7b47431b8227d1957f5d0c8ba7 EXE
3c50f6369f0938f42d47db29a1f398e754acb2a8d96fd4b366246ac2ccbe250a EXE
5d2204f3a20e163120f52a2e3595db19890050b2faa96c6cba6b094b0a52b0aa EXE
37a5cd265f7f555f2fe320a68d70553b7aa9601981212921d1ac2c114e662004 EXE
3090a37e591554d7406107df87b3dc21bda059df0bc66244e8abef6a5678af35 EXE
17879ed48c2a2e324d4f5175112f51b75f4a8ab100b8833c82e6ddb7cd817f20 EXE
42f05f5d4a2617b7ae0bc601dd6c053bf974f9a337a8fcc51f9338b108811b78 EXE
882019d1024778e13841db975d5e60aaae1482fcf86ba669e819a68ce980d7d3 EXE
e28188e516db1bda9015c30de59a2e91996b67c2e2b44989a6b0f562577fd757 EXE
0a8297b274aeab986d6336b395b39b3af1bb00464cf5735d1ecdb506fef9098e EXE
69192821f8ce4561cf9c9cb494a133584179116cb2e7409bea3e18901a1ca944 EXE
3337a7a9ccdd06acdd6e3cf4af40d871172d0a0e96fc48787b574ac93689622a EXE
17205c43189c22dfcb278f5cc45c2562f622b0b6280dcd43cc1d3c274095eb90 EXE
b32daf27aa392d26bdf5faafbaae6b21cd6c918d461ff59f548a73d447a96dd9 EXE

See Tables 8–11 for IOCs obtained from trusted third-party reporting.

Disclaimer: The authoring organizations recommend network defenders investigate or vet IP addresses prior to taking action, such as blocking, as many cyber actors are known to change IP addresses, sometimes daily, and some IP addresses may host valid domains.

Table 8: Network Indicators
IP Address Description
66.249.66[.]18 0gpw.588027fa.dns.realbumblebee[.]net, dns.trailshop[.]net, dns.artspathgroupe[.]net
66.249.66[.]18 my.2a91c002002.588027fa.dns.realbumblebee[.]net
66.249.66[.]18 fy9.39d9030e5d3a8e2352daae2f4cd3c417b36f64c6644a783b9629147a1.afd8b8a4615358e0313bad8c544a1af0d8efcec0e8056c2c8eee96c7.b06d1825c0247387e38851b06be0272b0bd619b7c9636bc17b09aa70.a46890f27.588027fa.dns.realbumblebee[.]net
95.181.173[.]227 adslsdfdsfmo[.]world
  fy9.36c44903529fa273afff3c9b7ef323432e223d22ae1d625c4a3957d57.015c16eff32356bf566c4fd3590c6ff9b2f6e8c587444ecbfc4bcae7.f71995aff9e6f22f8daffe9d2ad9050abc928b8f93bb0d42682fd3c3.445de2118.588027fa.dns.realbumblebee[.]net
207.126.152[.]242 xkpal.d6597fa.dns.blocktoday.net
nuher.3577125d2a75f6a277fc5714ff536c5c6af5283d928a66daad6825b9a.7aaf8bba88534e88ec89251c57b01b322c7f52c7f1a5338930ae2a50.cbb47411f60fe58f76cf79d300c03bdecfb9e83379f59d80b8494951.e10c20f77.7fcc0eb6.dns.blocktoday[.]net
72.14.196[.]50 .rasapool[.]net, dns.trailshop[.]net
72.14.196[.]192 .rasapool[.]net
72.14.196[.]2 .rasapool[.]net
72.14.196[.]226 .rasapool[.]net
46.161.27[.]151  
207.126.152[.]242 nuher.1d67bbcf4.456d87aa6.2d84dfba.dns.specialdrills[.]com
185.219.221[.]136  
64.176.219[.]106  
5.78.115[.]67 your-server[.]de
207.126.152[.]242 xkpal.1a4a64b6.dns.blocktoday[.]net
46.8.16[.]77  
185.7.214[.]79 VPN Server
185.220.100[.]240 Tor exit
107.189.30[.]69 Tor exit
5.183.130[.]92  
185.220.101[.]149 Tor exit
188.130.218[.]39  
188.130.137[.]181  
46.8.10[.]134  
155.138.246[.]122  
80.239.207[.]200 winklen[.]ch
183.181.86[.]147 Xserver[.]jp
34.149.120[.]3  
104.21.40[.]72  
34.250.161[.]149  
88.198.198[.]90 your-server[.]de; literoved[.]ru
151.101.130[.]159  
35.244.153[.]44  
35.212.86[.]55  
34.251.163[.]236  
34.160.81[.]203  
34.149.36[.]179  
104.21.26[.]145  
83.243.40[.]10  
35.227.194[.]51  
35.190.31[.]54  
34.120.190[.]48  
116.203.186[.]178  
34.160.17[.]71  
Table 9: File Indicators
Filename Hash
C:UsersPublicAudioJun.exe b6a4f4097367d9c124f51154d8750ea036a812d5badde0baf9c5f183bb53dd24
C:UsersPublicAudioesx.zip  
C:UsersPublicAudio7zG.exe f21240e0bf9f0a391d514e34d4fa24ecb997d939379d2260ebce7c693e55f061
C:UsersPublicAudio7z.dll  
C:UsersPublicdb_Usr.sql 8501e14ee6ee142122746333b936c9ab0fc541328f37b5612b6804e6cdc2c2c6
C:UsersPublicAudiodb_Usr.sql  
C:UsersPublicAudiohv2.ps1  
C:UsersPublic7zG.exe  
C:UsersPublic7z.dll  
C:UsersPublicBitLogic.dll  
C:UsersPublicNetApp.exe 4c897334e6391e7a2fa3cbcbf773d5a4
C:UsersPublicDataSoft.exe 2642ec377c0cee3235571832cb472870
C:UsersPublicBitData.exe b3fe23dd4701ed00d79c03043b0b952e
C:UsersPublicDigitalText.dll  
C:UsersPublicGeniusMesh.exe  
DeviceMup{redacted}C$UsersPublicMusicPROCEXP.sys  
DeviceMup{redacted}C$UsersPublicMusicDumpNParse86.exe  
DeviceMup{redacted}C$UsersPublicMusicPOSTDump.exe  
DeviceMup{redacted}C$UsersPublicMusicDumpNParse.exe  
C:UsersPublicsocksps.ps1  
C:UsersPublicThief.exe 034b5fe047920b2ae9493451623633b14a85176f5eea0c7aadc110ea1730ee79

C:UsersAll Users{redacted}GWT.ps1

C:Program FilesMonitorITGWT.ps1

8C68B2A794BA3D148CAE91BDF9C8D357289752A94118B5558418A36D95A5A45F

Winx86.exe 

Comment: alias for cmd.exe

 
C:UsersPubliceucr.exe 3c65da7f7bfdaf9acc6445abbedd9c4e927d37bb9e3629f34afc338058680407
C:WindowsDS_c1.dll 808c96cb90b7de7792a827c6946ff48123802959635a23bf9d98478ae6a259f9
C:WindowsDS_c1.dll 3a8fc07cadc08eeb8be342452636a754158403c3d4ebff379a4ae66f8298d9a6
C:WindowsDS_c1.dll 4ac69411ed124da06ad66ee8bfbcea2f593b5b199a2c38496e1ee24f9d04f34a
C:WindowsDS_c1.dll 819cb9bcf62be7666db5666a693524070b0df589c58309b067191b30480b0c3a
C:WindowsDS_c1.dll c26a5cb62a78c467cc6b6867c7093fbb7b1a96d92121d4d6c3f0557ef9c881e0
C:WindowsDS_c1.dll d503090431fdd99c9df3451d9b73c5737c79eda6eb80c148b8dc71e84623401f
*instructions_read_me.txt  
Table 10: Known Black Basta Cobalt Strike Domains
Domain Date/Time (UTC)/Time (UTC)
trailshop[.]net 5/8/2024 6:37
realbumblebee[.]net 5/8/2024 6:37
recentbee[.]net 5/8/2024 6:37
investrealtydom[.]net 5/8/2024 6:37
webnubee[.]com 5/8/2024 6:37
artspathgroup[.]net 5/8/2024 6:37
buyblocknow[.]com 5/8/2024 6:37
currentbee[.]net 5/8/2024 6:37
modernbeem[.]net 5/8/2024 6:37
startupbusiness24[.]net 5/8/2024 6:37
magentoengineers[.]com 5/8/2024 6:37
childrensdolls[.]com 5/8/2024 6:37
myfinancialexperts[.]com 5/8/2024 6:37
limitedtoday[.]com 5/8/2024 6:37
kekeoamigo[.]com 5/8/2024 6:37
nebraska-lawyers[.]com 5/8/2024 6:37
tomlawcenter[.]com 5/8/2024 6:37
thesmartcloudusa[.]com 5/8/2024 6:37
rasapool[.]net 5/8/2024 6:37
artspathgroupe[.]net 5/8/2024 6:37
specialdrills[.]com 5/8/2024 6:37
thetrailbig[.]net 5/8/2024 6:37
consulheartinc[.]com 3/22/2024 15:35
otxcosmeticscare[.]com 3/15/2024 10:14
otxcarecosmetics[.]com 3/15/2024 10:14
artstrailman[.]com 3/15/2024 10:14
ontexcare[.]com 3/15/2024 10:14
trackgroup[.]net 3/15/2024 10:14
businessprofessionalllc[.]com 3/15/2024 10:14
securecloudmanage[.]com 3/7/2024 10:42
oneblackwood[.]com 3/7/2024 10:42
buygreenstudio[.]com 3/7/2024 10:42
startupbuss[.]com 3/7/2024 10:42
onedogsclub[.]com 3/4/2024 18:26
wipresolutions[.]com 3/4/2024 18:26
recentbeelive[.]com 3/4/2024 18:26
trailcocompany[.]com 3/4/2024 18:26
trailcosolutions[.]com 3/4/2024 18:26
artstrailreviews[.]com 3/4/2024 18:26
usaglobalnews[.]com 2/15/2024 5:56
topglobaltv[.]com 2/15/2024 5:56
startupmartec[.]net 2/15/2024 5:56
technologgies[.]com 1/2/2024 18:16
jenshol[.]com 1/2/2024 18:16
simorten[.]com 1/2/2024 18:16
investmentgblog[.]net 1/2/2024 18:16
protectionek[.]com 1/2/2024 18:16
Table 11: Suspected Black Basta Domains
airbusco[.]net
allcompanycenter[.]com
animalsfast[.]net
audsystemecll[.]net
auuditoe[.]com
bluenetworking[.]net
brendonline[.]com
businesforhome[.]com
caspercan[.]com
clearsystemwo[.]net
cloudworldst[.]net
constrtionfirst[.]com
erihudeg[.]com
garbagemoval[.]com
gartenlofti[.]com
getfnewsolutions[.]com
getfnewssolutions[.]com
investmendvisor[.]net
investmentrealtyhp[.]net
ionoslaba[.]com
jessvisser[.]com
karmafisker[.]com
kolinileas[.]com
maluisepaul[.]com
masterunix[.]net
monitor-websystem[.]net
monitorsystem[.]net
mytrailinvest[.]net
prettyanimals[.]net
reelsysmoona[.]net
seohomee[.]com
septcntr[.]com
softradar[.]net
startupbizaud[.]net
startuptechnologyw[.]net
steamteamdev[.]net
stockinvestlab[.]net
taskthebox[.]net
trailgroupl[.]net
treeauwin[.]net
unitedfrom[.]com
unougn[.]com
wardeli[.]com
welausystem[.]net
wellsystemte[.]net
withclier[.]com

MITIGATIONS

The authoring organizations recommend all critical infrastructure organizations implement the mitigations below to improve your organization’s cybersecurity posture based on Black Basta’s activity. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Visit CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.

The authoring organizations also recommend network defenders of HPH Sector and other critical infrastructure organizations to reference CISA’s Mitigation Guide: Healthcare and Public Health (HPH) Sector and HHS’s HPH Cybersecurity Performance Goals, which provide best practices to combat pervasive cyber threats against organizations. Recommendations include the following:

  • Asset Management and Security: Cybersecurity professionals should identify and understand all relationships or interdependencies, functionality of each asset, what it exposes, and what software is running to ensure critical data and systems are protected appropriately. HPH Sector organizations should ensure electronic PHI (ePHI) is protected and compliant with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). Organizations can complete asset inventories using active scans, passive processes, or a combination of both techniques.
  • Email Security and Phishing Prevention: Organizations should install modern anti-malware software and automatically update signatures where possible. For additional guidance, see CISA’s Enhance Email and Web Security Guide.
    • Check for embedded or spoofed hyperlinks: Validate the URL of the link matches the text of the link itself. This can be achieved by hovering your cursor over the link to view the URL of the website to be accessed.
  • Access Management: Phishing-resistant MFA completes the same process but removes ‘people’ from the equation to help thwart social engineering scams and targeted phishing attacks that may have been successful using traditional MFA. The two main forms of phishing-resistant MFA are FIDO/Web Authentication (WebAuthn) authentication and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)-based authentication. Prioritize phishing-resistant MFA on accounts with the highest risk, such as privileged administrative accounts on key assets. For additional information on phishing-resistant MFA, see CISA’s Implementing Phishing-Resistant MFA Guide.
  • Vulnerability Management and Assessment: Once vulnerabilities are identified across your environment, evaluate and prioritize to appropriately deal with the posed risks according to your organization’s risk strategy. To assist with prioritization, it is essential to:
    • Map your assets to business-critical functions. For vulnerability remediation, prioritize assets that are most critical for ongoing operations or which, if affected, could impact your organization’s business continuity, sensitive PII (or PHI) security, reputation, or financial position.
    • Use threat intelligence information. For remediation, prioritize vulnerabilities actively exploited by threat actors. To assist, leverage CISA’s KEV Catalog and other threat intelligence feeds.
    • Leverage prioritization methodologies, ratings, and scores. The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) assesses the technical severity of vulnerabilities. The Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) measures the likelihood of exploitation and can help with deciding which vulnerabilities to prioritize. CISA’s Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) methodology leverages decision trees to prioritize relevant vulnerabilities into four decisions, Track, Track*, Attend, and Act based on exploitation status, technical impact, mission prevalence, and impacts to safety and public-wellbeing.

VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS

In addition to applying mitigations, the authoring organizations recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. The authoring organizations recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.

To get started:

  1. Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Tables 2-6).
  2. Align your security technologies against the technique.
  3. Test your technologies against the technique.
  4. Analyze your detection and prevention technologies’ performance.
  5. Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
  6. Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.

The authoring organizations recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.

REFERENCES

  1. SentinelOne: Black Basta Ransomware | Attacks Deploy Custom EDR Evasion Tools Tied to FIN7 Threat Actor
  2. Trend Micro: Ransomware Spotlight – Black Basta
  3. Kroll: Black Basta – Technical Analysis
  4. Who Is Black Basta? (blackberry.com)
  5. Palo Alto Networks: Threat Assessment – Black Basta Ransomware

REPORTING

Your organization has no obligation to respond or provide information back to FBI in response to this joint CSA. If, after reviewing the information provided, your organization decides to provide information to FBI, reporting must be consistent with applicable state and federal laws.

FBI is interested in any information that can be shared, to include boundary logs showing communication to and from foreign IP addresses, a sample ransom note, communications with threat actors, Bitcoin wallet information, decryptor files, and/or a benign sample of an encrypted file.

Additional details of interest include: a targeted company point of contact, status and scope of infection, estimated loss, operational impact, transaction IDs, date of infection, date detected, initial attack vector, and host- and network-based indicators.

FBI, CISA, and HHS do not encourage paying ransom as payment does not guarantee victim files will be recovered. Furthermore, payment may also embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. Regardless of whether you or your organization have decided to pay the ransom, FBI and CISA urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents to FBI’s Internet Crime Complain Center (IC3), a local FBI Field Office, or CISA via the agency’s Incident Reporting System or its 24/7 Operations Center (report@cisa.gov or by calling 1-844-Say-CISA [1-844-729-2472]).

DISCLAIMER

The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. FBI, CISA, HHS, and MS-ISAC do not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by FBI, CISA, HHS, and MS-ISAC.

VERSION HISTORY

May 10, 2024: Initial version.

DHS Announces Proposed Rule and Other Measures to Enhance Security, Streamline Asylum Processing

Source: US Department of Homeland Security

WASHINGTON – As part of the Biden-Harris Administration’s continued efforts to enhance the security of our border and deliver more timely consequences for those encountered who do not have a legal basis to remain in the United States, today the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), through U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that would allow statutory bars to asylum to be applied much earlier in the process. Even though the number of migrants who are subject to these bars is small, this rule would enable DHS to more quickly remove those who are subject to the bars and pose a risk to our national security or public safety.

Federal law bars individuals who pose a national security or public safety risk from asylum and withholding of removal, specifically those who have been convicted of a particularly serious crime, participated in the persecution of others, are inadmissible on national security or terrorism-related grounds, or for whom there are reasonable grounds to deem them a danger to the security of the United States. While anyone who is deemed to pose a public safety threat is taken into custody, the asylum eligibility determination is not currently made until later in the process – at the merits adjudication stage of the asylum and withholding of removal claims. Today’s proposed rule would permit Asylum Officers to consider these bars to asylum and withholding of removal during initial credible fear screening, which happens just days after an individual is encountered. This will allow DHS to expeditiously remove individuals who pose a threat to the United States much sooner than is currently the case, better safeguarding the security of our border and our country.

“The proposed rule we have published today is yet another step in our ongoing efforts to ensure the safety of the American public by more quickly identifying and removing those individuals who present a security risk and have no legal basis to remain here,” said Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas. “We will continue to take action, but fundamentally it is only Congress that can fix what everyone agrees is a broken immigration system.”

Noncitizens who present a national security or public safety risk remain in DHS custody while their cases are referred for full immigration hearings before an immigration judge, a process that can take years and is resource intensive. The proposed rule would allow Asylum Officers to issue denial of claims within days after an individual is encountered when there is evidence that the individual is barred from asylum because of a terrorism, national security, or criminal bar, thereby significantly shortening the overall time between encounter and removal from the United States.

In addition to this proposed rule and in close coordination with vetting and law enforcement partners, DHS is updating its policy and procedures regarding the use of classified information in immigration proceedings. This updated guidance clarifies the circumstances in which classified information should be used in immigration proceedings. Consistent with longstanding practice, DHS will continue to screen and vet individuals prior to their entry to the United States to identify national security or public safety threats and take appropriate action.

The Department also continues enforcing the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways (CLP) rule. This rule incentivizes the use of orderly processes and imposes swifter consequences for those without a legal basis to remain in the United States. Today, USCIS issued revised guidance to Asylum Officers to consider whether an asylum seeker could reasonably relocate to another part of the country of feared persecution when assessing claims of future persecution in all credible fear cases. Internal relocation has always been a part of an analysis of future claims of harm, and this new guidance, consistent with the CLP rule, will ensure early identification and removal of individuals who would ultimately be found ineligible for protection because of their ability to remain safe by relocating elsewhere in the country from which they fled.

The Biden-Harris Administration has already taken numerous actions to address migration challenges in the region and at our border, while overseeing a historic expansion of lawful pathways. These efforts, with partner countries in the region and across the world, have made a significant impact. From May 12, 2023 through May 1, 2024, DHS has removed or returned more than 720,000 individuals, the vast majority of whom crossed the Southwest Border, including more than 109,000 individual family members. That includes removals to 170 countries around the world. Total removals and returns since mid-May 2023 exceed removals and returns in every full fiscal year since 2011. DHS has also significantly expanded the capacity to conduct the credible fear interviews needed to ultimately remove those without a legal basis to stay in the United States.

The Administration again calls on Congress to pass needed reforms and provide DHS the resources and tools it needs to fully implement expedited processing of all individuals encountered at the border. The public is invited to submit comments on the NPRM during the 30-day public comment period from May 13, 2024 to June 12, 2024. 

Readout of Senior Official Performing the Duties of Deputy Secretary Canegallo’s Participation in the LA Declaration on Migration and Protection Ministerial

Source: US Department of Homeland Security

From May 6-7, Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Deputy Secretary Kristie Canegallo joined Secretary of State Antony Blinken, White House National Security Council’s Marcela Escobari, and USAID Acting Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean Michael Camilleri in Guatemala City, Guatemala to represent the United States Government at the third Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection Ministerial. Over the course of the last two years, the Los Angeles Declaration has provided a framework for its signatories throughout the Americas to take action on shared goals including strengthening border enforcement, expanding lawful pathways, and addressing the root causes of migration.

On the margins of the ministerial, Senior Official Performing the Duties of Deputy Secretary Canegallo participated in bilateral and trilateral meetings with counterparts from several countries, including Guatemala, Costa Rica, Belize, Ecuador, and Mexico, to continue enhancing hemispheric cooperation across several areas including information sharing, coordinating enforcement measures, and attacking transnational criminal organizations. During a bilateral meeting with Costa Rican Foreign Affairs Minister Arnoldo André, the Department of Homeland Security signed an agreement establishing a Biometric Data Sharing Partnership and the Department of State signed a separate agreement on countering human trafficking—measures that will boost security for both our nations and for the hemisphere. Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Deputy Secretary Canegallo also participated in a Labor Mobility event, where she highlighted this Administration’s work to boost temporary worker visas, noting that the United States issued a record number of H-2B visas to workers from Central and South America in 2023. Ms. Canegallo emphasized that the United States will continue to work with foreign partners to advance hemispheric efforts that expand labor opportunities, safeguard human rights, and contribute to bolstering the national and regional economy.  The following is a detailed fact sheet outlining achievements of the Los Angeles Declaration and the work the region is leading on.

Fact Sheet: Third Ministerial Meeting on the Los Angeles Declaration On Migration and Protection in Guatemala

Nearly two years ago, in response to the historic challenge of migration and forced displacement, President Biden launched the Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection, with 20 leaders from across the Western Hemisphere. The Los Angeles Declaration is a first-of-its-kind framework to promote coordinated action under three core pillars: (1) addressing root causes and supporting the integration of migrants to foster long-term stabilization; (2) expanding lawful pathways; and (3) strengthening humane enforcement.

On May 7, 2024, Guatemala hosted the third Los Angeles Declaration Ministerial with foreign ministers and senior representatives from 21 endorsing countries. Secretary of State Antony Blinken led the U.S. delegation, alongside White House Coordinator for the Los Angeles Declaration Marcela Escobari, Department of Homeland Security Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Deputy Secretary Kristie Canegallo, and USAID Acting Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean Michael Camilleri. The United States is grateful for President Arévalo’s leadership in hosting the Ministerial.

On behalf of the United States, Secretary Blinken announced $578 million in humanitarian, development, and economic assistance to support partner countries and host communities in responding to urgent humanitarian needs, expanding lawful pathways, and supporting the regularization and integration of migrants. The United States also announced expanded enforcement partnerships to deter irregular migration, including increased consequences for the smuggling networks that prey on vulnerable migrants. The U.S. Government reiterated its commitment to work alongside partners to establish a permanent, regionally-driven Secretariat to ensure that coordinated progress is sustained under the Los Angeles Declaration.

The endorsing countries presented progress toward their commitments under the Los Angeles Declaration and announced the following new initiatives.

Strengthening Humane Enforcement

  • The United States took steps on May 6 to impose visa restrictions on executives of several Colombian maritime transportation companies for facilitating irregular migration to the United States. These are part of a broader set of U.S. actions targeting owners, executives, and senior officials of companies providing transportation by land, sea, or charter air designed for use primarily by persons intending to irregularly migrate to the United States. Earlier restrictions were placed on individuals in the charter air sector.
  • The International Air Transport Association and several of its member airlines committed to concerted action to limit the use of commercial flights for irregular migration.
  • The United States and Costa Rica announced the establishment of a new Biometric Data Sharing Partnership to enhance Costa Rica’s biometric collection and matching, and strengthen its border management, thereby increasing safety and security in the region. The United States and Costa Rica also signed a memorandum of understanding outlining bilateral cooperation in countering trafficking in persons.
  • The United States is deploying additional resources to Guatemala to increase security at land, air, and sea ports throughout the country, increasing screening and vetting in the region.
  • The United States will expand public awareness of the CBP One™ mobile app among migrants seeking to enter the United States. From January 2023 through the end of March 2024, more than 547,000 individuals have used CBP One™ and presented themselves to a port of entry for processing, instead of risking their lives at the hands of smugglers.
  • The United States leads the Countering Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling Action Package Committee under the Los Angeles Declaration, coordinating international efforts to target, investigate, arrest, and prosecute human smuggling organizations that are preying on vulnerable migrants.
  • Partner countries reaffirmed their commitment to stem extracontinental irregular migration through increased use of transit visas, passenger vetting, and enforcement measures against entities and individuals that profit from irregular migration.

Expanding Lawful Pathways for Migration and Protection

  • President Biden rebuilt our refugee resettlement program and led a historic expansion of lawful pathways to the United States and partner countries.  Under the President’s Safe Mobility Offices initiative to deter irregular migration and expand lawful pathways in the Western Hemisphere, we are on track to increase six-fold the number of approved refugees from the region.  Already, over 21,000 individuals have been approved to resettle safely and legally in the United States through the Safe Mobility Offices in Guatemala, Costa Rica, Colombia, and Ecuador.
  • Guatemala and the United States announced that the Safe Mobility Offices in Guatemala will expand eligibility to include Hondurans, Salvadorans, and Nicaraguans present in Guatemala.
  • Costa Rica and the United States announced that the Safe Mobility Offices in Costa Rica will expand eligibility to accept Ecuadorians.
  • The United States reaffirmed its commitment to strengthening lawful pathways. Under the Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, Venezuela (CHNV) parole process, flows of irregular migrants from these four countries have been reduced significantly, while 435,000 vetted and cleared individuals of these nationalities have been approved to lawfully enter the United States. Applicants must have a U.S.-based financial supporter, pass vetting and background checks, and meet other established criteria to receive advanced travel authorization. Once paroled on a case-by-case basis, CHNV nationals are eligible to apply for work authorization and start work immediately.
  • USAID announced plans to launch a new regional labor mobility initiative — “Alianza de Movilidad Laboral para las Américas” or “Labor Neighbors” — to increase access to lawful temporary labor pathways for new migrant-source and destination countries. The initiative will work with international organizations and other partners to provide technical assistance to countries across the region to identify eligible workers to meet pressing labor needs.
  • The Department of Labor launched a $3 million project to strengthen protections for workers participating in U.S. temporary foreign worker programs. The United States also announced it is joining the International Labor Organization’s Fair Recruitment Initiative and its Advisory Committee. The initiative seeks to ensure that domestic and cross-border recruitment practices are grounded in international labor standards, promote gender equality, and prevent human trafficking and forced labor. These steps reinforce the Biden Administration’s Presidential Memorandum on Advancing Worker Empowerment, Rights, and High Labor Standards Globally and its steadfast commitment to protecting worker rights at home and around the world.
  • Mexico announced that, since 2022, it has issued over 17,500 temporary visas to individuals seeking international protection to address labor shortages in the country. Additionally, Mexico has launched a pilot program in collaboration with the Haitian Embassy, International Organization for Migration, and the Tent Partnership to expand labor pathways, offering job opportunities and work permits to Haitian migrants.
  • Costa Rica committed to continue modernizing its asylum system through digitalization, data-driven solutions, and adopting practices to streamline refugee status determination with support from UNHCR and the international community.  
  • Canada confirmed it will take UNHCR referrals from the Safe Mobility Offices, as part of Canada’s ongoing commitment to this important initiative. Canada has also made significant progress on its commitment to welcome 15,000 migrants from the Americas region. Canada is also investing $75 million Canadian dollars over six years to fund capacity building projects to strengthen migration and protection systems in the region.

Addressing Root Causes and Supporting the Integration of Migrants to Foster Long-term Stabilization

  • The United States reaffirmed its commitment to addressing the root causes of irregular migration. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation is announcing the approval of a $20 million direct loan to Cosami, a savings and loan cooperative, for low-income mortgages in rural Guatemala. Cosami’s assistance will help finance the construction of borrowers’ first homes, helping to improve living conditions, create jobs, and promote economic growth in lower-income communities.
  • With initial support from the U.S. Government, the International Organization for Migration launched a new online platform and data portal for the Los Angeles Declaration, which enables endorsing countries to obtain, share, and disseminate best practices and data.
  • Ecuador announced that, under a new regularization program, those who have already registered will be able to complete their process to obtain a temporary resident visa and more migrants will be able to apply for a temporary visa.
  • Colombia announced a plan for regularization of irregular migrants through special permits for parents and legal guardians of children with valid Temporary Protective Status. Colombia also announced a new special permanent visa for Latin American and Caribbean migrants without regular status in the country. The Colombian government estimates these actions will benefit up to 600,000 individuals.
  • Costa Rica committed to expand the Special Temporary Category regularization pathway and reduce barriers to access with continued assistance from the international community.
May 6, 2024, Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Deputy Secretary Kristie Canegallo signs an agreement for a Biometric Data Sharing Partnership with Costa Rica on the margins of the 3rd Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection ministerial in Guatemala City, Guatemala. 

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May 6, 2024, Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Deputy Secretary Kristie Canegallo signs an agreement for a Biometric Data Sharing Partnership with Costa Rica on the margins of the 3rd Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection ministerial in Guatemala City, Guatemala.  | View Original
May 7, 2024, Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Deputy Secretary Kristie Canegallo represented the U.S. government alongside Secretary of State Antony Blinken, the White House National Security Council’s Marcela Escobari, and U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala Tobin Bradley at the 3rd Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection ministerial in Guatemala City, Guatemala. 

” data-asset-id=”52512″ data-asset-link=”1″ data-asset-type=”photo” data-entity-type=”emerald” data-image-style=”medium” src=”https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/styles/medium/public/externals/5802daf8b47256bbb44402372da5347c.jpg.webp?itok=ViH3lt2P”/>

May 7, 2024, Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Deputy Secretary Kristie Canegallo represented the U.S. government alongside Secretary of State Antony Blinken, the White House National Security Council’s Marcela Escobari, and U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala Tobin Bradley at the 3rd Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection ministerial in Guatemala City, Guatemala.  | View Original

CISA Announces Secure by Design Commitments from Leading Technology Providers

Source: US Department of Homeland Security

WASHINGTON – Today, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) announced voluntary commitments by 68 of the world’s leading software manufacturers to CISA’s Secure by Design pledge to design products with greater security built in.

“More secure software is our best hope to protect against the seemingly never-ending scourge of cyberattacks facing our nation. I am glad to see leading software manufacturers recognize this by joining us at CISA to build a future that is more secure by design,” CISA Director Jen Easterly said. “I applaud the companies who have already signed our pledge for their leadership and call on all software manufacturers to take the pledge and join us in creating a world where technology is safe and secure right out of the box.”

A list of the 68 companies, including leading software manufacturers, participating in the pledge can be found at the Secure by Design Pledge page, and statements of support for the pledge can be read here.

By catalyzing action by some of the largest technology manufacturers, the Secure by Design pledge marks a major milestone in CISA’s Secure by Design initiative. Participating software manufacturers are pledging to work over the next year to demonstrate measurable progress towards seven concrete goals. Collectively, these commitments will help protect Americans by securing the technology that our critical infrastructure relies on.

“A more secure by design future is indeed possible. The items in the pledge directly address some of the most pervasive cybersecurity threats we at CISA see today, and by taking the pledge software manufacturers are helping raise our national cybersecurity baseline,” CISA Senior Technical Advisor Jack Cable said. “Every software manufacturer should recognize that they have a responsibility to protect their customers, contributing to our national and economic security. I appreciate the leadership of those who signed on and hope that every technology manufacturer will follow suit.”

The seven goals of the pledge are:

  • Multi-factor authentication (MFA). Within one year of signing the pledge, demonstrate actions taken to measurably increase the use of multi-factor authentication across the manufacturer’s products.
  • Default passwords. Within one year of signing the pledge, demonstrate measurable progress towards reducing default passwords across the manufacturers’ products.
  • Reducing entire classes of vulnerability. Within one year of signing the pledge, demonstrate actions taken towards enabling a significant measurable reduction in the prevalence of one or more vulnerability classes across the manufacturer’s products.
  • Security patches. Within one year of signing the pledge, demonstrate actions taken to measurably increase the installation of security patches by customers.
  • Vulnerability disclosure policy. Within one year of signing the pledge, publish a vulnerability disclosure policy (VDP) that authorizes testing by members of the public on products offered by the manufacturer, commits to not recommending or pursuing legal action against anyone engaging in good faith efforts to follow the VDP, provides a clear channel to report vulnerabilities, and allows for public disclosure of vulnerabilities in line with coordinated vulnerability disclosure best practices and international standards.
  • CVEs. Within one year of signing the pledge, demonstrate transparency in vulnerability reporting by including accurate Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) and Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) fields in every Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) record for the manufacturer’s products. Additionally, issue CVEs in a timely manner for, at minimum, all critical or high impact vulnerabilities (whether discovered internally or by a third party) that either require actions by a customer to patch or have evidence of active exploitation.
  • Evidence of intrusions. Within one year of signing the pledge, demonstrate a measurable increase in the ability for customers to gather evidence of cybersecurity intrusions affecting the manufacturer’s products.

Each goal has core criteria which manufacturers are committing to work towards, in addition to context and example approaches to achieve the goal and demonstrate measurable progress. To enable a variety of approaches, software manufacturers participating in the pledge have the discretion to decide how best they can meet and demonstrate the core criteria of each goal, but progress should be demonstrated in public.

CISA’s global Secure by Design initiative, launched last year, implements the White House’s National Cybersecurity Strategy by shifting the cybersecurity burden away from end users and individuals to technology manufacturers who are most able to bear it. CISA urges software manufacturers to review CISA’s Secure by Design guidance and Secure by Design alerts to build security into their products.

To date, the following 68 companies have signed the pledge: 1touch.io, Akamai, Amazon Web Services, Apiiro, Armis, Automox, BigID, BlackBerry, Bugcrowd, Chainguard, Cisco, Claroty, Cloudflare, CrowdStrike, Cybeats, Resilience, ESET, Everfox, Finite State, Forescout, Fortinet, Gigamon, GitHub, GitLab, Google, Hewlett Packard Enterprise, HiddenLayer, HP, Huntress, IBM, Infoblox, InfoSec Global, Ivanti, Kiteworks, Lasso Security, Lenovo, Manifest, Microsoft, N-able, NetApp, Netgear, Okta, Palo Alto Networks, Pangea, Proofpoint, Qualys, Rapid7, Red Queen Dynamics, Scale AI, Secureworks, Securin, Security Compass, SentinelOne, Socket, Sonatype, Sophos, Tenable, ThreatQuotient, ThriveDX, Tidelift, Trellix, Trend Micro, Vanta, Veracode, Veritas Technologies LLC, Wiz, Xylem, and Zscaler.

Learn more about this voluntary pledge and sign it today by visiting: cisa.gov/securebydesign/pledge.

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About CISA 

As the nation’s cyber defense agency and national coordinator for critical infrastructure security, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency leads the national effort to understand, manage, and reduce risk to the digital and physical infrastructure Americans rely on every hour of every day.

Visit CISA.gov for more information and follow us on TwitterFacebookLinkedIn, Instagram.

CISA Unveils New Public Service Announcement – We Can Secure Our World

Source: US Department of Homeland Security

WASHINGTON – Today, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is pleased to launch We Can Secure Our World, the second PSA in its Secure Our World cybersecurity public awareness program. The PSA will be promoted widely across the U.S. on television, radio, digital ads, retail centers, social media platforms, and billboards throughout 2024. We Can Secure Our World builds on the success of CISA’s first ever public service announcement (PSA) which launched in September 2023.

A Pew Research Center survey conducted last year shows that 95% of American adults use the internet, 90% have a smartphone and 80% subscribe to high-speed internet at home. Additionally, the survey also reported nearly 70% of children and adolescents have been exposed to at least one cyber risk in the past year. With cyber threats increasing among Americans of all ages, CISA is working to empower all Americans to protect themselves from hackers getting into their devices through easy steps that anyone can do anywhere and anytime.

The Secure Our World cybersecurity public awareness program, initially launched in September 2023, with its first PSA receiving nearly 20,000 views on YouTube, and educational materials including “How to” videos and tip sheets, were downloaded approximately 50,000 times. CISA also had a video that aired at the NFL Experience in the week leading up to the Super Bowl. CISA had a Super Bowl-related social media campaign that garnered more than 200,000 views and reached audiences spanning America’s diverse population.

The Secure Our World program is designed to educate and empower individuals to take proactive steps in safeguarding their digital lives. Tapping into the nostalgia of beloved musical cartoon series from the 1970s and 1980s, the new PSA features lovable character Max from the first PSA and introduces “Joan the Phone” who teaches us how to stay safe online. Through engaging messaging encouraging simple steps to protect ourselves online, the program aims to raise awareness about the importance of cybersecurity and empower individuals to adopt best practices to mitigate online risks.

“Basic cyber hygiene prevents 98% of cyber attacks—why we’re on a mission to make cyber hygiene as common as brushing our teeth and washing our hands. BUT(!) “cyber” anything can seem overly technical and complicated to the vast majority of Americans from K through Gray—why we’re also on a mission to make such information more accessible,” said CISA Director Jen Easterly. “As someone who grew up with Saturday morning cartoons, I am super excited about what we’ve done with our new Secure Our World PSA to leverage a recognizable educational medium to promote cybersecurity best practices. We’re really excited to take public awareness of cyber safety to a whole new level of creativity.”

We encourage organizations large and small to join forces with CISA today to bolster cybersecurity awareness, empower individuals to take action, and drive adoption of critical behaviors, Together, let’s champion the cybersecurity basics: encourage the use of strong passwords and multi-factor authentication, recognize and report phishing attempts, and prioritize software updates. Our collaboration can have a far-reaching effect to protect individuals, businesses and critical infrastructure from cyber threats, promoting trust, resilience and security in the digital realm.

View the We Can Secure Our World PSA on CISA.gov.

DHS, CISA Announce Membership Changes to the Cyber Safety Review Board

Source: US Department of Homeland Security

WASHINGTON – Today, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) announced changes to the Cyber Safety Review Board (CSRB) membership. With deep gratitude, four current members of the CSRB will depart and four new members will join the board. 

Departing members include:

  • Katie Moussouris, Founder and CEO, Luta Security
  • Chris Novak, Co-Founder and Managing Director, Verizon Threat Research Advisory Center
  • Tony Sager, Senior Vice President and Chief Evangelist, Center for Internet Security, and
  • Wendi Whitmore, Senior Vice President, Unit 42, Palo Alto Networks

Joining the CSRB:

  • Jamil Jaffer, Venture Partner Paladin Capital Group and Founder and Executive Director, National Security Institute, George Mason University Scalia Law School
  • David Luber, Director, Cybersecurity Directorate, NSA
  • Katie Nickels, Senior Director of Intelligence Operations, Red Canary
  • Chris Krebs, Chief Intelligence and Public Policy Officer, Sentinel One

David Luber will serve as the Federal CSRB representative from the NSA, replacing Rob Joyce upon his retirement. Joyce has been asked to continue to serve on the board as a private sector member.

“I can’t thank Katie, Chris, Tony, and Wendi enough for the outstanding contributions they’ve made as CSRB members. I am truly grateful for their service on the Board,” said CISA Director Jen Easterly.  “I am also very pleased to welcome Jamil, Dave, Katie, and Chris to the Board. I know their cybersecurity expertise and experience will be instrumental in the continuing evolution of the CSRB as a catalyst for positive change in the cybersecurity ecosystem.”

Robert Silvers, DHS Under Secretary for Policy, and Heather Adkins, Vice President for Security Engineering at Google, have been re-appointed as the Chair and Deputy Chair respectively for a second term by Easterly. 

“I send my sincere thanks to the departing members and welcome those who are beginning their service,” said Under Secretary Silvers. “The Cyber Safety Review Board will continue in its charge to conduct fact finding and develop lessons learned from the most serious cyber incidents.”

“It has been an honor to serve on the CSRB and I am looking forward to seeing the Board continue to evolve its important role in the cybersecurity ecosystem as we increase the security of the nation,” said Deputy Chair Adkins.  

Other returning members include:

  • Dmitri Alperovitch, Co-Founder and Chairman, Silverado Policy Accelerator and Co-Founder and former CTO of CrowdStrike, Inc.
  • Harry Coker, Jr., National Cyber Director, Office of the National Cyber Director
  • Jerry Davis, Founder, Gryphon X
  • Chris DeRusha, Federal Chief Information Security Officer, Office of Management and Budget
  • Eric Goldstein, Executive Assistant Director for Cybersecurity, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
  • Marshall Miller, Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice
  • John Sherman, Chief Information Officer, Department of Defense
  • Bryan Vorndran, Assistant Director, Cyber Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation

The CSRB conducts fact-finding and issues recommendations in the wake of major cyber incidents. The Board is made up of cybersecurity luminaries from the private sector and senior officials from DHS, CISA, the Department of Defense, the National Security Agency, the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of the National Cyber Director, and the Office of Management and Budget.

As directed by President Biden through Executive Order 14028 Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity, Secretary Mayorkas established the CSRB in February 2022. The Board is administered by CISA on behalf of the Secretary. The Board’s reviews are conducted independently, and its conclusions are independently reached. DHS and the CSRB are committed to transparency and will, whenever possible, release public versions of CSRB reports, consistent with applicable law and the need to protect sensitive information from disclosure.  

The Board’s reviews and other information about the CSRB can be found on the CSRB website.

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Statement from Secretary Mayorkas on Microsoft’s Announcement of Security Updates Following CSRB Recommendations

Source: US Department of Homeland Security

WASHINGTON – Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro N. Mayorkas issued the following statement on Microsoft’s announcement of security updates following recommendations from the Department of Homeland Security’s Cyber Security Review Board:

“We applaud Microsoft for its commitment to strengthen its security by embracing and acting upon the recommendations of the Cyber Safety Review Board and further advancing the company’s Secure Future Initiative. Microsoft’s full cooperation with the Board’s review helped create the tangible recommendations that will benefit not only Microsoft’s customers, but also the public at large that depends on the security of cloud services.  We look forward to continuing our work with Microsoft and other partners to strengthen the security of the cyber ecosystem on which we all depend.” 

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Delta Electronics CNCSoft-G2 DOPSoft DPAX

Source: US Department of Homeland Security

View CSAF

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • CVSS v4 8.5
  • ATTENTION: Low attack complexity
  • Vendor: Delta Electronics
  • Equipment: CNCSoft-G2 DOPSoft
  • Vulnerability: Stack-based Buffer Overflow

2. RISK EVALUATION

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code.

3. TECHNICAL DETAILS

3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS

The following versions of Delta Electronics CNCSoft-G2, a Human-Machine Interface (HMI) software, are affected:

  • CNCSoft-G2: Versions 2.0.0.5 (with DOPSoft v5.0.0.93) and prior

3.2 Vulnerability Overview

3.2.1 STACK-BASED BUFFER OVERFLOW CWE-121

Delta Electronics CNCSoft-G2 lacks proper validation of the length of user-supplied data prior to copying it to a fixed-length stack-based buffer. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the current process.

CVE-2024-4192 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.8 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H ).

A CVSS v4 score has also been calculated for CVE-2024-4192. A base score of 8.5 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (CVSS4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N).

3.3 BACKGROUND

  • CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS: Energy, Critical Manufacturing
  • COUNTRIES/AREAS DEPLOYED: Worldwide
  • COMPANY HEADQUARTERS LOCATION: Taiwan

3.4 RESEARCHER

Natnael Samson working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative reported this vulnerability to CISA.

4. MITIGATIONS

Delta Electronics recommends users update to CNCSoft-G2 v2.1.0.4 or later.

CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of this vulnerability, such as:

  • Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, ensuring they are not accessible from the internet.
  • Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolating them from business networks.
  • When remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.

CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.

CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov/ics. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.

CISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets.

Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov/ics in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B–Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.

Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.

CISA also recommends users take the following measures to protect themselves from social engineering attacks:

No known public exploitation specifically targeting this vulnerability has been reported to CISA at this time. This vulnerability is not exploitable remotely.

5. UPDATE HISTORY

  • April 30, 2024: Initial Publication

Statement from Secretary Mayorkas on the Biden-Harris Administration’s New National Security Memorandum on Critical Infrastructure

Source: US Department of Homeland Security

WASHINGTON – Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro N. Mayorkas issued the following statement on the National Security Memorandum (NSM) to secure and enhance the resilience of U.S. critical infrastructure, signed today by President Biden:

“Our nation’s critical infrastructure consists of the systems and services upon which Americans rely in their daily lives. From the banking system to the electric grid, from healthcare to our nation’s water systems and more, we depend on the safety and defense of our critical infrastructure as a matter of homeland and national security. President Biden’s new National Security Memorandum empowers the Department of Homeland Security to lead our government’s efforts, alongside our Administration partners, to better confront the increasingly complex and frequent threats facing our critical infrastructure.  Together, we will ensure America remains vigilant, secure, and resilient.”

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DHS is the Largest Federal Agency to Receive 15 Consecutive “A” Grades on the SBA Small Business Procurement Scorecard

Source: US Department of Homeland Security

WASHINGTON, DC – Today, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) received a grade of “A+,” the highest grade possible on the Small Business Administration’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Small Business Procurement Scorecard and was the largest federal agency to exceed all ten of the Scorecard’s small business prime and subcontracting goals. The Scorecard is an assessment tool that measures how well federal agencies meet their small business and socioeconomic prime contracting and subcontracting goals. This is the fifteenth consecutive fiscal year DHS has earned a grade of “A” or higher, starting in FY 2009.

“America’s small businesses are essential partners in equipping the Department’s workforce with the tools to fulfill our mission of protecting the homeland,” said the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Deputy Secretary Kristie Canegallo. “We are proud of DHS’s 15 year record and are committed to ensure that it continues. This year’s “A+” rating achievement is the result of modernizing and streamlining our processes to meet our contracting goals.”

In FY 2023, DHS obligated $9.9 billion, the highest amount in the Department’s history, to small businesses. Over $4.7 billion was awarded to small, disadvantaged businesses– a result of the Department’s increased targeted small business outreach efforts, which include a focus on undeserved vendor communities. Notably, DHS awarded 38.21% of its total eligible contracting dollars to small businesses, greatly exceeding the government-wide prime goal of 23%.

“Our achievements are the result of collaboration between DHS leadership and the acquisition workforce,” said E. Darlene Bullock, DHS Executive Director, Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization. “DHS will continue to implement various programs and policies to support small business participation.”

For the second time in the Department’s history, DHS exceeded all ten small business prime and subcontracting goals, making it the largest federal agency with this record of achievement. “DHS’s sustained accomplishments on the SBA scorecard for the past 15 years truly highlight the Department’s efforts to partner with small businesses. We are proud of our efforts and look forward to continued excellence in this area,” said Paul Courtney, DHS Chief Procurement Officer.

Small businesses play an instrumental role in strengthening the capabilities of the Department and helping us protect our homeland. DHS is committed to maximizing opportunities for small businesses and will continue to partner with industry to increase diversity in our contractor community.

For more information about the Department’s small business program, visit Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization | Homeland Security (dhs.gov).