Joint Statement on the Signing of Joint Declaration of Intent to Strengthen Franco-American Customs Cooperation

Source: US Department of Homeland Security

To strengthen cooperation between France and the United States in customs matters and improve the facilitation of travelers and goods, the Minister Delegate for Public Accounts, Mr. Thomas Cazanave, and the Senior Official Performing the Duties of Deputy Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Ms. Kristie Canegallo, signed today a Joint Declaration of Intent.   

Improved collaboration as outlined in the Joint Declaration is expected to include intelligence, inspections, investigations, targeting and operational cooperation, and exchange of best practices in the customs field. Additionally, this customs cooperation is expected to focus on securing container traffic, major port and airport facilities, express freight, e-commerce, and the financial flows of criminal organizations. 

Enhanced collaboration is also expected to cover combatting arms and drug trafficking, transnational organized crime, and threats to national security.  The collaboration is expected to occur between entities in their Ministries such as the French Customs Coast Guard and U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Air and Marine Operations, as well as the French National Directorate of Customs Intelligence and Investigations and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations, including in French communities in the Pacific, Polynesia, New Caledonia, and Wallis and Futuna. 

Cooperation is expected to intensify between CBP’s National Targeting Center and the French Customs Risk Analysis and Targeting Service for risk analysis and targeting of controls on passengers and cargo.  

The Joint Declaration of Intent additionally places emphasis on working together to secure the 2024 Paris Summer Olympics and 2028 Los Angeles Summer Olympics through the sharing of best practices.   

On this occasion, the Minister and Senior Official Performing the Duties of Deputy Secretary reaffirmed their common commitment to further strengthen operational cross-border cooperation between their Ministries to better combat the most current and sensitive threats to the flow of goods, national security breaches, narcotics, fentanyl, forced labor, arms trafficking, economic and fiscal fraud, and money laundering. 

CISA and ONCD Award the Winners of the Fifth Annual President’s Cup Cybersecurity Competition

Source: US Department of Homeland Security

WASHINGTON – Today, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and Office of the National Cyber Director (ONCD) awarded the winners of the fifth annual President’s Cup Cybersecurity Competition in a private ceremony at the Eisenhower Executive Office Building.   

The 2024 first place team winner was “Artificially Intelligent,” a team with participants from the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force. The winner of the 2024 Individuals Track A was U.S. Army Major Nolan Miles, and the winner of the 2024 Individuals Track B was Sergeant Michael Torres from the U.S. Marine Corps.  

“The President’s Cup provides a unique opportunity to create a network of cyber professionals across government organizations, allowing these groups to compete for the best outcomes while simultaneously learning from and working alongside leaders across the government,” said CISA Director Jen Easterly. “The government must rise to the occasion and lead by example by rigorously training, competing, and innovating so that we are prepared to address the cyber-enabled threats that stand in front of us. This is why this program is so important.”

“The President’s Cup Cybersecurity Competition brings out the best in our Nation’s cyber workforce and today’s ceremony at the White House provided a fitting tribute to the talent, dedication and service of the men and women who work everyday to protect us in our increasingly digital world,” said White House National Cyber Director Harry Coker, Jr. “I’m proud to recognize, reward, and celebrate the accomplishments of our winners in this competition but I’m even prouder to acknowledge their service to the Nation. Their work is vital, their service is appreciated, and we – as a Nation – are all better, safer, and stronger because of their efforts.”

The President’s Cup is led and hosted by CISA and presents competitors with a series of challenges designed around the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) Framework Work Roles to identify, recognize, and reward the best cybersecurity talent across the federal workforce.

CISA developed this interactive competition to invest in the professional development of federal employees and bring awareness to having skilled talent in cybersecurity careers.

This year’s competition provided a unique training opportunity that included an interactive story-based video game featuring a series of challenges aligned to the NICE Framework Work roles to enhance and embrace participants’ skills as they outwit and outthink their competitors. 

Another new element to the competition was the ICScape Room, an immersive, hands-on experience that provided challengers with a realistic and relatable scenario, compelling them to apply their expertise, teamwork, and collaboration skills to achieve optimal solutions.

The President’s Cup Cybersecurity Competition is open to the federal civilian workforce and members of the military. Watch videos from the 2024 and previous competitions and learn more information about the annual event at President’s Cup Cybersecurity Competition.  

Statement from Secretary Mayorkas on the Recognition of DHS Advancement on Partnership for Public Service List of “Best Places to Work”

Source: US Department of Homeland Security

WASHINGTON – Today, Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro N. Mayorkas issued the following statement regarding the Partnership for Public Service’s recognition of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the most improved large agency in its 2023 Best Places to Work in the Federal Government:

“The workforce of the Department of Homeland Security is the best in the world.  Our people execute an extraordinarily expansive, diverse, and challenging set of missions.  We have a solemn responsibility to recognize them, champion them, and take care of them. Ensuring these 268,000 public servants have the tools, resources, and support they need and deserve is not just the right thing to do, it is fundamental to our homeland security. 

“For three years, our Department has executed one of our highest organizational priorities: we engage with, listen to, and learn from our workforce and we take meaningful, tangible action in response to what we learn. The impact of this line of effort is real. I am very proud that, for the second consecutive year, our Department has shown significant improvement in its employee well-being and satisfaction, and that this year the Partnership for Public Service has recognized us as the Most Improved Large Agency in the federal government. 

“There is a lot more to do, and we are committed to doing it.  Our devotion to the incredible public servants who work in the Department of Homeland Security is enduring. I look forward to continuing to work with Congress to prioritize, support, and champion the DHS workforce, as together we address the threats and challenges America faces.”

Efforts by Secretary Mayorkas to support and champion the workforce include:

  • TSA Pay Equity and Collective Bargaining: Ensured the TSA’s workforce is paid comparably with their colleagues by implementing a new compensation plan in July 2023, which, for the first time ever puts all TSA employees on the same pay level as their federal counterparts on the General Schedule (GS) pay scale. The agency’s attrition numbers have noticeably dropped, and numbers of applicants continue to increase. TSA reached a new Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), which will take effect on May 24. The new agreement will provide benefits for all TSA bargaining unit employees comprised of non-supervisory screening officers. 
     
  • Recognizing Employees Across the Nation: In an effort to connect directly with DHS employees and recognize the incredible work they do each day, the Secretary directed that the Annual Secretary’s Awards be conducted through multiple regional ceremonies across the country rather than one ceremony at DHS Headquarters. During these regional ceremonies, leadership recognizes exemplary employees closer to where their work is happening, enabling more employees to participate and be recognized. Traveling to these locations also provides leadership with an opportunity to see first-hand any issues or concerns that can be addressed, and receive feedback directly from DHS employees that serve the public outside the National Capital Region.
     
  • More Staffing at the Border: Secretary Mayorkas helped to secure the first increase in Border Patrol staffing in over a decade with 300 additional Agents added in Fiscal Year 2023, and another 1,400 added in Fiscal Year 2024. 
     
  • Prioritizing Safe and Effective Facilities: DHS has stressed the importance of ensuring personnel have access to facilities that support our mission and provide a safe and effective working environment. This includes utilizing the Non-recurring Expenses Fund, which allows DHS to use expiring funds to improve DHS facilities across the country in need of repair. 
     
  • Jump Teams: Jump Teams provide a mechanism to build the connections between mission support and the front-line. Jump Team members are responsible for helping to solve immediate issues, guide how funding is allocated, and to assist in developing solutions to deliver support most effectively to our front-line. Secretary Mayorkas directed the creation of DHS Jump Teams to leverage DHS and Component leadership resources to solve problems for our front-line personnel. 

To read the full DHS results of the 2023 Best Places to Work in the Federal Government rankings, visit here: Home • Best Places to Work in the Federal Government.

To learn more about ways in which DHS is championing the workforce, visit: Champion the DHS Workforce and Strengthen the Department | Homeland Security.

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DHS and DOJ Announce “Recent Arrivals” Docket Process for More Efficient Immigration Hearings

Source: US Department of Homeland Security

Justice Department Finalizes Rule to Allow for More Efficient Immigration Judge Dockets

WASHINGTON – Today, Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro N. Mayorkas and Attorney General Merrick B. Garland announced a new Recent Arrivals (RA) Docket process to more expeditiously resolve immigration cases of certain noncitizen single adults who attempt to cross irregularly between ports of entry at the Southwest border.

This effort will allow DHS and DOJ to more swiftly impose consequences, including removal, on those without a legal basis to remain in the United States and to more swiftly grant immigration relief or protections to noncitizens with valid claims. The Justice Department also submitted to the Federal Register a final rule to promote efficient case and docket management in immigration proceedings.

“Today, we are instituting with the Department of Justice a process to accelerate asylum proceedings so that individuals who do not qualify for relief can be removed more quickly and those who do qualify can achieve protection sooner,” said Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro N. Mayorkas. “This administrative step is no substitute for the sweeping and much-needed changes that the bipartisan Senate bill would deliver, but in the absence of Congressional action we will do what we can to most effectively enforce the law and discourage irregular migration.”

“The Justice Department’s immigration courts are committed to the just and efficient enforcement of the immigration laws,” said Attorney General Merrick B. Garland. “These measures will advance that mission by helping to ensure that immigration cases are adjudicated promptly and fairly.”

In our current, overwhelmed immigration system, noncitizens arriving at the U.S. Southwest border often wait years before receiving a final decision in an immigration court proceeding. Insufficient resources, including insufficient immigration judges and attorneys, has impeded the swift resolution of claims, and extended the length of the immigration court process.

Under the RA Docket process, DHS will place certain noncitizen single adults on the RA Docket, and EOIR adjudicators will prioritize the adjudication of these cases. The RA Docket will operate in five cities: Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York City. Immigration judges will aim to render final decisions within 180 days, though the time to decision in any particular case will remain subject to case-specific circumstances and procedural protections, including allowing time for noncitizens to seek representation where needed.

In order to support these efforts, today the Justice Department also submitted to the Federal Register a final rule titled Efficient Case and Docket Management in Immigration Proceedings. The rule codifies procedures and standards for immigration adjudicators across the country to manage their dockets and resolve cases efficiently. The rule allows adjudicators to prioritize cases that are ready to be resolved promptly, enabling them to address their caseloads more efficiently and quickly. This rule is an important step the Justice Department is taking to promote the efficient, expeditious, and fair adjudication of immigration cases, allocate limited resources more efficiently, and ensure procedural protections for parties in immigration court.

Lastly, the Departments continue to call on Congress to take up and pass the Senate’s bipartisan border security legislation, which if passed would provide DHS and DOJ with additional authorities and resources that are critically needed. These resources include more immigration judges, additional asylum officers and support staff, and needed authorities to more quickly adjudicate asylum cases of those arriving at our border, including by granting protection to those with valid claims, and removing those without a lawful basis to remain. Congress should take up and pass this legislation to fix our broken immigration system.

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CISA Publishes Encrypted DNS Implementation Guidance to Federal Agencies

Source: US Department of Homeland Security

Provides actionable guidance that conforms to federal zero trust strategy 

WASHINGTON – The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) published Encrypted Domain Name System (DNS) Implementation Guidance today for federal civilian agencies to meet requirements related to encryption of DNS traffic and enhance the cybersecurity posture of their IT networks to align to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Memorandum M-22-09, Moving the U.S. Government Toward Zero Trust Cybersecurity Principles and the National Cybersecurity Strategy. 

Traditionally, DNS protocol has not supported methods for ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, or authenticity of requests for information or the responses. M-22-09 specifically calls for agencies to encrypt DNS traffic where technically feasible while statutory mandates require agencies to use CISA’s Protective DNS capability for egress DNS resolution. This guide will assist agencies with implementation of currently feasible technical capabilities for agency networks, DNS infrastructure, on-premises endpoints, cloud deployments, and roaming, nomadic, and mobile endpoints.

“As the operational lead for federal cybersecurity, CISA developed this guide to assist federal agencies with understanding and implementing key actions and protocols to begin encrypting DNS traffic,” said Eric Goldstein, Executive Assistant Director for Cybersecurity, CISA. “This guide will help agencies progress further in their zero trust security journey. CISA continues our efforts and collaboration with agencies to modernize federal agency cybersecurity successfully and securely.”

To help agency personnel understand the requirements and engage in the transition work, this document provides an array of resources such as a high-level implementation checklist of required changes, recommendations to help agencies prioritize phased implementation, and technical guidance and references. Implementing encrypted DNS will align and base civilian agencies enterprise security architecture with zero trust principles.

While this guide is intended for federal agencies, all organizations are encouraged to review it as a benchmark for appropriate, applicable steps they can apply to advance their own zero trust efforts.

For more information, please visit: Zero Trust Maturity Model

DHS Announces 26 Additional PRC-Based Textile Companies to the UFLPA Entity List

Source: US Department of Homeland Security

Largest Ever One-Time Expansion Will Help Responsible Companies Keep Forced Labor out of their Supply Chain

WASHINGTON – Today, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced the addition of 26 textile companies based in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) Entity List. Effective May 17, 2024, goods produced by the named 26 entities will be restricted from entering the United States. By focusing on cotton manufacturers based outside of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) that source cotton from the XUAR, their designation will increase transparency and ensure responsible companies can conduct due diligence on their supply chains to ensure they do not include goods made with forced labor.

The Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force (FLETF), chaired by DHS, is taking these steps as part of the United States’ commitment to eliminating the use of forced labor in the U.S. supply chain and promoting accountability for the ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity against Uyghurs and other religious and ethnic minority groups in the XUAR.

“The Department of Homeland Security will not tolerate forced labor in our nation’s supply chains,” said Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro N. Mayorkas. “Today’s announcement strengthens our enforcement of the UFLPA and helps responsible companies conduct due diligence so that, together, we can keep the products of forced labor out of our country. We will continue to execute on our textile enforcement strategy and hold the PRC accountable for their exploitation and abuse of the Uyghur people.”

Since the UFLPA was signed into law in December 2021, the FLETF has added 65 entities to the UFLPA Entity List. These entities reach into the apparel, agriculture, polysilicon, plastics, chemicals, batteries, household appliances, electronics, and food additives sectors, among others. The interagency FLETF – which also includes the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and the U.S. Departments of Commerce, Justice, Labor, State, and the Treasury – voted to add the 26 companies to the UFLPA Entity List. Today’s announcement represents the largest ever one-time expansion to the UFLPA Entity List. 

“Today we add 26 additional companies to the UFLPA Entity List,” said DHS Under Secretary for Policy Robert Silvers, who serves as Chair of the FLETF. “We have shown again through today’s enforcement actions that the United States is taking action to prevent forced labor in U.S. supply chains. Companies must conduct due diligence and know where their products are coming from. The Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force will continue to designate entities known to violate our laws, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection will continue its vigilant enforcement at our ports.”

Adding these entities to the UFLPA Entity List advances DHS’ Textile Enforcement Plan, which prioritizes examination and review of entities in the textile sector for possible inclusion on the UFLPA Entity List. The FLETF will continue to consider future designations to the UFLPA Entity List as part of DHS’ broader forced labor enforcement efforts.

The 26 entities added to the UFLPA Entity List include cotton traders and warehouse facilities within China, the majority of which operate outside of the XUAR. Adding these entities to the UFLPA Entity List will make it easier for responsible companies to ensure that they are not purchasing cotton from entities who are sourcing cotton from the XUAR. By identifying these additional entities in the textile sector, U.S. importers have more information to conduct due diligence and examine their supply chains for risks of forced labor to ensure compliance with the UFLPA. The FLETF determined that 21 of the entities source and sell cotton from the XUAR on the wholesale market. The FLETF also determined that five additional entities also source cotton from the XUAR.

Since January 2021, prior to the implementation of the UFLPA, cotton from the XUAR was subject to a U.S. Customs and Border Protection Withhold Release Order.  In addition, cotton and cotton products were also designated as a high priority sector under the Strategy to Prevent Importation of Goods Mined, Produced or Manufactured with Forced Labor in the People’s Republic of China, issued in June 2022. Before these new additions, the UFLPA Entity List   included 10 textile entities.

The bipartisan UFLPA, signed into law by President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., in December 2021, mandates that CBP apply a rebuttable presumption that goods that are mined, produced or manufactured in the XUAR, or produced by entities identified on the UFLPA Entity List, are prohibited from importation into the United States unless the Commissioner of CBP determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that the goods were not produced with forced labor.  CBP began enforcing the UFLPA in June 2022.  Since then, CBP has reviewed more than 8,000 shipments valued at more than $3 billion under the UFLPA.  Additionally, Homeland Security Investigations, through the DHS Center for Countering Human Trafficking, supports investigations and outreach to secure international cooperation in investigating human rights abuses and forced labor in XUAR.

Today’s announcement supports President Biden’s memorandum on advancing worker empowerment, rights, and high labor standards globally. The memorandum represents the first whole-of-government approach to advance workers’ rights by directing federal agencies engaged abroad to advance international recognized labor rights, which includes DHS’s work implementing the UFLPA.

This expansion of the UFLPA Entity List reflects DHS’ prioritization of combating the introduction of forced labor into U.S. supply chains.  This commitment is outlined in the Department’s recent Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, which added combating crimes of exploitation, including labor exploitation, as the newest and sixth DHS mission.

You can read more about the FLETF by visiting: www.dhs.gov/uflpa

Disrupting Irregular Migration: Best Practices in Response to Recent Developments in the Aviation Sector

Source: US Department of Homeland Security

The Departments of State, Homeland Security, and the Treasury are jointly issuing this alert to notify airlines, air charter operators, travel agents, and service providers of the ways in which migrant smuggling and human trafficking networks are exploiting legitimate transportation services to facilitate irregular migration to the United States.  This statement conveys the U.S. government’s efforts to promote responsible practices in the industry, prevent and disrupt illicit activity, and enhance compliance with lawful immigration and migration pathways.  It follows an important announcement by the International Air Transport Association (IATA) and several member airlines of their commitment to strengthen collaboration with governments and international organizations to address irregular migration and to consider commercial measures to minimize illicit travel. 

Recent developments in the aviation sector, described below, expose migrants, airlines, air charter operators, travel agents, and service providers to increased safety, economic, reputational, financial, logistical, and legal risks.  This statement identifies a number of recommendations that could help industry stakeholders and governments reduce their exposure to risks associated with facilitating irregular migration.

Migrants are increasingly traversing the region using Managua as a disembarkation point to continue the journey northward by overland means. The United States has shared releasable intelligence with the aviation sector highlighting this trend and underscoring the need for greater enforcement of airline policies with respect to flights in and out of Managua.  In particular, actions by the Nicaraguan government are of grave concern.  President Daniel Ortega and Vice President Rosario Murillo have put in place permissive-by-design migration policies that have introduced opportunities for migrant smuggling and trafficking networks to exploit migrants for economic gain and fuel dangerous, irregular travel towards the U.S. southwest border. 

There are numerous examples of how ruthless smuggling networks have taken advantage of these routes:

In September 2023, Ofelia Hernandez-Salas was extradited to the United States by Mexico for allegedly conspiring with other smugglers to facilitate the travel of large numbers of migrants into the United States from and through Bangladesh, Yemen, Pakistan, Eritrea, India, the United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Russia, Egypt, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico.  Hernandez-Salas took advantage of commercial routes and charter flights to facilitate the movement of individuals to the U.S. southwest border.

In December 2023, French authorities thwarted an attempt by an organization to move individuals from India, through France, into Nicaragua for further transportation and smuggling arrangements to the U.S. southwest border.  More recently, in May 2024, authorities in Jamaica refused entry to a charter flight of irregular migrants that were seeking to travel to the U.S. southwest border. 

In May 2024, an Egyptian court initiated the trial of 16 individuals accused of smuggling migrants to the United States.  The individuals face criminal charges related to organized crime and human smuggling.  According to the charges, the group arranged air transportation of migrants and placed the migrants in dangerous, degrading, and inhuman circumstances throughout the smuggling process.

Recommended Industry Actions

The following are recommended best practices, subject to applicable laws and regulations and, as appropriate according to their risk, based on: (i) their role; (ii) the information available to them; and (iii) the types of transactions in which they engage:

Recommendation 1:  Monitor high-risk routes. Proactive measures to identify flight segments/routes known to be used by migrants and migrant smuggling or human trafficking networks can prevent the exploitation of those routes.  The United States is closely tracking this issue and can provide relevant information to support airline efforts.  IATA and several airlines already have announced voluntary steps industry can take in support of this effort.

Recommendation 2:  Report companies that trigger concerns.  Industry participants can report concerning activity, including information about travel agencies known or suspected to be engaging in activities supporting irregular migration and migrant smuggling or human trafficking networks to their U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) liaisons, relevant law enforcement and civil aviation authorities, and IATA.  As appropriate, carriers may take proactive administrative actions, such as by restricting the ability of agencies known or suspected to be supporting irregular migration to conduct financial transactions with airlines for the purpose of making reservations and ticketing.

Recommendation 3:  Undertake appropriate due diligence.  Airlines can reduce risk by carrying out appropriate due diligence to protect against the exploitation of services.  Conducting increased diligence when dealing with intermediary companies (e.g., travel agents or brokers) that conceal their ownership or otherwise engage in unusually opaque practices.  Doing so can help mitigate deceptive practices that create risk.

Recommendation 4:  Transmit Advance Passenger Information (API).  All airlines should comply with government regulations requiring the transmission of accurate and timely Advance Passenger Information (API) prior to departure, beginning at 24 hours prior to scheduled takeoff to enable proper record checks and offload recommendations.

Actions the United States will Continue to Take to Halt Irregular Migration and the Exploitation of Migrant Populations:

Action 1:  Government-to-Government Training and Information Sharing:  The U.S. Government will work with governments to identify travel patterns and routes of concern and share indicators and best practices for addressing irregular migration.

Action 2:  Industry Training:  The U.S. Government will share information with and train airlines to help them detect migrant smuggling and human trafficking cases, signs of irregular migration, fraudulent documents, and imposters.  Enhancing foreign partner passenger analysis units and helping them fully leverage Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) transmission will aid in illuminating emerging trends, targeting malafide passengers, and identifying migration facilitators.

Action 3:  Visa Restrictions:  Under Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) Section 212(a)(3)(C), the Secretary of State has recently announced a visa restriction policy that targets owners, executives, and senior officials of companies providing transportation by land, sea, or charter air designed for use primarily by persons intending to migrate irregularly to the United States.  

The State Department has taken steps to impose visa restrictions on several individuals and their family members for knowingly facilitating the travel of irregular migrants to the U.S. southwest border.

Action 4:  Sanctioning transnational criminal organizations:  The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) will continue to impose sanctions on transnational criminal organizations, including migrant smuggling organizations, their facilitators, and their support networks, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13581, as amended by E. O. 13863.  OFAC is also prepared to use, as appropriate, other sanctions authorities to target human smuggling activity, including its Global Magnitsky authorities under E.O. 13818 that target persons involved in corruption or serious human rights abuses related to human smuggling and other irregular migration. 

Sanctions actions apply broadly and carry serious consequences.  OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons with or within the United States involving the property or interests in property of any individual or entity that is sanctioned.  All U.S. persons must comply with OFAC’s prohibitions—including all U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens whether in the United States or abroad, all persons within the United States, and all U.S.-incorporated entities and their foreign branches.  Violations of OFAC regulations could trigger civil or criminal penalties.  Moreover, OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations based on strict liability, meaning that a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction may be held civilly liable even if that person did not know or have reason to know that it was engaging in a transaction that was prohibited under sanctions laws and regulations administered by OFAC.

Action 5:  Investigate and prosecute migrant smuggling and human trafficking:  The U.S. government will continue to investigate and prosecute migrant smuggling and human trafficking cases through collaboration with foreign governments and the aviation industry and pursue criminal charges against migrant smugglers and human traffickers, and their co-conspirators.

CISA, DHS, FBI and International Partners Publish Guide for Protecting High-Risk Communities

Source: US Department of Homeland Security

Informs civil society organizations and individuals of cyber adversary behaviors and actions to mitigate this threat

WASHINGTON – The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in collaboration with cyber partners from Canada, Estonia, Japan and United Kingdom, published “Mitigating Cyber Threats with Limited Resources: Guidance for Civil Society” today which provides civil society organizations with recommended actions and mitigations to reduce their risk of cyber intrusions, particularly from state-sponsored cyber actors. It also strongly encourages software manufactures to actively implement and publicly commit to Secure by Design practices that are necessary to help protect vulnerable and high-risk communities.

The guide provides recommended mitigations for civil society organizations, which include implementing phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA), using caution when sharing information on social media, prioritizing vendors that align their practices to Secure by Design principles, and ensuring awareness of social engineering tactics.

“State-sponsored actors seek to undermine fundamental democratic and humanitarian values and interests supported by civil society organizations and individuals. However, these high-risk community organizations often lack cyber threat information and security resources,” said Jen Easterly Director CISA. “With our federal and international partners, we are providing this resource to help these organizations better understand the cyber threats they face and help them improve their cyber safety.”

“The FBI and its partners are putting out this guidance so that civil society organizations have the capacity to mitigate the threats that they face in the cyber realm,” said Assistant Director Bryan Vorndran of the FBI’s Cyber Division. “We’d like to help these entities, whether they are nonprofits, think tanks, or groups working to defend human rights and advance democracy, defend themselves against malicious state-sponsored actors looking to exploit them.”

“We thank CISA and partners for close cooperation on releasing this guidance. It was confirmed in Japan that organizations and individuals such as academia, think tanks and journalists have been targeted by cyberattacks.,” said Mr. Atsuo Suzuki, Director General, Japan National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC). “We would like to partner with co-sealing countries and organizations of this guidance to make contribution to enhancing cybersecurity.”

“Last couple of years have shown that every organisation can be targeted with malicious cyber activities. The root of this problem lies typically in lack of knowledge about cyber threats, or cyber threaths not taken as seriously as they should be. It is important to raise awareness and provide guidelines, such as the freshly published guidance for civil society organisations and individuals. I invite all organisations to make good use of the guide and to learn how to take the necessary steps to protect yourself from cyber threats,“ said Gert Auväärt, Director of Cyber Security of the Estonian State Information Authority (RIA).

“The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, a part of CSE, welcomes this report. The best way to protect Canada and our global partners from the growing threat of foreign interference, and digital transnational repression is to raise awareness about the threat,” said Sami Khoury, Head, Canadian Centre for Cyber Security. “We all have a role to play in defending our democratic institutions, including our civil society organizations and individuals.”

“Civil society groups play a crucial role in upholding our democratic values in the UK and around the world and so it is vital they have the information they need to protect themselves online,” said Felicity Oswald, Chief Executive of the United Kingdom National Cyber Security Centre. “This new guidance, developed with international partners, will help those with limited resources ensure they have strong security measures in place to manage the greater risk of targeting that they face. We are committed to our ongoing collaboration with likeminded countries to raise the collective resilience of global democracy and safeguard civil society from cyber threats.”

“Preparing for global cyber threats requires national and international cooperation. This report is an excellent example of confidential cooperation with our international partners. This guide also supports our work to improve cyber security awareness in Finland,” says Anssi Kärkkäinen, deputy director general of National Cyber Security Centre Finland (NCSC-FI)

Malicious state-sponsored actors use various tactics to gain initial access and then often install spyware on the compromised devices to conduct more extensive surveillance, such as location tracking and access to files. The guide provides a list of state-sponsored actors known to target civil society organizations primarily from Russia, China, Iran and North Korea, along with an overview of their known tactics and techniques. The overview helps organizations better understand the adversarial behavior so their leadership can make informed resourcing decisions on basic cybersecurity controls.

In addition to CISA, partnering agencies include:

Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS I&A), 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), Estonian National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-EE), National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC) Japan, National Police Agency (NPA) Japan, Japan Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center (JPCERT/CC), National Cyber Security Centre – Finland (NCSC-FI), and United Kingdom National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-UK).

For more information, see CISA’s Cybersecurity Resources for High-Risk Communities webpage.

#StopRansomware: Black Basta

Source: US Department of Homeland Security

SUMMARY

Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) (hereafter referred to as the authoring organizations) are releasing this joint CSA to provide information on Black Basta, a ransomware variant whose actors have encrypted and stolen data from at least 12 out of 16 critical infrastructure sectors, including the Healthcare and Public Health (HPH) Sector.

This joint CSA provides TTPs and IOCs obtained from FBI investigations and third-party reporting. Black Basta is considered a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) variant and was first identified in April 2022. Black Basta affiliates have impacted a wide range of businesses and critical infrastructure in North America, Europe, and Australia. As of May 2024, Black Basta affiliates have impacted over 500 organizations globally.

Black Basta affiliates use common initial access techniques—such as phishing and exploiting known vulnerabilities—and then employ a double-extortion model, both encrypting systems and exfiltrating data. Ransom notes do not generally include an initial ransom demand or payment instructions. Instead, the notes provide victims with a unique code and instructs them to contact the ransomware group via a .onion URL (reachable through the Tor browser). Typically, the ransom notes give victims between 10 and 12 days to pay the ransom before the ransomware group publishes their data on the Black Basta TOR site, Basta News.

Healthcare organizations are attractive targets for cybercrime actors due to their size, technological dependence, access to personal health information, and unique impacts from patient care disruptions. The authoring organizations urge HPH Sector and all critical infrastructure organizations to apply the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood of compromise from Black Basta and other ransomware attacks. Victims of ransomware should report the incident to their local FBI field office or CISA (see the Reporting section for contact information).

Download the PDF version of this report:

TECHNICAL DETAILS

Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework, version 15. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section for a table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK® tactics and techniques. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.

Initial Access

Black Basta affiliates primarily use spearphishing [T1566] to obtain initial access. According to cybersecurity researchers, affiliates have also used Qakbot during initial access.[1]

Starting in February 2024, Black Basta affiliates began exploiting ConnectWise vulnerability CVE-2024-1709 [CWE-288] [T1190]. In some instances, affiliates have been observed abusing valid credentials [T1078].

Discovery and Execution

Black Basta affiliates use tools such as SoftPerfect network scanner (netscan.exe) to conduct network scanning. Cybersecurity researchers have observed affiliates conducting reconnaissance using utilities with innocuous file names such as Intel or Dell, left in the root drive C: [T1036].[1]

Lateral Movement

Black Basta affiliates use tools such as BITSAdmin and PsExec, along with Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), for lateral movement. Some affiliates also use tools like Splashtop, Screen Connect, and Cobalt Strike beacons to assist with remote access and lateral movement.

Privilege Escalation and Lateral Movement

Black Basta affiliates use credential scraping tools like Mimikatz for privilege escalation. According to cybersecurity researchers, Black Basta affiliates have also exploited ZeroLogon (CVE-2020-1472, [CWE-330]), NoPac (CVE-2021-42278 [CWE-20] and CVE-2021-42287 [CWE-269]), and PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-34527, [CWE-269]) vulnerabilities for local and Windows Active Domain privilege escalation [T1068].[1],[2]

Exfiltration and Encryption

Black Basta affiliates use RClone to facilitate data exfiltration prior to encryption. Prior to exfiltration, cybersecurity researchers have observed Black Basta affiliates using PowerShell [T1059.001] to disable antivirus products, and in some instances, deploying a tool called Backstab, designed to disable endpoint detection and response (EDR) tooling [T1562.001].[3] Once antivirus programs are terminated, a ChaCha20 algorithm with an RSA-4096 public key fully encrypts files [T1486]. A .basta or otherwise random file extension is added to file names and a ransom note titled readme.txt is left on the compromised system.[4] To further inhibit system recovery, affiliates use the vssadmin.exe program to delete volume shadow copies [T1490].[5]

Leveraged Tools

See Table 1 for publicly available tools and applications used by Black Basta affiliates. This includes legitimate tools repurposed for their operations.

Disclaimer: Use of these tools and applications should not be attributed as malicious without analytical evidence to support threat actor use and/or control.

Table 1: Tools Used by Black Basta Affiliates
Tool Name Description
BITSAdmin A command-line utility that manages downloads/uploads between a client and server by using the Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) to perform asynchronous file transfers.
Cobalt Strike A penetration testing tool used by security professions to test the security of networks and systems. Black Basta affiliates have used it to assist with lateral movement and file execution.
Mimikatz A tool that allows users to view and save authentication credentials such as Kerberos tickets. Black Basta affiliates have used it to aid in privilege escalation.
PSExec A tool designed to run programs and execute commands on remote systems.
PowerShell A cross-platform task automation solution made up of a command-line shell, a scripting language, and a configuration management framework, which runs on Windows, Linux, and macOS.
RClone A command line program used to sync files with cloud storage services such as Mega.
SoftPerfect A network scanner (netscan.exe) used to ping computers, scan ports, discover shared folders, and retrieve information about network devices via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP), HTTP, Secure Shell (SSH) and PowerShell. It also scans for remote services, registry, files, and performance counters. 
ScreenConnect Remote support, access, and meeting software that allows users to control devices remotely over the internet.
Splashtop Remote desktop software that allows remote access to devices for support, access, and collaboration.
WinSCP Windows Secure Copy is a free and open source SSH File Transfer Protocol, File Transfer Protocol, WebDAV, Amazon S3, and secure copy protocol client. Black Basta affiliates have used it to transfer data from a compromised network to actor-controlled accounts.

MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

See Tables 2–6 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory.

Table 2: Black Basta ATT&CK Techniques for Initial Access
Technique Title ID Use
Phishing T1566 Black Basta affiliates have used spearphishing emails to obtain initial access.
Exploit Public-Facing Application T1190 Black Basta affiliates have exploited ConnectWise vulnerability CVE-2024-1709 to obtain initial access.
Table 3: Black Basta ATT&CK Techniques for Privilege Escalation
Technique Title ID Use
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation T1068 Black Basta affiliates have used credential scraping tools like Mimikatz, Zerologon, NoPac and PrintNightmare for privilege escalation.
Table 4: Black Basta ATT&CK Techniques for Defense Evasion
Technique Title ID Use
Masquerading T1036 Black Basta affiliates have conducted reconnaissance using utilities with innocuous file names, such as Intel or Dell, to evade detection.
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools T1562.001

Black Basta affiliates have deployed a tool called Backstab to disable endpoint detection and response (EDR) tooling.

Black Basta affiliates have used PowerShell to disable antivirus products.

Table 5: Black Basta ATT&CK Techniques for Execution
Technique Title ID Use
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1059.001 Black Basta affiliates have used PowerShell to disable antivirus products.
Table 6: Black Basta ATT&CK Techniques for Impact
Technique Title ID Use
Inhibit System Recovery T1490 Black Basta affiliates have used the vssadmin.exe program to delete shadow copies. 
Data Encrypted for Impact T1486 Black Basta affiliates have used a public key to fully encrypt files. 

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

See Table 7 for IOCs obtained from FBI investigations.

Table 7: Malicious Files Associated with Black Basta Ransomware
Hash Description
0112e3b20872760dda5f658f6b546c85f126e803e27f0577b294f335ffa5a298 rclone.exe
d3683beca3a40574e5fd68d30451137e4a8bbaca8c428ebb781d565d6a70385e Winscp.exe
88c8b472108e0d79d16a1634499c1b45048a10a38ee799054414613cc9dccccc DLL
58ddbea084ce18cfb3439219ebcf2fc5c1605d2f6271610b1c7af77b8d0484bd DLL
39939eacfbc20a2607064994497e3e886c90cd97b25926478434f46c95bd8ead DLL
5b2178c7a0fd69ab00cef041f446e04098bbb397946eda3f6755f9d94d53c221 DLL
51eb749d6cbd08baf9d43c2f83abd9d4d86eb5206f62ba43b768251a98ce9d3e DLL
d15bfbc181aac8ce9faa05c2063ef4695c09b718596f43edc81ca02ef03110d1 DLL
5942143614d8ed34567ea472c2b819777edd25c00b3e1b13b1ae98d7f9e28d43 DLL
05ebae760340fe44362ab7c8f70b2d89d6c9ba9b9ee8a9f747b2f19d326c3431 DLL
a7b36482ba5bca7a143a795074c432ed627d6afa5bc64de97fa660faa852f1a6 DLL
86a4dd6be867846b251460d2a0874e6413589878d27f2c4482b54cec134cc737 DLL
07117c02a09410f47a326b52c7f17407e63ba5e6ff97277446efc75b862d2799 DLL
96339a7e87ffce6ced247feb9b4cb7c05b83ca315976a9522155bad726b8e5be ELF
1c1b2d7f790750d60a14bd661dae5c5565f00c6ca7d03d062adcecda807e1779 ELF
360c9c8f0a62010d455f35588ef27817ad35c715a5f291e43449ce6cb1986b98 ELF
0554eb2ffa3582b000d558b6950ec60e876f1259c41acff2eac47ab78a53e94a EXE
9a55f55886285eef7ffabdd55c0232d1458175b1d868c03d3e304ce7d98980bc EXE
62e63388953bb30669b403867a3ac2c8130332cf78133f7fd4a7f23cdc939087 EXE
7ad4324ea241782ea859af12094f89f9a182236542627e95b6416c8fb9757c59 EXE
350ba7fca67721c74385faff083914ecdd66ef107a765dfb7ac08b38d5c9c0bd EXE
90ba27750a04d1308115fa6a90f36503398a8f528c974c5adc07ae8a6cd630e7 EXE
fafaff3d665b26b5c057e64b4238980589deb0dff0501497ac50be1bc91b3e08 EXE
acb60f0dd19a9a26aaaefd3326db8c28f546b6b0182ed2dcc23170bcb0af6d8f EXE
d73f6e240766ddd6c3c16eff8db50794ab8ab95c6a616d4ab2bc96780f13464d EXE
f039eaaced72618eaba699d2985f9e10d252ac5fe85d609c217b45bc8c3614f4 EXE
723d1cf3d74fb3ce95a77ed9dff257a78c8af8e67a82963230dd073781074224 EXE
ae7c868713e1d02b4db60128c651eb1e3f6a33c02544cc4cb57c3aa6c6581b6e EXE
fff35c2da67eef6f1a10c585b427ac32e7f06f4e4460542207abcd62264e435f EXE
df5b004be71717362e6b1ad22072f9ee4113b95b5d78c496a90857977a9fb415 EXE
462bbb8fd7be98129aa73efa91e2d88fa9cafc7b47431b8227d1957f5d0c8ba7 EXE
3c50f6369f0938f42d47db29a1f398e754acb2a8d96fd4b366246ac2ccbe250a EXE
5d2204f3a20e163120f52a2e3595db19890050b2faa96c6cba6b094b0a52b0aa EXE
37a5cd265f7f555f2fe320a68d70553b7aa9601981212921d1ac2c114e662004 EXE
3090a37e591554d7406107df87b3dc21bda059df0bc66244e8abef6a5678af35 EXE
17879ed48c2a2e324d4f5175112f51b75f4a8ab100b8833c82e6ddb7cd817f20 EXE
42f05f5d4a2617b7ae0bc601dd6c053bf974f9a337a8fcc51f9338b108811b78 EXE
882019d1024778e13841db975d5e60aaae1482fcf86ba669e819a68ce980d7d3 EXE
e28188e516db1bda9015c30de59a2e91996b67c2e2b44989a6b0f562577fd757 EXE
0a8297b274aeab986d6336b395b39b3af1bb00464cf5735d1ecdb506fef9098e EXE
69192821f8ce4561cf9c9cb494a133584179116cb2e7409bea3e18901a1ca944 EXE
3337a7a9ccdd06acdd6e3cf4af40d871172d0a0e96fc48787b574ac93689622a EXE
17205c43189c22dfcb278f5cc45c2562f622b0b6280dcd43cc1d3c274095eb90 EXE
b32daf27aa392d26bdf5faafbaae6b21cd6c918d461ff59f548a73d447a96dd9 EXE

See Tables 8–11 for IOCs obtained from trusted third-party reporting.

Disclaimer: The authoring organizations recommend network defenders investigate or vet IP addresses prior to taking action, such as blocking, as many cyber actors are known to change IP addresses, sometimes daily, and some IP addresses may host valid domains.

Table 8: Network Indicators
IP Address Description
66.249.66[.]18 0gpw.588027fa.dns.realbumblebee[.]net, dns.trailshop[.]net, dns.artspathgroupe[.]net
66.249.66[.]18 my.2a91c002002.588027fa.dns.realbumblebee[.]net
66.249.66[.]18 fy9.39d9030e5d3a8e2352daae2f4cd3c417b36f64c6644a783b9629147a1.afd8b8a4615358e0313bad8c544a1af0d8efcec0e8056c2c8eee96c7.b06d1825c0247387e38851b06be0272b0bd619b7c9636bc17b09aa70.a46890f27.588027fa.dns.realbumblebee[.]net
95.181.173[.]227 adslsdfdsfmo[.]world
  fy9.36c44903529fa273afff3c9b7ef323432e223d22ae1d625c4a3957d57.015c16eff32356bf566c4fd3590c6ff9b2f6e8c587444ecbfc4bcae7.f71995aff9e6f22f8daffe9d2ad9050abc928b8f93bb0d42682fd3c3.445de2118.588027fa.dns.realbumblebee[.]net
207.126.152[.]242 xkpal.d6597fa.dns.blocktoday.net
nuher.3577125d2a75f6a277fc5714ff536c5c6af5283d928a66daad6825b9a.7aaf8bba88534e88ec89251c57b01b322c7f52c7f1a5338930ae2a50.cbb47411f60fe58f76cf79d300c03bdecfb9e83379f59d80b8494951.e10c20f77.7fcc0eb6.dns.blocktoday[.]net
72.14.196[.]50 .rasapool[.]net, dns.trailshop[.]net
72.14.196[.]192 .rasapool[.]net
72.14.196[.]2 .rasapool[.]net
72.14.196[.]226 .rasapool[.]net
46.161.27[.]151  
207.126.152[.]242 nuher.1d67bbcf4.456d87aa6.2d84dfba.dns.specialdrills[.]com
185.219.221[.]136  
64.176.219[.]106  
5.78.115[.]67 your-server[.]de
207.126.152[.]242 xkpal.1a4a64b6.dns.blocktoday[.]net
46.8.16[.]77  
185.7.214[.]79 VPN Server
185.220.100[.]240 Tor exit
107.189.30[.]69 Tor exit
5.183.130[.]92  
185.220.101[.]149 Tor exit
188.130.218[.]39  
188.130.137[.]181  
46.8.10[.]134  
155.138.246[.]122  
80.239.207[.]200 winklen[.]ch
183.181.86[.]147 Xserver[.]jp
34.149.120[.]3  
104.21.40[.]72  
34.250.161[.]149  
88.198.198[.]90 your-server[.]de; literoved[.]ru
151.101.130[.]159  
35.244.153[.]44  
35.212.86[.]55  
34.251.163[.]236  
34.160.81[.]203  
34.149.36[.]179  
104.21.26[.]145  
83.243.40[.]10  
35.227.194[.]51  
35.190.31[.]54  
34.120.190[.]48  
116.203.186[.]178  
34.160.17[.]71  
Table 9: File Indicators
Filename Hash
C:UsersPublicAudioJun.exe b6a4f4097367d9c124f51154d8750ea036a812d5badde0baf9c5f183bb53dd24
C:UsersPublicAudioesx.zip  
C:UsersPublicAudio7zG.exe f21240e0bf9f0a391d514e34d4fa24ecb997d939379d2260ebce7c693e55f061
C:UsersPublicAudio7z.dll  
C:UsersPublicdb_Usr.sql 8501e14ee6ee142122746333b936c9ab0fc541328f37b5612b6804e6cdc2c2c6
C:UsersPublicAudiodb_Usr.sql  
C:UsersPublicAudiohv2.ps1  
C:UsersPublic7zG.exe  
C:UsersPublic7z.dll  
C:UsersPublicBitLogic.dll  
C:UsersPublicNetApp.exe 4c897334e6391e7a2fa3cbcbf773d5a4
C:UsersPublicDataSoft.exe 2642ec377c0cee3235571832cb472870
C:UsersPublicBitData.exe b3fe23dd4701ed00d79c03043b0b952e
C:UsersPublicDigitalText.dll  
C:UsersPublicGeniusMesh.exe  
DeviceMup{redacted}C$UsersPublicMusicPROCEXP.sys  
DeviceMup{redacted}C$UsersPublicMusicDumpNParse86.exe  
DeviceMup{redacted}C$UsersPublicMusicPOSTDump.exe  
DeviceMup{redacted}C$UsersPublicMusicDumpNParse.exe  
C:UsersPublicsocksps.ps1  
C:UsersPublicThief.exe 034b5fe047920b2ae9493451623633b14a85176f5eea0c7aadc110ea1730ee79

C:UsersAll Users{redacted}GWT.ps1

C:Program FilesMonitorITGWT.ps1

8C68B2A794BA3D148CAE91BDF9C8D357289752A94118B5558418A36D95A5A45F

Winx86.exe 

Comment: alias for cmd.exe

 
C:UsersPubliceucr.exe 3c65da7f7bfdaf9acc6445abbedd9c4e927d37bb9e3629f34afc338058680407
C:WindowsDS_c1.dll 808c96cb90b7de7792a827c6946ff48123802959635a23bf9d98478ae6a259f9
C:WindowsDS_c1.dll 3a8fc07cadc08eeb8be342452636a754158403c3d4ebff379a4ae66f8298d9a6
C:WindowsDS_c1.dll 4ac69411ed124da06ad66ee8bfbcea2f593b5b199a2c38496e1ee24f9d04f34a
C:WindowsDS_c1.dll 819cb9bcf62be7666db5666a693524070b0df589c58309b067191b30480b0c3a
C:WindowsDS_c1.dll c26a5cb62a78c467cc6b6867c7093fbb7b1a96d92121d4d6c3f0557ef9c881e0
C:WindowsDS_c1.dll d503090431fdd99c9df3451d9b73c5737c79eda6eb80c148b8dc71e84623401f
*instructions_read_me.txt  
Table 10: Known Black Basta Cobalt Strike Domains
Domain Date/Time (UTC)/Time (UTC)
trailshop[.]net 5/8/2024 6:37
realbumblebee[.]net 5/8/2024 6:37
recentbee[.]net 5/8/2024 6:37
investrealtydom[.]net 5/8/2024 6:37
webnubee[.]com 5/8/2024 6:37
artspathgroup[.]net 5/8/2024 6:37
buyblocknow[.]com 5/8/2024 6:37
currentbee[.]net 5/8/2024 6:37
modernbeem[.]net 5/8/2024 6:37
startupbusiness24[.]net 5/8/2024 6:37
magentoengineers[.]com 5/8/2024 6:37
childrensdolls[.]com 5/8/2024 6:37
myfinancialexperts[.]com 5/8/2024 6:37
limitedtoday[.]com 5/8/2024 6:37
kekeoamigo[.]com 5/8/2024 6:37
nebraska-lawyers[.]com 5/8/2024 6:37
tomlawcenter[.]com 5/8/2024 6:37
thesmartcloudusa[.]com 5/8/2024 6:37
rasapool[.]net 5/8/2024 6:37
artspathgroupe[.]net 5/8/2024 6:37
specialdrills[.]com 5/8/2024 6:37
thetrailbig[.]net 5/8/2024 6:37
consulheartinc[.]com 3/22/2024 15:35
otxcosmeticscare[.]com 3/15/2024 10:14
otxcarecosmetics[.]com 3/15/2024 10:14
artstrailman[.]com 3/15/2024 10:14
ontexcare[.]com 3/15/2024 10:14
trackgroup[.]net 3/15/2024 10:14
businessprofessionalllc[.]com 3/15/2024 10:14
securecloudmanage[.]com 3/7/2024 10:42
oneblackwood[.]com 3/7/2024 10:42
buygreenstudio[.]com 3/7/2024 10:42
startupbuss[.]com 3/7/2024 10:42
onedogsclub[.]com 3/4/2024 18:26
wipresolutions[.]com 3/4/2024 18:26
recentbeelive[.]com 3/4/2024 18:26
trailcocompany[.]com 3/4/2024 18:26
trailcosolutions[.]com 3/4/2024 18:26
artstrailreviews[.]com 3/4/2024 18:26
usaglobalnews[.]com 2/15/2024 5:56
topglobaltv[.]com 2/15/2024 5:56
startupmartec[.]net 2/15/2024 5:56
technologgies[.]com 1/2/2024 18:16
jenshol[.]com 1/2/2024 18:16
simorten[.]com 1/2/2024 18:16
investmentgblog[.]net 1/2/2024 18:16
protectionek[.]com 1/2/2024 18:16
Table 11: Suspected Black Basta Domains
airbusco[.]net
allcompanycenter[.]com
animalsfast[.]net
audsystemecll[.]net
auuditoe[.]com
bluenetworking[.]net
brendonline[.]com
businesforhome[.]com
caspercan[.]com
clearsystemwo[.]net
cloudworldst[.]net
constrtionfirst[.]com
erihudeg[.]com
garbagemoval[.]com
gartenlofti[.]com
getfnewsolutions[.]com
getfnewssolutions[.]com
investmendvisor[.]net
investmentrealtyhp[.]net
ionoslaba[.]com
jessvisser[.]com
karmafisker[.]com
kolinileas[.]com
maluisepaul[.]com
masterunix[.]net
monitor-websystem[.]net
monitorsystem[.]net
mytrailinvest[.]net
prettyanimals[.]net
reelsysmoona[.]net
seohomee[.]com
septcntr[.]com
softradar[.]net
startupbizaud[.]net
startuptechnologyw[.]net
steamteamdev[.]net
stockinvestlab[.]net
taskthebox[.]net
trailgroupl[.]net
treeauwin[.]net
unitedfrom[.]com
unougn[.]com
wardeli[.]com
welausystem[.]net
wellsystemte[.]net
withclier[.]com

MITIGATIONS

The authoring organizations recommend all critical infrastructure organizations implement the mitigations below to improve your organization’s cybersecurity posture based on Black Basta’s activity. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Visit CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.

The authoring organizations also recommend network defenders of HPH Sector and other critical infrastructure organizations to reference CISA’s Mitigation Guide: Healthcare and Public Health (HPH) Sector and HHS’s HPH Cybersecurity Performance Goals, which provide best practices to combat pervasive cyber threats against organizations. Recommendations include the following:

  • Asset Management and Security: Cybersecurity professionals should identify and understand all relationships or interdependencies, functionality of each asset, what it exposes, and what software is running to ensure critical data and systems are protected appropriately. HPH Sector organizations should ensure electronic PHI (ePHI) is protected and compliant with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). Organizations can complete asset inventories using active scans, passive processes, or a combination of both techniques.
  • Email Security and Phishing Prevention: Organizations should install modern anti-malware software and automatically update signatures where possible. For additional guidance, see CISA’s Enhance Email and Web Security Guide.
    • Check for embedded or spoofed hyperlinks: Validate the URL of the link matches the text of the link itself. This can be achieved by hovering your cursor over the link to view the URL of the website to be accessed.
  • Access Management: Phishing-resistant MFA completes the same process but removes ‘people’ from the equation to help thwart social engineering scams and targeted phishing attacks that may have been successful using traditional MFA. The two main forms of phishing-resistant MFA are FIDO/Web Authentication (WebAuthn) authentication and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)-based authentication. Prioritize phishing-resistant MFA on accounts with the highest risk, such as privileged administrative accounts on key assets. For additional information on phishing-resistant MFA, see CISA’s Implementing Phishing-Resistant MFA Guide.
  • Vulnerability Management and Assessment: Once vulnerabilities are identified across your environment, evaluate and prioritize to appropriately deal with the posed risks according to your organization’s risk strategy. To assist with prioritization, it is essential to:
    • Map your assets to business-critical functions. For vulnerability remediation, prioritize assets that are most critical for ongoing operations or which, if affected, could impact your organization’s business continuity, sensitive PII (or PHI) security, reputation, or financial position.
    • Use threat intelligence information. For remediation, prioritize vulnerabilities actively exploited by threat actors. To assist, leverage CISA’s KEV Catalog and other threat intelligence feeds.
    • Leverage prioritization methodologies, ratings, and scores. The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) assesses the technical severity of vulnerabilities. The Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) measures the likelihood of exploitation and can help with deciding which vulnerabilities to prioritize. CISA’s Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) methodology leverages decision trees to prioritize relevant vulnerabilities into four decisions, Track, Track*, Attend, and Act based on exploitation status, technical impact, mission prevalence, and impacts to safety and public-wellbeing.

VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS

In addition to applying mitigations, the authoring organizations recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. The authoring organizations recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.

To get started:

  1. Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Tables 2-6).
  2. Align your security technologies against the technique.
  3. Test your technologies against the technique.
  4. Analyze your detection and prevention technologies’ performance.
  5. Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
  6. Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.

The authoring organizations recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.

REFERENCES

  1. SentinelOne: Black Basta Ransomware | Attacks Deploy Custom EDR Evasion Tools Tied to FIN7 Threat Actor
  2. Trend Micro: Ransomware Spotlight – Black Basta
  3. Kroll: Black Basta – Technical Analysis
  4. Who Is Black Basta? (blackberry.com)
  5. Palo Alto Networks: Threat Assessment – Black Basta Ransomware

REPORTING

Your organization has no obligation to respond or provide information back to FBI in response to this joint CSA. If, after reviewing the information provided, your organization decides to provide information to FBI, reporting must be consistent with applicable state and federal laws.

FBI is interested in any information that can be shared, to include boundary logs showing communication to and from foreign IP addresses, a sample ransom note, communications with threat actors, Bitcoin wallet information, decryptor files, and/or a benign sample of an encrypted file.

Additional details of interest include: a targeted company point of contact, status and scope of infection, estimated loss, operational impact, transaction IDs, date of infection, date detected, initial attack vector, and host- and network-based indicators.

FBI, CISA, and HHS do not encourage paying ransom as payment does not guarantee victim files will be recovered. Furthermore, payment may also embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. Regardless of whether you or your organization have decided to pay the ransom, FBI and CISA urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents to FBI’s Internet Crime Complain Center (IC3), a local FBI Field Office, or CISA via the agency’s Incident Reporting System or its 24/7 Operations Center (report@cisa.gov or by calling 1-844-Say-CISA [1-844-729-2472]).

DISCLAIMER

The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. FBI, CISA, HHS, and MS-ISAC do not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by FBI, CISA, HHS, and MS-ISAC.

VERSION HISTORY

May 10, 2024: Initial version.

DHS Announces Proposed Rule and Other Measures to Enhance Security, Streamline Asylum Processing

Source: US Department of Homeland Security

WASHINGTON – As part of the Biden-Harris Administration’s continued efforts to enhance the security of our border and deliver more timely consequences for those encountered who do not have a legal basis to remain in the United States, today the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), through U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that would allow statutory bars to asylum to be applied much earlier in the process. Even though the number of migrants who are subject to these bars is small, this rule would enable DHS to more quickly remove those who are subject to the bars and pose a risk to our national security or public safety.

Federal law bars individuals who pose a national security or public safety risk from asylum and withholding of removal, specifically those who have been convicted of a particularly serious crime, participated in the persecution of others, are inadmissible on national security or terrorism-related grounds, or for whom there are reasonable grounds to deem them a danger to the security of the United States. While anyone who is deemed to pose a public safety threat is taken into custody, the asylum eligibility determination is not currently made until later in the process – at the merits adjudication stage of the asylum and withholding of removal claims. Today’s proposed rule would permit Asylum Officers to consider these bars to asylum and withholding of removal during initial credible fear screening, which happens just days after an individual is encountered. This will allow DHS to expeditiously remove individuals who pose a threat to the United States much sooner than is currently the case, better safeguarding the security of our border and our country.

“The proposed rule we have published today is yet another step in our ongoing efforts to ensure the safety of the American public by more quickly identifying and removing those individuals who present a security risk and have no legal basis to remain here,” said Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas. “We will continue to take action, but fundamentally it is only Congress that can fix what everyone agrees is a broken immigration system.”

Noncitizens who present a national security or public safety risk remain in DHS custody while their cases are referred for full immigration hearings before an immigration judge, a process that can take years and is resource intensive. The proposed rule would allow Asylum Officers to issue denial of claims within days after an individual is encountered when there is evidence that the individual is barred from asylum because of a terrorism, national security, or criminal bar, thereby significantly shortening the overall time between encounter and removal from the United States.

In addition to this proposed rule and in close coordination with vetting and law enforcement partners, DHS is updating its policy and procedures regarding the use of classified information in immigration proceedings. This updated guidance clarifies the circumstances in which classified information should be used in immigration proceedings. Consistent with longstanding practice, DHS will continue to screen and vet individuals prior to their entry to the United States to identify national security or public safety threats and take appropriate action.

The Department also continues enforcing the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways (CLP) rule. This rule incentivizes the use of orderly processes and imposes swifter consequences for those without a legal basis to remain in the United States. Today, USCIS issued revised guidance to Asylum Officers to consider whether an asylum seeker could reasonably relocate to another part of the country of feared persecution when assessing claims of future persecution in all credible fear cases. Internal relocation has always been a part of an analysis of future claims of harm, and this new guidance, consistent with the CLP rule, will ensure early identification and removal of individuals who would ultimately be found ineligible for protection because of their ability to remain safe by relocating elsewhere in the country from which they fled.

The Biden-Harris Administration has already taken numerous actions to address migration challenges in the region and at our border, while overseeing a historic expansion of lawful pathways. These efforts, with partner countries in the region and across the world, have made a significant impact. From May 12, 2023 through May 1, 2024, DHS has removed or returned more than 720,000 individuals, the vast majority of whom crossed the Southwest Border, including more than 109,000 individual family members. That includes removals to 170 countries around the world. Total removals and returns since mid-May 2023 exceed removals and returns in every full fiscal year since 2011. DHS has also significantly expanded the capacity to conduct the credible fear interviews needed to ultimately remove those without a legal basis to stay in the United States.

The Administration again calls on Congress to pass needed reforms and provide DHS the resources and tools it needs to fully implement expedited processing of all individuals encountered at the border. The public is invited to submit comments on the NPRM during the 30-day public comment period from May 13, 2024 to June 12, 2024.