El Salvador Continues to Improve Cancer Control Planning, Resources and Access

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

El Salvador has made significant progress in terms of implementing its National Cancer Control Plan, concluded a team of international experts during a recent imPACT Review mission to the country. To continue leveraging earlier achievements such as the new national law for the prevention, control and care of patients with cancer, however, more work is needed to streamline data collection, harmonize the delivery of diagnostic and therapeutic services across institutions, and reliably estimate costs.

The Review — carried out from February to June 2023 on request of the Salvadoran Ministry of Health – included a week-long field programme and resulted in a comprehensive set of tailor-made recommendations based on existing cancer control efforts in the country and in line with international quality and safety standards.

Among its population of 6.5 million, El Salvador reports over 9600 new cancer cases annually, primarily of the prostate and breast. The country’s public health system provides full coverage of its services to such patients, who are typically referred to one of three national hospitals — Benjamin Bloom, Nacional de la Mujer and Rosales.

“The IAEA’s technical cooperation program with El Salvador has been instrumental to support the strengthening of cancer prevention and control initiated by the Government after the imPACT Review in 2015. Therefore, we gladly welcome this important tool, which gives us the opportunity to periodically evaluate the progress made and to develop new strategies adapted to the capacities and needs of the country,” said Adriana Mira, Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs of El Salvador.

The Ministry of Health facilitated visits by the international imPACT team — comprising 11 cancer professionals appointed by IAEA, WHO-PAHO and IARC — to 18 hospitals and health clinics. This included a field trip to the regional hospital of Santa Ana and meeting more than 100 national health professionals as part of the Review.

IAEA Director General’s Statement on Verification in Iran

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Today, the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran), informed me of its decision to withdraw the designation of several experienced Agency inspectors assigned to conduct verification activities in Iran under the NPT Safeguards Agreement. This follows a previous recent withdrawal of the designation of another experienced Agency inspector for Iran. 

These inspectors are among the most experienced Agency experts with unique knowledge in enrichment technology. They have conducted essential verification work at the enrichment facilities in Iran which are under Agency safeguards.

With today’s decision, Iran has effectively removed about one third of the core group of the Agency’s most experienced inspectors designated for Iran.

This measure, while formally permitted by the NPT Safeguards Agreement, has been exercised by Iran in a manner that affects in a direct and severe way the ability of the IAEA to conduct effectively its inspections in Iran.

I strongly condemn this disproportionate and unprecedented unilateral measure which affects the normal planning and conduct of Agency verification activities in Iran and openly contradicts the cooperation that should exist between the Agency and Iran.

This profoundly regrettable decision by Iran is another step in the wrong direction and constitutes an unnecessary blow to an already strained relationship between the IAEA and Iran in the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement.

Without effective cooperation, confidence and trust will continue to be elusive and the Agency will not be in a position to discharge effectively its verification mandate in Iran and provide credible assurances that nuclear material and activities in Iran are for peaceful purposes.

Our experience demonstrates that shutting out Agency inspectors affects our essential verification mandate and is not the way of working in a cooperative manner.

I call upon the Iranian Government to reconsider its decision and to return to a path of cooperation with the Agency. I also call upon the highest authorities of Iran to engage with me at the earliest opportunity to correct course and work with the Agency for the complete clarification of the outstanding safeguards issues.

Rafael Mariano Grossi

Director General of the IAEA

Update 183 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) has been drilling more wells at the site as part of efforts to find new sources of cooling water after the destruction of the downstream Kakhovka dam more than three months ago, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said today.

Since last week, the ZNPP has built another two groundwater wells to supply the sprinkler ponds that cool the six reactors and spent fuel, bringing the total of new wells to nine.

Together they pump around 200 cubic metres of water per hour into the sprinkler ponds, representing almost all the cooling needs of the six shutdown reactors. The remainder of the water comes from the drainage system and clean water that is periodically discharged from the plant’s chemical water treatment facility. The IAEA has been informed that the water supply situation will be assessed after a tenth well has been constructed to see if more will be needed.

“Following the loss of the Kakhovka reservoir, actions have been taken to stabilise the site’s water resources, which are currently sufficient for several months of its cooling requirements in the current conditions,” Director General Grossi said.

“However, the challenges the site has been facing in this regard are further adding to the generally precarious nuclear safety and security situation at Europe’s largest nuclear power plant, especially as our experts are reporting about further indications of increased military activities in the region,” he said.

Underlining the potential dangers for nuclear safety and security during the conflict in Ukraine, the IAEA experts have continued to hear numerous explosions some distance away from the ZNPP, which is located by the frontline.

They were also informed by the ZNPP about further drone attacks, on 11 September, in the nearby city of Enerhodar where many staff live with their families, causing minor damage to two buildings. The ZNPP informed the IAEA experts that there were no casualties reported at that time.

“No action should be taken that could imperil nuclear safety and security at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant in any way. We remain determined to do everything we can to help prevent a nuclear accident during this tragic war. The risks continue to be all too real,” Director General Grossi said.  

At the ZNPP, the IAEA experts have continued to conduct walkdowns of specific areas at the site and meet with staff there.

They have not observed the presence of any new mines or explosives but confirmed the continued presence of mines in the buffer zone between the site’s internal and external perimeter barriers. The IAEA continues to request access to the rooftops of reactor units 1, 2, 5 and 6, and to all six turbine halls, one after the other.

Over the past week, the experts visited the isolation gate at the large cooling pond and confirmed the integrity of the gate and observed the reinforcements that had been made on the side of the Kakhovka reservoir following the dam’s collapse in early June.

The IAEA team also went to the main control room of unit 4, the reactor hall of unit 3, the turbine hall of unit 2 and a liquid waste treatment facility.

The six reactor units remain in shutdown, with units 1 to 5 in cold shutdown and unit 6 in hot shutdown to generate steam for various nuclear safety functions. For example, the steam from unit 6 is used in the liquid waste treatment facility that the IAEA experts visited this week.

During the visit and through discussions with ZNPP staff, the IAEA experts were informed that the inventory of liquid waste on site varies, due to the routine generation of waste together with the subsequent treatment of the waste. Currently, there is liquid waste to be treated, after which the site will also treat more such waste resulting from the regeneration of ion exchange resins, which are essential for maintaining the purity of the water, including that needed for the cooling of the spent fuel.

As previously stated, the IAEA experts have strongly been encouraging the ZNPP to investigate all possible options to install an external boiler to generate the steam required, which would enable the plant to bring all units into a cold shutdown state. Also as reported earlier, the Ukraine national regulator – SNRIU – has issued regulatory orders to limit the operation of all six units to a cold shutdown state.

At Ukraine’s three other nuclear power plants and the Chornobyl site, the IAEA teams based at these facilities reported no new nuclear safety and security issues over the past week. A rotation of IAEA experts was successfully conducted at the Chornobyl site earlier this week.

IAEA Mission Finds Poland’s Regulatory Framework in Line with Safety Standards, Stresses Need for Regulatory Independence and Funding

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) mission found Poland’s nuclear regulatory framework to be in line with IAEA safety standards and said its regulatory body is competent and prepared for the launch of the country’s nuclear power programme. The team also said the government must take robust measures to ensure the regulatory body is independent and properly resourced.

The Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) team today concluded a mission to Poland, conducted at the request of the Government of Poland and hosted by the Państwowa Agencja Atomistyki (PAA), the main regulatory body. Using IAEA safety standards and international good practices, IRRS missions are designed to strengthen the effectiveness of the national regulatory infrastructure for nuclear and radiation safety, while recognizing the responsibility of each country.

The 12-day mission – taking place from 4 to 15 September – reviewed Poland’s governmental, legal and regulatory framework for nuclear and radiation safety against IAEA safety standards. It was the second IRRS mission to Poland, following one held in 2013.

Construction of Poland’s first nuclear power plant is planned to begin in 2026 at Lubiatowo-Kopalino in the province of Pomerania. As set out in Polish Nuclear Power Programme, there will be up to six reactors in two or three locations in the country with total generation capacity of 6 to 9 GWe. All units are expected to be online by 2040.

Poland currently operates a single research reactor, MARIA, has a research reactor, EWA, under decommissioning and two spent fuel storage facilities, all located in Otwock, near Warsaw. Industry, medicine and research applications of radioactive sources are widely used. The National Radioactive Waste Repository, located in the town of Rozan, is a near-surface repository for radioactive waste and sealed radioactive sources disposal operated by Radioactive Waste Management Plant (ZUOP).

The mission team consisted of 15 senior regulatory experts from 14 countries, as well as four IAEA staff members and one observer from the European Commission. The team met with the PAA and also held meetings with the Chief Sanitary Inspectorate, the Civil Aviation Authority, the Ministry of Climate and Environment, the Military Preventive Medicine Centre of the Ministry of National Defence, the Ministry of the Interior and Administration, the State Regional Sanitary Inspection in Warsaw and the National Centre for Radiation Protection in Health Care. The experts also observed regulatory inspections and oversight activities at the MARIA Research Reactor operated by the National Center for Nuclear Research, the Maria Sklodowska-Curie National Research Institute of Oncology medical facility and the EWA research reactor under decommissioning, operated by ZUOP. These visits included discussions with management and staff of the facilities.

The team concluded that the PAA is a competent regulatory body whose staff are committed to deliver their regulatory statutory obligations effectively and to prepare to embark on a nuclear power programme in line with international safety standards.

“This is a major milestone for Poland, which has been considering a nuclear power programme for many years. The PAA’s commitment to safety, as demonstrated throughout this second IRRS mission, is essential to ensuring that any nuclear power plants built in Poland are operated safely and securely,” said Mike King, Deputy Office Director for Reactor Safety Programs and Mission Support at U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the IRRS Team Leader. “I would like to express my appreciation to the international team of experts who conducted this very thorough review.  Their findings show that the PAA is a competent regulatory body with dedicated staff who are committed to meet the highest safety standards.”

Poland’s simulation exercise of the regulatory assessment of an application for a license to build and operate a nuclear power plant, and the issuance of such a license – including participation from international experts – in 2018 and 2019 was signalled as a good practice by the IRRS team. The team said it enabled the PAA to enhance its competences for the licensing of a nuclear power programme, to identify priorities for further developing the safety infrastructure and to better prepare for several practical issues that may be encountered during licensing of the first nuclear plant in Poland.

In addition, the team identified good practices and performances conducted by Poland, including:

  • The training of 300 Regional Sanitary Inspectorates staff on how to effectively inform the public on radon related issues.
  • The communication strategy of the PAA to interact effectively with its interested parties, including information published on its website in relation to the conflict in neighbouring Ukraine.
  • The installation of thirty additional radiation monitoring stations close to its border to improve radioactivity detection capability.

The IRRS team considers that the main challenge in Poland is to implement robust measures to ensure that the PAA is effectively independent and continues to be properly resourced. Additionally, the IRRS team said the government should:

  • Ensure the availability of financial resources to enable the timely decommissioning of research reactors.
  • Improve coordination and cooperation between different regulatory authorities with responsibilities for facilities and activities in Poland.
  • Address the need for additional medical physicists for ensuring radiation protection of workers, patients and the public in medical treatments using radiation.
  • Provide the PAA with the authority to amend licenses on its own initiative without the documented consent from the authorized party.
  • The team added recommendations for the PAA including its need to establish an integrated overarching human resource plan, including the identification of financial resources to implement it.

“We would like to thank the IRRS team for their intensive work during last two weeks, the results of which will help us to further enhance the overall effectiveness of the regulatory system in Poland,” said Andrzej Głowacki, President of PAA. “The PAA has been identified as a competent regulatory body with staff committed to deliver their regulatory functions effectively. It will allow Poland to safely develop its nuclear power programme,” added the head of the Polish regulator.  “The IAEA’s recommendations and suggestions are very valuable to any country that is embarking on nuclear power, and identified areas of good practice and performance can only confirm that we are truly devoted to the development of our regulatory competences”.

The final mission report will be provided to PAA in about three months. Poland plans to make the report public.

Background

General information about IRRS missions can be found on the IAEA website. IRRS are used to advise Member States on ways to strengthen and enhance the effectiveness of national regulatory frameworks for nuclear, radiation, radioactive waste and transport safety while recognizing the ultimate responsibility of each State to ensure safety in these areas.

The IAEA Safety Standards provide a robust framework of fundamental principles, requirements, and guidance to ensure safety. They reflect an international consensus and serve as a global reference for protecting people and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation.

Singapore’s First IAEA Collaborating Centre: Using Accelerators for Cutting-edge Research and Development

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

The IAEA and the Centre for Ion Beam Applications (CIBA) at the National University of Singapore have agreed to carry out joint work on enhancing the use of accelerator science and technologies in multi-disciplinary applications, ranging from materials science and cultural heritage to cancer care. This is the first IAEA Collaborating Centre in the Southeast Asian country.

With a new agreement signed this week, the Agency has designated CIBA as an IAEA Collaborating Centre until 2027. CIBA’s core facility is an ion beam accelerator, which is used for multi-disciplinary research. CIBA can produce highly energetic (MeV) proton and alpha beams. By using a cutting-edge nano-focusing system developed by CIBA, it recently produced beam spot sizes as small as 10 nm, which has not been achieved anywhere else in the world. A strand of hair is around 100 000 nm wide.

“The IAEA values CIBA’s innovative approaches to research and development, as well as its unparalleled research infrastructure for developing new technologies based on fast ions,” said Najat Mokhtar, IAEA Deputy Director General and Head of the Department of Nuclear Sciences and Applications. “We have already been working together for several years in the fields of materials science, quantum science, cultural heritage and forensic sciences. I am really pleased that we are taking our cooperation to the next level.”

By exploring materials composition and properties down to the atomic level with fast ions from accelerators, experts can study and develop new materials for green technologies, such as improved photovoltaic cells for solar energy conversion and advanced hydrogen-evolution processes for energy storage. The new Collaborating Centre will also use accelerator-based techniques to determine the origin and authenticity of, for example, food packaging, food supplements, toys and their packing materials with the aim of increasing public awareness and safety.

“The designation of CIBA as an IAEA Collaborating Centre is a testament to our researchers’ quality innovations and expertise”, said Professor Koh Lian Pin, Vice Dean for Research and Development in the Faculty of Science at National University of Singapore. “The Collaborating Centre will investigate highly relevant research topics, from materials science to radiobiology, using accelerator-based technologies. We look forward to working with the IAEA to spur knowledge transfer and capacity building through local, regional and global research partnerships to develop solutions to real-world problems.”

CIBA’s nuclear microscopy beamline can detect elements down to the level of parts per million and visualize their distributions with sub-micrometre resolutions. These capabilities will be used to investigate the composition, structure, origin of materials and the techniques used to create cultural heritage objects. This is highly relevant in Singapore because the city was and is a trading hub in the Asia-Pacific region. This work will be done in collaboration with the Singapore Synchrotron Light Source and the National Heritage Board of Singapore. As part of this new Collaborating Centre programme, the first session of a new IAEA Webinar series on Nuclear Analytical Techniques for World Heritage will be hosted in Singapore on 3 October 2023.

IAEA Director General Statement to United Nations Security Council

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

I thank the President of the Security Council in allowing me the opportunity today to update you on IAEA activities concerning safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine. Your own personal conviction in supporting me and the work of the IAEA has been remarkable. I also thank the Council for their continuing support for the IAEA’s efforts. I will also lay out the basic principles needed to prevent a nuclear accident.

I have addressed the Council on the situation in Ukraine four times before, on 4 March, 11 August, 6 September and 27 October last year.

However, I see today’s meeting as the most important one, and I will explain why.

But first I want to briefly update you on what the Agency has been doing in Ukraine.

It is now over 15 months since the beginning of the war.

May I remind you that it is the first time in history that a war is being fought amid the facilities of a major nuclear power programme. This includes several of Ukraine’s five nuclear power plants and other facilities have come under direct shelling, and all NPPs having lost off-site power at some point.

Furthermore, one of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants Zaporizhzhya NPP has come under Russian military and operational control.

The IAEA has been closely monitoring the situation and assisting Ukraine every single day since the start of the war.

This assistance has involved the continuous engagement of the IAEA’s Incident and Emergency Centre.

There have been 12 expert missions to Ukraine.

I have personally led seven of them, including two to ZNPP.

Additionally, since 1 September 2022 we have had an IAEA Support and Assistance Mission stationed at Zaporizhzhya NPP, which is literally on the front lines of this war, and we are on the eighth rotation of our dedicated and courageous staff – who have had to cross that front line to undertake this vital work. 23 of our staff have been part of these teams.

And since January this year we have had other dedicated IAEA experts stationed at every other major Ukrainian nuclear site: Rivne NPP South Ukraine NPP Khmelnytskyy NPP and to the Chornobyl NPP – their presence allowing us to provide the international community with reliable information on the safety and security situation at each of those sites as well. Another 58 of our staff have been part of these teams, totalling more than 2350 person-days of our staff in Ukraine.

And I wish to thank the United Nations Secretary General and the Undersecretaries for Safety and Security and for Operational Support once again for their help in making this happen.

Moreover, we have facilitated an international assistance package totalling almost €5 million with 17 deliveries of vital equipment to Ukraine, and I thank MSs for their contributions.

We are putting in place a comprehensive programme of health care assistance including through equipment and psychological support for all Ukrainian nuclear workers.

In addition to our work on nuclear safety and security we are also continuing our vital safeguards verification activities across Ukraine ensuring that there is no diversion of nuclear material for military purposes.

And we are keeping the world informed of the situation at Ukraine’s nuclear sites in more than 160 web statements and updates, four reports and multiple briefings, including to the United Nations General Assembly and to your distinguished selves at Security Council.

Mr. President,

The nuclear safety and security situation at the Zaporizhzhya NPP, in particular, continues to be extremely fragile and dangerous.

Military activities continue in the region and may well increase very considerably in the near future.

The plant has been operating on significantly reduced staff, which despite being in temporary shut-down is not sustainable.

And there have been seven occasions when the site lost all off-site power and had to rely on emergency diesel generators, the last line of defence against a nuclear accident, to provide essential cooling of the reactor and spent fuel. The last one, the seventh, occurred just one week ago.

We are fortunate that a nuclear accident has not yet happened. As I said at the IAEA Board of Governors in March – we are rolling a dice and if this continues then one day our luck will run out.

So we must all do everything in our power to minimize the chance that it does.

As the Council knows, since returning from my first of two missions to the Zaporizhzhya NPP last September I have been urging all parties to protect the nuclear safety and security of the plant. This has involved numerous meetings, intensive consultations and exchanges, including at the highest levels in Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

Mr President, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen

As you would recall, already a year ago I have elaborated the Seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict. These are:

  1. The physical integrity of facilities – whether it is the reactors, fuel ponds or radioactive waste stores – must be maintained.
  2. All safety and security systems and equipment must be fully functional at all times.
  3. The operating staff must be able to fulfil their safety and security duties and have the capacity to make decisions free of undue pressure.
  4. There must be a secure off-site power supply from the grid for all nuclear sites.
  5. There must be uninterrupted logistical supply chains and transportation to and from the sites.
  6. There must be effective on-site and off-site radiation monitoring systems, and emergency preparedness and response measures.
  7. There must be reliable communication with the regulator and others.

These common-sense rules derive from a vast body of IAEA documents, guidelines, and experience. They have been universally quoted and supported. This is encouraging.

A nuclear or radiological accident during the ongoing conflict could have disastrous consequences for the people of Ukraine, for the people of Russia, as well as for neighbouring States, and beyond.

The time has come to be more specific as to what is required.

We must prevent a dangerous release of radioactive material.

To that end, and mindful of the 7 indispensable pillars for nuclear safety and security, I have been working intensively, and in consultation with the leadership of Ukraine, as well as of Russia.

As a result of these intensive consultations, I have identified the following concrete principles to help ensure nuclear safety and security at ZNPP in order to prevent a nuclear accident and ensure the integrity of the plant. I see these commitments as essential to avoid the danger of a catastrophic incident:

  1. There should be no attack of any kind from or against the plant, in particular targeting the reactors, spent fuel storage, other critical infrastructure, or personnel;
  2. ZNPP should not be used as storage or a base for heavy weapons (i.e. multiple rocket launchers, artillery systems and munitions, and tanks) or military personnel that could be used for an attack from the plant;
  3. Off-site power to the plant should not be put at risk. To that effect, all efforts should be made to ensure that off-site power remains available and secure at all times;
  4. All structures, systems and components essential to the safe and secure operation of ZNPP should be protected from attacks or acts of sabotage;
  5. No action should be taken that undermines these principles.

The IAEA experts onsite, namely the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhya (ISAMZ), will report to the IAEA Director General on the observance of these principles. The Director General will report publicly on any violations of these principles.

I respectfully and solemnly ask both sides to observe these five principles.

I request distinguished Members of the Security Council to unambiguously support them.

Let me say something very clearly: These principles are to no one’s detriment and to everyone’s benefit.

Avoiding a nuclear accident IS possible.

Abiding by the IAEA’s five principles is the way to start.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr President, distinguished colleagues:

The IAEA’s five principles to avoid a nuclear accident are hereby established.

The IAEA intends to start monitoring these principles through its on-site mission.

I thank you for your attention.

What are Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)?

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Many of the benefits of SMRs are inherently linked to the nature of their design – small and modular. Given their smaller footprint, SMRs can be sited on locations not suitable for larger nuclear power plants. Prefabricated units of SMRs can be manufactured and then shipped and installed on site, making them more affordable to build than large power reactors, which are often custom designed for a particular location, sometimes leading to construction delays. SMRs offer savings in cost and construction time, and they can be deployed incrementally to match increasing energy demand.

One of the challenges to accelerating access to energy is infrastructure – limited grid coverage in rural areas – and the costs of grid connection for rural electrification. A single power plant should represent no more than 10 per cent of the total installed grid capacity. In areas lacking sufficient lines of transmission and grid capacity, SMRs can be installed into an existing grid or remotely off-grid, as a function of its smaller electrical output, providing low-carbon power for industry and the population. This is particularly relevant for microreactors, which are a subset of SMRs designed to generate electrical power typically up to 10 MW(e). Microreactors have smaller footprints than other SMRs and will be better suited for regions inaccessible to clean, reliable and affordable energy. Furthermore, microreactors could serve as a backup power supply in emergency situations or replace power generators that are often fuelled by diesel, for example, in rural communities or remote businesses.

In comparison to existing reactors, proposed SMR designs are generally simpler, and the safety concept for SMRs often relies more on passive systems and inherent safety characteristics of the reactor, such as low power and operating pressure. This means that in such cases no human intervention or external power or force is required to shut down systems, because passive systems rely on physical phenomena, such as natural circulation, convection, gravity and self-pressurization. These increased safety margins, in some cases, eliminate or significantly lower the potential for unsafe releases of radioactivity to the environment and the public in case of an accident.

SMRs have reduced fuel requirements. Power plants based on SMRs may require less frequent refuelling, every 3 to 7 years, in comparison to between 1 and 2 years for conventional plants. Some SMRs are designed to operate for up to 30 years without refuelling.

IAEA Director General Briefs Board of Governors: Fukushima Daiichi ALPS Water Release, Ukraine, Iran and New Atoms4Food initiative

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

The IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi began his opening address to the IAEA’s Board of Governors by pledging support to the victims of Friday’s devastating earthquake in Morocco. He promised a quick IAEA response to provide technical assistance to the country.

Fukushima Daiichi ALPS Water Release

Mr Grossi updated the Board on the controlled release of ALPS-treated water into the sea from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, which Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), the Plant’s operator, began last month.

IAEA experts have assisted in ensuring the relevant international safety standards continue to be applied by sampling the treated water before release. Japan also requested assistance from the IAEA to monitor the seawater after the treated water began to be released on 24 August. Mr Grossi stated he was happy to note that the independent sampling and monitoring from the Agency has confirmed that the levels of tritium in the discharged water are below Japan’s operational limit and said the IAEA would continue to monitor the seawater.

The Agency is also providing continuous live data from Japan on the release of treated water.

Nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine

Mr Grossi reiterated his support for nuclear safety and security in Ukraine, speaking of the five main principles he outlined at the United Nations Security Council in May, and urging that these continue to be observed. Mr Grossi also highlighted the 53 missions the IAEA has carried out since 31 August 2022, including to all five nuclear sites in Ukraine. 

It has been just over a year since the IAEA established a team of experts and inspectors at Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine. In June the Director General led a mission to assess how damage of the Kakhovka dam is impacting safety at the plant. However, the overall situation at the facility remains highly precarious, and in the past week, IAEA experts based at the plant have heard numerous explosions, in a possible sign of increased military activity in the region that could also pose a potential threat to nuclear safety and security at the site.

“It is the increase of military activity around the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant that worries us the most,” he told the 35-member Board “The possibility of a nuclear accident with serious radiological consequences continues to be a reality, and we hope this will not happen.”

In addition to programmes supporting nuclear safety and security, the Director General said the IAEA was also providing technical assistance in Kherson Oblast province, in response to flooding caused by the destruction of the Kakhovka dam.

Verification and monitoring in Iran

The Director General presented his latest reports on verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran. He updated the Board on how cooperation with Iran is progressing, following the joint statement by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and the IAEA in March and regrets no further progress has been made.

“Of course, our work with our colleagues from the Islamic Republic of Iran continues … I hope to do better,” he said “And our Iranian colleagues know that. So, we will continue working together, trying to go faster and better and deeper in this important and indispensable area.”

Nuclear solutions for global challenges

The IAEA continues to assist countries in addressing some of their most pressing development challenges through peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology.

Mr Grossi announced the IAEA is launching a new initiative, Atoms4Food, aimed at supporting Member States in increasing food production, food safety, agricultural planning, and nutrition programming, using nuclear and isotopic techniques. This will involve working closely with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

Continuing on the theme of the IAEA’s technical cooperation programme, which includes almost 150 Member States, Mr Grossi spoke of recent successes in the IAEA’s Rays of Hope initiative, which has helped widen access to cancer care in Benin, Chad, Kenya, Malawi and Niger, and citing a major milestone in Botswana, which opened its first public radiotherapy centre in July, with IAEA support.

He also referred to the NUTEC plastic initiative, which is helping countries in Latin America, Asia and the Pacific address the global challenge of plastic production. He spoke about the Zoonotic Disease Integrated Action’s (ZODIAC) initiative, aimed at helping prevent pandemics from diseases that pass from animals to humans.

In relation to the energy and climate crisis, Mr Grossi highlighted the efforts to harmonize regulatory approaches and standardize industry approached through the IAEA’s Nuclear Harmonization and Standardization Initiative (NHSI), which will support the timely deployment of safe and secure small modular reactors.

Next month, the IAEA plans to launch the IAEA World Fusion Outlook at the 29th International Fusion Energy Conference, which will become the global reference for authoritative information and foster international cooperation and knowledge sharing regarding the latest developments in fusion energy.

Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre

Another new development is the opening of the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Training and Development Centre on 3 October, which Mr Grossi described as “the first truly international centre of capacity building in the area of nuclear security”. The new centre will help strengthen countries’ abilities to tackle nuclear terrorism, by providing

advanced training in the physical protection of nuclear and other radioactive materials and facilities, detection of and response to criminal and intentional unauthorized acts, nuclear forensics and preparation for major public events implementing nuclear security measures.

Closing the gender gap in nuclear

Mr Grossi concluded his statement by celebrating gender equality initiatives such as the IAEA’s flagship Marie Sklodowska-Curie Fellowship Programme, which aims to support the next generation of women nuclear professionals through scholarships and internships. Mr Grossi said the programme would soon award scholarships to 200 women engaged in nuclear related master’s programmes, bringing the total number of fellows to more than 500. In terms of the Lise Meitner Programme for early- and mid-career women professionals, he said the first cohort had their first round of professional visits in the United States. It is hoped more countries will come forward to host LMP professional visits in future.

He said: “My promise, my commitment to get to gender parity [at the IAEA] by 2025 is still on. We have reached and gone above the 43 per cent line. I’m very happy to announce this.”

The Board of Governors is meeting at the IAEA’s headquarters in Vienna from 11-15 September.

Republic of Korea Makes First Visit to IAEA Office at Fukushima Daiichi Under the IAEA – ROK Fukushima Information Mechanism (IKFIM)

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

Korean experts visited the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Office at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (FDNPS) for the first time under an agreement between the IAEA and the Republic of Korea (ROK) providing for the IAEA to share information on its monitoring of the discharge of ALPS treated water.

The Korean team, comprised of experts from the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS), visited the IAEA’s office where the IAEA has a continuous presence on the site. Agency staff also held several technical meetings with the Korean experts off-site over the past two weeks as part of the IKFIM.

The IAEA-ROK Fukushima Information Mechanism (IKFIM) established a framework for the IAEA to share technical information and data on the treated water discharge and its monitoring activities at the FDNPS with ROK. This agreement underscores the IAEA’s commitment to enhancing communication with the public on the safety of the discharge of ALPS treated water, including in the region.

The Agency provided information to the Korean experts on how the Agency monitors and assesses the water discharge to ensure that the relevant international safety standards continue to be applied by Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) – Fukushima Daiichi’s operator – and the Government of Japan.

Under IKFIM, information on the IAEA’s monitoring activities will be shared through written updates, virtual meetings, and ROK experts’ visits to the IAEA Fukushima office. The mechanism will provide a continuing overview of the IAEA’s monitoring activities to the Government of the ROK.

Japan’s TEPCO started discharging ALPS treated water stored at the FDNPS into the sea on 24 August. The Agency’s two year detailed safety review of the plan for discharging the treated water concluded that the approach and activities for this discharge are consistent with relevant international safety standards and would have a negligible radiological impact on people and the environment.

The IAEA continues to cooperate with all concerned states in relation to its safety review of the ALPS treated water discharge.

IAEA Conducts Its First Seawater Sampling After Japan’s Discharge of ALPS Treated Water, Finds Tritium Level Below Limit

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) first independent sampling and analysis of seawater near the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (FDNPS) since discharges of ALPS treated water started on 24 August confirms that the tritium levels are below Japan’s operational limit.

Agency staff present at the IAEA’s Office at the site sampled seawater from several locations within three kilometres from the site, at sea and from the coast.

The Agency’s independent sampling and measurement of the seawater from the coast shows consistency with the values reported by Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) – operator of the FDNPS – as well as the Ministry of Environment of Japan. TEPCO reports daily public results on its website showing that the tritium activity concentration in the sea falls below its operational limit, that is, the limit set for operation of the ALPS discharge process that must not be exceeded. The Agency is continuing its analysis of all the seawater samples.

The IAEA’s safety review of Japan’s plan to release the treated water into the sea, carried out before the discharge started, concluded that Japan’s approach and activities to discharge ALPS-treated water are consistent with relevant international safety standards. The report noted that the controlled, gradual discharges of the treated water into the sea, as currently planned and assessed by TEPCO, would have a negligible radiological impact on people and the environment.

The IAEA has been collecting marine samples in the waters off Fukushima over the past decade, following a request by the Japanese Government to assist it in ensuring that its sea area monitoring – conducted since the accident in 2011 – maintains a high quality, and is credible and transparent. The project is a follow-up activity to recommendations made on marine monitoring in a report by the IAEA in 2013 related to the decommissioning of the FDNPS plant.

IAEA staff sampling seawater within three kilometres from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as part of the Agency’s safety review of the ALPS treated water discharge (Photo: TEPCO)