Category: Global Bodies

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

The city where most staff of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) live was left without electricity for 16 hours over the weekend after a second sub-station in the area sustained damage and was taken out of operation, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said today.

The IAEA team of experts stationed at the ZNPP on Saturday visited the site of the latest affected sub-station, Raduga, in the city of Enerhodar to observe damage to one of its two transformers that the plant said was caused by a drone attack the previous evening.

Coming just a few days after one of Enerhodar’s other sub-stations – Luch – was destroyed, Director General Grossi said it further deepened his serious concerns about the fragility and vulnerability of Ukraine’s electricity infrastructure, which is crucial also for nuclear safety and security, even though the power supplies to the ZNPP’s six reactors were not affected this time.

As a result of recent days’ damage to the electrical infrastructure, the IAEA was informed that Enerhodar had no electricity from around 8pm on Friday to noon on Saturday, when power was restored in the city, which is located next to the ZNPP. Sub-stations form vital parts of a country’s electrical production, transmission and distribution system.

“Whoever is behind this, it must stop. Drone usage against the plant and its vicinity is becoming increasingly more frequent. This is completely unacceptable and it runs counter to the safety pillars and concrete principles which have been accepted unanimously.,” Director General Grossi said.

After Wednesday’s destruction of the Luch sub-station – which had provided electricity to parts of Enerhodar and other areas – the Raduga sub-station was used to supply some of the lost power to five districts of Enerhodar, before it too was damaged.

Two days after visiting Enerhodar to assess the extent of damage to the Luch sub-station, the IAEA experts yesterday saw electric components and other drone debris at the Raduga sub-station, as well as an unexploded device on the ground near the damaged transformer.

Officials at the scene said a hole in the transformer had caused a cooling oil leak that prompted the sub-station to shut down. They added that the oil spill had been covered by sand and that repairs were under way, which were completed later in the afternoon. The IAEA experts did not see any oil traces on the transformer itself. The sub-station appeared to have suffered less damage than the transformer at the Luch sub-station and there was no fire or firefighters in the area.

The ZNPP later informed the IAEA team that power for Enerhodar had been restored on Saturday afternoon by using Raduga’s back-up transformer.

As was the case with the damage to the Luch sub-station, the loss of electricity from Raduga did not directly impact the two power lines that are still available for the ZNPP. The plant continues to receive the off-site electricity it needs for cooling its shutdown reactors from its last remaining 750 kilovolt (kV) main power line and the last 330 kV backup power line.

However, the failure of the Raduga sub-station affected the electrical supply to the industrial zone next to the ZNPP as well as the plant’s transport unit, a pump for its tap water and some of the area’s external environmental radiological monitoring stations, which stopped working briefly on Saturday morning after running out of battery, but resumed operating as expected when power was restored.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

A recent Swiss-hosted “Summit on Peace in Ukraine” has highlighted wide international recognition of the crucial role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in preventing a nuclear accident during the conflict in Ukraine, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said today.

“I appreciate the strong support for the indispensable work of the IAEA expressed by the many countries and organizations attending the summit,” Director General Grossi said.

At the largest of Ukraine’s nuclear facilities – the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) – the IAEA team stationed at the site has continued to hear indications of military activity over the past week, including an explosion close to the site on 16 and again on 17 June. The ZNPP informed the IAEA experts that there had been no impact on or near the site itself. On most days, the IAEA experts also heard explosions further away from the site.

Persistent risks related to the availability of off-site power remain a source of deep concern for nuclear safety and security, as Ukraine’s electricity grid has been severely impacted by the conflict, including extensive damage caused by infrastructure attacks in recent months.

In the latest indication of such dangers, the Luch sub-station in  the city of Enerhodar was destroyed on Wednesday. The ZNPP informed the IAEA team that the cause of the destruction was a drone attack. This is the second time this sub-station has been damaged since 2022. Following this event, Enerhodar – where most ZNPP staff live and which had been powered by the Luch and Raduga sub-stations – lost electrical power on Wednesday evening. The IAEA team based at the ZNPP went to the Luch sub-station on Thursday, confirming it had been destroyed and was not operational.

The Luch sub-station usually provides electricity to parts of Enerhodar and to other areas, such as the water pumping station of the city, the industrial area and surrounding small towns. As of yesterday, parts of Enerhodar received electricity through the Raduga power line instead. Power supplies to the ZNPP were not directly affected this time, as it does not receive off-site power from either the Luch or Raduga power lines.

However, Director General Grossi said it was another stark reminder that it is essential to have a reliable connection between a nuclear power plant (NPP) and the external grid for maintaining nuclear safety, both for operational and shutdown plants. Although each NPP is designed to manage situations where the connection to the grid is cut, the loss of off-site power to any NPP is a significant  event that must be protected against as a fundamental component of nuclear safety.

Any attack affecting the power supplies to any of Ukraine’s NPPs would be a violation of the seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during the conflict, he said, noting that pillar four states that there “must be a secure off-site supply from the grid for all nuclear sites”.

“I remain extremely concerned about the off-site power situation for Ukraine’s nuclear power plants. The Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant – which has already lost access to most of its external power lines – is particularly vulnerable in this regard. It has repeatedly lost all off-site power during the conflict. The damaged sustained by the Luch sub-station had a direct impact on plant staff who live in Enerhodar, immediately adjacent to the plant, and therefore also an impact on nuclear safety and security. It is therefore essential that energy infrastructure be protected and preserved at all times,” Director General Grossi said.

A team of IAEA experts on 20 June assesses damage at an electrical sub-station in the city of Enerhodar, home to many staff of the nearby Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine. (Credit: IAEA)

At the ZNPP, the IAEA experts have continued to conduct walkdowns as part of their regular activities to monitor nuclear safety and security and related developments across the site. 

They are also continuing to closely monitor maintenance activities at the site, which are vital for maintaining nuclear safety and security but which have faced challenges during the conflict. The IAEA experts this week discussed the ZNPP’s maintenance plan for reactor units 1 and 2, especially for the second half of 2024.

Over the last week, the ZNPP operated the four diesel steam generators (DSG) commissioned in early 2024 to treat 500m³ of liquid radioactive waste. The resulting treated water is intended to be re-used for plant operation. The generators were put back to standby mode on Tuesday after the completion of this task.

Separately on the same day, the main electrical transformer of reactor unit 2 was returned to operation after a month of maintenance, including tests on valves, sensors, electrical components, and oil. The IAEA experts were also informed that the ZNPP plans to purchase a spare transformer in the future.

The IAEA team this week also observed the testing of parts of the safety system of unit 5, including its emergency diesel generator (EDG). The ZNPP staff simulated a loss of power, which initiated the start of the EDG and left it in operation for 25 minutes before switching it back to standby mode.

On Wednesday, the IAEA experts visited the ZNPP training centre where they observed the installed mock-ups of different components of the plant and two of the three full-scope simulators, including Main Control Room operation shift staff undergoing training on one of them.

The IAEA experts present at the Khelmnytskyy, Rivne and South Ukraine NPPs and the Chornobyl site reported that nuclear safety and security is being maintained despite the effects of the ongoing conflict, including air raid alarms on several days over the past week.

Early on Thursday morning, the IAEA experts at the South Ukraine NPP went to the shelter in their hotel after hearing small arms fire nearby. They were later informed that a drone had been shot down in the vicinity of the hotel, but that it had not targeted the hotel or the NPP.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team of experts completed a review of long term operational safety at Unit 1 of the Angra Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) in Brazil.

The Safety Aspects of Long Term Operation (SALTO) review mission was requested by the Eletronuclear S.A, the public entity that owns and operates Angra NPP. Two IAEA pre-SALTO missions in 2013 and 2018, followed by a pre-SALTO follow-up in 2022, were previously conducted to review the long term safety of the unit.

Eletronuclear submitted a license renewal application to the Brazilian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (CNEN) in 2019 to extend the operating lifetime of the 640 Megawatt electric (MWe) Unit 1 from 40 to 60 years. The plant, located 150 kilometres west of Rio de Janeiro, went into commercial operation in 1985 and its current operating licence expires in December of 2024. The two other units of Angra NPP, the 1350 MWe Unit 2, which started its commercial operation in 2001, and the 1405 Mwe Unit 3, which is under construction, were not part of the review.

During the ten-day mission from 4 to 13 June, the team reviewed the plant’s preparedness, organization and programmes for safe long term operation (LTO). The mission was conducted by a twelve-person team comprising experts from Argentina, Bulgaria, Finland, Japan, Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, Slovakia, and the United States, as well as two IAEA staff members. The team held discussions with staff from Angra NPP and conducted plant walkdowns during the review.

“The team noted the progress in measures taken by the operator to ensure the safe LTO of the plant. The professionalism, openness and receptiveness for improvements to meet and move beyond the IAEA safety standards in operation are commendable,” said Gabor Petofi, team leader and IAEA Senior Nuclear Safety Officer. He added that “most of the ageing management and LTO activities are already in alignment with IAEA Safety Standards. We encourage the plant to address the review findings and proceed with the implementation of all remaining activities for safe LTO.”

The team identified several good practices and good performances at the Angra NPP that will be shared with the nuclear industry globally, including:

• The confirmation process to regularly evaluate and improve ageing management programmes.
• The software tool developed to determine opportunistic inspections of components.
• The use of artificial intelligence to determine the qualified life of plant equipment.

The team also provided recommendations to further enhance the preparations for  safe LTO, including for the plant to consider:

• Consistently addressing and implementing all ageing management programme attributes for civil structures.
• Improving the process of temporary design modifications for LTO.
• Implementing a comprehensive equipment qualification programme.

The plant management expressed determination to address the areas identified for improvement and to invite a SALTO follow-up mission in 2026.

“Eletronuclar is strongly committed to satisfy all regulatory requirements and implement all possible improvements that can be derived from international best practices and IAEA Safety Standards” said Abelardo da Cruz Viera, Angra Unit 1 plant manager. “The SALTO findings will help us ensure a safe and reliable completion of LTO activities and improve performance for the next cycle of operation of the plant”.

The team provided its draft report to the plant management and CNEN at the end of the mission. The plant management and CNEN will have an opportunity to make factual comments on the draft. The final report will be submitted to the plant management, CNEN and the Brazilian Government within three months.

This mission was supported by the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Programme which assists Member States in the use of nuclear technology for sustainable socioeconomic development.

Background

Information on SALTO missions can be found here.

A SALTO peer review is a comprehensive safety review addressing strategy and key elements for the safe long term operation of nuclear power plants. They complement OSART missions, which are designed as a review of programmes and activities essential to operational safety. Neither SALTO nor OSART reviews are regulatory inspections, nor are they design reviews or substitutes for an exhaustive assessment of a plant’s overall safety status.

LTO of nuclear power plants is defined as operation beyond an established time frame determined by the license term, the original plant design, relevant standards or national regulations. As stated in IAEA safety standards, to maintain a plant’s fitness for service, consideration should be given to life limiting processes and features of systems, structures and components (SSC), as well as to reasonably practicable safety upgrades to enhance the safety of the plant to a level approaching that of modern plants.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

The International Atomic Energy Agency rotated its teams at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) today. Since the Agency established a continued presence at the site in September 2022, 20 teams of experts have crossed the frontline of the conflict in Ukraine to reach the plant, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said.

The rotation took place one day after Director General Grossi met with Swiss Foreign Minister Ignazio Cassis, ahead of the Swiss-hosted Summit on Peace in Ukraine, scheduled for June 15 and 16. Director General Grossi briefed Foreign Minister Cassis on the IAEA’s unique role in preventing a nuclear or radiological accident amid the ongoing military conflict.

“The IAEA is the only international organization with a permanent presence at nuclear facilities in Ukraine, including the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant. We continue to provide technical support and independent information to the world,” said Director General Grossi. “I urge all states attending the Peace Summit to strengthen and support the unique, independent, and technical role of the IAEA.”

On the ground, the IAEA team at ZNPP reported hearing explosions, including close to the plant, on several days over the past week. They confirmed with the plant that one of the mines located next to the ZNPP cooling pond area exploded on 11 June.  There were no physical damage or casualties from the explosion and the cause of the explosion was not shared with the IAEA team.

“This latest explosion, so close to the plant, is of grave concern and is aggravating an already fragile situation,” said Director General Grossi, who continued that “nuclear safety and security of the ZNPP cannot be compromised.”

On Monday, the IAEA experts visited one of the electrical sub-stations located in the nearby town of Enerhodar. The purpose was to observe the impact of an alleged shelling which, according to the ZNPP, occurred on 8 June. The alleged shelling resulted in a fire and damage to the substation which serves the Enerhodar city council building where the main communication hub between the ZNPP and Enerhodar is located. The ZNPP confirmed that the damage did not interrupt the communication lines.

Last week, the IAEA team observed testing of one of the safety trains in Unit 2 at the plant. Nuclear power reactors, such as those at the ZNPP, each have three separate and independent redundant systems – known as safety trains – comprising their safety systems. The planned test simulated the loss of regular power supply to one of the safety trains, which required the emergency diesel generator of that safety train to activate to supply the power required. The team was informed by the ZNPP that the test was successful, and no issues were identified.

During meetings with the ZNPP over the past week, the IAEA team discussed the number and qualification of staff working in the main control room of the plant. The ZNPP confirmed that, with all six units being in cold shutdown, three authorized personnel would be on duty for each shift in the main control room, with a minimum requirement for two to be present at all times.

As part of its regular walk downs of the plant, the team earlier this week visited the pumping station of Unit 4 where one circulation pump is used to maintain the flow of cooling water between the ZNPP discharge and intake channels. The operation of the circulation pumps is dependent on the overall water level in the ZNPP cooling pond, which continues to drop after the destruction of the Kakhovka dam in June 2023. The IAEA experts were recently informed that the ZNPP has installed a submersible pump near the isolation gate of the discharge channel of the Zaporizhzhya Thermal Power Plant, which is capable of pumping 100 m3 of water per hour from the Kakhovka reservoir into the channel, which is then pumped into the ZNPP cooling pond. The 12 sprinkler ponds used to cool the six reactors and safety systems continue to be fed with approximately 250 m3 of water per hour from 11 groundwater wells.

This week, the team also observed the real-time monitoring system of the storage casks, containing spent fuel from all six reactors, at the ZNPP dry spent fuel storage facility.

Emergency preparedness and response arrangements are crucial for nuclear safety at any nuclear power plant. The IAEA team engaged in discussions with ZNPP regarding the outcomes of the emergency drill conducted at the plant on 15 May. ZNPP confirmed that the drill successfully achieved its objectives and identified several valuable lessons. An action plan is being implemented to address the areas identified for improvement during the drill.

At Ukraine’s other nuclear power plants – Khelmnytskyy, Rivne and South Ukraine, and the Chornobyl site – IAEA teams continue to perform routine walkdowns and conduct meetings with the facilities to assess nuclear safety and security. The teams reported that despite the effects of the ongoing conflict, including air raid alarms over the past week, nuclear safety and security is being maintained. Nevertheless, the IAEA is continuing to follow the situation with regard to external power very closely at each of these plants, where a loss of off-site power event has the potential to be serious given the higher nuclear fuel temperatures for reactors in operation in Ukraine. 

The teams reported that one reactor unit at both the Rivne and South Ukraine NPPs remains shut down for planned maintenance and refuelling, while one other unit at the South Ukraine NPP resumed operations after the completion of its scheduled maintenance and refuelling, which concluded safely and successfully.

Over the past two days, the IAEA experts observed a large scale emergency exercise conducted at the South Ukraine NPP which also included participation from the Khelmnytskyy and Rivne NPPs.

The teams at Khelmnytskyy, Rivne and South Ukraine have all rotated over the last week.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team of experts said Canada has a comprehensive and robust regulatory framework for nuclear and radiation safety. The team also encouraged continued efforts to further align regulatory policies with the IAEA safety standards.

The Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) follow-up mission was conducted from 4 to 10 June at the request of the Government of Canada and hosted by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC). The team found that Canada has addressed most of the four recommendations and 16 suggestions made during the initial IRRS mission in 2019.

Using IAEA safety standards and international good practices, IRRS missions are designed to strengthen the effectiveness of the national legal and regulatory infrastructures while recognizing the responsibility of each country to ensure nuclear and radiation safety.

The IRRS team – comprised of 7 regulatory experts from 7 IAEA Member States, and three IAEA staff members – met with the CNSC and other representatives from Natural Resources Canada and Health Canada at CNSC headquarters in Ottawa during the seven-day follow-up mission.

Canada has a comprehensive nuclear safety regulatory framework covering facilities and activities. Its 19 operating nuclear power reactors – situated at four sites – generate about 13 per cent of Canada’s electricity. Canada also has uranium mines and mills, processing and fuel fabrication facilities, and waste storage sites. Canada also uses radiation sources in medical, industrial, scientific, and research applications, and has five research reactors.

The IRRS team said Canada strives to continuously upgrade its regulatory framework to address new challenges and upcoming technologies such as the development of small modular reactors and repositories for radioactive waste.

“The team recognizes the hard work and progress in strengthening the regulatory framework on nuclear, waste, and transport safety in Canada,” said Mission Team Leader, Ritva Bly, Principal Advisor, Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, STUK. “The joint efforts of CNSC, Natural Resources Canada, and Health Canada have further enhanced radiation safety.”

The CNSC human resources plan was recognized as a good performance. The team said it clearly and transparently addresses challenges and risks and includes a wide range of diverse strategies and actions, as well as performance indicators to track and measure outcomes in line with the organization’s strategic objectives.

Of the 4 recommendations and 16 suggestions made in 2019, 2 recommendations and 10 suggestions have been closed. Notable achievements have been made in: 

• The radioactive waste management framework through the publication of the Integrated Strategy for Radioactive Waste and the revision of Canada’s Policy for Radioactive Waste Management and Decommissioning.
• The conduct and processes for inspections of facilities and activities through further formalization of the CNSC programme guidance.
• The consolidation of CNSC’s safety policy elements and the development of a process for performing regulatory policy review and analysis.
• The revision and publication of regulatory and guidance documents in the areas of the transport of nuclear and radioactive materials and fuel cycle facilities, so that they are consistent with IAEA safety standards.

The team highlighted the remaining areas identified by the initial mission for alignment with the IAEA safety standards. These areas include:

• Explicit justification of facilities and activities whereby radiation risks must be considered in terms of the overall benefit, in line with IAEA safety standards;
• Full alignment of Radiation Protection Regulations with IAEA safety standards;
• Implementation of constraints on dose or on risk, to be used in the optimization of protection for members of the public for nuclear facilities.

Speaking at the closing session of the mission, Anna Hajduk Bradford, Director of the IAEA Division of Nuclear Installation Safety, emphasized the collaborative spirit of the mission. “This comprehensive review underscores the commitment of Canada to enhancing its nuclear and radiation safety measures,” she said. “I commend Canada for requesting the mission.”

“The comprehensive review conducted by the IAEA IRRS team during this follow up mission has validated the effectiveness of Canada’s regulatory framework for nuclear and radiation safety,” said Ramzi Jammal, acting Chief Executive Officer of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission. “More importantly, the resulting assessment from this diverse team of nuclear and radiation safety experts has provided us with different views and perspectives to help ensure our standards remain aligned with international best practices. The hard work we dedicated toward closing the mission’s recommendations and suggestions led to many enhancements, including the modernization of our radioactive waste management and decommission policy, a testament to our commitment to enhancing the safety, security and safeguard frameworks in Canada.”

The final mission report will be provided to the Government in about three months.

IAEA safety standards

The IAEA safety standards provide a robust framework of fundamental principles, requirements and guidance to ensure safety. They reflect an international consensus and serve as a global reference for protecting people and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation.