FBI Announces Results from Nationwide Takedown of Violent Crime

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Crime News

Today, the FBI announces the results of a nationwide effort to combat violent crime during the summer of 2023. Law enforcement efforts were conducted between May 29 to September 4, 2023, and involved numerous FBI field offices and state and local partners. The FBI, alongside its state and local law enforcement partners, executed over 4,000 arrests, over 2,500 drug seizures, over 1,600 weapons seized, and the dismantlement of over 50 violent organizations. 

The FBI’s overall efforts to address violent crime include statistical accomplishments from the following programs: Violent Crime and Gangs, Violent Crime, Transnational Organized Crime, Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces, and Violent Crimes against Children. Specifically, the data released reflects collective actions against violent criminals, transnational criminal organizations, gang members, and child predators.  

“There’s no greater responsibility in law enforcement than making sure the neighborhoods and communities we serve are safe,” said FBI Director Christopher Wray. “This summer, the FBI worked shoulder to shoulder with our state and local partners to combat violent crime across the nation. But our work is far from done. We will continue to work tirelessly to protect Americans from the scourge of violent crime.” 

In our efforts to combat violent crime, the FBI operates over 300 specialized task forces nationwide that are comprised of over 3,000 state and local law enforcement officers. The dedicated task forces, including Safe Streets Gang Task Forces and our Transnational Organized Crime Task Forces, enhance information sharing and coordination among law enforcement agencies to ensure a unified and effective response to violent crime.  

In tandem with our partners, the FBI’s actions led to over 700 child identifications and over 590 child locations. The FBI recognizes the hard work of our Field Offices, task forces, and partners, who play a crucial role in combatting violent crime. It is the FBI’s shared commitment to address this issue head-on and create a safer environment for all. 

Learn more about the FBI’s violent crime program: https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/violent-crime/news 

While there is no credible threat at this time, the FBI would like to remind the public to remain vigilant and report any suspicious activity to tips.fbi.gov or their local law enforcement agency.   

Jacqueline Maguire Named Assistant Director of the Training Division

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Crime News

Director Christopher Wray has named Jacqueline Maguire as the assistant director of the Training Division. Ms. Maguire most recently served as special agent in charge of the Philadelphia Field Office.  

Ms. Maguire was assigned to the New York Field Office when she joined the FBI as a special agent in 2000 and was a member of the Joint Terrorism Task Force. She was the lead agent for the investigation of the five hijackers of American Airlines Flight 77 after the 9/11 terror attacks. 

In 2006, Ms. Maguire was promoted to supervisory special agent, and then to unit chief, in the Counterterrorism Division at FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C. She moved to the Washington Field Office in 2011 as a supervisory special agent. She returned to FBI Headquarters in 2014, when she was named the special assistant to the executive assistant director of the Human Resources Branch. 

Ms. Maguire was promoted in 2016 to assistant special agent in charge of the Birmingham Field Office in Alabama, where she oversaw all criminal and administrative matters. She was named section chief in the Office of Public Affairs at FBI Headquarters in 2017 and promoted to deputy assistant director in 2018. She was promoted in 2019 to special agent in charge of the Criminal Division of the New York Field Office. In 2021, she was promoted to special agent in charge of the Philadelphia Field Office.  

Ms. Maguire has earned several awards during her FBI career, including the Attorney General’s Award for Excellence in Furthering the Interests of U.S. National Security and the Attorney General’s Award for Distinguished Service. 

Prior to joining the FBI, Ms. Maguire worked at the Office of the Medical Examiner in Suffolk County, New York. She earned a bachelor’s degree in comprehensive science from Villanova University, a master’s degree in criminal justice from Long Island University, and a master’s degree in homeland defense and security from the Naval Postgraduate School.

Director Wray Honors FBI Employees and Partners for the 31st Annual Director’s Awards for Excellence

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Crime News

On September 22, FBI Director Christopher Wray announced the recipients of the 31st Annual Director’s Awards for Excellence, recognizing FBI employees and partners for extraordinary performance in furtherance of the FBI’s mission to protect the American people and uphold the Constitution. The annual awards recognize distinguished service, operational excellence, and innovation with the FBI. 

“Today, our nation faces threats of unprecedented scope and diversity—and the expectations placed on the FBI have never been greater,” Director Wray said. “Yet the people of the FBI continue to meet—and exceed—those expectations, every day. This year’s award recipients have raised the bar once again; what we honor today is work hat stands out among the many examples of public service we see throughout the Bureau.” 

This year, 222 FBI employees received awards, while 43 non-FBI individuals—including task force officers, assistant U.S. attorneys, and other federal and international partner agency employees—were also honored for their work.  

Among the awardees are FBI employees and law enforcement partners who identified and stopped terrorists and foreign spies; helped identify victims of child sexual exploitation and find and arrest the perpetrators; thwarted malign foreign influence campaigns; confronted violent gangs and transnational criminal organizations; undertook a complex project to ensure the FBI’s information is more centralized and accessible; and brought data insights into the FBI’s diversity recruitment and hiring efforts. 

The awards are given in 27 categories, including:

  • Distinguished Service for Assisting Victims of Crime
  • Distinguished Service to the Law Enforcement Community
  • Excellence in Innovation
  • Excellence in Intelligence Analysis
  • Excellence in International Operations
  • Excellence in Investigation
  • Excellence in Investigative Support
  • Excellence in Leadership
  • Exceptional Public Service
  • Excellence in Program Management
  • Excellence in Support of the Integrity and Compliance Program
  • Excellence in the HUMINT Program
  • Excellence in Training and Professional Development
  • Outstanding Counterintelligence Investigation
  • Outstanding Counterterrorism Investigation
  • Outstanding Criminal Investigation
  • Outstanding Information Management
  • Outstanding Scientific Advancement
  • Distinguished Service by a New Employee; Outstanding Service by a Federal Wage Grade System Employee
  • Outstanding Service in Diversity and Inclusion
  • Outstanding Technical Advancement
  • Distinguished Service by a Professional Staff Employee
  • Sustained Distinguished Service
  • The Manuel J. Gonzalez Ethics Award
  • Thomas E. DuHadway Humanitarian Award

Director Wray’s Remarks at the Mandiant/mWISE 2023 Cybersecurity Conference

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Crime News

Good afternoon, everyone. I first want to thank Kevin Mandia for hosting this conference and for inviting me here to speak with all of you today. Any time so many leaders—from the private sector, and the government, and around the world, both managers and front-line defenders—get together in one room, cyberspace becomes a little bit safer.

I firmly believe that the best way to build our collective defense is by having dialogue about the threats we’re seeing and having creative conversations about the ways we can work together to stay ahead of them, which is explicitly the FBI’s vision: to stay “ahead of the threat.”

Now, I understand you’ve already been discussing ways to do just that, hearing from Kevin and a threat intelligence panel earlier today, and with plenty of other events over the next couple days. But I’d like to spend my time with you this afternoon talking about the FBI’s strategy to counter threats in cyberspace, what those threats are that we’re countering, and giving you a couple examples of how we form a virtuous cycle with our partners—both foreign and domestic, across government and the private sector—to use the information we receive to take the fight to our adversaries and to protect each other, because everyone here knows it’s simply not an option to sit back on our heels in today’s environment.

My hope is I can get you to leave here feeling encouraged by what we at the FBI are doing and wanting to be a part of our virtuous cycle.

When the FBI was born 115 years ago, we could’ve never predicted the threats we’re facing today. Back in 1908, we were focused on the first Model Ts hitting the streets and celebrating the Chicago Cubs’ second-straight World Series title—which was sure to be the beginning of a dynasty. But if there’s one thing we at the FBI have excelled at throughout our history, it’s innovation. As the threats have changed, we’ve changed with them.

One of the biggest inflection points in the Bureau’s history, of course, was September 11, 2001. Last week, we commemorated yet another anniversary of that tragedy—a day that dramatically changed the FBI’s work and the way we do it, maybe more than any other. Those attacks showed us how much our nation’s safety depends on partnerships and on information sharing. So, in the aftermath of 9/11, we made innovative changes that started in our counterterrorism program, and since then, have come to inform every type of investigation we conduct in every community we serve, and cyberspace is no exception.

For more than two decades now, we’ve had an entire Cyber Division—with cyber squads spread across the country throughout our 56 field offices—all devoted to identifying and mitigating cyber threats. So, while this topic is not new to us at the FBI, our approach to countering the cyber threat has certainly changed over that time.

Today, our strategy is informed by where we sit at the center of a cybersecurity ecosystem that stretches on the defensive side from, most importantly, the private sector, but also sector risk management agencies and CISA [the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency] to the NSA [National Security Agency], CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], CYBERCOM [U.S. Cyber Command], and our foreign partners on the offensive side.

What the FBI does is take in information from partners across that spectrum, investigate, develop leads, and share what we have with whoever can use that information to have the greatest impact on our adversaries. That might be a foreign law enforcement agency or intelligence service joining an operation with us. It might be NSA, it might be CISA, but very often, it’s the private sector. Whether that’s a specific victim that needs a heads-up or a whole industry, we can warn through a bulletin or, increasingly, a provider or other sophisticated partner actually joining one of our operations.

Our goal is to plan and conduct joint, sequenced operations—where we’re all on the same page, and each step is taken strategically and with purpose, where it doesn’t matter who gets the credit as long as the job gets done.

Often, the FBI is the agency in the best position to make an impact because we have a wide and unique combination of both law enforcement and intelligence authorities, and we’re using every one of those authorities and every combination of our tools to impose the greatest possible costs on our enemies. We’re doing that by going after the actors and the services that support them—their finances, their communications, their malware, and their infrastructure.

Like earlier this year, when we announced the culmination of a year-and-a-half-long campaign to disrupt the Hive ransomware group. Hive had been extorting victims all around the globe, but we silently and secretly gained and exploited access to their control panel. In effect, we hacked the hackers, and we used our access to help Hive victims decrypt their networks, saving them about $130 million in ransom payments. Then, working with our European partners, we were able to seize Hive’s servers and websites, shutting down the criminal group’s ability to function.

But we know these operations often don’t completely eradicate the threats we’re facing, so the process continues. When we do get information about the threat from one company, we work hard to develop analysis about who the adversary is; what they’re doing; and where, why, and how they’re doing it—all while taking pains to protect that company’s identity.

And then, we pass what we’ve developed to our partners, and they ball that up with what they know and their reporting and, in return, provide us with even more information and actionable leads, enhancing our global investigations.

Ultimately, that helps us discover malicious infrastructure we can target. It helps us discover victims two, three, four, and five that we can help because of victim 1. It helps us run new operations with new partners against the same adversary.

Then, the process repeats itself. That’s the virtuous cycle I mentioned earlier—and it’s only possible when we work together.

Each piece of data is one part of a larger, longer-term puzzle. And while, by its very nature, work like that is never complete, we’ve had some real successes in recent years.

Take an operation we executed in 2022, for instance, when we remotely disrupted Cyclops Blink, a widespread botnet built by Russia’s GRU—its military intelligence agency—before the botnet could do any harm. We did that by creatively combining a traditional federal search warrant and extraterritorial law enforcement authorities, but we were only as successful as we were because of willing and able private sector participation. In that case, the GRU’s Sandworm team had managed to implant malware on thousands of firewall devices worldwide. Those devices were largely used by small and medium-sized businesses and produced by WatchGuard Technologies.

But, we were able to alert WatchGuard about the malware targeting their devices and collect additional samples from other victims. That allowed us to reverse-engineer the malware, and develop and execute a sophisticated technical operation, severing the GRU’s ability to communicate with the botnet’s command-and-control layer, all while working with CISA and WatchGuard on mitigation efforts. Because of that collaboration, we were ultimately able to cut off the GRU’s ability to control the botnet, remove the malware from the affected devices, and shut the door on our way out so the Russians couldn’t get back in.

That type of collaborative, public-private operation is the present and the future for the FBI, and it will only become more important as the threats continue to evolve, just as they have for the past 115 years. Because the TTPs—the tactics, techniques, and procedures—cybercriminals and nation-states use to attack our networks and our digitally connected way of life are constantly evolving, the intelligence and operational briefings I get from our team every day make it pretty clear—as I’m sure this group can guess—that our cyber program is where we’re facing some of our most complex, most severe, and most rapidly evolving threats. And what our team knows—and what everybody in this room knows, too—is that today’s cyber threats are more pervasive, hit a wider array of victims, and carry the potential for greater damage than ever before.

On top of that, there always seems to be a new danger on the horizon.

Of course, at the front of everyone’s minds today are the artificial intelligence capabilities being developed here in the U.S. and around the world. I’m sure none of you will be shocked to hear that AI is ripe for potential abuses—and that criminals and hostile foreign governments are already exploiting the technology. And while generative AI can certainly save law-abiding citizens time by automating tasks, it also makes it easier for bad guys to do things like generate deepfakes and malicious code and can provide a tool for threat actors to develop increasingly powerful, sophisticated, customizable, and scalable capabilities.

So, to stay ahead of the threat, at the FBI, we’re determining how we can ethically and legally leverage AI to do our jobs, but we’re also identifying and tracking our adversaries’ and criminals’ uses of AI, while protecting American innovation in the AI arena.

Because, as we’ve been telling anyone who will listen, the Chinese government has been stealing American intellectual property and data for years, and you can be sure they’re not going to stop now and sit back and watch while American companies develop technologies that can change the world. China already has a bigger hacking program than every other major nation combined. In fact, if each one of the FBI’s cyber agents and intelligence analysts focused on China exclusively, Chinese hackers would still outnumber our cyber personnel by at least 50:1. Let me say that again: 50:1. With AI, China is now in position to try to close the cycle—to use the fruits of their widespread hacking to power, with AI, even-more-powerful hacking efforts.

And it’s not just China: The Russian, Iranian, and North Korean cyber programs are also relentless.

And it’s becoming increasingly difficult to discern where cybercriminal activity ends and adversarial nation-state activity begins. Like when we see foreign intelligence officers moonlighting—making money on the side through cybercrime—or hackers who are profit-minded criminals by day and state-sponsored by night, or nation-states using cybercriminal tools to conduct state-sponsored attacks because they think it gives them some plausible deniability or will hide who’s behind the attacks. These threats are why we want and need your help, and when we work together, we’re able to strike some serious blows against these actors.

Just last month, we announced the results of a worldwide, FBI-led operation that crippled Qakbot, one of the longest-running botnets ever seen. The botnet compromised everything from financial institutions on the East Coast to a critical infrastructure government contractor in the Midwest to a medical device manufacturer on the West Coast. It was used by cybercriminals to attack a publishing company two years ago, which then had to pay $4.9 million in ransom. Last year, malicious actors used the botnet to steal gigabytes of private information from a healthcare provider and later leaked that information on the darkweb.

Then the FBI and our partners stepped in, working with five other countries. We neutralized Qakbot’s command-and-control servers, redirected botnet traffic to an FBI-controlled server, quickly notified victims they had been compromised, removed Qakbot malware from infected victims, seized and dismantled the botnet’s support infrastructure, and seized millions of dollars of cryptocurrency. These are the key services I mentioned earlier that we’re targeting.

So even though this botnet was one of the world’s largest, we showed that our own network—and our own capabilities—are more powerful. And we’re going to continue using all lawful methods to put constant, proactive pressure on our adversaries. We’re going to go after all parts of their organizations, all parts of their operations, and we’re going to keep imposing consequences for their illegal action.

So I hope all of this has been informative, but I also hope it’s shown you the benefits of working with the FBI, which is, admittedly, part of why I’m here today: to recruit you to partner with us. One more plug: Just by coming here this week, it’s clear you and your organizations take cybersecurity seriously and share our goal to make cyberspace a safer place for everyone.

So you’ve likely also been planning ahead for when you’re targeted or compromised by a cyberattack. To take that one step further, my request is not just that you make an incident-response plan, but that you make us at the FBI part of that incident-response plan.

We know the private sector hasn’t always been excited about working with federal law enforcement, but when you contact us about an intrusion, we won’t be showing up in raid jackets. Instead, we’ll treat you like the victims you are—just like we treat all victims of all crimes.

To make that even easier, give our folks a call today and build a relationship with your local FBI field office now. If you know who to call, and we know who you are, that will make information sharing easier both ways and will make everything a lot more efficient if and when a crisis comes. Then, once we build these trusted relationships, we can possibly bring you in on close-hold operations and we can more confidently provide you with sensitive leads.

But none of this works if compromises don’t get reported to us in the first place. We just cannot help you if we don’t know there’s an issue, nor can we warn and protect others.

So our approach is victim-centered, because it helps us help you. It helps us help others who may be in danger, and it helps us use the intelligence we receive to take actions and run operations to defeat our adversaries.

Through that process—that virtuous cycle where we share, analyze, repeat—we can protect our nation’s networks.

As an example, many of you probably remember the cyberattack on Colonial Pipeline in 2021, which led to a fuel panic along America’s East Coast.

Once Colonial was compromised, they quickly engaged Mandiant to help with incident response, and as a result of their combined cooperation with the FBI—and the fast, open sharing of timely, relevant, accurate information—we were able to focus on our investigation and quickly make substantial breakthroughs. At the same time, the information shared by Colonial and Mandiant allowed the FBI and our government partners to publish information related to the cybercriminals responsible for the attack—and helped the public better prepare for possible future attacks.

And Colonial benefitted, too. Because Colonial reached out so quickly, we were able to identify and seize the virtual currency wallets belonging to the hackers, giving back most of the ransom to Colonial and depriving the bad guys of their ill-gotten gains. That’s the type of success that’s possible when we all work together toward common goals, even if we may be approaching those goals from different angles.

For those 115 years I mentioned earlier, the Bureau has been charged with protecting the American people and upholding the Constitution. I tell this to every class of new agent graduates I speak to: it’s a simple mission to say, yet profound to actually execute, and the FBI workforce goes to the ends of the earth, literally, every day to achieve that mission.

It’s inspiring to watch and inspiring to be a part of, but we know we can’t accomplish it on our own. We cannot do what we do—we cannot protect the American people—without partners like you. So, I want to thank you again for taking the time out of your busy schedules to come to Washington to listen to my thoughts and my requests of you, and to talk with each other about how we can strengthen our collective defense. And I want you to also know how grateful we are for your commitment to collaboration and cooperation and your willingness to share what you know with us as we work together to keep the country and the world safe. Thank you.

Twenty-Six Defendants Charged for Drug Trafficking in Multi-State Operation

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Crime News

ALEXANDRIA, Va. – The U.S. Attorney’s Office announced today that an indictment was unsealed charging 26 defendants of drug trafficking, possessing a firearm during drug trafficking, money laundering, and other charges.

These charges were brought as the result of Operation Lights Out, an FBI-led investigation in partnership with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. The defendants have been indicted for the following charges:

Name

Age

Hometown

Charges

Cortez Dayshawn Bumphus, aka “Co”

34

Newport News

Continuing Criminal Enterprise

Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute Marijuana, Cocaine, Fentanyl, Oxycodone and Cocaine Base

Conspiracy to Launder Money

Felon in possession of Firearm

Distribution of Fentanyl and Marijuana

Possession of Firearm During Drug Trafficking

Maintaining a Drug Involved Premises

Use of a Communication Facility in Furtherance of Drug Trafficking

Dontae Lamont Dozier, aka “2 Chains”

 35

Chesapeake

Continuing Criminal Enterprise

Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute Marijuana, Cocaine, Fentanyl, Oxycodone and Cocaine Base

Conspiracy to Launder Money;

Distribution of Fentanyl and Marijuana

Possession of Firearm During Drug Trafficking

Maintaining Drug Involved Premise

Use of a Communications Facility in Furtherance of Drug Trafficking

Zuri Anthony Dre-Oliver Reeves, aka “Zu” or “ZuWaap”

26

Spotsylvania

Continuing Criminal Enterprise

Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute Marijuana, Cocaine, Fentanyl, Oxycodone and Cocaine Base

Conspiracy to Launder Money

Distribution of Fentanyl and Marijuana

Possession of Firearm During Drug Trafficking

Use of a Communication Facility in Furtherance of Drug Trafficking

Amanda Bell

22

Chesapeake

Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute Marijuana, Cocaine, Fentanyl, Oxycodone and Cocaine Base

Conspiracy to Launder Money

Possession of Firearm During Drug Trafficking

Use of a Communication Facility in Furtherance of Drug Trafficking

Dilquon Best, aka “Quon” or “DQ”

31

Atlanta, GA

Continuing Criminal Enterprise

Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute Marijuana, Cocaine, Fentanyl, Oxycodone and Cocaine Base

Conspiracy to Launder Money

Distribution of Fentanyl and Marijuana

Use of a Communication Facility in Furtherance of Drug Trafficking

Stephon Lamount Bumphus, aka “Fon”

34

Newport News

Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute Marijuana, Cocaine, Fentanyl, Oxycodone and Cocaine Base

Conspiracy to Launder Money

Distribution of Fentanyl and Marijuana

Use of a Communication Facility in Furtherance of Drug Trafficking

Damian Deshawn Gay, aka “Hatch”

25

Hampton

Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute Marijuana, Cocaine, Fentanyl, Oxycodone and Cocaine Base

Conspiracy to Launder Money

Distribution of Fentanyl and Marijuana

Use of a Communication Facility in Furtherance of Drug Trafficking

Possession of Firearm During Drug Trafficking

Interstate Travel in Aid of Racketeering

Andrea Hunt

28

Hampton

Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute Marijuana, Cocaine, Fentanyl, Oxycodone and Cocaine Base

Use of a Communication Facility in Furtherance of Drug Trafficking

Obstruction of Justice

Ervin Orlando Linares, aka “Ery”

23

Los Angeles, CA

Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute Marijuana, Cocaine, Fentanyl, Oxycodone and Cocaine Base

Conspiracy to Launder Money

Distribution of Fentanyl and Marijuana

Interstate Travel in Aid of Racketeering

Use of a Communication Facility in Furtherance of Drug Trafficking

Brandon Lamar Martin, aka “Lil B”

37

Hampton

Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute Marijuana, Cocaine, Fentanyl, Oxycodone and Cocaine Base

Conspiracy to Launder Money

Distribution of Fentanyl and Marijuana

Use of a Communication Facility in Furtherance of Drug Trafficking

Interstate Travel in Aid of Racketeering

Possession of Firearm During Drug Trafficking

Carl Eugene Mitchell, Jr., aka “Lil Man”

27

Newport News

Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute Marijuana, Cocaine, Fentanyl, Oxycodone and Cocaine Base

Conspiracy to Launder Money

Distribution of Fentanyl and Marijuana

Use of a Communication Facility in Furtherance of Drug Trafficking

Interstate Travel in Aid of Racketeering

Earvin Jerome Moore, aka “Gooch”

43

Newport News

Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute Marijuana, Cocaine, Fentanyl, Oxycodone and Cocaine Base

Conspiracy to Launder Money

Distribution of Fentanyl and Marijuana

Use of a Communication Facility in Furtherance of Drug Trafficking

Maintaining a Drug Involved Premises

Freddie Jamaul Moore, aka “Goons”

37

Portsmouth

Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute Marijuana, Cocaine, Fentanyl, Oxycodone and Cocaine Base

Conspiracy to Launder Money

Distribution of Fentanyl and Marijuana

Possession of Firearm During Drug Trafficking

Use of a Communication Facility in Furtherance of Drug Trafficking

Dominique McKenzie Osborne

24

Hampton

Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute Marijuana, Cocaine, Fentanyl, Oxycodone and Cocaine Base

Conspiracy to Launder Money

Use of a Communication Facility in Furtherance of Drug Trafficking

Rahkim O’Neil Perry, aka “Rahk”

25

Newport News

Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute Marijuana, Cocaine, Fentanyl, Oxycodone and Cocaine Base

Conspiracy to Launder Money

Use of a Communication Facility in Furtherance of Drug Trafficking

Distribution of Fentanyl and Marijuana

Interstate Travel in Aid of Racketeering

Graciela Ruiz-Bernabe, aka “Grace”

33

Los Angeles, CA

Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute Marijuana, Cocaine, Fentanyl, Oxycodone and Cocaine Base

Conspiracy to Launder Money

Distribution of Fentanyl and Marijuana

Interstate Travel in Aid of Racketeering

Nathan Caleb Schlosser-Goodson, aka “Nasty”

25

Yorktown

Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute Marijuana, Cocaine, Fentanyl, Oxycodone and Cocaine Base

Conspiracy to Launder Money

Use of a Communication Facility in Furtherance of Drug Trafficking

Distribution of Fentanyl and Marijuana

Possession of Firearm During Drug Trafficking

Camille Lache Smith

30

Los Angeles, CA

Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute Marijuana, Cocaine, Fentanyl, Oxycodone and Cocaine Base

Conspiracy to Launder Money

Use of a Communication Facility in Furtherance of Drug Trafficking

Anastasia Suyas

25

Newport News

Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute Marijuana, Cocaine, Fentanyl, Oxycodone and Cocaine Base

Conspiracy to Launder Money

Use of a Communication Facility in Furtherance of Drug Trafficking

Nyra Taylor

23

Hampton

Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute Marijuana, Cocaine, Fentanyl, Oxycodone and Cocaine Base

Conspiracy to Launder Money

Distribution of Fentanyl and Marijuana

Use of a Communication Facility in Furtherance of Drug Trafficking

Interstate Travel in Aid of Racketeering

Christina Michele Thompson

26

Spotsylvania

Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute Marijuana, Cocaine, Fentanyl, Oxycodone and Cocaine Base

Conspiracy to Launder Money

Use of a Communication Facility in Furtherance of Drug Trafficking

Terrance Leonard Vick, aka “V”

36

Rio Linda, CA

Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute Marijuana, Cocaine, Fentanyl, Oxycodone and Cocaine Base

Conspiracy to Launder Money

Interstate Travel in Aid of Racketeering

Use of a Communication Facility in Furtherance of Drug Trafficking

Thaddeus Williams IV, aka “Thad”

31

 

Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute Marijuana, Cocaine, Fentanyl, Oxycodone and Cocaine Base

Conspiracy to Launder Money

Distribution of Fentanyl and Marijuana

Use of a Communication Facility in Furtherance of Drug Trafficking

Interstate Travel in Aid of Racketeering

Korea Woods

26

Irvine, CA

Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute Marijuana, Cocaine, Fentanyl, Oxycodone and Cocaine Base

Conspiracy to Launder Money

Use of a Communication Facility in Furtherance of Drug Trafficking

Distribution of Fentanyl and Marijuana

Guang Yang, aka “Ryan”

26

Rosemead, CA

Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute Marijuana, Cocaine, Fentanyl, Oxycodone and Cocaine Base

Conspiracy to Launder Money

Use of a Communication Facility in Furtherance of Drug Trafficking

Distribution of Fentanyl and Marijuana

Alicia Zamora

22

Chesapeake, VA

Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute Marijuana, Cocaine, Fentanyl, Oxycodone and Cocaine Base

Conspiracy to Launder Money

Distribution of Fentanyl and Marijuana

Use of a Communication Facility in Furtherance of Drug Trafficking

Interstate Travel in Aid of Racketeering

If convicted, the defendants each face a mandatory minimum of 10 years in prison and a maximum of life in prison. Actual sentences for federal crimes are typically less than the maximum penalties. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after taking into account the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

Jessica D. Aber, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia; Colonel Gary T. Settle, Superintendent of Virginia State Police; Jimmie Wideman, Chief of Hampton Police; Brian Dugan, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI’s Norfolk Field Office; Steve R. Drew, Chief of Newport News Police; Mark G. Solesky, Chief of Chesapeake Police; Stephen Jenkins, Chief of Portsmouth Police; Craig Kailimai, Special Agent in Charge of the ATF’s Washington Field Division; and Shannon Saylor, U.S. Marshal for the Eastern District of Virginia, made the announcement.

“The unsealing of this indictment reflects months of incredible efforts by law enforcement. We are able to bring these charges because of the effective cooperation and collaborative effort of our local, state and federal partners on this case,” said Jessica D. Aber, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia. “I am grateful to all our attorneys, agents and officers who work diligently every day to take massive amounts of illegal guns and drugs off of our streets.”

“The arrests made in this operation is the culmination of years of investigative work between the FBI and our law enforcement partners,” said Brian Dugan, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI Norfolk Field Office. “Today, I want to sincerely thank those partners for their teamwork and patience as we gathered the evidence needed for this investigation to come to a logical conclusion, as our law enforcement partners have been dealing with some of these offenders for over a decade. I hope that this operation gives them a return on investment for all the officers and resources they dedicated to assisting the investigation. This operation is a testament to the strong partnership the FBI has with local and state police, as well as sheriff’s offices, and how that partnership better protects our communities.”

“These arrests are just one of the many successful operations achieved over the years through the collaborative agency partnerships within the FBI Peninsula Safe Streets Task Force,” said Colonel Gary T. Settle, Virginia State Police Superintendent. “The Virginia State Police Bureau of Criminal Investigation’s Chesapeake Field Office is proud to have played a role in dismantling what had become a very violent, multi-tiered, drug trafficking organization spanning much of the Hampton Roads region.”

“Combating violent crime, illegal firearm possession and narcotics distribution within our communities remains at the forefront of the ATF mission,” said Craig Kailimai, Special Agent in Charge of the ATF’s Washington Field Division. “I am proud that our agents and partner agencies worked to bring some peace of mind back to the affected communities. ATF will continue leveraging its expertise to ensure that illegal firearms and deadly narcotics are removed from our streets.”

“Our community and surrounding jurisdictions are not immune to the violence stemming from illegal drug trafficking,” said Steve R. Drew, Chief of Newport News Police. “It has become a top priority to take illegal drugs and guns off our streets and holding those accountable for endangering our communities. We are proud to have been part of this proactive approach and are honored to have served with the U.S. Attorney’s office, and other federal and local agencies to combat this issue. We believe that together we can make a difference and create a safer environment for our community.”

“Today’s arrest is a clear demonstration of the exceptional cooperative effort among law enforcement in the Hampton Roads area,” said Stephen Jenkins, Chief of Portsmouth Police. “It exemplifies the effectiveness of collaboration between federal, state, and local agencies who have united to combat a suspected violent drug trafficking organization. This operation not only underscores the commitment of both federal and local law enforcement but also highlights their unwavering dedication to ensuring the safety of our community.”

Assistant U.S. Attorney Eric M. Hurt is prosecuting the case.

This effort is part of an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) operation. OCDETF identifies, disrupts, and dismantles the highest-level criminal organizations that threaten the United States using a prosecutor-led, intelligence-driven, multi-agency approach. Additional information about the OCDETF Program can be found at https://www.justice.gov/OCDETF.

A copy of this press release is located on the website of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia. Related court documents and information are located on the website of the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia or on PACER by searching for Case No. 4:23-cr-54.

An indictment is merely an accusation. The defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty.

FBI Houston Seeks “Boss Lady Loser” for Bank Robbery

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Crime News

(HOUSTON, TX—The FBI Violent Crime Task Force needs the public’s help identifying and locating a man, dubbed the “Boss Lady Loser,” who robbed a Wells Fargo Bank in west Houston. Crime Stoppers of Houston is offering a reward of up to $5,000 for information that leads to the identification and arrest of the robber.

The robbery occurred at approximately 1:45 p.m. on Thursday, September 7, 2023, at the Wells Fargo Bank located at 2464 S. Kirkwood Road in Houston, Texas.

The suspect entered the bank, approached a teller, and handed them a threatening note which demanded cash. The robber left the bank traveling on foot northbound on S. Kirkwood Road with no money. No one was physically hurt during the robbery.

The robber is described as a black male between the ages of 25 and 35, approximately 6’1” tall with a medium build. During the robbery, he wore a pink medical mask, a black sweatshirt, dark pants, gray sneakers, and a baseball cap that displayed “Boss Lady” on the front.

Photographs of the bank robbery can be found on FBI Houston’s Twitter and Facebook accounts.

Crime Stoppers of Houston, a non-governmental organization, is offering up to $5,000 for information leading to the identification and arrest of this robber. If you have any information, please call the Crime Stoppers tip line at 713-222-TIPS (8477) or the FBI Houston Field Office at (713) 693-5000. Tips may also be submitted to Crime Stoppers through their website, www.crime-stoppers.org, or the Houston Crime Stoppers mobile phone app which can be downloaded for both iPhone and Android devices. All tipsters remain anonymous.

Two More Dublin Federal Correctional Officers Plead Guilty to Sexually Abusing Multiple Female Inmates

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Crime News

As part of its ongoing investigation into Bureau of Prisons (BOP) officials at Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) Dublin, two more federal prison correctional officers were charged for sexually abusing multiple female inmates.

Nakie Nunley, 48, of Fairfield, California, and Andrew Jones, 35, of Pleasanton, California, were each charged by information with multiple counts of sexually abusing female inmates and then lying about the abuse to federal investigators. Both Nunley and Jones were employed as federal correctional officers at the time of the abuse. Both have agreed to plead guilty in written plea agreements, which were filed concurrently with the charging documents.

“The sexual abuse charges and guilty pleas announced today are the result of the Department of Justice’s sustained commitment to rooting out sexual misconduct at the Bureau of Prisons,” said Deputy Attorney General Lisa O. Monaco. “As these guilty pleas reflect, we will continue to hold accountable correctional officers who abuse their positions of trust and fail to humanely care for those in their custody.”

“The FBI is unrelenting in its protection of the civil rights of all individuals, including those who are incarcerated,” said FBI Deputy Director Paul Abbate. “No matter where these crimes occur, violence of any type destroys the safety and protection that every person deserves. We will continue to pursue investigations into any Bureau of Prisons official who abuses their position and assaults those in their care.”

“This office’s ongoing investigation into the conditions at FCI Dublin has revealed significant wrongdoing by multiple correctional officers at that facility,” said U.S. Attorney Ismail J. Ramsey for the Northern District of California. “The Department of Justice will not tolerate misconduct in the care of incarcerated persons. Correctional officers have an obligation to ensure the safety of incarcerated persons, and all Bureau of Prisons employees should view these latest two prosecutions as confirmation that the Department of Justice will do its part to ensure that those who stray from these obligations are held accountable.”

“Nunley and Jones are the seventh and eighth individuals charged with sexually abusing inmates at FCI Dublin. Five individuals, including the Warden and Chaplain, have been convicted of sexual abuse of inmates,” said Inspector General Michael E. Horowitz. “The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General  (DOJ-OIG) is continuing to investigate these heinous allegations at FCI Dublin and is aggressively pursuing justice for victims of sexual abuse at the hands of rogue BOP employees.”

“Incarcerated individuals should be able to serve their sentences without fear of being sexually assaulted by correctional institution staff,” said Special Agent in Charge Robert Tripp of FBI San Francisco Field Office. “Nakie Nunley and Andrew Jones abused their positions and will be held accountable. Protecting civil rights stands among the FBI’s highest priorities, and we will continue to investigate such claims as they come to light.”

Nunley was charged with engaging in sexual acts and sexual contacts with five women who were serving prison sentences at FCI Dublin at the time of the abuse. He was also charged with lying to federal investigators about the sexual abuse and writing sexually explicit notes with one of his victims. Jones was charged with engaging in sexual acts with three women who were serving prison sentences at FCI Dublin, as well as lying to federal investigators about sexually abusing one of these victims. 

Nakie Nunley

Nunley was employed as a correctional officer at FCI Dublin where he supervised prisoners who worked in UNICOR, a trade name for the federal prison industries. All of Nunley’s victims worked at the UNICOR call center at the time of his abuse. According to his plea agreement, Nunley admits that between March 2020 and November 2021, he engaged in sexual acts with two prisoners, including having oral and vaginal sex with one victim and digitally penetrating another victim on multiple occasions. He also admitted that he engaged in illegal sexual contacts with three other prisoners and that he lied to federal investigators about sexually abusing his victims and about sending one of his victims sexually explicit notes.

In addition to the five victims, Nunley also admitted in his plea agreement that he sexually abused two other prisoners who worked at UNICOR. Nunley admitted that he digitally penetrated one victim’s vagina and caused her to touch his penis under his pants, resulting in him ejaculating in her hand. Nunley admitted that he caused another victim to perform oral sex on him.

Nunley also admitted that he engaged in other inappropriate behavior. For example, Nunley agreed that he wrote sexual notes to one of his victims and made sexual comments to multiple victims. Moreover, when one of his victims approached him about his conduct towards another victim, Nunley threatened her by raising with her the potential that she could be transferred to another facility and that she could lose her job. Similarly, Nunley admitted that he told another victim that if she wanted to keep her job at UNICOR, she needed to pull down her underwear and bend over. When she complied, Nunley slapped her buttocks several times.

Andrew Jones

Jones was employed as a correctional officer at FCI Dublin where he supervised prisoners who worked in the Food Services Department. According to his plea agreement, between July 2020 and June 2021, Jones admitted that he received oral sex from, or had sexual intercourse with, three female prisoners who worked for him in the FCI Dublin kitchen. Jones admitted that he sexually abused these prisoners in multiple places near the FCI Dublin kitchen, including a staff bathroom, a warehouse, and a room where kitchen utensils were kept. In addition, like Nunley, Jones admitted in his plea agreement that he engaged in improper conduct in addition to the conduct for which he was charged in the Information. Specifically, Jones admitted that he also had sexual intercourse and received oral sex from an additional victim on multiple other occasions between July and December 2020, and that he had sexual intercourse with yet another victim multiple times between March and June 2021.

FCI Dublin Investigation

As part of the Justice Department’s ongoing investigation into FCI Dublin, eight FCI Dublin correctional officers, including the former Warden, have been charged with crimes related to the sexual abuse of the female prisoners at the facility. In December 2022, former Warden Ray J. Garcia was convicted by a jury of sexually abusive conduct against three female victims and was sentenced to 70 months in prison for his crimes. To date, the tally of correctional officers charged with misconduct as part of the Justice Department’s investigation are as follows:

NAME

CASE NUMBER

STATUS

Warden Ray J. Garcia

4:21-cr-00429-YGR

Convicted on all counts by jury on Dec. 8, 2022; sentenced to 70 months in prison

CO John Bellhouse

4:22-cr-00066-YGR

Convicted on all counts by jury on June 5; sentencing scheduled for Oct. 27

Chaplain James Highhouse

4:22-cr-00016-HSG

Pleaded guilty on Feb. 24, 2022; sentenced to 84 months in prison

CO Enrique Chavez

4:22-cr-00104-YGR

Pleaded guilty on Oct. 27, 2022; sentenced to 20 months in prison

CO Ross Klinger

4:22-cr-00031-YGR

Pleaded guilty on Feb. 10, 2022; sentencing scheduled for Dec. 13

CO Darrel Smith (aka “Dirty Dick Smith”)

4:22-cr-00110-YGR

Indicted on April 13; status conference scheduled for Aug. 3

CO Nakie Nunley

4:23-cr-00213-HSG

Information and Plea Agreement filed on July 13

CO Andrew Jones

4:23-cr-00212-HSG

Information and Plea Agreement filed on July 13

DOJ-OIG and the FBI investigated the case.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Molly K. Priedeman and Andrew Paulson for the Northern District of California, with the assistance of Madeline Wachs, Sara Slattery, Christine Tian, Claudia Hyslop, Leeya Kekona, and Kay Konopaske, are prosecuting the case.

FBI National Command Course Graduates Fifth Session

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Crime News

On July 14, 51 chief law enforcement executives graduated from the fifth session of the FBI’s National Command Course (NCC) program at Quantico, Virginia.

In 2020, the FBI created the National Command Course as a unique training opportunity for chief executives of America’s law enforcement agencies with fewer than 50 sworn officers.

“We are honored that such an elite group of law enforcement executives sacrificed time away from their departments to join us for a week of training and professional development,” said Acting Assistant Director Wayne Jacobs of the FBI’s Training Division. “Each one of the attendees brought extensive criminal justice knowledge and perspectives as diverse as the communities they serve.”

The program’s purpose is to foster long-lasting relationships, increase agency effectiveness, and promote partnerships to tackle emerging crime problems across the country. 

High-Level Member of ISIS Sentenced to Life in Prison for Material Support to a Foreign Terrorist Organization Resulting in Death

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Crime News

A New York man was sentenced to life in prison on one count of conspiracy to provide material support to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and five substantive counts of providing material support to ISIS in the forms of personnel—including himself, Australian citizen Jake Bilardi, and others—as well as services, weapons, property and equipment, and false documentation and identification, all between January 2013 and June 2017, when the defendant was arrested in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Crime News

Statement for the Record

Good afternoon, Chairman Jordan, Ranking Member Nadler, and members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. I do so on behalf of the men and women of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), who tackle some of the most complex national security and criminal threats every day with perseverance, professionalism, and integrity—sometimes at the greatest of costs. I am extremely proud of their service and commitment to the FBI’s mission and to ensuring the safety and security of communities throughout our nation.

Despite the many challenges our FBI workforce faces, I am immensely proud of their dedication to protecting the American people and upholding the Constitution. The list of diverse threats we face underscores the complexity and breadth of the FBI’s mission: to protect the American people and uphold the Constitution of the United States. I am prepared to discuss with you what the FBI is doing to address these threats and what the FBI is doing to ensure that our people adhere to the highest of standards while it conducts its mission.

Key Threats and Challenges

Our nation continues to face a multitude of serious and evolving threats ranging from homegrown violent extremists to hostile foreign intelligence services and operatives, from sophisticated cyber-based attacks to internet facilitated sexual exploitation of children, from violent gangs and criminal organizations to public corruption and corporate fraud. Keeping pace with these threats is a significant challenge for the FBI, and requires us to stay current with constantly evolving technologies. Our adversaries—terrorists, foreign intelligence services, and criminals—take advantage of technology, including the internet and social media, to facilitate illegal activities, to recruit followers, to encourage terrorist attacks and other illicit actions, and to disperse information on building improvised explosive devices and other means to attack the United States. The breadth of these threats and challenges are as complex as at any time in our history. And the consequences of not responding to and countering threats and challenges have never been greater.

The support of Congress, including this Committee, is critical in helping the FBI do its part to thwart these threats and face these challenges. That support enables us to establish strong capabilities and capacities to assess threats, to share intelligence, to leverage key technologies, and—often most importantly—to hire some of the best talent to serve as special agents, intelligence analysts, and professional staff. We are continuously enhancing a workforce that possesses skills and knowledge to deal with the complex threats and challenges we face today—and will face tomorrow. We are building a leadership cadre that views change and transformation as a positive tool for keeping the FBI focused on the key threats facing our nation.

Today’s FBI is a national security and law enforcement organization that uses, collects, and shares intelligence in everything we do. Each FBI employee understands that, to defeat the key threats facing our nation, we must constantly strive to be more efficient and more effective. Just as our adversaries continue to evolve, so, too, must the FBI. We live in a time of acute and persistent terrorist and criminal threats to our national security, our economy, and, indeed, our communities. These diverse threats underscore the complexity and breadth of the FBI’s mission: to protect the American people and uphold the Constitution of the United States.

National Security

Top Terrorism Threats

Protecting the American people from terrorism—both international and domestic—remains the FBI’s number one priority. The threat from terrorism is as persistent and complex as ever. The threats from international terrorism, domestic terrorism, and state-sponsored terrorism all remain at elevated levels, requiring continued investment and vigilance.

The greatest terrorism threat to our homeland comes from lone actors or small cells who radicalize—typically online—and look to attack soft targets with easily accessible weapons.

We see these threats manifested within both Domestic Violent Extremists (“DVEs”) and Homegrown Violent Extremists (“HVEs”), two distinct threats, both of which are located primarily in the United States and typically radicalize and mobilize to violence on their own. Individuals who commit violent criminal acts in furtherance of social or political goals stemming from domestic influences are described as DVEs, whereas HVEs are individuals who are inspired primarily by global jihad but are not receiving individualized direction from Foreign Terrorist Organizations (“FTOs”).

Domestic and Homegrown Violent Extremists are often motivated and inspired by a mix of social or political, ideological, and personal grievances against their targets. Recently, they have focused on accessible targets, including civilians, law enforcement and the military, symbols or members of the U.S. government, houses of worship, retail locations, and mass public gatherings. Lone actors present a particular challenge to law enforcement and intelligence agencies. These actors are difficult to identify, investigate, and disrupt before they take violent action, especially because of the insular nature of their radicalization and mobilization to violence, as well as their limited discussions with others regarding their plans.

The top domestic terrorism threat we face continues to be from DVEs we categorize as Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists (“RMVEs”) and Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremists (“AGAAVEs”). In May 2022, a RMVE in the United States conducted an attack in Buffalo, New York, that resulted in the deaths of 10 innocent individuals. The number of FBI domestic terrorism investigations has more than doubled since the spring of 2020. As of the end of fiscal year 2022, the FBI was conducting approximately 2,700 investigations within the domestic terrorism program. The FBI was also conducting approximately 4,000 investigations within its international terrorism program in fiscal year 2022.

The FBI uses all tools available at its disposal to combat domestic terrorism. These efforts represent a critical part of the National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism, which was released in June 2021, and which sets forth a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach to address the many facets of the domestic terrorism threat.

As for international terrorism, the FBI assesses that HVEs are the greatest, most immediate threat to the homeland. Rather than receiving individualized direction from FTOs, HVEs are people inspired by FTOs—including the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (“ISIS”) and al-Qaida and their affiliates—to commit violence. A HVE’s lack of a direct connection with an FTO, ability to rapidly mobilize without detection, and use of encrypted communications can pose significant challenges to our ability to proactively identify and disrupt potential violent attacks. For example, on New Year’s Eve last year in New York City, an HVE attacked three New York Police Department Officers using an edged weapon.

The FBI remains concerned about the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan and the intent of FTOs, such as ISIS and al-Qaida and their affiliates, to carry out or inspire large-scale attacks in the United States.

Despite its loss of physical territory in Iraq and Syria, ISIS remains relentless in its campaign of violence against the United States and our partners—both here at home and overseas. ISIS and its supporters continue to aggressively promote hate-fueled rhetoric and to attract like-minded violent extremists with a willingness to conduct attacks against the United States and our interests abroad. We are also concerned about ISIS’ successful use of social media and messaging applications, like other foreign terrorist groups, to advocate for lone-offender attacks in the United States and Western countries. They use videos and other English-language propaganda that have specifically advocated for attacks against civilians, the military, law enforcement, and Intelligence-Community personnel.

Al-Qaida also maintains its desire to conduct and inspire large-scale, spectacular attacks. Because continued pressure has degraded some of the group’s senior leadership, we assess that, in the near term, al-Qaida is more likely to continue to focus on cultivating its international affiliates and supporting small-scale, readily achievable attacks in regions such as East and West Africa. Over the past year, however, propaganda from al-Qaida leaders continued to seek to inspire individuals to conduct their own attacks in the United States and other Western nations.

Iran and its global proxies and partners, including Iraqi Shia militant groups, continue to attack and plot against the United States and our allies throughout the Middle East. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (“IRGC-QF”) continues to provide support to militant resistance groups and terrorist organizations. Iran also continues to support Lebanese Hizballah and other terrorist groups. Hizballah has sent operatives to build terrorist infrastructures worldwide. The arrests of individuals in the United States allegedly linked to Hizballah’s main overseas terrorist arm, and their intelligence-collection and -procurement efforts, demonstrate Hizballah’s interest in long-term contingency planning activities here in the Homeland. Hizballah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah also has threatened retaliation for the death of IRGC-QF Commander Qassem Soleimani. This willingness to seek retaliation against the United States was reflected in charges the Department brought in 2022 against a member of the IRGC, working on behalf of the Qods Force, with a plot to murder a former national security advisor.

While the terrorism threat continues to evolve, the FBI’s resolve to counter that threat remains constant. As an organization, we continually adapt and rely heavily on the strength of our federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and international partnerships to combat all terrorist threats to the United States and our interests. We use all available lawful investigative techniques and methods to combat these threats. We collect, analyze, and share intelligence concerning the threats posed by violent extremists, in all their forms, who desire to harm Americans and U.S. interests. And we will continue to share information and encourage the sharing of information among our numerous partners through our Joint Terrorism Task Forces across the country, as well as our legal attaché offices around the world.

In addition to fighting terrorism, countering the proliferation of weapons-of-mass-destruction materials, technologies, and expertise, preventing their use by any actor, and securing nuclear and radioactive materials of concern are also top national security priority missions for the FBI. The FBI considers preventing, mitigating, investigating, and responding to weapons of mass destruction (“WMD”) terrorism a “no-fail” mission because a WMD attack could result in substantial injuries, illness, or loss of lives, with significant social, economic, political and other national security consequences. In collaboration with federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and other partners, the FBI integrates complementary efforts to counter WMD terrorism. An example of this collaboration is the FBI-led Weapons of Mass Destruction Strategic Group. This interagency crisis action team spans more than fifteen departments and agencies to coordinate the federal government’s response to WMD threats and incidents. Alongside the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security maintains the largest footprint on the Strategic Group.

Cyber

Cybercriminal syndicates and nation-states continue to innovate and use unique techniques to compromise our networks and maximize the reach and impact of their operations. Those techniques include selling malware as a service and targeting vendors as a way to access scores of victims by hacking just one provider.

These criminals and nation-states believe that they can compromise our networks, steal our property, extort us, and hold our critical infrastructure at risk without incurring any risk themselves. In the last few years, we have seen—and have publicly called out—the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”), the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“DPRK”), and Russia for using cyber operations to target U.S. COVID-19 vaccines and research. We have seen the far-reaching disruptive impact a serious supply-chain compromise can have through the SolarWinds-related intrusions, conducted by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. We have seen the PRC working to obtain controlled dual-use technology and developing an arsenal of advanced cyber capabilities that could be used against other countries in the event of a real-world conflict. As these adversaries become more sophisticated, we are increasingly concerned about our ability to detect and warn about specific cyber operations against U.S. organizations. One of the most worrisome facets is their focus on compromising U.S. critical infrastructure, especially during a crisis.

Making things more difficult, there is often no bright line that separates where nation-state activity ends and cybercriminal activity begins. Some cybercriminals contract or sell services to nation-states; some nation-state actors moonlight as cybercriminals to fund personal activities; and nation-states are increasingly using tools typically used by criminal actors, such as ransomware.

So, as dangerous as nation-states are, we do not have the luxury of focusing on them alone. In the past year, we also have seen cybercriminals target hospitals, medical centers, educational institutions, and other critical infrastructure for theft or ransomware, causing massive disruption to our daily lives. Incidents affecting medical centers, in particular, have led to the interruption of computer networks and systems that put patients’ lives at an increased risk at a time when America has faced its most dire public health crisis in generations.

We have also seen the rise of an ecosystem of services dedicated to supporting cybercrime in exchange for cryptocurrency. Criminals now have new tools to engage in destructive behavior—for example, deploying ransomware to paralyze entire hospitals, police departments, and businesses—as well as new means to better conceal their tracks. It is not that individual malicious cyber actors have necessarily become much more sophisticated, but that they can now more easily rent sophisticated capabilities.

We must make it harder and more painful for malicious cyber actors and criminals to carry on their malicious activities. Using its role as the lead federal agency for threat response, the FBI works seamlessly with domestic and international partners to defend their networks, attribute malicious activity, sanction bad behavior, and take the fight to our adversaries overseas. We must impose consequences on cyber adversaries, and use our collective law enforcement and intelligence capabilities to do so through joint and enabled operations sequenced for maximum impact. And we must continue to work with the Department of State and other key agencies to ensure that our foreign partners are able and willing to cooperate in our efforts to disrupt and bring to justice the perpetrators of cybercrime.

An example of this approach is the coordinated international operation announced in April 2023 against Genesis Market, a criminal online marketplace offering access to data stolen from over 1.5 million compromised computers around the world containing over 80 million account access credentials. Genesis Market was also a prolific initial access broker in the cybercrime world, providing criminals a user-friendly database to search for stolen credentials and more easily infiltrate victims’ computers and accounts. As part of this operation, law enforcement seized 11 domain names used to support Genesis Market’s infrastructure pursuant to a warrant authorized by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. A total of 22 international agencies and 44 FBI field offices worked with the FBI Milwaukee Field Office investigating the case. And on April 5, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced sanctions against Genesis Market.

In total, along with our Department colleagues, we took over 1,000 actions against cyber adversaries in 2022, including arrests, criminal charges, convictions, dismantlements, and disruptions. We enabled many more actions through our dedicated partnerships with the private sector, with foreign partners, and with federal, state, and local entities. We also provided thousands of individualized threat warnings and disseminated 70 public threat advisories by way of Joint Cybersecurity Advisories, FBI Liaison Alert System (“FLASH”) reports, Private Industry Notifications (“PINs”), and Public Service Announcements (“PSAs”)—many of which were jointly authored with other U.S. agencies and international partners.

Along with our partners in the interagency, the FBI has devoted significant energy and resources to these partnerships, especially those involving the private sector. We are working hard to push important threat information to network defenders, but we have also been making it as easy as possible for the private sector to share important information with us. For example, we are emphasizing to the private sector how we keep our presence unobtrusive in the wake of an incident, as well as how we protect identities and other information that the private sector shares with us. We are also committed to providing useful feedback and to improving coordination with our government partners so that we are speaking with one voice. But we need the private sector to do its part, too. We need the private sector to come forward to warn us and our partners—and warn us quickly—when they see malicious cyber activity. We also need the private sector to work with us when we warn them that they are being targeted. Significant cyber incidents—SolarWinds, Cyclops Blink, the Colonial pipeline incident—only emphasize what we have been saying for a long time: the government cannot protect against cyber threats on its own. We need a whole-of-society approach that matches the scope of the danger. There is no other option for defending a country where nearly all of our critical infrastructure, personal data, intellectual property, and network infrastructure sits in private hands.

In summary, the FBI is engaged in a myriad of efforts to combat cyber threats, from improving threat identification and information-sharing inside and outside of the government to developing and retaining new talent, to examining the way we operate to disrupt and defeat these threats. We take all potential threats to public and private sector systems seriously, and will continue to investigate and hold accountable those who pose a threat in cyberspace.

Foreign Intelligence Threats

Top Threats

Nations such as China, Russia, and Iran are becoming more aggressive and more capable in their nefarious activity than ever before. These nations seek to undermine our core democratic, economic, and scientific institutions. They employ a growing range of tactics to advance their interests and to harm the United States. Defending American institutions and values against these threats is a national security imperative and a priority for the FBI.

With that, the greatest long-term threat to our nation’s ideas, innovation, and economic security is the foreign intelligence and economic espionage threat from the PRC. It’s a threat to our economic security—and, by extension—to our national security. The PRC government aspires to reshape the international rules-based system to its benefit, with little regard for the democratic ideals that underpin it. The pursuit of these goals is often with little regard for international norms and laws.

When it comes to economic espionage, the PRC uses every means at its disposal against us—blending cyber, human intelligence, diplomacy, corporate transactions, and other pressure on U.S. companies operating in the PRC, to achieve its strategic goals to steal our companies’ innovations. These efforts are consistent with the PRC government’s expressed goal to become an international power, modernizing its military and creating innovative-driven economic growth.

To pursue this goal, China uses human intelligence officers, co-optees, and corrupt corporate insiders, as well as sophisticated cyber intrusions, pressure on U.S. companies in China, shell-game corporate transactions, and joint-venture “partnerships” that are anything but a true partnership. There’s also nothing traditional about the scale of their theft. It is unprecedented in the history of the FBI. American workers and companies are facing a greater, more complex danger than they have ever dealt with before. Stolen innovation means stolen jobs, stolen opportunities for American workers, stolen national power, and stolen leadership in the industries.

National Counterintelligence Task Force (“NCITF”)

As the lead U.S. counterintelligence agency, the FBI is responsible for detecting and lawfully countering the actions of foreign intelligence services and organizations as they seek to adversely affect U.S. national interests. Recognizing the need to coordinate similar efforts across all agencies, the FBI established the NCITF in 2019 to create a whole-of-government approach to counterintelligence. The FBI established this national-level task force in the National Capital Region to coordinate, facilitate, and focus these multi-agency counterintelligence operations, and to programmatically support local Counterintelligence Task Force (“CITF”) operations. Combining the authorities and operational capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community, NT-50 departments and agencies, law enforcement agencies around the country, and local CITFs in each FBI field office, the NCITF coordinates and leads whole-of-government efforts to defeat hostile intelligence activities targeting the United States.

The Department of Defense (“DoD”) has been a key partner in the NCITF since its founding. While the FBI has had long-term collaborative relationships with DoD entities such as the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and Army Counterintelligence, the NCITF has allowed us to enhance our collaboration with each other for greater impact. We plan to emphasize this whole-of-government approach as a powerful formula to mitigate the modern counterintelligence threat.

Transnational Repression

In recent years, we have seen a rise in efforts by authoritarian regimes to interfere with freedom of expression and punish dissidents abroad. These acts of repression cross national borders, often reaching into the United States. Governments such as the PRC, the Russian Federation, and the Government of Iran stalk, intimidate, and harass certain people in the United States. This is called transnational repression. It is illegal, and the FBI is investigating it.

Transnational repression can occur in different forms, including assaults and attempted kidnapping. Governments use transnational repression tactics to silence the voices of their citizens, U.S. residents, or non-citizens connected to the home country. This sort of repressive behavior is antithetical to our values as Americans. People from all over the world are drawn to the United States by the promise of living in a free and open society—one that adheres to the rule of law. To ensure that this promise remains a reality, we must continue to use all of our tools to block authoritarian regimes that seek to extend their tactics of repression beyond their shores.

Our nation is confronting multifaceted foreign threats seeking both to influence our national policies and public opinion and to harm our national dialogue and debate. The FBI and our interagency partners remain focused on foreign malign influence operations—which include subversive, undeclared, coercive, and criminal actions used by foreign governments in their attempts to sway U.S. voters’ preferences and perspectives, shift U.S. policies, increase discord in the United States, and undermine the American people’s confidence in our democratic institutions and processes.

Foreign malign influence is not a new problem, but the interconnectedness of the modern world, combined with the anonymity of the internet, have changed the nature of the threat and how the FBI and its partners must address it. Foreign malign influence operations have taken many forms and have used many tactics over the years.

The FBI is the lead Federal agency responsible for investigating foreign malign influence threats. Several years ago, we established the Foreign Influence Task Force (“FITF”) to identify and counteract foreign malign influence operations targeting the United States. The FITF is led by our Counterintelligence Division, and comprises agents, analysts, and professional staff from the Counterintelligence, Cyber, Counterterrorism, and Criminal Investigative divisions. It is specifically charged with identifying and combating foreign malign influence operations targeting democratic institutions inside the United States.

The domestic counterintelligence environment is more complex than ever. We face a persistent and pervasive national security threat from foreign adversaries, particularly the governments of Russia and China, conducting sophisticated intelligence operations using coercion, subversion, malign influence, cyber and economic espionage, traditional spying, and non-traditional human intelligence collection. Together, they pose a continuous threat to U.S. national security and our economy by targeting strategic technologies, industries, sectors, and critical infrastructures. Historically, these asymmetric national security threats involved foreign intelligence service officers seeking U.S. government and U.S. Intelligence Community information. The FBI has observed foreign adversaries employing a wide range of nontraditional collection techniques, including the use of human collectors not affiliated with intelligence services, foreign investment in critical U.S. sectors, and infiltration of U.S. supply chains. The FBI continues to adjust our counterintelligence priorities and posture to address the evolving and multifaceted threat.

Criminal Threats

The U.S. faces many criminal threats, including financial and health care fraud, transnational and regional organized criminal enterprises, crimes against children and human trafficking, and public corruption. Criminal organizations—domestic and international—and individual criminal activity represent a significant threat to security and safety in communities across the nation.

Violent Crime

Violent crimes and gang activities exact a high toll on individuals and communities. Many of today’s gangs are sophisticated and well-organized. They use violence to control neighborhoods and boost their illegal money-making activities, which include robbery, drug and gun trafficking, fraud, extortion, and prostitution rings. These gangs do not limit their illegal activities to single jurisdictions or communities. The FBI is able to work across such lines, which is vital to the fight against violent crime in big cities and small towns across our nation. Every day, FBI special agents work in partnership with federal, state, local, and tribal officers and deputies on joint task forces and individual investigations.

FBI joint task forces—Violent Crime Safe Streets, Violent Gang Safe Streets, and Safe Trails—focus on identifying and targeting major groups operating as criminal enterprises. Much of the FBI criminal intelligence is derived from our state, local, and tribal law enforcement partners, who know their communities inside and out. Joint task forces benefit from FBI surveillance assets, and our sources track these gangs to identify emerging trends. Through these multi-subject and multi-jurisdictional investigations, the FBI concentrates its efforts on high-level groups engaged in patterns of racketeering. This investigative model enables us to target senior gang leadership and to develop enterprise-based prosecutions.

By way of example, the FBI has dedicated tremendous resources to combat the threat of violence posed by MS-13. The atypical nature of this gang has required a multi-pronged approach. We work through our task forces here in the United States, while simultaneously gathering intelligence and aiding our international law enforcement partners. We do this through the FBI’s Transnational Anti-Gang Task Forces (“TAGs”). Established in El Salvador in 2007 through the FBI’s National Gang Task Force, Legal Attaché San Salvador, and the United States Department of State, each TAG is a fully operational unit responsible for the investigation of, primarily, MS-13 operating in the northern triangle of Central America and threatening the United States. This program combines the expertise, resources, and jurisdiction of participating agencies involved in investigating and countering transnational criminal gang activity in the United States and Central America. There are now TAGs in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Through these combined efforts, the FBI has achieved substantial success in countering the MS-13 threat across the United States and Central America.

We are committed to working with our federal, state, local, and tribal partners in a coordinated effort to reduce violent crime in the United States.

Transnational Organized Crime (“TOC”)

More than a decade ago, organized crime was characterized by hierarchical organizations, or families, that exerted influence over criminal activities in neighborhoods, cities, or states. But organized crime has changed dramatically. Today, international criminal enterprises run multinational, multibillion-dollar schemes from start to finish. Modern-day criminal enterprises are flat, fluid networks with global reach. While still engaged in many of the “traditional” organized crime activities of loan-sharking, extortion, and murder, modern criminal enterprises are also involved in trafficking counterfeit prescription drugs containing deadly fentanyl, targeting stock market fraud and manipulation, cyber-facilitated bank fraud and embezzlement, illicit drug trafficking, identity theft, human trafficking, money laundering, alien smuggling, public corruption, weapons trafficking, kidnapping, and other illegal activities.

TOC networks exploit legitimate institutions for critical financial and business services that enable the storage or transfer of illicit proceeds. Preventing and combating transnational organized crime demands a concentrated effort by the FBI and federal, state, local, tribal, and international partners.

As part of our efforts to combat the TOC threat, the FBI is focused on the cartels trafficking dangerous narcotics, like fentanyl, across our border. The FBI has 323 pending investigations linked to cartel leadership and 78 of those investigations are along the southern border. Additionally, the FBI actively participates in 17 OCDETF Strike Forces across the United States, investigating major drug trafficking, money laundering, and other high priority transnational organized crime networks. On top of that, we are pursuing healthcare fraud investigations against medical professionals and pill mills through our prescription drug initiative, investigating the gangs and criminal groups responsible for distributing dangerous substances like fentanyl through our Safe Streets Task Forces, and disrupting and dismantling darknet marketplaces for prescription opioids and drugs like fentanyl through our Joint Criminal Opioid Darknet Enforcement team.

While the FBI continues to share intelligence about criminal groups with our partners and combines resources and expertise to gain a full understanding of each group, the threat of transnational crime remains a significant and growing threat to national and international security with implications for public safety, public health, democratic institutions, and economic stability across the globe. TOC groups increasingly exploit jurisdictional boundaries to conduct their criminal activities overseas. Furthermore, they are expanding their use of the darknet to engage in illegal activity, while exploiting emerging technology to traffic illicit drugs and contraband across international borders and into the United States.

Crimes Against Children and Human Trafficking

Every year, thousands of children become victims of crimes, whether it is through kidnappings, violent attacks, sexual abuse, human trafficking, or online predators. The FBI is uniquely positioned to provide a rapid, proactive, and comprehensive response. We help identify, locate, and recover child victims. Our strong relationships with federal, state, local, tribal, and international law enforcement partners also help to identify, prioritize, investigate, and deter individuals and criminal networks from exploiting children.

But the FBI’s ability to learn about and investigate child sexual exploitation is being threatened by the proliferation of sites online on the darknet. For example, currently, there are at least 30 child sexual abuse material sites operating openly and notoriously on the darknet. Some of these exploitative sites are exclusively dedicated to the sexual abuse of infants and toddlers. The sites often expand rapidly, with one site obtaining 200,000 new members within its first four weeks of operation.

Another growing area of concern involving the sexual exploitation of children is the explosion in incidents of children and teens being coerced into sending explicit images online and extorted for money—a crime known as financial sextortion. In 2022, law enforcement received over 7,000 reports related to the online financial sextortion of minors, resulting in at least 3,000 victims, primarily boys, and more than a dozen suicides. A large percentage of these sextortion schemes originate outside the United States, primarily in West African countries such as Nigeria and Ivory Coast. The FBI continues to collaborate with other law enforcement partners and the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children to mitigate this criminal activity, and provide the public with informational alerts and victim resources regarding these crimes.

The FBI has several programs in place to arrest child predators and to recover missing and endangered children. To this end, the FBI funds or participates in a variety of endeavors, including our Innocence Lost National Initiative, Innocent Images National Initiative, Operation Cross Country, Child Abduction Rapid Deployment Team, Victim Services, over 80 Child Exploitation and Human Trafficking Task Forces, over 50 International Violent Crimes Against Children Task Force officers, as well as numerous community outreach programs to educate parents and children about safety measures they can follow. Through improved communications, the FBI also has the ability to quickly collaborate with partners throughout the world, which plays an integral role in crime prevention.

The Child Abduction Rapid Deployment Team is a rapid-response team with experienced investigators strategically located across the country to quickly respond to child abductions. Investigators are able to provide a full array of investigative and technical resources during the most critical time period following the abduction of a child, such as the collection and analysis of DNA, impression, and trace evidence, the processing of digital forensic evidence, and interviewing expertise.

The FBI also focuses efforts to stop human trafficking of both children and adults. The FBI works collaboratively with law enforcement partners to disrupt all forms of human trafficking through Human Trafficking Task Forces nationwide. One way the FBI combats this pernicious crime problem is through investigations such as Operation Cross Country. Over a two-week period in 2022, the FBI, along with other federal, state, local, and tribal partners, executed approximately 400 operations to recover survivors of human trafficking and disrupt traffickers. These operations identified and located 84 minor victims of child sex trafficking and child sexual exploitation offenses, and located 37 actively missing children. Furthermore, the FBI and its partners located 141 adult victims of human trafficking. In addition to recovering victims, the law enforcement activity conducted during Operation Cross Country led to the identification and arrest of 85 suspects for child sexual exploitation or human trafficking offenses.

Although many victims of human trafficking recovered by the FBI are adult U.S. citizens, the FBI and its partners recognize that foreign nationals, children, and other vulnerable populations are disproportionately harmed by both sex and labor trafficking. We take a victim-centered, trauma-informed approach to investigating these cases and strive to ensure the needs of victims are fully addressed at all stages. To accomplish this, the FBI works in conjunction with other law enforcement agencies and victim specialists on the federal, state, local, and tribal levels, as well as with a variety of vetted non-governmental organizations. Even after the arrest and conviction of human traffickers, the FBI often continues to work with partner agencies and organizations to assist victims and survivors in moving beyond their exploitation.

Reauthorization of Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

Before closing, I would be remiss if I didn’t underscore an urgent legislative matter directly relevant to our discussion today. As the committee knows, at the end of December, Section 702 and other provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act will expire unless renewed.

Loss of this vital provision, or its reauthorization in a narrowed form, would raise profound risks. For the Bureau in particular, either outcome would mean substantially impairing, or in some cases entirely eliminating, our ability to find and disrupt many of most serious security threats I described earlier in my statement.

I am especially concerned about one frequently-discussed proposal, to require the government to obtain a warrant or court order from a judge before personnel may conduct a “U.S. person query” of information previously obtained through use of Section 702. A warrant requirement would amount to a de facto ban, because query applications either would not meet the legal standard to win court approval; or because, when the standard could be met, it would be so only after the expenditure of scarce resources, the submission and review of a lengthy legal filing, and the passage of significant time—which, in the world of rapidly evolving threats, the government often doesn’t have. That would be a body blow to the FBI, which relies on this longstanding, lawful capability to rapidly uncover previously hidden threats and connections, and to take swift steps to protect the homeland when needed.

To be sure, nobody more deeply shares Members’ concerns regarding past FBI compliance violations related to FISA, including the rules for querying Section 702 collection using U.S. person identifiers, than I do. These violations never should have happened and preventing recurrence is a matter of utmost priority. Fortunately, the administration’s initial response to these episodes was rigorous, and already has yielded significant results—in dramatically reducing the number of “U.S. person queries” by the FBI of the Section 702 database, and in substantially improving its compliance rate. Moreover, as we publicly announced last month, the Bureau is implementing further measures both to keep improving our compliance and to hold our personnel accountable for misuse of Section 702 and other FISA provisions—including through an escalating scheme for employee discipline, culminating in possible dismissal.

Together with other leaders of the Intelligence Community and the Department of Justice, I remain committed to working with this committee and others in Congress, on potential reforms to Section 702 that would not diminish its critical intelligence value. There are many options for meaningfully enhancing privacy and oversight, while fully preserving Section 702’s efficacy. Doing that will be critical, in order to ensure the FBI’s continuing ability to fulfill its mission of identifying and stopping national security threats within the U.S. homeland.

Conclusion

The strength of any organization is its people. The threats we face as a nation have never been greater or more diverse, and the expectations placed on the FBI have never been higher. Our fellow citizens look to the FBI to protect the United States from all of those threats, and the men and women of the FBI continue to meet and exceed those expectations, every day. I want to thank them for their dedicated service.

Chairman Jordan, Ranking Member Nadler, and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am happy to answer your questions.