Studies in Intelligence Vol.60, No.2 — Central Intelligence Agency

Source: Central Intelligence Agency CIA

Headline: Studies in Intelligence Vol.60, No.2 — Central Intelligence Agency

The Office of Public Affairs (OPA) is the single point of contact for all inquiries about the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

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Studies in Intelligence Vol.60, No.1 — Central Intelligence Agency

Source: Central Intelligence Agency CIA

Headline: Studies in Intelligence Vol.60, No.1 — Central Intelligence Agency

The Office of Public Affairs (OPA) is the single point of contact for all inquiries about the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

We read every letter, fax, or e-mail we receive, and we will convey your comments to CIA officials outside OPA as appropriate. However, with limited staff and resources, we simply cannot respond to all who write to us.


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  • If you have information which you believe might be of interest to the CIA in pursuit of the CIA’s foreign intelligence mission, you may use our e-mail form. We will carefully protect all information you provide, including your identity. The CIA, as a foreign intelligence agency, does not engage in US domestic law enforcement.
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Studies in Intelligence Vol.59, No.4 — Central Intelligence Agency

Source: Central Intelligence Agency CIA

Headline: Studies in Intelligence Vol.59, No.4 — Central Intelligence Agency

The Office of Public Affairs (OPA) is the single point of contact for all inquiries about the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

We read every letter, fax, or e-mail we receive, and we will convey your comments to CIA officials outside OPA as appropriate. However, with limited staff and resources, we simply cannot respond to all who write to us.


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Before contacting us:

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    Because of safety concerns for the prospective applicant, as well as security and communication issues, the CIA Recruitment Center does not accept resumes, nor can we return phone calls, e-mails or other forms of communication, from US citizens living outside of the US. When you return permanently to the US (not on vacation or leave), please visit the CIA Careers page and apply online for the position of interest.

    To verify an employee’s employment, please contact the Employment Verification Office.

  • Solicitations to transfer large sums of money to your bank account: If you receive a solicitation to transfer a large amount of money from an African nation to your bank account in exchange for a payment of millions of dollars, go to the US Secret Service Web site for information about the Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud or “4-1-9” Fraud scheme.
  • If you have information which you believe might be of interest to the CIA in pursuit of the CIA’s foreign intelligence mission, you may use our e-mail form. We will carefully protect all information you provide, including your identity. The CIA, as a foreign intelligence agency, does not engage in US domestic law enforcement.
  • If you have information relating to Iraq which you believe might be of interest to the US Government, please contact us through the Iraqi Rewards Program

Studies in Intelligence Vol.59, No.3 — Central Intelligence Agency

Source: Central Intelligence Agency CIA

Headline: Studies in Intelligence Vol.59, No.3 — Central Intelligence Agency

The Office of Public Affairs (OPA) is the single point of contact for all inquiries about the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

We read every letter, fax, or e-mail we receive, and we will convey your comments to CIA officials outside OPA as appropriate. However, with limited staff and resources, we simply cannot respond to all who write to us.


Contact Information

Submit questions or comments online

By postal mail:
Central Intelligence Agency
Office of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20505

By phone:
(703) 482-0623
Open during normal business hours.

By fax:
(571) 204-3800
(please include a phone number where we may call you)

Contact the Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties

Contact the Office of Inspector General

Contact the Employment Verification Office


Before contacting us:

  • Please check our site map, search feature, or our site navigation on the left to locate the information you seek. We do not routinely respond to questions for which answers are found within this Web site.
  • Employment: We do not routinely answer questions about employment beyond the information on this Web site, and we do not routinely answer inquiries about the status of job applications. Recruiting will contact applicants within 45 days if their qualifications meet our needs.

    Because of safety concerns for the prospective applicant, as well as security and communication issues, the CIA Recruitment Center does not accept resumes, nor can we return phone calls, e-mails or other forms of communication, from US citizens living outside of the US. When you return permanently to the US (not on vacation or leave), please visit the CIA Careers page and apply online for the position of interest.

    To verify an employee’s employment, please contact the Employment Verification Office.

  • Solicitations to transfer large sums of money to your bank account: If you receive a solicitation to transfer a large amount of money from an African nation to your bank account in exchange for a payment of millions of dollars, go to the US Secret Service Web site for information about the Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud or “4-1-9” Fraud scheme.
  • If you have information which you believe might be of interest to the CIA in pursuit of the CIA’s foreign intelligence mission, you may use our e-mail form. We will carefully protect all information you provide, including your identity. The CIA, as a foreign intelligence agency, does not engage in US domestic law enforcement.
  • If you have information relating to Iraq which you believe might be of interest to the US Government, please contact us through the Iraqi Rewards Program

Delivering Intelligence to Kennedy and Johnson — Central Intelligence Agency

Source: Central Intelligence Agency CIA

Headline: Delivering Intelligence to Kennedy and Johnson — Central Intelligence Agency

On September 16, 2015, the Agency released roughly 2,500 previously classified President’s Daily Briefs (PDBs) from the John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson administrations at a public symposium at the LBJ Presidential Library in Austin, TX, entitled The President’s Daily Brief: Delivering Intelligence to the First Customer. This 40-page color booklet describes the documents and the PDB process during this period.

The PDB contains intelligence analysis on key national security issues for the President and other senior policymakers. Only the President, the Vice President, and a select group of officials designated by the President receive the briefing, which represents the Intelligence Community’s best insights on issues the President must confront when dealing with threats as well as opportunities related to our national security.

For several years, CIA information management officers have worked with their counterparts at the National Security Council and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on the review and declassification of these documents. Roughly 80 percent of the collection has been declassified and is being made available to the public.

For a complete recap of the event, view the press release and Director Brennan’s remarks.

The document collection can be viewed on the CIA FOIA website at: http://www.foia.cia.gov. You can also view the related photographs on CIA’s Flickr page.

This collection was assembled as part of the CIA’s Historical Review Program, which identifies, reviews, and declassifies documents on historically significant events or topics. Previous releases can be viewed at: http://www.foia.cia.gov/historical-collections.

Romeo Spies — Central Intelligence Agency

Source: Central Intelligence Agency CIA

Headline: Romeo Spies — Central Intelligence Agency

Long before the traditions of Valentine’s Day sprang forth, spymasters worldwide used the amorous arts to obtain secrets from their enemies. Known in the trade as “honey traps,” rivals ensnarled their adversaries in this game of love, lure, and lies. One of the best known seductresses was Mata Hari, a Dutch exotic dancer convicted of spying for the Germans during WWI. She was accused of obtaining her intelligence by seducing prominent French politicians and officers. Just the mention of the word ‘temptress’ conjures up images of Cleopatra or Jezebel; rarely does it produce the image of Casanova. But men too have been used as honey traps to steal secrets.

After the end of World War II, the East German authorities constructed the Berlin Wall in 1961; dividing East Germany from West Germany. Neither side trusted the other and both were anxious to know what the other was conspiring. Because of the war, many women of marrying age had taken jobs in business, government, parliament, the military, and the intelligence services in West Germany, and they often had access to highly classified government secrets. With the shortage of eligible men—another consequence of the war—single West German women, eager for male companionship, became frequent targets for East German male spies who were only interested in them for one thing: secrets. These men from the East earned the nickname “Romeo Spies.”

The Man without a Face

Markus Wolf was the mastermind behind the East German Romeo Spies. Western officials referred to him as “the man without a face,” since they were unable to identify him for decades. Wolf was born in Germany but grew up in Moscow, where he learned the tradecraft of spying. He returned to Germany and at the age of 30 and became the chief of the foreign intelligence division of the Stasi, East Germany’s Ministry for State Security. His mission was to infiltrate West German political, military, and security institutions. His weapon of choice: men.

“Romeo, Romeo, Wherefore Art Thou Romeo?”

The idea of the Romeo spy developed out of practicality. Romeo spies were a cost-effective way to steal secrets. Wolf believed that one woman with the right access and motivation could provide more intelligence than 10 male diplomats. Of course, not just any man could be a Romeo spy. There was a rigorous screening process that weeded out 99 percent of the candidates. Of those chosen, most were between 25 and 35 years old, well educated, and had good old-fashioned manners, which many women found irresistible. The men selected for this program were trained in espionage and given false identities, typically of a deceased citizen or an immigrant. Then they were sent to West Germany with a specific espionage task to complete. Once there, they identified a potential “Juliet” who had access to the information they were after. They created a chance encounter, began an affair, and then propositioned the women to pass them secrets.  

Before being deployed to West Germany, however, Romeo spies were warned that they were prohibited from marrying their assets, even if they developed genuine feelings for them, which many of them did. The Romeo’s true identity and intentions would most likely be discovered: West German authorities conducted background investigations of anyone seeking marriage to an employee of the state who had access to classified material. Therefore, the Romeos had to insist that they were not the marrying type.

Juliets

The women the Romeos picked were all West German citizens. Many of them had upper-middle-class backgrounds and strong personalities. The majority were employed by the government when they were approached by a Romeo. The men did their homework and knew the likes, dislikes, and vulnerabilities of a particular Juliet prior to setting up a chance encounter. Despite an advertising campaign by the West warning women of these Stasi tactics, many Juliets fell hard for the good-mannered, well-intentioned young men claiming to work for humanitarian organizations.

Initially, most of the women were naive about the true intentions of their Romeos; however, more often than not, as the relationship developed, Juliet began to suspect that her Romeo was working for the other side. Most women were not shocked when they were asked to spy for their men (although this proposition almost always took place in a neutral country, outside West Germany, just in case the Juliet wasn’t receptive and the Romeo needed a quick escape).

While there were many women who terminated the relationship when asked to spy, by this point in the relationship, some women had fallen in love and agreed to spy to keep their affairs going; some relationships lasted for decades. For those women who fell in love with their Romeos, their espionage careers ended when the affairs did. Occasionally a “replacement” Romeo would be deployed, but she would typically not accept him. These women spied for their one true Romeo, and when that relationship ended, so did the espionage.

Other women agreed to spy for love as well, but not for the love of a Romeo. These women fell in love with the excitement of espionage: their Romeos were just part of the process. In this case, these women often would accept a replacement Romeo if the first vanished for security reasons.

Bad Hair Day

From time to time, a Romeo would go missing, captured by the West. For years, the East could not figure out how the West was identifying their men. Turns out it was their haircut. The Romeos all had short and tight cuts, while the young men in the West grew their hair long. When Western counterintelligence officers spotted a man with a short “do,” they would follow the suspect and arrest the Romeo at his first wrong move. 

Cupid Strikes

The Original Romeo: The very first Romeo—codenamed “Felix” by the East Germans—was an engineering student reluctant at first to abandon his studies for the pursuit of love, lies, and secrets. He was eventually persuaded and began work as a Romeo in the 1950s. He moved to West Germany, where he devised a plan to meet the ladies who worked at the chancellery. He hung around the bus stop, hoping to have a chance encounter with one of the secretaries. His plot was successful, and he struck up a relationship with a secretary the East Germans codenamed “Norma.” She fell for her Romeo and began passing him secrets from the chancellery. As fate would have it, Felix also fell for the secretary. They moved in together and began an affair that lasted for several years. Alas, their love was not to last. A mole let the East Germans know that Felix had fallen under suspicion. He was pulled East immediately. Norma came home one day after work to an empty apartment. She never learned his true identity or why he had disappeared without a trace.

The Rebound Romeo: Another unsuspecting Juliet, aged 32, met her Romeo in July 1977 on the banks of the Rhine River—it was love at first sight for the divorcee. Her Romeo was seven years her senior and played the part of a scientist employed by a research company devoted to world peace. The couple became engaged three months after meeting. This Juliet worked as a translator and interpreter at the American Embassy. She met her Romeo once a month and passed him thousands of secret documents, more than any other agent in her position. She was madly in love with him and never questioned him about what he did with the documents. Their relationship lasted for 12 years. In 1991, she and her Romeo were betrayed by a Stasi defector. Romeo later died when his car was hit by a train. In 1996, Juliet went on trial for espionage, during which she focused solely on finding out as much as she could about her true love, inquiring if he had, in fact, really loved her. She was given a two-year suspended sentence and fined. The presiding judge concluded her “blind adoration” for her Romeo had led her to spy.

The Super-Romeo: The East Germans referred to select Romeos as “Super-Romeos” for their conquests. One such man was an intelligent, attractive theater director. In 1961, he was sent to Paris, France, to approach an interpreter at NATO’s command center. Three other Romeos had tried and failed. The interpreter was a devoted Catholic who fell for Romeo number four, believing him to be a Danish military intelligence officer. She began passing him NATO secrets when he came to Paris to visit her. Eventually, though, her Catholic upbringing caught up with her, and she suffered from guilt about their affair and her espionage. She felt an overwhelming desire to confess her sins and to marry Romeo if their relationship was to continue. Romeo dodged the marriage requirement, blaming work. He did, however, arrange for an East German intelligence agent, disguised as a Danish-speaking Catholic priest, to hear her confession. Juliet confessed her sins to the “priest,” who absolved her from all wrongdoing and encouraged her to carry on spying with the blessings of the good Lord.

The Two-Timing Romeo: Some Romeos were lucky in love twice. Although not necessarily considered handsome, this Romeo was honest. He met his first Juliet in 1960 at the “secretaries’ sandpit” in Paris, so named by the East for the plethora of West German Government employees sent there to learn French. Romeo charmed his way into the heart of a 19-year-old secretary and revealed his true identity. Their relationship blossomed and continued for several years. At his suggestion, she transferred to the Bonn Foreign Office, where all telegrams from embassies abroad were deciphered. She would stuff the documents into her bag and walk out of the office to meet her Romeo. 

Five years later, she was transferred to Warsaw, where the long distance wreaked havoc on their affair. She began drinking heavily and then confided in an undercover Bonn agent disguised as a West German journalist. The agent convinced her to confess her crimes. She did, but first she warned her Romeo, giving him time to flee to East Berlin. The secretary was tried for espionage and received a three-year sentence, shorter than the usual because she had cooperated, disclosing details of her work with the East.

Romeo escaped and was sent to the Black Sea in Bulgaria to recover. While there, he met a potential Juliet—codenamed Inge by the East. He invented a cover story and introduced himself and began an affair. Unfortunately for him, an article in the newspaper revealed his true identity in connection with his previous Juliet’s spying. He was forced to come clean to Inge. She also appreciated his honesty, and the relationship continued. Since Romeo was persona non grata in the West, Inge had to travel to East Berlin on weekends. The East paid for her to learn French and stenography, and she was then able to land a post in the chancellery, where for several years she passed information about the internal workings of the leadership. Inge had a reputation as a hard-working secretary among her colleagues. Little did they know, she was staying late at night to photocopy and microfilm documents.

Inge was in love with her Romeo and wanted to marry him, so the East Germans staged a marriage. The couple said their vows, exchanged rings, and signed the marital register. It wasn’t until her arrest in 1977 that she found out the wedding was a hoax. She was tried for espionage and sentenced to four years and three months in prison.

The High-Achieving Romeo: This Romeo managed to seduce the most highly placed woman in West Germany’s foreign intelligence agency. They met in East Germany where she was working on her doctoral thesis. He was disguised as a mechanic. They spent the summer together, after which Romeo revealed his true identity. Juliet was fascinated. She returned to West Germany but went east every three months to receive espionage training and to meet her Romeo. The couple became engaged. In 1973, she began working as a political analyst for the West’s foreign intelligence agency. When no one was looking, she would microfilm documents and conceal them in fake deodorant bottles. Initially, she hid these bottles in the toilet tanks of trains traveling from Munich into East Germany. This was later deemed too risky and ineffective, so she instead met a female go-between at a Munich swimming pool and passed the information between their changing rooms. Juliet was in love, but not with her Romeo. She had fallen for the excitement of espionage.

In early 1990, the East realized that unification between East and West was inevitable, so they destroyed all documentation of their assets. Unfortunately for Juliet, a senior officer betrayed her identity to secure immunity for himself. She was arrested in 1990 as she crossed the Germany-Austria border for a final meeting with her handlers.

“Stop in the Name of Love”

Forty women were prosecuted in West Germany over the course of four decades during the Cold War for committing espionage. They may have been victims of Cupid’s arrow, but they were not entirely innocent. However, many hearts were broken, including those of several Romeos who truly loved their Juliets. Several couples endured the charade, fell genuinely in love, and went on to marry and start new lives.

Markus Wolf fled to Moscow when Germany reunified. Three years later, he surrendered at a rural border crossing in Bavaria. He was sentenced to six years in prison for treason, but the conviction was overturned on the grounds that East Germany had been a sovereign state for which he had been entitled to spy. The same was true for the Romeos, who were never convicted, although several were apprehended by the West prior to unification

“The ends did not always justify the means we chose to employ,” Wolf wrote in his autobiography, “but, as long as there is espionage, there will be Romeos seducing unsuspecting Juliets with access to secrets. After all, I was running an intelligence service, not a lonely-hearts club.”

Wolf died at the age of 83 on the 17th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Pompeo Testifies on Top Global Threats Facing US — Central Intelligence Agency

Source: Central Intelligence Agency CIA

Headline: Pompeo Testifies on Top Global Threats Facing US — Central Intelligence Agency

The Office of Public Affairs (OPA) is the single point of contact for all inquiries about the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

We read every letter, fax, or e-mail we receive, and we will convey your comments to CIA officials outside OPA as appropriate. However, with limited staff and resources, we simply cannot respond to all who write to us.


Contact Information

Submit questions or comments online

By postal mail:
Central Intelligence Agency
Office of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20505

By phone:
(703) 482-0623
Open during normal business hours.

By fax:
(571) 204-3800
(please include a phone number where we may call you)

Contact the Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties

Contact the Office of Inspector General

Contact the Employment Verification Office


Before contacting us:

  • Please check our site map, search feature, or our site navigation on the left to locate the information you seek. We do not routinely respond to questions for which answers are found within this Web site.
  • Employment: We do not routinely answer questions about employment beyond the information on this Web site, and we do not routinely answer inquiries about the status of job applications. Recruiting will contact applicants within 45 days if their qualifications meet our needs.

    Because of safety concerns for the prospective applicant, as well as security and communication issues, the CIA Recruitment Center does not accept resumes, nor can we return phone calls, e-mails or other forms of communication, from US citizens living outside of the US. When you return permanently to the US (not on vacation or leave), please visit the CIA Careers page and apply online for the position of interest.

    To verify an employee’s employment, please contact the Employment Verification Office.

  • Solicitations to transfer large sums of money to your bank account: If you receive a solicitation to transfer a large amount of money from an African nation to your bank account in exchange for a payment of millions of dollars, go to the US Secret Service Web site for information about the Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud or “4-1-9” Fraud scheme.
  • If you have information which you believe might be of interest to the CIA in pursuit of the CIA’s foreign intelligence mission, you may use our e-mail form. We will carefully protect all information you provide, including your identity. The CIA, as a foreign intelligence agency, does not engage in US domestic law enforcement.
  • If you have information relating to Iraq which you believe might be of interest to the US Government, please contact us through the Iraqi Rewards Program

Frank A. Darling — Central Intelligence Agency

Source: Central Intelligence Agency CIA

Headline: Frank A. Darling — Central Intelligence Agency

Remembering CIA’s Heroes: Frank A. Darling

This is part of our series about CIA employees who have made the ultimate sacrifice. Here we will look at the lives of the men and women who have died while serving their country.

Currently, there are 125 stars carved into the marble of the CIA Memorial Wall. The wall stands as a silent, simple memorial to those employees “who gave their lives in the service of their country.” The CIA has released the names of 91 employees; the names of the remaining 34 officers must remain secret, even in death.


Frank A. Darling, a five-year CIA employee, was known as a wise leader with the uncanny ability to solve complex problems while making it look easy. Although only at the Agency for a short time, he quickly rose through the ranks, and was often sought after for his technical expertise and thoughtful advice to fellow colleagues.

Frank was killed in January 1993 while on his way to work at CIA Headquarters. As Frank and his wife, Judy, sat in their car waiting for a traffic light to change so that they could enter through the main gate of the Agency compound, a gunman opened fire on the stopped cars. In the car adjacent to Frank’s, Dr. Lansing Bennett, an Agency medical officer, was also shot and killed. Three other people were wounded.

Early Years:

Frank Darling grew up in southeastern Pennsylvania, attending Council Rock High School in Newtown. He went on to graduate from Spring Garden College in Philadelphia with a Bachelor of Science in Electronics Engineering Technology in 1986.

During his school years, Frank enjoyed fishing, weightlifting, and tinkering with CB Radios. While in college, he worked as a part-time radio dispatcher for the local police department, answering emergency calls and preparing incident reports. He also worked part-time installing, maintaining, trouble-shooting, and repairing two-way radios and transmission tower sites for the county police and fire departments, and served as a volunteer fireman for the Northampton Township Fire Company, achieving the rank of Lieutenant.

Life at CIA:

Frank joined the Central Intelligence Agency in March 1987 as an electronic technician. Armed with a degree in Electronics Engineering Technology, and with computer and some software expertise, Frank made an immediate impression on his office colleagues with his ability to trouble-shoot and repair a broad range of technical equipment—most of which was Agency-specific and not familiar to him. His skills often matched those of Agency field engineers serving at considerably higher levels than he was.

Early in his career Frank was chosen as a team leader. His peers viewed him as an adviser, confidant, and leader—quite a feat for a relatively new employee. Later, managers recognized him for volunteering to draft and successfully authoring a complex satellite-tracking manual. The publication became a standard part of the operations package for that system.

In 1987, Frank was assigned overseas as an assistant field engineer. He served in Europe and the Middle East for four years. This was a perfect opportunity for him to showcase his excellent organizational and advanced technical skills as a project manager and team leader, updating and constructing Agency communications capabilities. A satellite installation project he worked on drew particular praise from both CIA Headquarters and the chief of station at the site. To the uninitiated, this major technical installation seemed to be a simple and seamless project. It was not.

As Frank continued his rapid development as a field engineer, Agency stations called frequently upon his impressive technical capabilities and problem-solving skills. He traveled and worked all over the globe.

His Final Mission:

In February 1991, Frank was assigned to CIA Headquarters as a Field Engineer. With the stability of a Headquarters assignment and, for the most part, his hectic temporary duty assignments completed for the foreseeable future, Frank got married and made plans to go back to school in pursuit of an advanced degree in electronics engineering.

On Monday, January 25, 1993, at around 8:00am, a number of cars had stopped temporarily in morning rush-hour traffic in the northbound, left-turn lanes on Route 123 at the main entrance to the Headquarters compound of the Central Intelligence Agency. The cars had stopped at the red light and were waiting to turn onto the Agency compound.

With the cars unable to move, a lone gunman emerged from another vehicle, which he had stopped behind the other cars. The gunman, armed with an AK-47 assault rifle, proceeded to move among the stopped vehicles, firing into them. Within seconds, Frank Darling and Dr. Bennett were killed and three others wounded, one gravely. Frank’s wife Judy, sitting beside him in the car, was uninjured. The gunman, a Pakistani national later identified as Aimal Kasi, fled the scene. In 1997, he was captured in Pakistan and returned to the US, where he was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death. Kasi was executed on November 14, 2002.

Frank A. Darling was 28 years old when he was killed. His wife, mother, and brother survived him. Frank was posthumously awarded the Agency’s Intelligence Commendation medal in recognition of his distinguished service to the Central Intelligence Agency.

On May 24, 2002, Agency officers dedicated the Route 123 Memorial to our two fallen colleagues. The Memorial is located on the west side of the Virginia Route 123 entrance (alongside the outbound right lane). It includes a walkway leading to a 9-foot by 3-foot granite wall. Benches dedicated to Frank Darling and Lansing Bennett face each other in front of the granite wall.

Dr. Lansing H. Bennett — Central Intelligence Agency

Source: Central Intelligence Agency CIA

Headline: Dr. Lansing H. Bennett — Central Intelligence Agency

This is part of our series about CIA employees who have made the ultimate sacrifice. Here we will look at the lives of the men and women who have died while serving their country.

Currently, there are 125 stars carved into the marble of the CIA Memorial Wall. The wall stands as a silent, simple memorial to those employees “who gave their lives in the service of their country.” The CIA has released the names of 91 employees; the names of the remaining 34 officers must remain secret, even in death.


Dr. Lansing Bennett, 1982

Dr. Lansing H. Bennett, a 13-year CIA employee, was frequently lauded by supervisors and colleagues throughout the Agency and Intelligence Community for his dedication, passion, and incredible perseverance in the medical field. Lansing often served in extremely difficult locations around the globe, and he was known as a consummate clinician. In addition to his military and Agency service, Lansing made outstanding contributions toward land conservation as well as public health in underserved communities.

Dr. Bennett was killed in January 1993 while on his way to work at CIA Headquarters. As Lansing and other Agency employees sat in their cars waiting for a traffic light to change so that they could enter through the main gate of the Agency compound, a gunman opened fire on the stopped cars. In the car adjacent to Lansing’s, Frank Darling, an Agency communications officer, was also shot and killed. Three other people were wounded.

Early Years:

Lansing Bennett was born in Poughkeepsie, New York, and moved with his family to Merchantville, New Jersey, where he attended his first 10 years of public school. He then attended the Mercersburg, Pennsylvania Academy, where he participated in sports, literary clubs, and the school newspaper. He graduated cum laude from Mercersburg in 1944. While in high school he had summer jobs at ranches in Idaho and Utah.

Lansing entered Princeton University in June 1944, in the pre-med program. That December he volunteered for the US Marine Corps and took basic training at Parris Island. As a Marine he served at Camps Lejeune and Pendleton and spent 13 months in Guam. After his discharge, he became a Marine Corps reservist.

Lansing returned to Princeton in September 1946, graduating in June 1949, cum laude, with a BA in Biology. He was recalled by the Marine Corps to serve during the Korean War, but instead joined the Navy, accepting a commission as a Navy ensign.

Lansing entered Jefferson Medical College in Philadelphia in September 1950 and graduated in 1953 with a degree in medicine.

From Military to Medicine:

Armed with his newly minted medical degree and Naval reserve status as an ensign, Dr. Bennett served on active duty as an intern in 1953-1954 at the US Naval Hospital in Chelsea, Massachusetts. He finished first in his class and was promoted to Lieutenant in the Naval Medical Corps reserve.

Starting in November 1954, Lansing ran a general medical practice, for two years in Topsfield, then he did the same for 23 years in Duxbury, Massachusetts. His practice included general medicine with substantial cardiopulmonary emphasis, surgical assistance, pediatrics, gynecology, and for a relatively brief time, obstetrics.

Dr. Bennett also developed skills in emergency medicine and underwater medicine. He was a member of the Undersea Medical Society for several years, and he had a strong interest in diving medicine both as a certified diver and physician.

He also enjoyed sailing his frostbite dinghy for winter sailing and his 38-foot yawl along the coast of Maine. In addition, Lansing was an excellent skier, swimmer, amateur archeologist and numismatist (collector of coin and paper currency).

Dr. Bennett’s strong interest in patient care was reflected in his volunteer stints at St. Jude’s Hospital in St. Lucia, West Indies, the US Public Health Indian Hospital in Winslow, Arizona, and the Darbonne Mission in Haiti, where he taught himself the basics of Creole language.

In the 1960s and ’70s, Dr. Bennett served as Chairman of the Duxbury Conservation Commission and secured more than 1,200 acres of conservation land and the passage of the Duxbury Wetlands Protection Bylaw. In honor of his outstanding achievement, 344 acres were dedicated as the Lansing Bennett Forest.

Life at CIA:

After responding to an ad placed by the Agency in a medical journal, Dr. Bennett joined the Central Intelligence Agency in January 1980 as a Medical Officer in the CIA’s Office of Medical Services (OMS).

At the time that his application with the Agency was pending, the US Air Force was also pursuing him, offering him a commission as a Lt. Colonel in the medical corps with a possible first assignment to the United Kingdom. This arrangement was attractive to Dr. Bennett, especially when considering the positive effect of his previous military service on his Air Force salary.

It was nip-and-tuck as to which organization he would select.

He chose to join the Agency’s Office of Medical Services. Friends said he based his decision on the wide variety of overseas assignment opportunities he envisioned in the Agency and the intrigue of providing medical support to operations.

After a brief period of training and orientation, Dr. Bennett’s first assignment with OMS was in 1980 as the Regional Medical Officer (RMO) for Asia. His first wife traveled with him.

In this position he was responsible for providing medical care to CIA, some military, and some state department employees and their dependents throughout the region.

During his tour, the White House officially commended Dr. Bennett for his planning and medical support for a visit to the region by then-President Reagan. Upon completion of his tour of duty, Lansing served a two-year tour as regional medical officer in Europe.

Back at Headquarters:

In the fall of 1986, following his overseas tours, Dr. Bennett returned to CIA Headquarters. This was a busy period for both OMS and Dr. Bennett. During his first year back at HQs, Lansing was frequently away on temporary duty assignments overseas, including two stays in Africa: hardship posts where he filled in for Agency doctors who were away for extended periods.

During his time as a staff physician, Dr. Bennett handled a large patient load with a taxing array of complicated clinical problems. These challenges included dealing with emergency situations, medical evacuations from overseas posts, and assessing employees’ fitness for duty and medical disability retirement assessments. He also participated in special studies and projects. For example, he researched and wrote an extensive medical newsletter on mammography, as well as one on AIDS that drew praise from the DCI. The AIDS newsletter was considered by many who read it, including top medical professionals, to be one of the most comprehensive and effective documents on the subject of HIV infection and AIDS.

With the Agency’s core management courses under his belt, Dr. Bennett assumed the responsibilities of a branch chief starting in 1988. Among his notable accomplishments during this period was his leadership role in an ongoing examination of how best to deliver and integrate medical and psychological services to the Agency population. Lansing also developed comprehensive proposals for revamping the Agency’s periodic health examination system and the Agency’s policies for granting overseas medical clearances.

Abroad Again:

Dr. Bennett began a two-year tour in September 1989 as the regional medical officer in South America. He spent more than one-third of his time “medical-circuit-traveling.” Also noteworthy during this assignment was a trip to the heart of the Amazon jungle—an area of worldwide environmental attention and concern—where he assessed several medical facilities in anticipation of visits by high-level US Government personnel.

During his many overseas assignments, Lansing was repeatedly lauded by chiefs of station for his exceptional medical support, which was oftentimes extremely complicated and dangerous. Dr. Bennett’s OMS colleagues characterized him as a consummate clinician and praised his tireless research and writing on—and advocacy of—health promotion policies.

His Final Mission:

Lansing returned to the United States from South America in the fall of 1991. He was assigned to the VIP Medical Division in the Directorate of Intelligence (now the Directorate of Analysis), where, as a medical officer-analyst, he applied his extensive medical experience to writing assessments on key international leaders.

On Monday, January 25, 1993, at about 8:00am, a number of cars had stopped temporarily because of morning rush-hour traffic in the northbound, left-turn lanes on Route 123 at the main entrance to the Headquarters compound of the CIA. The cars had stopped at the red light and were waiting to turn onto the Agency compound.

With traffic unable to move, a lone gunman emerged from another vehicle, which he had stopped behind the other cars. The gunman, armed with an AK-47 assault rifle, proceeded to move among the stopped vehicles, firing into them. Within seconds, Dr. Lansing Bennett and Frank Darling were killed and three others were wounded, one gravely. The gunman, a Pakistani national later identified as Aimal Kasi, fled the scene. In 1997, he was captured in Pakistan and returned to the US, where he was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death. Kasi was executed on November 14, 2002.

Honoring His Service:

Dr. Lansing H. Bennett was 66 years old when he was killed. He was survived by his second wife, his first wife, and four children. Lansing was posthumously awarded the Agency’s Intelligence Commendation Medal in recognition of his distinguished service to the Central Intelligence Agency.

On May 24, 2002, Agency officers dedicated the Route 123 Memorial to our two fallen colleagues. The Memorial is located on the west side of the Virginia Route 123 entrance (alongside the outbound right lane). It includes a walkway leading to a 9-foot by 3-foot granite wall. Benches dedicated to Lansing Bennett and Frank Darling face each other in front of the granite wall.

CIA Director Marks One-Year Anniversary in Public Address at American Enterprise Institute — Central Intelligence Agency

Source: Central Intelligence Agency CIA

Headline: CIA Director Marks One-Year Anniversary in Public Address at American Enterprise Institute — Central Intelligence Agency

26 January 2018


Exactly one year into his tenure at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Director Mike Pompeo took the stage at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) to reflect on his first year leading the Agency and discuss hot topics with AEI Resident Fellow Marc Theissen.

In his remarks to nearly 200 AEI members and guests, Director Pompeo highlighted his approach to leading the Agency and his strong belief that the CIA workforce should be positioned to execute our mission free from unnecessary obstacles and overbearing bureaucracy.

One way he’s been able to achieve this goal is by encouraging decisions be made by the experts. “If [the decision] had significant risk– cost, political, military risk to lives of officers – that’s [an] important [decision] for the Director to [make]… but if it’s just coming to me because I was the next fellow in the chain of command – then that’s a mistake because I would inevitably slow it down and I would not be in a position to add any value to that decision making process,” Pompeo said.

Looking ahead to 2018, Director Pompeo highlighted his plans to continue empowering the men and women of CIA to be agile, creative, speedy, and adaptable while ensuring that we preserve the American people’s trust. “That trust that the American people have provided to us [is] central to us achieving our mission.” Pompeo said.

Director Pompeo’s remarks were followed by a moderated discussion with Mr. Theissen covering a range of topics including President Trump’s daily engagement with the intelligence community, the pending threat of North Korea, and how Director Pompeo will position the Agency to take calculated risks to defeat America’s adversaries.

Director Pompeo’s remarks can be seen here or by clicking the video below.

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